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Abstract 
This dissertation is a theoretically grounded empirical study aimed at shedding light on 
the multiple dimensions of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy of 
engaging North Korea. It questions the ontological viability of conventional strategies 
and theories of engagement and produces a framework of comprehensi ve engagement 
based on realist, liberal and, most importantly, constructivist approaches. The study 
focuses on identifying the new tools of engagement employed by South Korea's policy 
elites, who created a social environment for South Koreans' shift of identities vis-a-vis 
North Korea in the course of implementing this engagement policy. To support the 
thesis of a momentous shift in identities as a result of the Sunshine Policy, this study 
uses a wide range of interviews with policy e,lites and sets of opinion polls published by 
news organizations and government agencies, while at the same time analyzing the 
policy from a theoretical and historical perspective. 
In order to provide concrete evidence of the identity shift, this dissertation 
analyzes three major policy issues during the Kim administration: North Korea's 
improvement of diplomatic relations with Western powers; the Hyundai Business 
Group's Mt. Kumgang tourism project and its link to the inter-Korean summit in June 
2000; and North Korea's revelation of a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002. 
The key research findings of this study are as follows: first, the Sunshine Policy, 
implemented by South Korea's policy elites, who projected North Korea as a 'partner' 
or a 'brother', enabled a majority of South Koreans to develop positive identification 
with the South's enemy, as defined by the National Security Law; second, the policy 
played a significant role in preventing crises and maintaining the political status quo on 
the Korean Peninsula; and third, the policy laid the groundwork for a new era of inter-
Korean economic cooperation and integration. 
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Chapter One. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
To place the Sunshine Policy, the brainchild of President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), 
into a certain category of policies is not an easy job in view of its diverse dimensions 
and conflicting interpretations in both the policy and academic communities. I 
Nevertheless, this dissertation will draw on 'identity politics' as a way to analyze the 
origins of the Nobel Peace Prize winner's policy,2 while building on strategies of 
'engagement' to capture a more nuanced and complete picture. By doing so, this study 
does not rule out or play down power politics or the power politics side of the policy. 
Power politics has long been a catchword in the discourse of International Relations 
OR), partly because the discipline had nurtured itself in the historical conditions of the 
Cold War, during which state identities were well reflected in the formation of alliances 
and rivalries. However, the Soviet Union's voluntary retreat from eastern Europe, an 
historic event that closed one chapter of humankind's turbulent history in a peaceful 
manner, made many IR scholars divert their attention away from Cold War issues of 
conflict towards elucidating the underlying reasons for the end of the Cold War. In spite 
of the dominance of realist and liberal approaches, a group of scholars have started 
offering an alternative analytical framework by explaining the momentous shift of 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies from the perspectives of ideas and 
identities vis-a-vis the West.3 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc unravelled the past's tightly-woven state 
I The term, 'sunshine', is derived from an Aesop fable in which sunshine triumphed over wind in a test to 
see who could induce a traveller to take off his thick coat. Moon (1999: 37) called the policy a 'OJ (Dae-
jung) Doctrine', arguing the term 'sunshine' fails to capture the comprehensive nature of the policy, since 
it ignores its security dimensions. Other scholars have highlighted the policy's emphasis on integration or 
umlil:ation (Kim and Yoon 1999; Ku 2000; Park M.L. 2000; Lee H.Y. 2000; Kwak 2(02). engagement 
(Park K. Y. 2000,2001; Ha 2000; Paik H.S. 2(00) and peace and security (Kim K.Y. 2000, 2002; Kim 
K.N. 2002; Levin and Han 2(02). 
1 Identity politics embodies the idea that some groups in society are vulnerable to oppression and 
marginalization by the dominant identity groups with vested interests (Young 1990). Grant (2000: 631) 
argues that 'identity politics can be characterized as a political movement sustained by minority agency: 
the determination to convert structural disenfranchisement into a means of claiming cultural and political 
power for historically marginalized groups'. As a form of identity politics, President Kim's Sunshine 
Policy sought to put an end to the mainstreamers' oppression of the minority groups identifying North 
Korea positively, thus empowering them to contest the established identities of South Koreans vis-it-vis 
North Korea and fostering the society's collective identity shifts as part of strategies of engagement with 
the legally defined enemy state. See Appendix II for the legal basis of viewing North Korea as an enemy, 
as stated in the National Security Law. 
3 See Lebow (1994); Risse-Kappen (1994); Neumann (1995); Katzenstein (I 996a); Herman (1996); and 
Checkel (1993; 1997; 1998a). 
relations, prompting many states, mostly from the former Communist bloc, to search for 
new Idenllties, since their conventional identities vis-a-vis the Western world became 
obsolete as a means to serve their interests after the abrupt end of the East-West divide. 
At the tum of the 21 s1 century, a number of states from eastern Europe underwent or 
were undergoing identity shifts in a desperate effort to join the European Union (EU), a 
club of capitalist states that once lay the other side of the Berlin Wall. In Asia, Vietnam 
could be singled out as a model case of identity shifts, given the fact that it established 
diplomatic ties with the United States. shedding the legacies of the Vietnam War, and 
joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless, a few states 
were left behind in a labyrinth of frustration and dilemma over what course of action 
they should take to ensure their survival and, undoubtedly, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea or the North) was one 
of them. The crisis in the North Korean state has not merely resulted from the failure of 
its socialist command economy, but also from a crisis of state identity, which was not of 
its own making.4 Since identities are formed in an endless cycle of interactions between 
self and other. the presence of the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereafter South Korea or 
the South) across the narrow strip of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as an archrival 
competing for hegemony on a relatively small land mass, called the Korean Peninsula, 
has been a prime factor affecting North Korea's identity formation. 
In fact, identity crisis has been a shared problem of the Korean nation as a 
collectivity exposed to a new post-Cold War situation. Like in North Korea, the end of 
the Cold War ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion and uncertainty in South 
Korea over whether to define North Korea as a friend or a foe. In this intense public 
discourse between groups with contesting identities vis-a-vis North Korea, a series of 
policies were launched by Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) and Kim Young-sam 
(1993-8), exhibiting inconsistencies and fanning the further polarization of public 
opinion. Brushing aside this never-ending debate in South Korea's public sphere, 
President Kim Dae-jung, who took office in February 1998, embarked on his own 
policy agenda in the name of the Sunshine Policy. Most of all, President Kim 
strengthened those South Korean domestic groups that positively identified with North 
Korea and opened the way for ordinary people to bandwagon with them. This identity 
politics, targeting both North and South Koreans, emerged in the shadow of power 
politics, whose feasibility was in question especially when the target state was viewed 
as a bankrupt, but heavily armed, state finding itself in the centre of the world's 
4 For a debate on stale identity and security. see Katzenstein (J996a) and Chafez, Spirtas and Frankel 
(1999). 
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economic powerhouses. 
Throughout history, one of the fundamental projects, undertaken by a state, is 
how to define its own identity vis-a-vis its neighbours, since it is the first thing to 
consider when it enters an alliance with them or decides to balance against them. 
However, it is not easy to label a state as a friend or a foe, since identities are elusive 
and transitional. Animosity seldom lasts hundreds of years in state-to-state relations. In 
many cases, it lives short officially, but lurks in human emotions or collective memories, 
camouflaged under the veneer of overt friendship, as seen in the relationship between 
such neighbouring countries as Japan and its former colonial victim, South Korea. In the 
world of realpolitik, yesterday's enemy could change overnight to become today's 
friend. Nevertheless, an intense sense of animosity, shared by a majority of South 
Koreans vis-a-vis North Korea during the decades-long Cold War confrontation, did not 
fade away even after the end of the Cold War, restricting the options of policy elites 
when they tried to introduce strategies of engagement. 
In the face of this policy quagmire, President Kim endeavoured to create a 
positive dynamics in inter-Korean relations as both a guarantee of fledgling economic 
integration and a kind of safety net that would permit the gradual removal of persistent 
problems, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes. Most of all, North and 
South Korea entered into a phase of unprecedented interactions, which contributed to 
the whittling away of an acute sense of animosity among a growing number of South 
Koreans positively exposed to these new developments. Though weakened, there was 
still a bastion of anti-Communist forces intact in South Korea, along with laws and 
regulations enforcing the conventional rules of the game.5 The Sunshine Policy, as an 
expression of identity politics, was subject to a fierce debate between groups with 
competing identities vis-a-vis North Korea, especially when North Korea showed signs 
of violating international norms. When the Kim administration strove to justify its 
policy by articulating redefined national interests on the basis of emerging identities vis-
a-vis North Korea, political actors in the opposition camp struggled to contest state 
policies and maintain their established privileges and vested interests deriving from 
Cold War identities and logics. However, the growing nationalist sentiment, nurtured by 
the Kim administration in the post-Cold War situation, could maintain a momentum, 
even at difficult moments when the positive interactions between the two official 
enemies were not welcomed by neighbouring powers and a large number of domestic 
~ The National Security Law. enacted in December 1948 and still in force in 2004. is regarded as one of 
the mo!>l drawman law!> aimed at penalizing pro-North Korean movements in South Korea. See Appendix 
II. 
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consti tuents. 
With the domestic opponents of new identity groups waging 'ideological 
warfare' and foreign powers intervening in inter-Korean interactions, the process of 
South Koreans' identity shifts was a road strewn with stumbling blocks and landmines. 
The old guard, which enjoyed privileges under the established system, never yielded 
voluntarily to the emerging forces with new identities vis-a-vis North Korea. In times of 
momentous change, the conventional logic, conceived in the strategic and emotional 
setting of the past. was still valid in many senses. Therefore, state policy elites with new 
identities were required to launch strenuous efforts to imbue the domestic public with 
new information and perspectives on the changing realities, on the one hand, while 
endeavouring to bring about the enemy's behavioural and attitudinal changes, on the 
other. In the fields of diplomacy and national security, South Korea's changing identities 
emerged as direct obstacles to the time-honoured alliance with the United States (US). 
South Korea and the United States are treaty allies, which means that they are ready to 
share the same fate in times of war and peace. For South Koreans, however, President 
George W. Bush's administration (2001- ) was increasingly seen as posing a greater 
threat than their legal enemy, North Korea, particularly if it had attacked what it called 
part of the 'axis of evil' and unleashed an uncountable amount of human and property 
losses. In this new strategic calculation, it was rational for South Korean policy elites to 
play the role of the devil 's advocate rather than a faithful ally. 
It is still to be seen whether these two enemies can move to forge a pan-national 
community, which was once unimaginable between them. In spite of the uncertainty of 
the future course of the Korean nation, this study seeks to analyze the Sunshine Policy, 
highlighting the process in which South Korea's national interests and identities vis-a-
vis North Korea have been reconfigured in order to engage the enemy state. In particular, 
this dissertation places primary emphasis on elucidating how the government and social 
forces embodying new identities could nurture a collective identity shift by mobilizing 
various strategies and tactics. 
2. Research Questions and Objectives 
The aim of this dissertation is to produce a model of comprehensi ve engagement vis-a-
vis an enemy state that can be used to analyze empirically the Sunshine Policy as an 
engagement policy. To successfully elucidate the role of the Kim administration in 
promoting new identities and attendant norms, this research will first raise two 
fundamental questions: vertical and horizontal. By vertical, this thesis means to explore 
where to situate the Sunshine Policy historically among a multitude of different 
4 
initiatives and policies carned out by successive South Korean governments vis-a-vis 
North Korea along a long spectrum of national division. By horizontal, this research 
means to analyze what policy options were available to the Kim administration at a 
particular historical juncture. 
More specifically, the first question focuses on the historical context in which 
the Kim administration exercised entrepreneurship to reconstitute state identities in a 
process of launching strategies of engagement. In the course of answering this question, 
this research seeks to uncover the necessary conditions for the successful revamping of 
state identities. To call a state an enemy or a friend, it is indispensable to take into 
account personal emotions. collective memories, state policies and regulations, and 
most imponantly the interactions taking place with the potential to create identity shifts. 
Therefore, altering state images or identities accompanies an unprecedented level of 
poJicymakers' personal devotion, structural shifts, or acute crises and, sometimes, all of 
them. This study investigates whether the social setting was ripe for the implementation 
of the Sunshine Policy and the alteration of South Koreans' identities vis-a-vis North 
Korea. 
The first question leads to a more strategic second question that centres on 
identifying the theoretical and empirical framework of the Sunshine Policy as a 
particular type of engagement policy. Even in the confusion of the post-Cold War world, 
the paramount mission of each state is how to keep its own people safe from a wide 
range of threats emanating from the international structure or individual states seeking 
to alter the status quo. Nevertheless, a state's blind pursuit of security-first policies, in 
the absence of a strategic reformulation of national interests and state identities, runs the 
risk of yielding more threats, thus undermining the very foundation of its own security. 
Traditionally, strategies of engagement have been defined as a mix of incentives and 
punishments to ameliorate the behaviour of enemy states (Litwak 2000). However, 
history tells us that these strategies do not necessarily result in the behavioural change 
of the target states and improvement of the bilateral relationship in the foreseeable 
future. Even in the case of relatively successful strategies, the use of coercive tactics, 
including economic sanctions, accompanied far-reaching civilian suffering and the 
devastation of the target states. These shoncomings of the existing strategies of 
engagement lead to this dissertation's central argument; namely, that an innovative 
approach is in demand in dealing with those states, even though such an approach could 
be subject to criticism by opponents for being no more than 'appeasement'. Sir Winston 
Churchill's remarks, made on 14 December 1950 in the House of Commons (quoted in 
Morgenthau 1948: 66-7), offers a clue to discriminating between 'appeasement from 
5 
strength' and 'appeasement from weakness': 
Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. 
Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement 
from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps 
the only path to world peace. 
Even though the Sunshine Policy was criticized for being an appeasement policy, 
it could be rather defined as what Churchill referred to above as 'appeasement from 
strength'. Morgenthau (1948: 64) noted that appeasement is a foreign policy that 
attempts to deal with an imperialistic state with methods appropriate to the policy of the 
status quo. In this sense, the criticism of the Sunshine Policy as an appeasement policy 
does not take into account the subtle differences pointed to by Churchill and 
Morgenthau. since North Korea was hardly an imperialistic state by any account. Taking 
into consideration the criticism of the Sunshine Policy as an appeasement policy, this 
dissertation will add a new dimension to the conventional understanding of strategies of 
engagement, thus making it possible to analyze the policy in the wider context of 
'comprehensive engagement'. 
3. Hypotheses 
In an attempt to answer the second question relating to the theoretical and empirical 
framework of the Sunshine Policy, this dissertation requires a conceptualization of the 
policy based on three hypotheses: first, that the Sunshine Policy was premised on the 
belief that a state's identity shifts vis-a-vis an enemy state are possible, at least to some 
extent, if policy elites make consistent efforts; second, that the Sunshine Policy is a 
status quo policy; and third, that the Sunshine Policy is an integration policy. 
In connection with the first hypothesis, there is some disagreement over whether 
a government is capable of modifying or switching existing norms based on a given 
identity. Posner and Rasmusen (1999) argue that a norm is usually regarded as 
something that cannot be altered arbitrarily by the government to meet its policy 
preferences. while liberal norm scholars, such as Sunstein (1997), alert us to the 
entrepreneurship of an activist government in transforming social norms on a national 
scale.6 This thesis adopts Sunstein's approach in the belief that a government's efforts 
to change norms deriving from a given identity are an indispensable part of strategies of 
6 For a debate on norms. see the excellent journalistic review in The New Yorker. 20-27 October 1997: 
170-81. 
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comprehensive engagement. Sunstein (ibid: 19) argues that a state system might lose a 
golden opportunity for social improvement if it makes future political choices only on 
the basis of existing preferences and norms. His ideas are rooted in the belief that it is 
justifiable for state policy elites to intervene and engage in 'norm management' for 
public interests because individuals have been given only limited access to information 
and are supposed to follow existing social norms and institutions, shaped partly by the 
government (ibid: 34). 
To test the second and third hypotheses that the Sunshine Policy is a status quo 
policy and. at the same time. an integration policy, this dissertation puts forward a fresh 
characterization of the conventional understanding of the status quo and integration, 
since the two statements appear incompatible with each other. In particular, it needs to 
elaborate on the scope of the status quo and integration, as envisioned by the Sunshine 
Policy. 
A debate on the status quo traditionally belongs to the sphere of political realism, 
which seeks to explain international affairs based on state-centric perspectives. In a 
realist definition. the status quo literally means the existing state of affairs, while status 
quo states or status quo powers refers to those states stri vi ng to retai n their existi ng 
privileges or resources against any forces attempting to alter the present situation 
(Morgenthau 1948: 40). Therefore, they are categorized as high-status actors determined 
to suppress or ignore low-status actors or issues jeopardizing the current distribution of 
power in their favour. In this vein, high-status actors are those which have already made 
a major investment in the existing structure (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 153). As the 
fear of a possible loss of position or resources arouses more powerful emotions than the 
prospect of gaining something new in the logic of the realists, state actors are all out to 
retain their established status. 
Given its economic difficulties and collapsing security alliances with China and 
Russia after the end of the Cold War, North Korea was destined to become a revisionist 
state seeking to shatter the prevailing post-Cold War status quo unfavourable to it. In 
fact. North Korea had attempted to revise the status quo by exploring the possibility of 
normalizing diplomatic ties with the United States and other Western states and 
experimenting with the capitalist mode of production. However, the lack of progress in 
its diplomatic and economic initiatives forced it to resort to the development of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to ensure self-protection (Noland 2000). 
Nevertheless. the WMD programmes became another source of insecurity for North 
Korea since they invited repeated threats of pre-emptive strikes from the United States, 
enforcing the international non-proliferation regime. 
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With North Korea muddling through in an increasingly hostile international 
environment, President Kim needed to declare two principles in managing inter-Korean 
relations: the status quo and integration. To signal his adherence to the political status 
quo on the Korean Peninsula, President Kim declared that South Korea would not unify 
the peninsula by the absorption of North Korea, but help it to improve relations with the 
international community. His policy, in short, means South Korea's graduation from the 
relative gains dilemma, preached by neo-realists, as it was ready to accept the relative 
costs of the status quo as the cost of peace. While alleviating its security dilemma and 
upholding the principle of the political status quo, the Kim administration endeavoured 
to induce North Korea to divert its revisionist zeal to its resocialization into the 
international community and economic reconstruction.7 
In sum, this thesis, contending that the dichotomy between the status quo and 
revisionist options for a state is unfruitful, sets out a new proposition that revision is 
realizable through the status quo and the status quo is possible through revision. As a 
revisionist or imperialist course taken by a state out of territorial, political or economic 
ambitions incurs enormous human and property losses in the contemporary world of 
close interdependence, this study seeks to offer an alternative option in which the target 
state's economic integration with the rest of the world could be realizable on the sound 
foundation of the territorial and political status quo. Moon (1999: 40) calls it 'a 
simultaneous pursuit of engagement and security', while Park Kun-young (2000: 56) 
described it as a 'two-track approach'. Therefore, such a status quo policy as posited by 
this dissertation does not seek to freeze the situation completely, but aims to prevent the 
regression into the Hobbesian logic of the 'struggle of all against all' in order to 
maintain the Lockean culture, which is the predominant face of today's status quo world 
composed of rival states.s Meanwhile, integration, pursued by the Sunshine Policy as 
an engagement policy, refers to an inter-Korean economic and social integration short of 
political unity. 
4. Approach, Methodology and Contribution 
This research uses a theoretically grounded empirical approach to explore the diverse 
dimensions of the Sunshine Policy and offer a conceptual framework for comprehensive 
engagement. In fact, the Sunshine Policy is an outgrowth of time-honoured philosophies 
and strategies of engagement employed to transform an enemy state into a responsible 
7 This dissertation favours the term, 'resocialization'. instead of 'socialization', since North Korea was 
once a vibrant economy and an active player in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). See Chapter Four. 
• For a further debate on the Hobbesian and Lockean structures, see Wendt ( 1999) and Wight ( 1977; 
1991). 
8 
member of the international community. However, the existing studies on the Sunshine 
Policy fall short of capturing the policy in its entirety, since their theoretical grounding 
and analytical frameworks have been narrowly conceived to elucidate mainly the 
political and economic dimensions of the policy, thus playing down the social 
dimension of developments unfolding before and during President Kim's five-year 
tenure. 
The Western and South Korean scholarship has been heavily biased in favour of 
theories and approaches developed by the realist and liberal schools, reflecting the Cold 
War template lingering on the Korean Peninsula. Based on the proposition that the 
international system is anarchy without the presence of overarching authority, realism 
injected an acute sense of fear and threats to the South Korean policy-making process, 
forcing state policy elites to put priority on national security and act in a tit-for-tat 
manner against North Korea's provocations. 9 Meanwhile, liberalism spawned 
unrealistic images and agreements in inter-Korean relations, while its traditional ideal of 
liberal democracy led to the intolerance of an authoritarian state, like North Korea, and 
the mobilization of coerci ve measures, such as economic sanctions. 10 
Analyzing the Sunshine Policy, some realists and liberals reached rather 
premature conclusion that the policy, despite the leadership's good will, failed to 
achieve its goal of transforming North Korea's behaviour in view of the resurgence of 
the nuclear weapons problem in October 2002. or was bogged down in the cash-for-
summit scandal. eroding the morality of the Kim administration. I I Meanwhile, Moon 
(1999: 200 1: 2002) approaches the Sunshine Policy in a balanced manner to explain the 
diverse dimensions of the policy, but still lacks a framework of analysis that could be 
subject to rigorous empirical tests. 
This dissertation reinvestigates the various dimensions of North Korea's highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) programme. the cash-for-summit scandal, and other cases as a 
study of the Sunshine Policy from the perspectives of constructivism, which puts 
emphasis on identities and norms. Such a study has not been carried out before. 
Nevertheless. this research does not aim to maintain theoretical purity, but rather draws 
'/ ChOlpter Two Will re\lew realist. liberal and constructivist approaches. 
10 For a further debate on 'democratic peace' and contlicts between liberal democracy and authoritarian 
states. see Doyle (1986). The shortcomings of liberals are well illustrated in this New York Times (18 
February 2(03) column as follows: 'The bIg problem with liberals in international affairs is that ever 
since Woodrow Wilson. they've been 100 idealistic. Liberals hamstrung the C.I.A (thUS impairing 
intelligence collection). scorned the military (undermining a humanitarian force in places like Bosnia and 
Afghanistan). campaIgned against sweatshops in Bangladesh and Cambodia (forcing teenage girls out of 
manufacturing JObs and into the sex industry). and imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar (destroying 
the mIddle class and propping up military dictators),. 
II See LevlO and Han (2002); ¥oo (2003); and Kim Sung-han (2003a; 2003b). 
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on necessary analytical tools from both realism and liberalism, which are indispensable 
to formulate strategies of engagement. In the process, this study answers the question of 
whether the Sunshine Policy, a unique blend of various policy tools on hand, helped 
South Koreans to collectively shift their identities vis-a-vis North Korea in the direction 
of creating a harmonious national community from the legacies of decades of war, 
confrontation and rivalry. If then, what implications did these identity shifts and ensuing 
inter-Korean rapprochement have for the policy elites of the countries concerned and 
the international community as a whole? To answer these questions, this thesis embarks 
on an intellectual and empirical journey in which the reader should be able to witness 
the changing identities between North and South Korea from enemies to would-be 
partners or brothers after a myriad of interactions between them. 
As a method to build a theoretical framework, this dissertation reviews a wide 
range of literature on theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, as well as 
strategies of containment and engagement. Overall, this thesis is heavily inclined 
towards a constructivist approach and an engagement option to highlight the shift of 
South Koreans' identities vis-a-vis North Korea and the policy implications to follow. 
For the case studies, it uses various primary sources and secondary materials, both in 
English and Korean, to illustrate the South Korean administrations' policy shifts, as well 
as South Koreans' identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea, First, it surveys speeches and 
statements by policy elites, businessmen and other opinion leaders, as published in 
official documents, newspapers and other printed materials, to supplement academic 
publi(ations in analyzing the shifts of policies and opinions. This analysis of public 
discourse is an indispensable approach in shedding light on the key actors' shifting 
articulation of state interests and identities over time. Second, a collection of opinion 
polls by both government and private agencies is presented to illustrate the shift of 
South Koreans' identities and norms vis-a-vis North Korea on the popular level. Third, a 
wide range of interviews has been conducted with policy elites and businessmen to shed 
light on the intentions and beliefs of these major actors, which were not published in 
official documents or other printed materials. In particular, the interviewees include top 
policymakers in the Kim administration: national security advisors, foreign ministers 
and unification ministers. 
By doing so, this thesis formulates a generic process of state identity shifts. 
which could be applicable to the relationship between former and present enemies, such 
as the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States and Vietnam, China and 
Taiwan. and other similar cases. Modem IR scholarship has paid due attention to state 
identity and its policy implications. but has failed to fully address the process of identity 
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shifts. In this sense. this study is groundbreaking or at least pioneering in that it seeks to 
find the causal link among such factors as the evolving historical setting. human 
endeavours, policy initiatives and identity shifts in South Korea's relationship with the 
North. 
s. The Structure of the Dissertation 
This introductory chapter, which outlines the research questions. hypotheses and 
methodologies of this study. is followed by seven more chapters, which aim to analyze 
various facets of the Sunshine Policy. Chapter Two is a literature review on the past 
policies of containment and engagement from both theoretical and historical 
perspectives. In particular, this chapter reviews the US Cold War policies vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union, as well as its policies towards so-called 'rogue states' with the aim of 
identifying their strengths and weaknesses and laying the groundwork to formulate a 
new framework to analyze the Sunshine Policy in the following chapter. In addition. this 
chapter surveys some examples of engagement in the relationship between the United 
States and China, between the United States and Vietnam, and between East and West 
Germany, to identify the underlying principles in such successful cases of engagement. 
In sum, it shows that the problematization of the conventional theories and practices of 
containment and engagement could open a new window for conceptualizing 
comprehensive engagement. 
Chapter Three puts forward a new framework of comprehensi ve engagement, 
formulated in order to capture the diverse dimensions of the Sunshine Policy. It features 
u unique combination of historical and theoretical approaches to create a set of policy 
tools to analyze the Sunshine Policy from various perspectives. In this process, it 
outlines a core proposition of this dissertation by identifying the three levels of 
comprehensive engagement, namely, identity shifts, the status quo and integration. It is 
followed by an analysis of South Korea's policy-making process, which made the 
implementation of the Sunshine Policy possible. It also sheds light on the Kim 
administration's information processing, a system that was not susceptible to outside 
stimuli, as well as the key actors of the Kim administration's policy-making process. 
Chapter Four is an historical overview of South Korea's policies towards North 
Korea, as implemented by the fo))owing six successive administrations: Syngman Rhee 
(1948-60), Park Chung-hee (1961-79), Chun Doo-hwan (1981-8), Roh Tae-woo (1988-
93), Kim Young-sam (1993-8) and Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003). This chapter outlines the 
similarities and differences of each administration's policies and, subsequently, South 
Koreans' shifting identities vis-a-vis North Korea. By i))ustrating the vicissitudes of 
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inter-Korean relations from such an historical perspective, this chapter uncovers the 
causal relationship of various structural and domestic factors in the process of identity 
shifts. By shedding light on South Korea's dissident and student movements, this 
chapter illustrates the slow. but steady, growth of domestic groups in South Korea that 
identified North Korea positively. 
The next three chapters are the empirical case studies to test the approaches and 
hypotheses outlined in the previous chapters. Chapter Five is an analysis of North 
Korea's external relations with the United States, Japan and the European Union. This 
chapter eluCIdates what role the Sunshine Policy played in helping North Korea to 
improve its diplomatic relations with those countries. In the process, the chapter 
highlights the South Korean policy elites' sweeping identity shifts, which enabled them 
to free themselves from the Cold War mentality and practices of isolating North Korea 
diplomatically. This case study shows that, in spite of an activist government's 
strenuous nonn entrepreneurship and diplomatic efforts, the United States and Japan 
chose to maintain their established identities vis-a-vis North Korea, since they 
concluded that. based on their immediate interests, it was beneficial to continue to 
project North Korea as an enemy state. 
Chapter Six investigates the Hyundai Business Group's Mt. Kumgang tourism 
project. the flagship scheme of the Sunshine Policy. In particular, this chapter sheds 
light on such key incidents and events during the Kim administration as the West Sea 
naval skirmishes. the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000, and the following cash-for-
summit scandal to explain their relevance to the Kim administration's strategies of 
engagement and South Koreans' identity shifts. The invisible partnership between the 
government and a private company and, in particular, the use of bribes, will help to 
establish the notion of an activist government that struggles to engage an enemy state 
through all available means. It sheds light on the negative side of government-business 
collusion and the positive side of inter-Korean interactions that were made possible on 
an unprecedented scale as a result of this controversial tourism project. 
Chapter Seven analyzes North Korea's brinkmanship in the form of its 
admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in October 2002. This chapter 
probes what role the Sunshine Policy played in preventing the escalation of tensions 
between North Korea and the countries concerned, especially the United States, and 
encouraging them to sit round the negotiating table instead of mobilizing economic 
sanctions and adopting other coercive measures. The chapter highlights how the Kim 
administration. in tandem with the effort to maintain the political status quo, 
endeavoured to retain the cumulative process of inter-Korean integration in the face of 
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interference by the United States. It confinns that identities matter in a state's foreign 
policy to the extent that an enemy state can· be embraced and turned into a partner for 
cooperation, which in tum can serve to erode the solid foundation of a traditional 
alliance. 
Chapter Eight draws together the arguments of this dissertation and reviews the 
legacies of the Sunshine Policy under the next administration, led by President Roh 
Moo-hyun. On the basis of this dissertation's empirical findings, the concluding chapter 
argues that the process of South Korean's identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea is in 
progress and can be expected to remain robust in the foreseeable future. 
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Chapter Two. Containment and Engagement: Literature 
Review 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an historical account of various strategies of 
containment and engagement and elucidate their theoretical grounding in order to 
uncover parallels and discrepancies between those strategies and identifying the key 
conceptual components of comprehensi ve engagement, as proposed by this dissertation. 
The twin concepts of containment and engagement have long been used by state policy 
elites to formulate strategies towards their enemy states. In fact, the history of 
containment and engagement is synonymous with the history of US foreign policy since 
World War II (WWII), given that the hegemonic state in the Western hemisphere had 
mobilized all available means of statecraft to frustrate any expansionist attempt by the 
Soviet Union and other adversaries. In the fierce ideological competition of the Cold 
War period, foreign policies adopted by the allies of the United States were part of the 
grand strategy drawn by the hegemonic power. Even after the end of the Cold War, the 
United States and its allies faced another group of smaller but still menacing states, 
namely 'rogue states' ,I which they needed to contain in some cases or engage in others. 
Despite the seemingly clear-cut definition of the two concepts, however, 
containment and engagement are far from invoking identical images when theorists or 
policymakers use them. In fact, we may notice that they are evolving terms in the long 
span of the post-WWII history against the backdrop of structural and domestic 
opportunities and constraints. This complexity frustrates IR students when they try to 
define clearly the terms and lump past policies and initiatives together as either 
containment or engagement. In fact, most policies and initiatives are somewhere on the 
continuum between containment and engagement. In the face of these seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles, theorists and specialists have rejected a containment-
engagement dichotomy and instead called for the formulation of country-specific 
strategies (Litwak 2000; Haass and O'Sullivan 2000; George 1993). 
This chapter will analyze the two concepts of containment and engagement by 
dividing the post-WWII era into the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. While the 
focus of this chapter is on the post-Cold War period when the debate on whether to 
contain or engage 'rogue states' has become a particularly salient policy issue, the 
I The lerm, 'rogue siales', will be defined in grealer detail later in this chapler. 
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contemporary debate on containment and engagement is without doubt closely linked to 
Cold War policies and initiatives, making it fruitless to merely delve into the post-Cold 
War situation. In particular, the Korean Peninsula, which in 1950-3 experienced the first 
'hot war' of the Cold War period, is where both the structural and ideological legacies of 
the Cold War remain more or less intact. 
2. Containment and Engagement in the Cold War Period 
Containment is a by-product of the Cold War in which the United States and other 
Western states made all-out efforts to contain the ever-multiplying sphere of 'red' 
stretching across the Eurasian continent. In his seminal book, Strategies of Containment, 
Gaddis (1982) sought to analyze containment in terms of 'strategies' as a way to 
elucidate this illusive concept, which had undergone mutations and transformations 
through successive US administrations. As part of its global strategies of containment, 
the United States needed to build close alliances with democratic states worldwide, 
virtually establishing a wall around the Soviet Union and its allies and giving birth to 
such metaphors as Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain'. Even though the United States 
placed priority on rebuilding Western Europe, it also allocated limited resources to Asia. 
First, it turned to Japan in an attempt to find a key security partner in the region, while 
trying to make the war-devastated South Korea a frontline bulwark against communism 
(Iriye 1977; Ikenberry 2001a). In particular, the United States opened its market to 
Japanese and South Korean exports to help to reconstruct the two war-tom states, which 
could counterbalance the expansion of Communist states in East Asia. Nevertheless, the 
United States did not remain steadfast in its strategies of containment, as it deviated 
from its original roadmap to introduce strategies of limited engagement, as seen in the 
case of its engagement with China from the early 1970s onwards. This section will first 
offer an historical overview of strategies of containment and engagement, followed by a 
review of Cold War-related theories from the three perspectives of realism, liberalism 
and constructivism. 
2.1. Historical Overview of Containment 
The emergence of Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union as a powerful socialist state prompted 
US officials to grasp the vague idea of containing it from 1941 onwards. Even before 
the concept of containment took life as a type of policy, the United States had already 
put into practice a kind of containment in both the Central European and East Asian 
theatres in the closing days of World War II in an automatic response to Soviet 
expansionism. For example. the US's hasty occupation of the southern half of the 
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Korean Peninsula was mainly aimed at denying the Soviet military control over the 
whole peninsula. as Washington defeated another of Moscow's territorial ambitions in 
the Japanese archipelago (Oberdorfer 2001: 6). 
On 22 February 1946, George Kennan, then-minister counsellor at the US 
Embassy in Moscow, sent his famous 'long telegram' to Washington to explain Soviet 
foreign policy, but the term, 'containment', was not coined until July 1947 when 
Kennan published an article in Foreign Affairs, entitled The sources of Soviet 
conduct,.2 Kennan (1947) called for the implementation of a long-term policy of 
containment to thwart the Soviet Union's expansionist penchant, enabling the term 
'containment' to win prominence as a post-war US policy. Ambrose (1991: 86) argued 
that the policy of containment acted as a guiding light for the United States to emerge 
from isolationism and make a strong commitment to intervention in global affairs for 
the first time 'in a period of general peace'. 
Orthodox realist explanations of the Cold War are based on the structural and 
materialistic division of power between the United States and the Soviet Union after 
World War II. which many saw as making conflicts between the two powers inevitable 
(Halle 1967; Schlesinger 1967; Yergin 1978). Some believed the confrontation to be a 
tragedy of misperceptions and missed opportunities (George and Smoke 1974; Jervis 
1976). Meanwhile. revisionists and critics have focused on the economic dimensions 
and the expansionist US political culture. Explaining the stability and longevity of the 
Cold War template, Galtung (1971) attributed it to material impediments to change. 
caused by the imperialist structures of the international system, while Galbraith (1978) 
shed light on the ominous workings of military-industrial complexes in both 
superpowers. 
This section will review a set of US strategies of containment to illustrate that 
they had alternated between concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical response to 
Communist encroachments in the face of structural and domestic constraints. For the 
advocates of asymmetrical response, such as Kennan, the Eisenhower administration 
(1953-61) and the Nixon administration (1969-74). the major policy instruments on 
hand were economic aid and nuclear deterrence. Conversely, the authors of NSC-68, the 
Kennedy administration (1961-3) and the Reagan administration (1981-9) advocated 
flexibility in mobilizing resources to act at all levels. Kissinger (1977) noted that the US 
approach to the world had oscillated between isolationism and overstretch and what was 
needed was a sense of realism to accept the world as given. Gaddis (1982) contended 
that the prime reason for these oscillations derived from internal forces operating within 
2 Kennan used the name of 'X' to preserve his anonymity. 
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the United States, such as the Congress and the military-industrial complex, rather than 
the attitude or actions of the Soviet Union. Kaldor (1995) argued that the Cold War was 
an 'imaginary war' created by the leaders of the two competing blocs as part of their 
political strategies to divert public attention from domestic problems by spawning 
pcriodi<.: threats. 
Truman Doctrine. Although there is still a debate over the origins of the Cold 
War, President Harry Truman (1945-53) needed at least a public excuse to offer aid to 
Greece, which was suffering from communist insurgencies. Therefore, the Truman 
Doctrine, announced in March 1947, was conceived to achieve the immediate aim of 
preventing the communization of Greece and Turkey as a rudimentary step in the 
practice of containment. In the course of drafting the doctrine, however, its authors 
came to champion America's 'grand heroic crusades on a worldwide scale, a struggle 
between light and darkness with the fate of the world hanging on the outcome' 
(Ambrose 1991: 85) and signal the US willingness to support anti-Communist forces 
anywhere in the world (Halliday 1986: 3). Truman exaggerated the situation to the 
extent that he portrayed 'the Greek civil war as part of a global struggle between the 
forces of freedom and totalitarianism' (Larson 1985: 327). From the outset, Truman 
needed to imbue the American public with a sense of danger in order to gamer support 
for anti-Communist campaigns worldwide. which might require a huge amount of 
political, economic and military aid to be put to use by the United States (Ambrose 
1991: 85). 
Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine, as a strategy embodying Kennan's idea of 
containment, was deceptive because it did not result in the proliferation of US 
commitments across the world but a 'reordering of priorities which emphasized 
economic assistance to Western Europe at the expense of interests in the Far East and 
elsewhere' (Gaddis 1977: 281). For example, the US troops left South Korea in 1949 
and Acheson's National Press Club speech in January 1950 publicized South Korea's 
exclusion from the US defence perimeter. The withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops 
from the Korean Peninsula and their ambiguous commitment to security resulted in the 
transfer of 'the power of decision from the major power to small allies', inviting 
challenges against the US implementation of containment from its early years 
(Flemming 1961: 608). 
The idea of Kennan's containment, based on the concept of the balance of power, 
centred on maintaining US hegemony by frustrating Soviet expansionism worldwide. 
While calling for 'a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment', Kennan 
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(1947: 575) was both pessimistic and optimistic over the future international order: 
pessimistic since he thought that the US-Soviet rivalry was inevitable because of Soviet 
expansive tendencies; and optimistic since he believed the United States had enough 
power and resources to induce the Soviet Union to ameliorate its behaviour. As a 
specific step to achieve this goal, Kennan (ibid: 581) called for the establishment of 
'unalterable counter-force at every point where they [the Soviets] show signs of 
encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world', which became the 
tactical foundation of the Truman Doctrine. Kennan's ideas were based on strategic 
calculations in which 'distinctions had to be made between what was vital and what was 
not' since US capabilities were finite (Gaddis 1982: 32-3). In his grand strategy, based 
on his notion of five vital centres of industrial and war-making capability3, Kennan 
(1947; 1954) formulated a set of key strategies of containment, including the 
reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan to counterbalance Soviet expansionism on 
a global scale, the exploitation of tension between the Soviet Union and China for the 
purpose of hampering the unity of the Communist powers,4 the obstruction of Soviet 
ability to project its power beyond its borders, and the modification of Soviet behaviour 
and worldview through dialogue, which could put an end to the Cold War. 
NSC-68. Following his re-election in 1948, President Truman was forced to 
review his foreign and defence policies in light of the Communist triumph in mainland 
China in 1949. the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons, and rising 
McCarthyism (Ambrose 1991: 113). In a new document drafted in 1950 in the name of 
the National Security Council (NSC) policy paper No. 68, Kennan's strategy of 
defending strong points asymmetrically gave way to an emphasis on perimeter defence 
in which all points are equally important to US interests. Although Kennan believed that 
it was crucial to defend only vital interests since US resources were limited, the new 
document, authored by Paul Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning 
Bureau, was based on a new interpretation of the scale of Soviet threats and the possible 
mobilization of US resources. NSC-68 declared that, in view of its economic power, the 
United States could spend US$50 billion or 20 per cent of its gross national product in 
1950 for military expenditure (ibid: 114). The document is regarded as having 
established the parameters and rationale for post-war US foreign policy (Campbell 
3 The five vital locations of the world. which enjoy good conditions of climate. industrial strength and 
population. are the United States. Great Britain. Germany and central Europe. the Soviet Union. and 
Japan (Kennan 1954). 
4 For the divide-and-rule approach adopted by the United States towards the Soviet-China alliance. see 
Burr ( 1998) and Chang ( 1990). 
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1992). The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 apparently validated one of NSC-
68's premises that if the US tolerates any shift in the balance of power, it could invite 
similar aggression elsewhere (Smith 1998: 62). 
'New Look'. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61), who won the 1952 
presidential election with a pledge to liberate the enslaved countries of the world under 
Communist rule, did not endeavour to fulfil his commitment to 'rollback' but 
implemented the policy of containment in the name of the 'New Look' (Ambrose 1991: 
134-5). The major premise of Eisenhower's 'New Look' principle, supported by his 
Cabinet figures who stressed the importance of a balanced federal budget and tax cuts, 
was that an insunnountable increase of security burdens might cripple the domestic 
economy. 
The New Look spawned the idea of 'massive retaliation', which signalled the 
message to the Communist powers that, rather than accepting casualties and costs while 
defending the land of the communist periphery in a protracted war, the United States 
might resort to strategic nuclear attacks on the communist heartlands, as it threatened to 
do at the end of the Korean War to speed up the process of signing an annistice 
agreement (George and Smoke 1974: 28). Despite the inception of the Cold War, 
however, the concept of containment was lacking in any strategy or theory linking 
military planning to foreign policy objectives prior to 1950. Therefore, the idea of 
'massive retaliation', approved in 1953 by Eisenhower, can be regarded as the first 
systematic theory of deterrence in the Cold War era. Deterrence is a policy aimed at 
thwarting an enemy state from aspiring to change the international status quo in its 
favour. Its basic idea was to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of states 
aligned with the United States either by treaty or unilateral declaration, with the hope 
that an American security umbrella over them would discourage the Communist 
countries from launching attacks. George and Smoke (ibid: 48) noted that in its simplest 
form, 'deterrence is merely a contingent threat: If you do x, I shall do y to you. If the 
opponent expects the costs of y to be greater than the benefits of x, he will refrain from 
doing y'. In spite of the introduction of the concept of deterrence, the New Look became 
known for containing fundamental flaws because of its excessive dependence on the 
potentia) use of nuclear weapons to compensate for manpower shortages vis-a-vis the 
Red Anny, thus limiting effective responses (Ambrose 1991: 71) and running the risk 
that the Soviets might dismiss it as US bluffing (Haass 1999: 11; George and Smoke 
1974: 30). 
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Flexible Response. In a significant departure from the New Look strategies. 
President John F. Kennedy (1961-3) sought to expand the range of options to counter 
Soviet expansionism. Kennedy embraced the spirit of Kennan's balance of power by 
introducing flexibility, but stressed bold steps on the basis of a more expansive 
perception of means. In particular. Kennedy called for the strengthening of both 
conventional and unconventional military capabilities and the build-up of strategic 
missiles. However, the 'flexible response' strategy, which favoured counter-insurgency 
operations by a small number of 'military advisors' over direct combat against 
adversaries, was again bogged down in the Vietnam War because efforts to find a 
middle ground between a nuclear war and appeasement were frustrated since the war in 
Vietnam required more US military assistance over time (Smith 1998: 71). Deterrence 
theory also shifted its focus from an 'attack out of the blue' by the Soviet Union to the 
prevention of escalation of small-scale warfare (Schelling 1960; Holsti 1972; and 
Brodie 1966), With the Soviet Union achieving nuclear parity with the United States. 
the Kennedy administration introduced the concept of 'sufficiency', based on the idea of 
'mutually assured destruction (MAD),.5 
Dere1lle. Halliday (1986: 205-6) viewed the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of derente 
as an attempt to preserve US hegemony with a comprehensive package of punishments 
and inducements, while Gaddis (1982: 314) stressed that the initiative, based on 
Kennan's strategy of containment, was aimed at integrating the Soviet economy with 
that of the Western world to such an extent that the Soviet Union would have no motive 
for shattering the status quo. President Richard Nixon's credentials as a staunch anti-
communist political figure helped him to thwart criticism from the right when he sought 
to build better relations with the Soviet Union and China (Garthoff 1985). In short, 
detente could be defined as 'a mixed competitive-collaborative relationship between 
global superpowers' with contrasting ideologies and different worldviews (Breslauer 
1983: 336). 
To implement this new strategy, the United States was first required to free itself 
from the stereotypical view of the balance of power as a zero-sum game in which gains 
for one side meant losses for the other. Therefore, the Nixon-Kissinger approach, based 
on 'linkage', could be regarded as the first attempt at engaging the Soviet Union, though 
it has been classified as a strategy of containment. Hoffmann (1978: 46) described 
'linkage', a sophisticated mix of pressures and inducements, as follows: 'There would 
5 The idea of MAD was to leave one's population vulnerable to the other's attack because, regardless of 
whoever attacks first, the results are mutual annihilation. 
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be incentives for good behaviour, rewards if such behaviour occurred, and punishments 
if not'. 
Nixon and Kissinger set forth the broad concept of their strategy publicly with 
candour and clarity, but coupled this with a reliance on secrecy and outright deception at 
the tactical level (Gaddis 1982: 305). The two attempted to isolate the bureaucracy from 
the policy-making process, centralizing decisions to an unprecedented degree in their 
own hands and thus eroding the principle of transparency (Garthoff 1985: 26). Under 
the rationale of linkage, the bureaucracy, driven by its own parochial interests, was 
regarded as a set of organizations incapable of evaluating separate issues in relation to 
each other. . 
Like any other conciliatory steps, detente needed domestic compatibility, 
especially Congressional support, as a condition (George 1993: 59). Despite the 
implementation of the sophisticated strategies of detente by the Nixon-Kissinger team, 
the surge of the right wing in the United States from 1974 eliminated the public space 
for norms of restraint to settle down. Kissinger became the victim of his own success, 
when Senator Henry Jackson 'linked' Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union with US 
trade deals, such as the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and the 
extension of Eximbank credits (Dunbabin 1994: 23). The linkage brought an adverse 
impact on the strategies of detente, curtailing bilateral trade and prompting Moscow to 
reduce Jewish immigration (Ambrose 1991: 280). Even though the Nixon-Kissinger 
team tried to bring about changes in Soviet attitude by implementing detente, the 
Congress made detente hostage to Soviet changes, thus stripping Kissinger of his 
chance to test his theory that economic interdependence would give the Soviet Union an 
incentive to exercise political restraints (Gaddis 1982: 315). 
Even though detente was offered as a viable strategy, long-cultivated enemy 
images and biased understandings of world politics had apparently blinded high politics 
(Guzzini 2(02). During the 1976 presidential campaign, for instance, both Jimmy Carter 
of the Democratic Party and Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party attacked detente 
for its acceptance of the international status quo through the establishment of the 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which had consolidated the post-WWII boundaries in 
Europe, long sought by the Soviet Union (Garthoff 1994: 526-33). The collapse of 
detente was inevitable since the strategy, despite its initial success, failed to contain a 
series of Communist challenges in Vietnam and other parts of the world (Halliday 1986: 
210). The strategies of President Carter (1977-81) initially embraced the Nixon-
Kissinger team's asymmetrical approach of discriminating between vital and peripheral 
interests, but evolved into symmetrical response after the Soviet invasion of 
21 
Afghanistan, ushering In an era of what became known as the 'Reagan buildup' 
(Garthoff 1994: 39). 
Reagan Doctrine. President Ronald Reagan (1981-9) highlighted the US's 
historic mission of promoting the superiority of democracy over totalitarianism in his 
initiative, known as the Reagan Doctrine, in a direct rebuttal to the Brezhnev Doctrine 
(Smith 1998: 130).6 Reagan was the first post-war president to argue that the Soviet 
Union had gained superiority in terms of strategic weapons because of the results of 
arms control talks in the past (Nogee and Spanier 1988). Therefore, the Reagan 
administration rejected the idea of detente and implemented what could be called a 
'neo-conservative evangelism of fear', ushering in the second Cold War (Smith 1998; 
Halliday 1986). In one of the most perilous moments of the Cold War, Reagan called the 
Soviet Union an 'evil empire', prompting the Soviet leadership to think that the United 
States might launch a nuclear strike against it. In 1981, for instance, the Soviets, in an 
apparent intelligence failure, was gripped by the fear that Reagan would order a pre-
emptive nuclear attack and put its own forces on alert for a nuclear showdown (Bearden 
and Risen 2(03). 
The Reagan administration touched off an arms race, ostensibly threatening to 
create a satellite-based missile defence system (the Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI]), 
in its judgement that the fragile economy of the Soviet Union could not sustain massive 
parallel investment in the military build-up (Garth off 1994). Critics called it an attempt 
to erect a non-nuclear 'astrodome' over the United States to step up security for the 
American public (Nogee and Spanier 1988: 176). 
2.2. Theories of the Cold War 
Realism and its neo-realist variants dominated the theories of the Cold War, as they 
were theories of wars, confrontations and alliances. The ideological precursor of 
Kennan's containment harks back to the contributions of Reinhold Niebuhr, who 
revived the pessimistic Augustinian view of human nature to challenge the Lockean 
view of benign human nature (Cox 1981). Morgenthau (1948), who espoused 
determinist realism, believed that history would repeat itself in an endless struggle for 
power, nurtured by the self-fulfilIing prophecy in which the worst-case thinking 
6 In a speech given in November 1968 at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Soviet 
leader Leonid Brezhnev justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia and stressed the Soviet Union's mission 
of protecting communism from outside encroachments, which was known in the West as the 'Brezhnev 
Doctrine'. See the text on the website, http://www.cnn.comlSPECIALS/cold.war/episodesIl4/documentsl 
doctrine! (accessed 15 April 2004). 
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generates the very worst case. Despite the hegemonic status of realism within IR 
theories, the Cold War also gave birth to a myriad of different theories and 
interpretations. Among them, this section will shed light on the realist, liberal and 
constructivist contributions to the interpretation and analysis of the underlying causes of 
the Cold War. 
2.2.1. Realism and the Cold War 
Realism has dominated international relations theory since Word War II, thus playing 
the role of a paradigm (Wrever 2002). During the Cold War, realist thinkers attributed 
international conflicts to the existence of an imposing structure of what they called 
'anarchy' as an absence of an overarching authority (Waltz 1979). For realists, the 
primary means of resolving conflicts has been the mobilization of power, coercion and 
military force. 
The realist thinkers were generally concerned with why and how the Cold War, 
which is also interpreted as a 'cold peace', was possible on a global scale in spite of the 
occurrence of wars of lesser scale, like those in Korea and Vietnam (Haass 1999: 3). 
The origins and developments of the Cold War have also raised many questions. Did 
nuclear deterrence work? Did bipolarity help to ensure peace? Was the long peace 
possible in the framework of hegemonic stability? Are states driven by relative gains 
concerns? 
Nuclear Deterrence. There has been a long-running debate among realists as to 
whether nuclear weapons were the key variable that contributed to the maintenance of 
peace during the Cold War. It appears, however, that a majority of scholars agree on the 
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, bolstered by a flurry of relevant concepts such as 
'massive retaliation' and MAD, as observed in the previous section. Supporters of 
nuclear deterrence theory contend that the imperative of fending off a nuclear war had 
apparently prompted the superpowers to take great caution in their decisions which 
might have led to major wars or the possible escalation of small-scale wars (Bundy 
1988; Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1990; Haass 1999). In particular, mainstream neo-
realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer could be categorized as core believers of the 
deterrent power of nuclear weapons to the extent that they would endorse a world of 
multiple states armed with nuclear weapons, checking and balancing each other. Waltz 
(1979; 1981) notes that the controlled proliferation of nuclear weapons would help to 
promote international peace and stability. In particular, Mearsheimer (1990) advocated 
Germany's possession of nuclear weapons because the economically powerful state 
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might be again tempted to threaten international peace if it felt insecure. 
Meanwhile, other scholars, including Robert Gilpin and John Mueller, are 
sceptical about the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. Gilpin (1981: 218) noted that 
'the thesis that nuclear weapons have made hegemonic war or a system-changing series 
of limited wars an impossibility must remain inconclusive'. Mueller (1989), an advocate 
of the obsolescence of great power war, argues that a large-scale war between the 
superpowers had been impractical even before World War II because they experienced 
the calamities and costs of World War I. Hence, he called World War II an exceptional 
case, Hitler being an evil genius and Japanese militarists romantic risk-takers who had 
not experienced World War I (ibid). 
Bipolarity. In parallel with the debate on nuclear deterrence, the realists have 
also grappled with whether bipolarity had contributed to systemic stability during the 
Cold War. Waltz (1979) is a staunch advocate of the belief that bipolarity contributed to 
a long peace during the Cold War in a definite departure from the beliefs of classical 
realists, including the founding father of containment, Kennan, and his practitioner, 
Kissinger, who were in favour of multipolarity as a bedrock of peace and stability. Even 
though conventional wisdom advocates a concert of five powers in a typical balance-of-
power system, with one playing the role of balancer, Waltz (ibid: 163-4) dismissed this 
as an historical generalization, stemming from Britain's role in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, rather than a theoretical concept. Waltz (1964) argued that 
politicians might make a misjudgement on the intentions and actions of enemy states, 
because a mUltipolar world results in greater uncertainty. In contrast, Singer and 
Deutsch (1964) contended that a multipolar system tends to be stable because 
uncertainty encourages decision-makers to make calculations in consideration of the 
larger number of actors involved, and thus become cautious of the consequences of their 
actions. Meanwhile, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) dismissed both accounts by claiming 
that as long as the system's structure remains intact regardless of bipolarity or 
multipolarity, there is little uncertainty because decision-makers are able to anticipate 
the likely results of similar actions under similar circumstances. 
Hegemonic Stability. The debate over bipolarity is closely related to hegemonic 
stability theory. This theory has been built on the following two premises: order in 
world politics is created by a single dominant power and cooperation relies on the 
perpetuation of hegemony (Keohane 1984: 76). At first glance, this theory looks 
irrelevant to Cold War bipolarity. If one accepts the idea of 'dual hegemons', however, 
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this theory offers a viable account of Cold War stability and cooperation (Gaddis 1992: 
176). In fact, the two superpowers, like 'duopolists', learned gradually how to cope with 
each other for their mutual benefits, which sometimes made China accuse the Soviet 
Union of seeking world domination through collaboration with the United States (Waltz 
1979: 175). 
Relative Gains. In a two-power competition, like the Cold War, losses for one 
party are immediately translated into gains for the other. As states are extremely 
sensitive to their relative erosion of capabilities under anarchy in which survival is the 
foremost goal, realists contend that their primary concern is to stop rival states from 
making advances rather than to endeavour to achieve absolute gains. Carr (1946: 111) 
noted that '[t]he most serious wars are fought in order to make one's own country 
militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country from becoming militarily 
stronger, so that there is much justification for the epigram that the principal cause of 
war is war itself'. Echoing this view, Waltz (1979: 126) contended that 'the first concern 
of the states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.' 
Gowa and Mansfield (1993) claimed that states, dri ven by relati ve gains concerns, are 
inclined to trade more with their allies than with enemies under bipolarity.7 
2.2.2. Liberalism and the Cold War 
Liberal thinkers survived the dominance of realism during the Cold War and maintained 
their independent research projects, such as economic integration and institutional 
building. Ikenberry (2001a: 382-8) argues that 'liberal grand strategy' has played a more 
crucial role in US foreign policy during and after the Cold War than its realist 
counterpart, as manifested in its engagement with the Soviet Union, China and North 
Korea. The liberal visions of modernization and progress have been reflected in 
strategies of engagement when the United States sought to foster political and economic 
development in the backward Communist states with the aim of changing their 
worldview and behaviour. Ikenberry's (ibid: 393-7) liberal strategies of engagement are 
focused on efforts to 'open up,' 'tie down' and 'bind together' potential adversaries.s 
7 The three case studies of this dissertation investigate South Korea's departure from these relati ve gains 
concerns in order to launch strategies of engagement with the North. 
8 'Opening up' refers to the creation of linkages between the democratic and Communist blocs through 
trade and investment, exchanges, and interdependence. as seen in the US's 'constructive engagement' 
with China during the era of President Bill Clinton's administration (1993-2001). 'Tying down' means 
fostering Communist states' involvement in such international organizations as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Finally, 'biding together' stands for creating security communities. involving 
enemy states, as Germany was incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
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Game Theory. Axelrod (1984: 153), using a computerized Prisoner's Dilemma 
tournament, argued that the strategy of tit for tat, based on reciprocity, is the most 
desirable way to achieve cooperation, which could equally be applicable to deterrence. 
For example, the United States can deter any encroachment by the Soviet Union if it can 
build a reputation as a country that actually carries out its threats (ibid: 154). The three 
requirements of deterrence are: '(1) the full formulation of one's intent to protect a 
nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up the intent; and (3) 
the communication of the intent to the potential aggressor' (George and Smoke 1974: 
64). US signals of commitments are especially important because, as seen in the Korean 
War, an official exclusion of South Korea from the sphere of US interests made North 
Korea feel free to attack it (ibid: 65-6). The importance of US commitments is crucial in 
a game theoretical model of a deterrence situation, as seen in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Game-Theory Example of a Deterrence Situation 
USSR 
US 
defend 
No 
defence 
attack 
-100 
-100 
+20 
-20 
Column I 
Source: George and Smoke (1974: 68). 
No attack 
-1 
+1 
-1 
+1 
Column II 
Row! 
Row II 
Suppose that the US has offered indications that it would defend, say, South 
Korea, from an attack and the USSR is now calculating whether to make such an attack. 
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Possible payoffs are as shown: in the event of a Soviet attack and US defence. both 
sides lose heavily (-100); however, in the event of a Soviet attack and no US defence, 
the Soviets win moderate gains while the US suffers moderate losses in credibility (+20 
and -20 respectively). In the absence of the Soviet attacks, it could be assumed that the 
US gains very slightly, as world opinion may believe that US deterrence is successful 
(+1 and -1, respectively). 
An interesting aspect of this model is that the US should convince the Soviet 
Union that it would choose to defend South Korea under any circumstances. If not, the 
Soviets might choose to attack South Korea in the belief that the US is unlikely to 
defend it because, in the event of a US defence, it will lose heavily (-100), while no 
action will incur only a moderate loss of -20. In sum, a defending power must display 
the ability and willingness to wage war if it wants to avert a major war, because 
moderation and conciliation are likely to be taken for weakness (Jervis 1976; George 
and Smoke 1974; Schelling 1976; Boulding 1966). 
Even though game theory provides a 'framework for analysis' (Schelling 1967: 
219-20), its assumption of rationality has been challenged because the decision-making 
process is not always rational (George and Smoke 1974: 76; George 1993: 9). As 
preferences and payoffs are not obvious in many cases, Adler (1992) questioned the 
basis of rational choice models. Furthermore, success in deterrence encourages the 
defending powers to ignore the need for using other policy options to find viable and 
mutually acceptable solutions to the conflicts of interests (George and Smoke 1974: 
508). 
Regimes. Liberals and neo-liberal institutionalists have worked on strategies for 
promoting cooperation and interdependence between states suffering from security 
dilemma and relative gains concerns in an anarchical international structure. In principle, 
they agree on the realist notion that hegemonic power is important in fostering 
international cooperation, since a large number of regimes and institutions were formed 
under US leadership after World War II. In a departure from the realist premise, 
however, Keohane (1984: 246) believes that international regimes can replace a 
hegemonic power to ensure cooperation after the decline of the hegemonic power. For 
example, Keohane (ibid), dismissing the pessimistic conclusion of realism, argues that 
rational choice theory shows that cooperation between states, assumed to be rational 
egoists, is possible if they share common or complementary interests. In the same vein, 
Nye (1988: 250) contends: 
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The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the 
redistribution of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be 
feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about 
other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as 
allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one 
another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the 
capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial 
agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political 
outcomes. 
As to the durability of a regime, Keohane (1984; 50) argues: 'Cooperation is 
possible after hegemony not only because shared interests can lead to the creation of 
regimes, but also because the conditions for maintaining existing regimes are less 
demanding than those required for creating them'. Since Ruggie (1975) introduced the 
concept of the regime as a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, 
organizational energies and financial commitments accepted by a group of states, 
different theorists have given different meanings to it. Keohane, for example, shares 
Krasner's (1982) definition: 
[RJegimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice. 
Nevertheless, realists and liberals hold diametrically opposed views on whether 
economic interdependence or linkages help to promote cooperation between states or 
lead to war. While realists contend that cooperation is hampered by relative gains 
concerns and the possibility of being cut off from trade in an anarchical international 
system (Grieco 1995; Mearsheimer 1990), liberals argue that the level of 
interdependence conditions the extent to which relative or absolute gains motivate 
actors (Keohane 1984: 123). Although states tend to assess the intentions of other states 
as well as their relative capabilities, the constant calculation of relative gains is 
impractical and almost impossible should states have diverse relations with many other 
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countries (ibid). However, it would be misleading to characterize realists as concerned 
only with relative gains and liberals as preoccupied with absolute gains. Keohane (1993: 
275), developing his idea of institutionalism, conditionally recognized the possibility 
that states' interests in relative gains might inhibit cooperation, but noted that relative 
gains are motivating forces 'only when gains in one period alter power relations in 
another, and when there is some likelihood that subsequent advantages in power may be 
used against oneself'. Partly because of the questions of relative gains in the process of 
forming and operating international institutions, neo-liberals embarked on a project of 
rationally designing institutions to promote effective cooperation (Koremonos et al. 
2001). Nevertheless, Mearsheimer (1994/5: 7) dismisses the argument as having 
'minimal influence on state behaviour' and holding little promise for promoting stability 
in the post-Cold War world. As institutions are not a form of world government, 
Mearsheimer (ibid: 9) argued that it is not the organizations that compel states to obey 
the rules. but states that choose the rules to obey. 
Liberals also insist that economic interdependence diminishes the likelihood of 
war because it opens the way to maximize state interests through trade rather than resort 
to war (Rosecrance 1986). Hence, liberals sought to interweave a 'mass of cobwebs' 
across state boundaries to create a borderless society, which can eliminate states' 
motivations towards war (Burton 1972: 43).9 
2.2.3. Constructivism and the Cold War 
Constructivism, regarded as an outgrowth of critical theory (Reus-Smit 2001: 215), 
problematizes the basis of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which focus on war and 
cooperation between states in a fix.ed international system and treat the identities and 
interests of states as exogenously given (Wendt 1992). For example, US realists, like 
Morgenthau and Waltz, carved out a form of 'problem-solving theory' during the Cold 
War, a specific historical situation in which international relations relied on bipolarity 
and the overriding US concern was the defence of its power as a bulwark of the 
international order (COx. 1981: 131). Therefore, constructivists, questioning neo-
realism's historical sense, argue that its a-historical stance erodes its explanatory power 
when it attempts to analyze a changing reality (ibid). In contrast to the rationalist 
assumption that actors are atomistic egoists, constructi vists regard them as social actors 
'in the sense that their identities are constituted by the institutionalized norms, values 
and ideas of the social environment in which they act' (Reus-Smit 2001: 219). 
9 President Kim introduced these liberal approaches in his policies of engagement to promote inter-
Korean economic interdependence and integration. See Chapter Six. 
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According to Reus-Smit (ibid), there are three forms of constructivism: 
systematic, unit-level and holistic. The first form, as demonstrated in Wendt's (1992; 
1994; 1999) systematic constructi vism, focuses on the structural level, while ignoring 
those that exist within the domestic political realm. Conversely, the second form, unit-
level constructivism, focuses on the relationship between and among domestic, social 
and legal norms and the identities and interests of states. This approach, represented by 
Katzenstein (1990; 1996b), illustrates variations of identity, interest, and action across 
states. The holistic constructivists, in the meantime, treat the domestic and the 
international as two faces of a single social and political order. This perspective is 
epitomized by Ruggie's (1993) work on the rise of sovereign states out of medieval 
feudalism and Kratochwil's (1989; 1993; 1994) writings on the end of the Cold War, 
which stress the role of ideas regarding international order and security. 10 
Despite its rich understanding of some aspects of international life, Ruggie 
(2000: 37) harbours scepticism about the possibility that constructivism could develop 
out of its inherent limits into an explanatory tool of international life, since it lacks 
rigour and specification. However, scholars, such as Reus-Smit and Klotz, see the 
possibility of a scholarly division of labour because their approaches are basically 
complementary. They find the possibility of convergence, as constructivism focuses on 
how state identities evolve over time and institutionalized norms shape their identities 
and interests, while rationalism works on how states pursue their interests strategically. 
Klotz (1995: 20) notes: 'Combined with theories of institutions and interest-based 
behaviour, this approach offers us a conceptually consistent and more complete 
understanding of international relations'. 
One of the major research projects of constructivists has been to problematize 
and reinterpret the whole developments of the Cold War from its origin to its end. 
Campbell (1992) argues that the Cold War, a name coined by a fourteenth-century 
Spanish writer to describe the rivalry between Christens and Arabs, was not rooted in 
the specific existence of the Soviet Union, but more or less a struggle by the United 
States to build its own identity as a state through historical interactions with its 
adversaries. Questioning the realist view that the Cold War stemmed from the rivalry of 
the two superpowers, Campbell (ibid) contends that US foreign policy, based on a zero-
sum game, dangers emanating from the other and the tendency to militarize all 
responses, was not specific to one state or one ideology. Instead. he argues that US 
foreign policy has been constructed throughout history by linking American identity to 
difference, danger and ·otherness'. Rejecting realism's notion that the world comprises 
10 This dissertation jldopts both systemic and holistic constructivist approaches in Chapter Three. 
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objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them, Campbell (ibid: 
195) contends that the interpretation of threat emanating from the Soviet Union played 
the crucial role in forming American identity, as well as its foreign policy, during the 
Cold War, because containment was a strategy associated with the logic of identity. In 
sum, Campbell (ibid: 196) hinted at the possibility that 'rogue states', terrorism or some 
other potential challenger to American hegemony might replace the Soviet Union after 
the Cold War era as sources of threats to the United States, thus enabling it to move 
forward in its identity-building process. Halliday (1990) echoed this view by noting that 
the Cold War could persist even after the demise of the Soviet Union in the sense that 
the United States requires the existence of a common enemy as part of its identity-
building process. 
Building on Campbell (1992),s work, Wendt (1999: 274-5) describes how the 
United States and the Soviet Union needed each other to play the roles of enemies in a 
Hobbesian anarchy, creating the phenomenon of 'adversary symbiosis'. Showing how 
interests, norms and identities are internalized in this Hobbesian culture, Wendt (ibid) 
names three cases of adversary symbiosis: the military-industrial complex, in-group 
solidarity and projective identification. The case of the military-industrial complex 
explains how domestic interest groups in the United States and the Soviet Union were 
created and how these groups affected state policies, helping to constitute state identities 
especially during the Cold War. The second argument concerning 'in-group solidarity' is 
apt for illustrating the US's projection of Iraq as an enemy state. Wendt (ibid) shows 
how state elites periodically invent threats to the state to justify the existence of their 
state. The third argument on projective identification is based on psychoanalytic theory, 
in which the enemy's role is a site for the disposal of unwanted feelings about the self. 
Stein (1985: 250) argues: 'We do not relate to the Soviet Union as though it were 
separate, distinct, from ourselves; rather we act toward it as though it were an unrUly, 
unacceptable part or aspect of ourselves'. 
Guzzini (2002) regarded deterrence theory as being predisposed to a particularly 
stereotypical understanding of the world, which automatically reproduces perceptions of 
threats. Therefore, the arms race was not accelerated in the context of action and 
reaction, but the product of a self-generated momentum of inertia and autonomously 
produced threat perceptions by the two autistic superpowers (ibid). Kaldor (1995) 
argued that the leaders of the two blocs, namely, 'Stalinism' and 'Atlanticism', had 
generated the threat of 'the other' for domestic purposes. The build-up of conventional 
and nuclear arsenals was to create an imaginary war that enabled the leadership to 
control domestic political life and manage internal conflicts through the swings between 
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detente and confrontation (ibid). 
Realisls atlempl LO explain the end of the Cold War from their observation that 
the overstretched Soviet Union could not maintain its status as a superpower in a fierce 
material competition with the United States (Wohlforth 1994/5; Copeland 199912000; 
Schweller and Wohlforth 2000). Nevertheless. Zubok (2001: 41) argued that it was 
wrong to approach the collapse of the Soviet Union from the perspectives of 'economic 
crisis and external pressure', since the country had never been an economic superpower. 
In line with this thought, constructivists are active in explaining why the Cold War was 
brought to an end in a peaceful way by using such ideational variables as cognitive 
learning. political entrepreneurship. identity politics, transnational networks and 
internalization of Western norms and values (Checkel 1993 and 1997; Mendelson 1993; 
Risse-Kappen 1994; Lebow 1994; Evangelista 1995). In particular, these analysts 
attempt to identify what motivated the Soviet Union in the late 1980s to abandon 
confrontational modes of behaviour and retreat from eastern Europe voluntarily by 
highlighting the New Thinking of the Soviet leadership (Herman 1996; Katzenstein 
1996a~ Kowert and Legro 1996; Checkel 1998a). Herman (1996: 275) argues that the 
proponents of the New Thinking jettisoned the self-defeating Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and dreamed of restructuring the Soviet Union as a 'democratic and peaceful member of 
the world'. In the process of translating the New Thinking into actual policies, the 
Soviet leadership effectively changed the antagonistic US attitude, thus ending the Cold 
War. Gorbachev's initiatives, the Russian version of engagement with the Western world, 
were successful in mellowing the attitude of the United States, a 'rogue state' in the 
Russian view. II One notable thing is that the Moscow leadership had voluntarily 
restructured its way of thinking and acting before the United States changed its attitude 
towards the Soviet Union, a process of engagement that will be explained in greater 
detail in Chapter Three. 
3. Containment and Engagement in the Post-Cold War Period 
The disappearance of the Soviet bloc and the newborn freedom in Russia and eastern 
European states sent seismic shockwaves across the world, touching off debates ranging 
from Fukuyama's (1989) 'end of history', with the triumph of democracy and the 
market economy, to Mearsheimer's (1990) gloomy forecasts of confusion and instability. 
unseen by humankind in the bipolar world. Even though the Soviet Union, the prime 
II For example. the Reagan administration played the role of a rogue state by seeking to develop the 
space-based anti-missile system. which ran against the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. After the 
2003 invasion of Iraq. the Bush administration has also been described as a 'rogue state'. 
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target of containment, no longer exists, it did not take much time for the practitioners of 
containment to locate new targets, much smaller in size but more unpredictable in their 
behaviour and possible risks to security for the Western world. In the hotbed of disorder, 
called the post-Cold War world, a group of 'rogue states' arose, drawing concerns from 
both policymakers and theorists. If the Soviet Union, given its size and expansionist 
penchant, had been a relatively clear target of containment, it is even unclear whether a 
group of 'rogue states' should be objects of containment or engagement. Haass (1999: 
3) attributes the emergence of 'rogue states' to the loss of political control, formerly 
exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, it is not certain 
whether China or Russia has leverage to deter North Korea, their former client, from 
developing nuclear weapons. 
In spite of the end of the Cold War, the logic and practices of containment and 
deterrence lingered in the US Defence and State Departments, forcing Washington to go 
adrift without a guiding intellectual and strategic roadrnap fitting the post-Cold War 
situation. The unravelling of blocs and alliances led the United States to launch more 
frequent military intervention as a 'globocop' than before the Cold War, given so little 
fear of major superpower conflicts (Dumbrell 1997: 43). In a sense, US strategists 
transformed Saddam Hussein's Iraq into a fearsome enemy equivalent to the Soviet 
Union by 'following organizational routine and mobilizing on a scale commensurate 
with a Cold War scenario' (Kaldor 2002: 142). Despite mounting opposition from 
Russia, as well as from France and Germany, for example, the Bush administration 
launched the Iraq invasion to topple Hussein in 2003, because it was convinced that the 
military action would not develop into a major war with Russia and the advancement of 
US military technologies could ensure an early victory without inflicting large military 
and civilian casualties. The next target was arguably North Korea or Iran, as both 
countries were known to be engaged in nuclear weapons programmes, posing the most 
urgent non-proliferation threats to the Bush administration (New York Times, 20 June 
2003). Nevertheless. the United States refrained from invading North Korea, despite the 
presence of a relatively mature nuclear weapons programme, since military intervention 
could set off a large-scale conventional war and inflict far-reaching damages on South 
Korea and, possibly, Japan. 
Despite the apparent proclivity towards options of containment or even a pre-
emptive strike during and after the Cold War, the United States also pursued strategies 
of engagement on a limited scale across the world. Noting that the American system 
was not tailor-made for pushing a policy of containment. Ikenberry (2oo1a: 387) argues 
that the United States is 'institutionally predisposed to engagement'. In parallel with 
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strategies of containment, the United States endeavoured to transfonn the Soviet Union, 
China and other Communist countries by engaging them with such liberal tools as 
'economic integration, democratization, and institution building' (ibid: 383). In fact, US 
strategies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union changed from comprehensive to conditional 
containment after the death of Stalin because it was seen to be necessary to launch 
substantial engagement on such an issue as anns control, given the Soviet Union's 
destructive nuclear power (Litwak 2000: 105). As US policies towards the Soviet Union 
oscillated between symmetric and asymmetric responses, its policies vis-a-vis 'rogue 
states' were similarly confused. For example, the Clinton administration's Iraq policies 
continued to oscillate between keeping Hussein 'in his box' and unseating him from 
power (ibid: 101). On the Korean Peninsula, the United States concluded that an attempt 
to isolate North Korea completely might worsen its already troubled economy, thus 
increasing the likelihood that it would invade South Korea (Neilan 2000). 
This section will first offer a new look at the tenn, 'rogue states', and then 
critically analyze the use of economic sanctions as a main policy tool against those 
states, before proceeding to review strategies of containment and engagement after the 
end of the Cold War. 
3.1. 'Rogue States' 
One of the main problems facing theorists or practitioners of containment and 
engagement is what to call a group of states violating international nonns. For example. 
'rogue states', used repeatedly by the United States, have also been called 'renegade 
states'. 'outlaw states', 'pariah states', 12 or 'states of concern'. Nevertheless, the tenn, 
'rogue states'. seems to enjoy popularity, although the phrase originally referred to such 
regimes as Pol Pot's Cambodia and Idi Amin's Uganda, notorious for their brutal 
internal repression (Litwak 2000: 50). Regardless of what they are called, the United 
States and like-minded countries assume that this group brackets a band of states 
ignoring or openly overriding international nonns and practices by seeking to develop 
or trade WMD, suppressing their own peoples by brutal means, sponsoring or 
committing acts of terrorism. or using illegal means to meet their own national interests 
(George 1993: 49). Given the inclusion of Cuba in the US list of 'rogue states', which 
does not fit the criteria outlined above, another major factor in categorizing this group 
of states is domestic politics in the United States, which reflects the Cuban emigre 
12 For the Carter administration. which valued the worldwide promotion of human rights, President Park 
Chung-hee's South Korea was a 'pariah state rather than an example of Asian success' (Gleysteen 1999: 
20) 
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community's animosity toward the Castro regime (Litwak 2000: 76). 
The Cuban case indicates that the US's classification of 'rogue states' stemmed 
from its negative identification with those states regardless of whether they were 
proliferators or international norm breakers. North Korea and Cuba are the legally 
designated enemies of the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 
1917. 13 Meanwhile, Iraq, Iran and Libya were the primary targets of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 in which the US president is granted 
authority to 'deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States' .14 In particular, Iraq has been the US's main 
enemy since they fought against each other during the Gulf War. The George W. Bush 
administration argued that it decided to invade Iraq in 2003, since it felt an imminent 
threat from the state that allegedly denied the existence of the United States. IS However, 
critics of the war in Iraq believe that the United States exaggerated the threats of Iraq's 
WMD programmes to make the case for war (New York Times, 6 June 2003). 
Since the designation of a certain state as a 'rogue' has been a rather arbitrary 
decision by the United States, there is no consensus even among Western countries over 
how to name these states and how to deal with them. Therefore, the term, 'rogue states', 
was unable to offer any clear guideline for policies, since the United States and other 
Western states held conflicting identification with these states. When the United States 
attempted to isolate Iran and Iraq economically, some western European countries, 
especially France and Germany, maintained close economic contacts with them. Even 
Britain and Germany went on to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and 
stayed the course of engagement in spite of North Korea's admittance of a nuclear 
weapons programme in October 2002. 
The United States also exhibited inconsistency in imposing the hegemonic norm 
of nuclear non-proliferation across the world, further compounding this question of 
13 The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, administered under the Act, established economic sanctions 
against North Korea from the start of the Korean War in 1950. In fact, North Korea and the United States 
are technically still at war because they signed only the Armistice Agreement in 1953, not a peace treaty. 
Therefore, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programmes have often been cited as the direct 
threats to the security of the United States by the Bush administration. Meanwhile, Cuba was also subject 
to similar sanctions by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, issued by the US government in 1963 
under the same Act. 
14 For more information on US sanctions-related laws, see the US Department of Treasury website, 
www.treas.gov/officesleotffc/ofac/sanctionslindex.html(accessed 15 December 2003). 
15 President Bush highlighted clear and imminent threats from Iraq's WMD on many public occasions 
before the war, including his State of the Union address in January 2003. As for the theoretical debate on 
enemy images, see Wendt (1999: 260-63) and Wolfers (1962: 25-35). 
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categorization. In retrospect, the eradication of WMD was not the top priority issue for 
the United States in spite of its commitment to non-proliferation, insofar as proliferators 
did not directly threaten its national interests (Tellis 2001). For instance, the Clinton 
administration did not place India and Pakistan on the list of 'rogue states', even though 
they conducted nuclear tests in 1998 in flagrant violation of the NPT regime. For the 
Bush administration, international terrorism was an even bigger concern than the 
prospect of nuclear proliferation after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US 
mainland. Since the Pakistani government had cooperated with the United States in 
capturing al-Qaeda operatives, the Bush administration refrained from taking punitive 
actions which might undermine the authority of President Pervez Musharraf. 16 
This convergence of national interests between the United States and Pakistan is 
reminiscent of the US political backing of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. 
The Reagan administration, for example, overlooked Iraq's use of chemical weapons 
against Iran in the 1980s and the provision of sanctuary to terrorists. It stayed on the 
path of engagement with Baghdad by offering military and economic assistance and 
recognizing the regime politically and diplomatically, since its priority was neither the 
prevention of WMD proliferation nor terrorism at the time, but a halt to the spread of 
the Islamic revolution from Iran to other Muslim states. I? According to declassified 
State Department documents, made public by the National Security Archive on 18 
December 2003, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who was Reagan's special 
envoy to Baghdad back in 1984, played down the significance of Washington's official 
condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons and stressed to Iraqi leaders that 'our 
interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and 2) continuing to improve bilateral 
relations with Iraq, at a pace of Iraq's choosing, remain undiminished' .18 Meanwhile, 
President Reagan, whose top priority was the containment of the Soviet Union, cleared 
the way for Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme in the 1980s, since the pro-US state 
played the role of the main route for the transfer of US weapons to Afghan mujahideen 
guerrillas fighting the Soviet troops after their invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979. Under Reagan's pressure, the US Congress voted in 1981 to exempt Pakistan 
from US laws banning assistance to any non-nuclear state engaged in illegal 
16 The Bush administration, praising Pakistan's handling of the nuclear proliferation controversy 
involving Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, even announced 
that it would designate the country a 'major non-NATO ally' (New York Times, 18 April 2004). The 
decision gives Pakistan diplomatic prestige and access to US military technology. 
17 Following the Islamic Revolution. Iran posed a potential threat to successive US administrations which 
subscribed to the thesis of 'clash of civilizations'. 
18 The texts for declassified State Department documents are available at www.nsarchive.oq~ (accessed 
23 December 2003). 
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procurement of equipment for nuclear weapons programmes. Pakistan also secured a 
six-year aid package from the United States worth US$3.2 billion. 19 
Some opponents of the US's use of the term, 'rogue states', contend that any 
state undertaking policies against the United States are categorized as 'rogue states'. 
George (1993: 49) and Litwak (2000: 74), in particular, argued that this US political 
approach of lumping a group of states under this pejorative rubric had marred 
meaningful progress in dealing with these states primarily because this approach 
neglects the particularities of each state and limits strategic flexibilities. The other group 
claims that the United States itself is a 'rogue state' since it has been accused of the 
same policy patterns of recklessness and brutality in transgressing international norms 
and treaties such as the ABM Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto 
Protocol. 20 For Chomsky (2000), the United States is the very incarnation of a 
prototype 'rogue state' in view of its open contempt for the rule of law, its support of 
oppressive regimes worldwide and its frequent resort to coercive means to resolve any 
conflicts of interests. 
In sum, 'rogue states', is hardly neutral language that has any standing in 
international law and practice. In many cases, the term has been used to denigrate the 
enemies of the United States. Since 'rogue states' is not appropriate as a general 
description of those states, this dissertation will use the term only in the context of US 
foreign policy in order to avoid confusion. In inter-Korean relations, for example, we 
will refer to North Korea as South Korea's 'enemy state', a term with a basis in South 
Korean law. 
3.2. Economic Sanctions 
As an arguably single superpower after the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
mobilized a wide range of measures to enforce hegemonic norms, such as nuclear non-
proliferation (Ikenberry 2001b; Johnston 2001). For successive US administrations 
seeking to punish their adversaries transgressing such norms, economic sanctions have 
been the most readily mobilized policy tools to the extent that it was virtually 
impossible to rule out their use (Litwak 2000: 105; Haass 1997). In fact. the United 
States has imposed economic sanctions to fulfil a wide range of other purposes, 
including the promotion of human rights, the condemnation of terrorism, the prevention 
of drug trafficking, and even the ousting of a specific regime (Haass 1997). For the 
IQ Detailed ac\.:ountl> for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programmes were published on The Asia Times (29 
January 2004). The New York Times (2 February 2004) and The Times of India (3 February 2003). 
20 For an interesting definition of rogue states. see the Internet encyclopaedia, 
hup:llen.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogue_state (accessed 15 February 2004). 
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United States, economic sanctions have been relatively easy policy instruments it can 
resort to as part of its efforts to affect the policies of those states short of war. For 
example, the United States imposed multilateral sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War 
and succeeded in delaying the reconstruction of Hussein's military machine (Litwak 
2000: 106). The United States also imposed comprehensive unilateral sanctions on 
Libya in 1986 for supporting international terrorism (ibid: 107). Despite the limited 
success in denying those states the opportunity to rearm themselves, this option could 
not lead to any meaningful change of their policies and contributed only to the further 
isolation of those states. As the change of the target state's policies might be slower 
than expected, it was theoretically necessary to set the duration of the sanctions. In most 
cases, however, sanctions have been applied indiscriminately and indefinitely. In an 
analysis of 115 cases of economic sanctions since World War I, Hufbauer et al. (1990: 
101) contend that the phased strategy is less likely to succeed than a quick, 
comprehensive use of economic sanctions since 'time affords the target the opportunity 
to adjust: to find alternative suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic 
opinion in support of its policies'. 
There is also a controversy over whether unilateral or multilateral economic 
sanctions are more effective. Some scholars emphasize that multilateral cooperation is 
the key to the successful implementation of economic sanctions (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg 1999; Mansfield 1994 and 1995; Martin 1992). The logic of this view is that 
a significant number of strong states can dominate the international system and prevent 
defection if they are able to collaborate (Snidal 1985). However, Hufbauer et al. (1990) 
find that international cooperation does not bring about desirable outcome, despite the 
cost the prime sanctioner should pay to drum up multilateral support. Drezner (2000) 
argues that multilateral sanctions are sabotaged by enforcement difficulties, rather than 
bargaining problems between the primary and secondary sanctioners. In particular, the 
difficulties in multilateral sanctions resemble the prisoner's dilemma, because 
sanctioning states are supposed to shoulder the costs of banning trade or economic 
cooperation with the target state. while 'sanctions busters' could reap huge benefits 
(ibid). 
One of the major obstacles to this sanctions strategy is its failure to win support 
at home and abroad. Domestically, for example, US oil companies protested against 
economic sanctions preventing them from investing in Iran, while allowing their 
European counterparts to make lucrative deals (Litwak 2000: 106). Internationally, US 
policies could not be compatible with European approaches emphasizing political 
dialogue and economic relations as inducements for behavioural change. While the 
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United States was inclined to put in place comprehensive sanctions, its European allies 
advocated a limited use of embargoes only against items of military significance, such 
as dual-use goods (Rodman 1995). In particular, Europe and Canada attacked the United 
States for infringing their sovereignty by applying the Trading with the Enemy Act and 
the Export Control Act, which give the administration the authority to apply embargoes 
and export controls in foreign operations of US companies (ibid). The Helms-Burton 
and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act also caused conflict with European allies, because 
they were targeted at foreign companies trading with Iran, Libya and Cuba (Litwak 
2000: 84). Rodman (1995) attributed Europe's rising negative voices to the hegemonic 
decline of the United States, in particular, its economic status relative to Japan and 
Western Europe, and the fading Cold War ideologies, which posed a challenge to the 
US's govemability vis-a-vis multinational corporations, as well as foreign states. 
The controversy over the effectiveness of economic sanctions led to public calls 
for an end to the use of economic embargoes as a foreign policy tool, because they 
mostly harm the civilian population, especially children and the elderly, rather than the 
leadership they target (Stremlau 1996: 44). Even though humanitarian exemptions are 
granted under a majority of UN sanctions, the issue of civilian suffering was a major 
challenge to the supporters of the sanctions option (ibid). In sum, economic sanctions 
did not yield significant foreign policy achievements for the United States, while being 
costly and counterproductive (Haass 1997). Thus they have been used as a 'default 
option' when there is no policy alternative (Litwak 2000: 79). To punish those states 
seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons or export missiles, the United States has been 
compelled to take action, but options were limited because official interdictions or more 
coercive military actions might require stronger determination and readiness to fight a 
war (Haass 1997). In most cases, the target state did not change its policies but 
summarily rejected those sanctions resulting from the conflicts of interests between 
norm breakers and enforcers (Schroeder 1994). 
3.3. Strategies of Containment and Engagement 
When it comes to strategies of containment and engagement after the end of the Cold 
War, a myriad of terms describing the different levels of containment and engagement 
have been used by theorists and practitioners. Since the containment/engagement 
dichotomy is impossible to maintain both theoretically and practically, as mentioned 
above, many theorists and practitioners have coined such terms as 'comprehensive 
containment', 'conditional containment', 'conditional engagement', 'limited 
engagement'. 'quid pro quo engagement'. ·congagement'. 'unconditional engagement', 
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and 'comprehensive engagement'. As they are all somewhere on the spectrum of 
containment and engagement, this section will first identify the three main strategies the 
United States has employed to deal with its enemy states: rollback, comprehensive 
containment and conditional containment (engagement).2J It will be followed by some 
cases of successful engagement implemented by the United States and West Germany. 
In fact, an analysis of cases of engagement seems like reviewing a collection of 
failed initiatives, except for a few cases, since the implementation of engagement 
policies is such a tall order that a state or a group of states cannot successfully push 
them through in many cases. The purpose of this section is thus to illustrate the major 
cases of containment and engagement and identify their frameworks in order to analyze 
what have been the shortcomings of those initiatives. Therefore, the identified 
weaknesses of past cases in terms of both theory and practice will offer clues to how a 
different type of engagement could be conceived in Chapter Three. 
3.3.1. US Policies vis-a-vis 'Rogue States' 
Ritwak (2000: 103), who regarded the US's policies vis-a-vis 'rogue states' as an 
offshoot of the realist tradition, divided the various strategies adopted into three 
categories: rollback, comprehensive containment and conditional containment. Hence, 
he classified the Clinton administration's policies vis-a-vis North Korea as a case of 
conditional containment, although it is widely called an example of engagement. As 
most policies undergo mutations and transformations over time, the Clinton 
administration, in fact, moved on the containment-engagement continuum from 
conditional containment to conditional engagement in the waning months of his 
presidency. This section will review the three cases of US policies vis-a-vis 'rogue 
states': rollback, comprehensive containment and conditional containment 
(engagement). 
Rollback. This strategy aims to alter the status quo in order to reverse regional 
aggression or replace a 'rogue' regime with a benign one (Ritwak 2000: 103-5). One of 
the typical examples of this strategy is the Bush administration's overthrow of the 
Hussein regime in 2003. As one of the main architects of this strategy, President Bush's 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice embodied the idea that 'the United States 
would act pre-emptively against any power that threatened the United States, or 
21 Conditional containment will be bracketed along with conditional engagement because actual policies 
are found to oscillate between them. as seen in the Clinton administration's strategies vis-A-vis North 
Korea. 
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threatened to put nuclear material into the hands of terrorists' (New York Times, 20 June 
2(03).22 Originally, this term was used by the critics of the Truman administration's 
containment policy, who sought to liberate eastern Europe under Soviet occupation 
rather than recognizing the status quo (Ritwak 2000: 103-5). As it involves war or 
military operations in some cases and covert intelligence operations in others, it has 
been subject to criticism for its imperialist motives. 
ComprelJensive Containment. As observed in the previous section, Kennan 
called for comprehensive containment of the Soviet Union because he saw little chance 
of dialogue with Stalin. Even after the Cold War, this option remained as one of the 
main strategies for the United States when it dealt with such states as Iraq and Iran 
(Litwak 2000: 105). This strategy uses economic sanctions as a primary policy 
instrument, as analyzed earlier in this chapter. 
Following the Gulf War, Iraq faced the most extensive containment regime in 
four areas: 'UNSCOM inspections to monitor the destruction of Iraq's WMD 
capabilities. multilateral economic sanctions, no-drive and no-fly military exclusion 
zones in northern and southern Iraq, and the threatened use of force to deter Iraqi 
aggression and ensure Baghdad's compliance with Security Council resolutions' (ibid). 
In the case of Iran, the United States resorted to unilateral sanctions when it failed to 
win multilateral support for sanctions. Nevertheless, it was almost impossible to 
penalize Iran economically because of its oil trade and close relationship with Russia 
and Europe (New York Times. 20 June 2(03). 
Conditional Containme1l1 (Engagement). In a significant departure from 
comprehensive containment, this strategy combines the traditional elements of 
containment with those of engagement to induce changes in the target state's policies. 
Hence, this strategy, under the principle of 'conditional reciprocity', mobilizes both 
22 Reporting on the US intelligence failure in the discovery of WMD in Iraq on 11 February 2004. The 
N~Ml York 7inr~j quoted a European official as saying. 'Pre-emption was an idea created for Iraq. It has 
now died in Iraq'. Following the intelligence fiasco, which dealt a blow to the Bush administration. there 
was a rising view that the United States would find it hard to make a case for war against other countries. 
ltuch as North Korea. on the baSIS of lis intelligence findings. Nevertheless. Professor John Lewis Gaddis. 
In an interview With the Council on Foreign Relations on 6 February 2004, argued, . As a result of 
September II, I think that the shift in foreign policy to a strategy of pre-emption -- that supplements but 
doesn't replace the Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence -- is the most dramatic and most 
!ilgnificant shift in American foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War'. Gaddis compared this 
lttrategy 10 the warnmg Mayor Ed Koch used to prevent illegal parking in New York City, reading 'Don't 
even think about parking here'. GaddiS said this strategy has given a clear signal to the world that any 
state harbounng terromt groups, like al-Qaeda. would face the fate of the Taliban. The text is available at 
http"'wwwcfrorglpubhcationphp?id=6755 (accessed II February 2004). 
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sticks and carrots to motivate the target state to drop its unacceptable foreign policies 
and open the way for its resocialization into the global community (George 1993: 51). 
During the Cold War, the Nixon-Kissinger detente policy was a good example of this 
strategy. 
In the post-Cold War era, the Clinton administration, under the name of a 
'strategy of engagement and enlargement', took a conditional containment policy 
toward North Korea and eventually veered into conditional engagement in the final 
months of his presidency. At that time, the US government sought to improve its 
relations dramatically with North Korea upon the recommendation of the South Korean 
government, which was pursuing the Sunshine Policy. Many experts agree that, because 
of North Korea's mature nuclear programmes, the artillery Pyongyang amassed within 
range of Seoul, and the possibility of a large-scale conventional war, the Clinton 
administration opted for negotiations and signed the AF in 1994 (Sigal 2oo0a: 70; 
Ritwak 2000: Ill; Kim H.J. 1996). Under the agreement, the United States agreed to 
provide North Korea with two reactors in return for its suspension of all nuclear 
activities. In fact, this deal was heavier on incentives than sticks, but the willingness to 
spend financial resources by South Korea, Japan and the United States to fund the 
project represented a successful case of preventive diplomacy (Mazarr 2000).23 
Although this strategy was denounced as 'appeasement' by the US Congress and other 
critics, Ritwak (2000), building on George's (1993: 55-6) hypotheses on behavioural 
modification and learning theory, contends that it is distinguished from appeasement in 
three respects: 
First, the inducement must be tied to specific changes in the target state's 
behaviour, not general expectations of improved behaviour. Second, the 
reward should come only after the specific change in behaviour. If the reward 
is provided in advance of behaviour modification or is not linked to a specific 
behavioural change, it may be legitimately criticized as a bribe. And third, 
such an approach depends on mutual adherence to the specific conditional 
reciprocal steps in the sequence. 
Following the nuclear deal, the United States had temporarily dropped North 
Korea from its list of 'rogue states' in 1996. However. this strategy, based on quid pro 
quo reciprocity. failed eventually to put an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons 
programmes. Among the many reasons for the collapse of this agreement were the 
23 The North Korean nuclear weapons programmes will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Pyongyang government's security dilemma and nuclear ambitions, the lack of 
systematic US efforts to root out the causes of North Korea's security concerns, the 
delays In the construction of LWRs and the end of the Clinton administration's term 
which had. all of sudden. closed the window of opportunity for engagement. 
Despite the Clinton administration's successful bargaining to freeze North 
Korea's nuclear programmes. it had lacked any steady efforts to enlarge and strengthen 
the domestic support base for the implementation of the engagement option and failed 
to pay attention to North Korea's desire to build better relations to alleviate its security 
dilemma resulting from periodical threats from Washington (Mazarr 2000: 309). Once 
the threats of nuclear proliferation were gone in 1994, US attention to North Korea 
ebbed rapidly without following through on its commitment to upgrade 'bilateral 
relations to the Ambassadorial level'. as stipulated in the AF (Appendix V). In panicu)ar, 
the Clinton administration failed to create a support base in the Republican-led 
Congress. which annually hampered the administration's efforts to win the 
appropriation of heavy oil for ~orth Korea as alternative energy sources (Ritwak 2000: 
231). Therefore. a thorough understanding of the internal politics of a state pursuing 
engagement. as well as that of the target state, is crucial for the formulation of an 
engagement policy (Reissner 2000: 45; Suettinger 2000: 28). 
Meanwhile. the Kim Young-sam government of South Korea, which was the 
main partner of the Clinton administration's engagement with North Korea, was 
notorious for its policy inconsistency, which perplexed both the United States and North 
Korea (Paek 2000: Choi 2000: Mazarr 2000; Barry 1998; Moon 1998). As the United 
States had oscillated between containment and engagement vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, 
the Kim Young-sam government ex.hibited the typical dilemma in coping with the 
economically weak. but militarily menacing. North Korea. In sum, the lingering 
scepticism over the intentions of the North Korean regime in both the United States and 
South Korea served as stumbling blocks for the successful implementation of an 
engagement option. a situation that was further hampered by North Korea's periodic 
military provocations, including the 1996 submarine incursion into South Korean waters. 
George (1993: 54) argued that resocialization, unlike the symmetrical tit for tat, is an 
asymmetrical game. since a state seeks to achieve a fundamental change of the target 
state's behaVIour. which requires much more refined and calibrated strategies. 
3.3.2. Cases of Successful Engagement 
As noted in Chapter One. this study aims to formulate a model of comprehensive 
engagement on the basis of the Sunshine Policy. The previous section has already 
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reviewed the process of Soviet leaders' identity shifts that made them drop the past's 
antagonistic policies towards the West and perceive their state as part of the West, which 
in tum expedited the process of unravelling the Cold War bipolarity in a peaceful 
manner. In a sense. the end of the Cold War was the triumph of the Soviet leadership's 
engagement policy vis-a-vis the United States. This section will analyze three other 
cases of successful engagement: the US policies towards China and Vietnam, and West 
Germany's policy towards East Germany. 
US-China Rela/ions. Successive US administrations have been ambivalent over 
whether China is a partner or a potential enemy amidst an intense rivalry between 
competing policy and academic communities: the neo-liberal school advocating 
economic engagement and its neo-realist counterpart subscribing to the 'China threat' 
thesis (Gurtov 2002: 115: McGrew and Brook 1998: 151-5). As a result of this 
polarization. Sino-US relations have experienced ups and downs since the birth of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949, but evolved in a rather positive direction over time 
(NI 2(00). After President Nixon's policy of detente, the following US administrations 
opted for the engagement option vis-a-vis China in contrast to their hostile attitude 
towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In particular, the Clinton administration 
maintained a policy of engagement in a steadfast manner despite its misgivings over the 
rise of Chinese power (r\ye 1995).24 Under President George W. Bush's administration, 
the two countnes further deepened economic interdependence and cooperation as 
partners In a v.ar against terrorism (CRS 2003a). 
In fact. this US attitude means a significant departure from the initial stage of the 
Cold War era in which the United States was gripped with fear, witnessing the 
Communists' victory over the Nationalists in a civil war. The United States and China 
regarded each other as enemies mainly because of their conflicting positions during the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars and the US's support of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s (Ni 
2000: 52: Yahuda 1996: 193). However, the US's strategic calculations, which led to its 
efforts to take advantage of China's secondary Communist power status to 
counterbalance Soviet hegemonism, prompted it to take a differentiated approach 
towards Beijing (Gaddis 1982). China's attitude towards the United States has also 
changed over time from hostility to somewhere between rivalry and partnership, since it 
perceived the US's engagement in Northeast Asia as a counterweight to Soviet threats 
(Yahuda 1996: 202). 
:4 For lhe US en~~~emcnl policy vls·a-vls Chma. ~ Mann (1998). Shinn (1996). Vogel (1997) and 
Shambaugh (19961. 
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The United States embarked on engagement from 1971 when it acquiesced in a 
United Nations vote to grant China a seat on the Security Council, held previously by 
Taiwan's Nationalists (Mann 1998). In 1972, President Nixon made an historic visit to 
Beijing at the invitation of Chairman Mao Zedong. The 'farsighted geostrategic visions 
of the Chinese and American leaders' enabled the two countries to establish the 
Shanghai Communique. a monumental document in bilateral relations, which upheld 
Beijing's status as the only legitimate government of China (Ni 2000: 53; Yahuda 1996). 
Despite fluctuations in bilateral relations, the two countries could maintain their 
relations on track, since mutual cooperation was translated into mutual interests. 
China's US policies were set up on the premise that since the United States has 
been a dominant power after the Cold War, China's long-term strategic and security 
interests lie in avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States and 
fostering good working relations to create a benign environment for steady economic 
growth (Bueno and Story 200 1). In fact, China has no option but to maintain close ties 
with the United States, which has been the major market for Chinese products, as well 
as the major source of cutting-edge technologies (Nye 1999). These geopolitical and 
economic considerations enabled China to stick to the status quo principle in its 
relations with the United States, North and South Korea, and other countries, which is 
one of the major conditions for the strategies of comprehensive engagement to be 
elaborated in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
us-Vietnam Relations. Despite the lingering misgivings between Washington 
and Beijing, US-China relations marked one of the successful cases of the US's 
strategies of engagement. To aid in formulating a sophisticated framework of 
comprehensive engagement in Chapter Three, it is meaningful to investigate how the 
United States and Vietnam ended their two decades of frozen relations after the end of 
the Vietnam War in 1975 and moved to establish diplomatic relations in 1995. 
Strategically, the US government needed to revamp its policies vis-a-vis Vietnam after 
the end of the Cold War.25 Since China was an emerging economic and political power 
In Asia, the US strategists needed to find a counterweight to it, as they did during the 
Cold War. When Vietnam started withdrawing its troops from Cambodia in 1989, the 
atmosphere was ripe for the lifting of US economic sanctions, which were imposed after 
the start of the Vietnam War in 1964 and stiffened after the communization of Vietnam 
H For further information on US-Vietnam relations. see Sidel (1996). Marr (1995). Kolko (1997). 
Kamow ( 1997) and Jamieson ( 1993). Also see the US Embassy website, 
hltp 1/\ Icln.Jm u~emba~~~.gO\/wwwhm:la.html#i (accessed 14 April 2004) 
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in 1975 and its invasion of Cambodia in 1978. The Bush administration set up a 
roadmap for diplomatic normalization with Vietnam in 1991, even though the plan still 
held US relations with Vietnam hostage to the resolution of Cambodia-related issues 
(Richburg 1991).26 Economically, the United States was running the risk of losing its 
potential market. since European countries and Japan had already normalized relations 
with Vietnam, which assumed a strategic status in Southeast Asia and the South China 
Sea (Herring 1996: 319). Even though the improvement of bilateral relations could 
serve US national interests, President Clinton's engagement policy faced stiff opposition 
from the Congress and other opponents, who claimed that Vietnam maintained a poor 
human rights record and failed to show sincerity in accounting for US soldiers missing 
in action (CRS 2001b). When Clinton lifted the economic embargoes against Vietnam in 
1994, the detractors of the engagement policy proclaimed 'Black Thursday' and Senator 
Robert Smith. a Republican from New Hampshire and a Vietnam veteran, criticized the 
administration for rewarding Vietnam for 'twenty years of intransigence' (Herring 1996: 
320). 
One of the salient factors on the part of the United States, which made the 
process of normalization maintain momentum, however, was the pioneering activities of 
pro-normalization forces, which had already embraced new identities vis-a-vis Vietnam. 
They included broad-based groups of businessmen, Vietnam War veterans and 
journalists. who supported rapprochement with Vietnam in a consistent manner. In 
particular, the involvement of Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic 
Senator John Kerry, both Vietnam War veterans, served as the 'political cover' for the 
arduous normalization process (Sidel and Gray 1998). A growing number of US 
businessmen also pressed the Bush and Clinton administrations to improve relations 
with Vietnam in their pursuit of business interests, enabling the Bush government to set 
up the four-stage roadmap leading to diplomatic normalization (CRS 1994). Since 
Vietnam, unlike North Korea, did not pose serious security challenges to the United 
States in the absence of any WMD programmes. the conservative policy actors from the 
US defence and intelligence communities did not interfere with the Clinton 
administration's efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam (Sidel and Gray 1998). 
Even though it was not easy for successive US presidents to overcome the deeply 
embedded trauma resulting from its defeat in the Vietnam War, regarded as the only 
defeat in US history, President Clinton championed the engagement option during his 
26 In 1978. Vietnam invaded Cambodia. toppled Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and installed a pro-Vietnamese 
regime there. Since Vietnamese leaders visited the Soviet Union to sign a friendship treaty shortly before 
the invasion. US policy makers concluded that the Soviet-Vietnamese connection offered Moscow a 
strong foothold In Southeast Asia. 
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eight-year presidency (Le 2(01).27 
In August 1995. the two countries established diplomatic ties. For the three 
consecutive years since 1998. President Clinton issued a waiver from the requirements 
of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974. which restricts interactions with socialist 
countries. even though the president faced joint resolutions by the Senate and the House 
disapproving his action (CRS 2001a). Clinton's reconciliatory measures opened the way 
for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Eximbank to extend support to 
American businesses in Vietnam. Culminating in President Clinton's efforts of 
engagement. the two countries signed a trade agreement in July 2000, which led to 
Clinton's trip to Vietnam in November, the first trip by a US president since 1969. 
In fact, the amelioration of the lingering animosity and improvement of relations 
were possible through mutual steps. since Vietnam also introduced sweeping economic 
opening and reform, cooperated with the search and location of MIA, and withdrew its 
troops from Cambodia. Vietnamese leaders accepted a series of US demands to the 
extent that US policymakers might conclude that Vietnam was willing to make 
concessions on issues of importance to US national interests (Manyin 2003). Vietnam's 
new initiatives, marking a sweeping departure from the ideology-based foreign and 
economic policies of the past, stemmed from the strategy of doi rnoi (renovation). 
announced in 1986 in the pursuit of 'more friends, less enemies' (Le 2001; Alagappa 
1998). 
It might still require many years of efforts to construct a working post-
normalization relationship between the two countries (Sidel 1996). There is a lingering 
perception in Vietnam that the US government might seek to overthrow the Vietnamese 
Communist Party and its leaders. Nevertheless. the US-Vietnam relationship has been 
transformed remarkabl y from the days when the two regarded each other as threats to 
peace and stability to today when each sees the other as a partner for peace and stability. 
The United States had long maintained the position that it is unthinkable to improve 
relations with Castro's Cuba or Hussein's Iraq, as long as these leaders remained in 
power. The lesson from US-Vietnam relations, however, is that the amelioration of 
27 President Clinton. announcing the US- Vietnam bilateral trade agreement on 13 July 2000. praised the 
contributions to the normalization process of his Congressional 'allies', Senator John Kerry and Senator 
John McCain. Clinton said: 'it is my opinion that none of this would have been possible had it not been 
for the visionary and brave and reconciling leadership of the Americans in the United States Congress 
who served. many of whom suffered. in Vietnam; especially those who are here with me and the others 
whose names I mentioned earlier. Our debt to them as a nation is immense. This agreement is one more 
reminder that former adversaries can come together to find common ground in a way that benefits all their 
people. to let go of the past and embrace the future. to forgive and to reconcile' (http://usinfo.state.gov! 
reglOnallealvletnarn!cl!rd713.htm. accessed 15 April 2(03). 
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decades-long animosity and improvement of bilateral relations are possible to some 
ex.tent even before a transition in leadership (Sidel and Gray 1998). At the same time, 
President Clinton's adherence to the engagement option and the activities of pro-
normalization forces have been the indispensable components of successful engagement. 
Inter-German Relations. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-74) 
sought to overhaul the confrontational inter-German policy implemented by his 
predecessor. Konrad Adenauer (1949-63). who pursued German unification through the 
annexation of East Germany and caused friction with the United States. which sought 
the reduction of East-West tensions (Dunbabin 1995: 279). Nevertheless. Brandt's 
original version of Ostpolitik (East Policy). which envisioned the goal of reunification. 
'damaged the credibility of Bonn's detente policy and made the goals of Ostpolitik 
suspect in the East' (Rosolowsky 1987: 64). After realizing any hasty unification 
attempt was doomed to failure as long as the Soviet Union regarded East Germany as its 
western border. Brandt initiated a new version of Ostpolitik, which is in essence a status 
quo policy aimed at achieving better relations not only with East Germany, but also with 
the Soviet bloc (Tilford 1975: 2). 
Brandt travelled to the East German city of Erfurt for a summit in 1970 and 
hosted a return visit by his East German counterpart, Premier Willi Stoph (1964-73). 
even though their summit diplomacy was not initially successful (Dunbabin 1995: 276). 
Nevertheless, the two Germanys managed to establish the Basic Treaty in 1972, which 
opened the way for regular official and private contacts, as well as for the exchange of 
television programmes and correspondence (Schmidt 1993). Bonn made a strategic 
decision to secure limited opportunities for inter-German communication and travel in 
exchange for its recognition of East Germany (Giessmann 2001).28 In spite of these 
achievements, the Social Democratic Party was subject to intense criticism by the 
Christian Democratic Union for abandoning the goal of reunification (Rosolowsky 
1987: 68). 
Despite some parallels between the West German and South Korean approaches. 
Giessmann (200 1) distinguished between South Korea's policies and Ostpolitik as 
follows: 
'Ostpolitik' never tried to trade one system for another. It simply started from 
the assumption that the gradual opening up and change of the 'closed system' 
21 President Kim (1994) believed that the West German policies vis-a-vis East Germany had been more 
critical in achieving German unification than external factors. such as Gorbachev's perestroika. 
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In the East would (given a favorable European environment) eventually 
prepare East German society for a systemic transformation and the 
opportunity to decide in freedom about their future in Germany. When 
compared with the 'Ostpolitik' the new South Korean 'North Policy' initiated 
in 1972 started from a different perspective. Whereas the 'Ostpolitik' 
deliberately left open the future status of Germany and postponed the solution 
of the 'national question', the North Policy of South Korea from the outset 
became focused on the goal of reunification. 
In this vein, Giessmann (ibid) declined to call the Sunshine Policy a status quo 
policy because the goal of unification was specified in the Joint Declaration, issued by 
the two Korean leaders after their summit in 2000.29 Meanwhile, other scholars argue 
that it is impossible to replicate the German unification formula in the inter-Korean 
situation. Yang (2002) noted that substantial changes in inter-German relations had been 
underway long before unification took place. Schmidt (1993) contended that, unlike the 
two Germanys, the two Koreas fought a ferocious war. Nevertheless, German 
unification, which was speedily achieved after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, offers 
the lesson that it is desirable for the two Koreas to launch a gradual process under 
controlled conditions instead of rushing into unification. The German unification 
process also highlights the importance of the status quo principle in inter-German 
relations and the shift of identities between East and West Germans through their 
institutionalized contacts and communication. 
4. Conclusion 
Soviet spokesman Georgi Arbatov, jokingly warned the United States in 1987 that 
Moscow would do a terrible thing: 'we are going to deprive you of an enemy' (quoted in 
Dumbrell 1997: 3). Nevertheless, the United States has never faced a dearth of new 
enemies after the end of the Cold War, as observed above. In parallel with the process of 
29 Giessmann's opinion is not compatible with this dissertation's hypothesis that the Sunshine Policy is a 
status quo policy, as discussed in Chapter One. Traditionally, the two Korean governments had no option 
but to pay lip service to the goal of unification, because it is a highly political issue separate from whether 
all Koreans really have a yearning for reunification. President Kim had been under suspicion from the 
conservative forces in South Korea for failing to move to achieve unification or sympathizing with the 
North Korean unification formula, based on a federal system that pursues the coexistence of two different 
governments in one state. As President Kim needed to garner public support to pursue his reconciliation 
policy towards North Korea, he had to embrace the goal of unification pushed by the conservative forces. 
Even in the German case, the West German government rejected the notion that East Germany constituted 
a foreign territory and abstained from establishing full diplomatic relations provided under international 
law (Tilford 1975: 3). 
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creating new enemy states for the continuation of its internal identity dynamics, as 
elucidated by Campbell (1992), the United States also launched the policies of 
engagement with China and Vietnam and embraced them as members of the 
international community. 
By analyzing various strategies and theoretical foundations of both containment 
and engagement, this chapter discovered a set of strategic and theoretical parameters, 
which will be crucial for formulating a new framework of engagement for real-life 
application and refining the theoretical approaches to the concept of comprehensive 
engagement in Chapter Three. First, the containment/engagement dichotomy is 
meaningless because the concepts of containment and engagement are elusive terms in 
real-life situations. In particular, it is questionable whether Kennan's concept of 
containment and Kissinger's policy of detente should be categorized under the rubric of 
containment. In contrast to Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation', Kennedy's 'flexible 
response' and Reagan's SOl, which stressed the strict application of deterrence and an 
unlimited spending of American resources, those approaches by Kennan and Kissinger 
are rather similar to the post-Cold War strategies of engagement with enemy states. 
Second, strategies of containment and engagement, exercised by the United 
States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were based on the theoretical frameworks of realism 
and liberalism, characterized by a mix of incentives and penalties. Even though the 
concept of engagement has been used by the United States in devising strategies to deal 
with 'rogue states', they were actually based on the same ontological framework as 
strategies of containment, given that the Nixon-Kissinger administration's policy of 
containment was also a mix of penalties and inducements. The strategies of containment 
and engagement also contained fatal flaws in establishing themselves as working 
strategies at the stage of implementation, because their means were not properly chosen 
to achieve the specified ends: behavioural change of those states and their eventual 
integration into the international community. In fact, history tells that policies based 
solely on a mix of carrots and sticks, a typical realist recipe, were unable to change the 
behaviour of those states. For example, the Agreed Framework, lauded as a successful 
case of engagement, broke down without bringing about meaningful changes in North 
Korea's behavioural patterns. In spite of the tactical flexibility, however, detente was 
also a policy sought by a realist like Kissinger and fell short of addressing the root 
causes of the Cold War (Herman 1996: 291). 
Third, any policy implemented in pursuit of reconciliation and realization of 
mutual interests should be based on the status quo principle. Both Kennan's 
containment and Kissinger's detente pursued the status quo in political and military 
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affairs between the two superpowers. West Germany's Ostpolitik also envisioned the 
status quo rather than seeking to achieve unification. The AF was also a good example 
of a status quo policy because the United States and North Korea agreed to establish 
ambassadorial relations if all the suspicions over the North's nuclear weapons 
programme were cleared. 
Fourth, the interactions between a status quo state and a target state should be 
freed from the strict rules of the zero-sum game to create the environment for the use of 
economic incentives. The Nixon-Kissinger administration's detente policy sought to 
integrate the Soviet Union into the global economy with the goal of preventing it from 
realizing any ambition to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, it used a sophisticated mix of 
pressures and inducements in the framework of 'linkage'. The aforementioned 
successful cases of engagement have also resulted in the expansion of economic 
relations between the United States and China, between the United States and Vietnam, 
and between East and West Germany. 
Fifth, this literature review shows that strategists of engagement need to 
understand the internal politics of the target state, as well as that of states pursuing 
engagement. Domestic opponents could emerge as the major obstacle to an engagement 
option, as seen in Nixon's detente and Clinton's engagement vis-a-vis China, Vietnam 
and North Korea. 
Sixth, this literature review has discovered that working strategies of 
engagement undoubtedly accompanied strategic recalculations involving some degrees 
of identity shifts vis-a-vis the target states from enemies to partners. For example, the 
Clinton administration pursued its policy of engagement on the basis of the shifted 
identities vis-a-vis Vietnam, as promoted by various pro-Vietnam activists in the United 
States. 
In conclusion, a significantly different framework of engagement needs to be 
formulated, if its final goal is to change the target state's behaviour running against 
international norms and enable it to join the international community. Such a new 
framework is in demand because the conventional approaches toward engagement 
cannot adequately account for the theoretical puzzle of the Sunshine Policy, as 
adumbrated in Chapter One.30 
lQ Despite the strategic similarities of detente and the Sunshine Policy, both of which emphasized 
political dialogue, Nixon did not rush to hold a summit with a Soviet leader. Kissinger even threatened to 
cancel a summit in December 1971 unless the Soviet Union pressed India not to invade West Pakistan 
(Gaddis 1982: 293). Another difference is the tight linkage of political progress and economic benefits. 
While Nixon's White House was determined to control trade with the Soviet Union prior to political 
progress (Kissinger 1979), President Kim's Chong Wa Dae (Blue House) was all out to expand economic 
linkages between the two Koreas regardless of any improvement in political relations. 
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Chapter Three. The Concept of Comprehensive Engagement: 
Theoretical Framework 
1. Introduction 
Delving into the myriad of strategies of containment and engagement during and after 
the Cold War, the previous chapter concluded that a majority of these strategies were 
variants of containment and both practitioners and theorists of containment and 
engagement had worked on a narrow scope of policy tools that are questionable in terms 
of viability and effectiveness. Indeed, their negative identification and short-sighted 
devotion to a mix of incentives and penalties in dealing with adversaries heightened 
international tensions. In particular, the practitioners of containment promoted an undue 
domestic antagonism against adversaries and stirred up a sense of insecurity emanating 
from their potential threats, which in tum fended off proactive steps to ready the 
domestic public for a changing international environment. Now that mankind has been 
liberated from the heavy psychological burden of the Cold War, this study aims to 
demonstrate that comprehensive engagement, like the Sunshine Policy, is one of the 
viable policy options in alleviating long-running animosities and promoting exchange 
and cooperation between adversaries. We have already reviewed three successful cases 
of engagement in Chapter Two in which the strong adherence to an engagement option 
by President Clinton and Chancellor Brandt led to the alleviation of mutual animosity 
and the establishment of constructive relationship between the former foes. The purpose 
of this chapter is to draw on what has been learnt in Chapter Two to formulate strategies 
of comprehensive engagement. 
In an interview with CNN in May 1999, President Kim himself referred to his 
initiative as 'a comprehensive engagement policy', noting that it was the most practical 
policy for South Korea in order to make the North give up its war option and opt for 
peaceful coexistence (Korean Overseas Culture & Information Service: 1999). To 
achieve this goal, Kim pointed to five possible approaches: first, the reactivation of the 
1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation 
between the South and the North (hereafter the Basic Agreement); second, North 
Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan; third, the 
international community's strengthening of interaction with North Korea; fourth, the 
elimination of WMD from the Korean Peninsula; and fifth, the replacement of the 
Armistice Agreement with a peace regime between the two Koreas (ibid). 
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In fact, the Korean Peninsula has been an empirical test site for a wide range of 
policies and initiatives launched jointly by South Korea and the United States, or 
sometimes independently by South Korea, with the aim of containing or engaging North 
Korea. Nevertheless, all previous policies made only marginal achievements in making 
North Korea abandon antagonistic poJicies towards South Korea and join the 
international community, while only the Sunshine PoJicy demonstrated the potential to 
bring about Jimited but nevertheless significant behavioural change. Building on the 
analysis of the Sunshine Policy, this study defines comprehensive engagement as a 
process in which a status quo power employs all possible means of statecraft to induce 
an enemy state to change its behaviour running against the norms shared by the 
international community. Its ultimate goal is the enemy state's integration into the 
global community as a responsible member. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this study aims to make a contribution to the 
extant literature by clarifying how the process of promoting a fundamental change in the 
behaviour of an enemy state is an interactive process which needs to entail the identity 
shift of the status quo power's policy elites and domestic public vis-a-vis the enemy 
state. This process of building a structure of peace is analogous to what constructivists 
dub 'collective identity formation' in which former adversaries become homogenized to 
the extent that they feel like they share a common fate (Wendt 1999: 343). Moon (1999) 
argues that the Sunshine Policy was rooted in the concept of social exchange that 
precludes an immediate balancing of reciprocal relations such as that in the tit-for-tat 
game, while critics (Levin and Han 2002; Han Y.S. 2002; Ha 2000) warned that the 
policy would end up as unrequited love or appeasement because of its failure to give 
due consideration to the security dimension. This chapter will first illustrate the concept 
of comprehensive engagement, focused on the analysis of the Sunshine Policy, and then 
map out a South Korean decision-making process to examine how this concept was put 
into practice in the context of domestic and international constraints. 
2. Three Levels of Comprehensive Engagement 
As argued in Chapter One, this study contends that an eclectic approach combining 
realism, liberalism and constructivism, but focusing in particular on ideational factors, 
enables us to capture the diverse dimensions of comprehensive engagement. 
Cooperation theories of realism and liberalism, such as hegemonic stability theory and 
regime creation, cannot be applied to the case in point, since they deal mainly with 
interactions within the sphere of a hegemonic power or between friendly states. 
Meanwhile, the constructivist approach to international cooperation is still 
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underdeveloped and cannot give a clear answer to this question of promoting close 
interaction between adversaries. Hook et al. (2001: 38) argue that tight paradigmatic 
frameworks of IR should be jettisoned, and insights from realism, liberalism and 
constructivism combined in order to offer a more profound understanding of different 
forces affecting a state's behaviour, when rightly mixed. Alagappa (1998) notes that, in 
spite of the salience of realism, no single international relations theory is able to capture 
the various features of security practices in Asia. 
If strategies of engagement pursue a behavioural change on the part of an enemy 
state, realism and liberalism, called 'problem-solving theories' (Cox 1981: 128-9), 
cannot address the problems properly because they are based on the fixture of time and 
space, for example, the Cold War template or a clear enemy/friend concept, thus 
tolerating no room for any substantial change in policies or attitudes in the post-Cold 
War situation. Hence, the appropriate use of a constructivist approach, which is keen to 
identify clues to historical change, is indispensable in order to conceptualize 
comprehensive engagement. At this juncture, a constructivist approach demonstrates the 
potential to offer an analytical account of the process of rapprochement between 
adversaries by identifying signs of structural and domestic change and guiding policies 
in the right direction during the murky moments of change, while realism and liberalism 
are apt to solve problems in a rather static international environment. 
The conventional strategies of engagement, epitomized as the right mix of 
inducements and penalties, are based on a simple causal relationship, which has 
limitations when applied to defiant states with their own systems of governance and 
ideologies. History tells that such policies sowed mistrust between the United States and 
its adversaries without bringing any meaningful behavioural change on the part of the 
target states. In fact, strategies of engagement, based on a mix of carrots and sticks, 
were devised based on the Cold War template, whose pressing priority was not the 
enemy state's behavioural change, but the reinforcement of security based on the 
principle of the status quo. With regard to a theory's validity, Cox (1981: 128) insists: 
Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a 
perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, 
specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a 
standpoint definable in teons of nation or social class, or dominance or 
subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of 
present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future. 
Of course, sophisticated theory is never just the expression of a perspective. 
54 
The more sophisticated a theory is, the more it reflects upon and transcends its 
own perspective; but the initial perspective is always contained within a 
theory and is relevant to its explication. There is, accordingly, no such thing as 
theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any 
theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, 
and to lay bare its concealed perspective. 
Under Cox's rationale, problem-solving theories take the constellation of social 
and power relations and institutions as a given and their ultimate purpose is to make 
these established dynamics work smoothly in dealing with sources of trouble, while a 
critical theory questions its origins and scouts for signs of possible change, thus opening 
up the possibility of creating an alternative world based on a different perspective (ibid: 
128-9). Echoing the idea of the division of labour between rationalism and 
constructi vism, Wendt (1999: 367) notes that rationalist models are superior to 
constructivist models if identities and interests are not supposed to change over the 
course of interaction, but constructivist models will demonstrate ample explanatory 
power if they are expected to change. In sum, constructivism provides a ground for 
explaining conceptual shifts to bring about an alternative order, while problem-solving 
theories are designed to devise tactics to maintain the established order (Cox 1981). 
Therefore, constructivism is particularly relevant for the analysis of the Sunshine Policy, 
since this dissertation seeks to illustrate strategies of engagement from the perspective 
of what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888) termed 'strategic social constructivism' in 
which 'actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social 
context'. This section identifies three levels of comprehensive engagement: domestic, 
inter-state and global. The three levels correspond respectively to the three parameters 
of comprehensive engagement: identity shifts, the status quo and integration. In a 
similar way, the three parameters of engagement cover respectively the spheres of the 
social, the politico-military and the economic. In fact, the three parameters, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1, are mutualIy reinforcing in a dialectic manner in the course of deepening 
engagement vis-a-vis an enemy state. 
55 
Figure 3.1 Three Levels of Comprehensive Engagement 
Identity Shifts 
The Status Quo 
Integration 
Source: author. 
This configuration is similar to Cox's (1981:136) three forces interacting in a 
structure: material capabilities, ideas and institutions, as shown in Figure 3.2. In 
conceptualizing strategies of comprehensive engagement, the force of 'material 
capabilities' is exercised in the form of enforcing the status quo, while the clash of 
'ideas', defined as 'collecti ve images of social order held by different groups of people' 
(ibid), leads to identity shifts and normative change in an historical context. If 
'institutions' are 'amalgams of ideas and material power' (ibid: 137), integration is the 
crystallized form of the two parameters of the status quo and identity shifts. To the 
extent that institutions reduce the probabilities of the use of force to resolve conflicts 
(ibid), integration, envisaged by liberals, heightens the costs of defection from 
international cooperation. 
Figure 3.2 Three Interacting Forces in a Structure 
Material 
Capabilities 
Source: Cox (1981: 136). 
Ideas 
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Institutions 
In his analysis of collective identity formation, Wendt (1999: 343-63) also 
mentioned four master variables: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-
restraint. In this framework of comprehensive engagement, interdependence 
corresponds to integration; common fate and homogeneity refer to the process of 
identity shifts; and self-restraint can be understood to mean the status quo. 
2.1. The Domestic Level: identity shifts 
As analyzed in Chapter Two, theories of containment had been created based on the 
Cold War template in which states pursuing democracy and the market economy were 
pitted against those upholding communism. Amid the perception of mutual destruction 
and an escalating arms race, both blocs were caught in a security dilemma, or in what 
Wendt (1999: 274-5) called 'adversary symbiosis'. Partly because of the deeply 
embedded perception of threats and negative identification, the domestic level was the 
least explored and somewhat untouchable sector when theorists or policymakers 
conceived strategies of engagement. Nevertheless, there is an overall consensus that 
domestic support, especially from the parliamentary branch of government, is the key 
for the smooth implementation of any engagement initiative (Haass and O'Sullivan 
2000: l78-81; Litwak 2000: 87-90; Moon 1999: 41-2). In the post-Cold War world, in 
particular, Haass (1999: 7) says that the US administration faced difficulty in building 
domestic political consensus around specific foreign policies, as it finds the assertive 
but decentralized Congress difficult to work with. The situation is compounded by 
heightened media scrutiny, thus making policymakers refrain from embarking on 
controversial policies (ibid). For example, the United States contemplated adopting a 
strategy of 'constructive engagement' towards Iran in 1992, such as the lifting of 
economic sanctions against oil sales, but dropped it eventually because it was pOlitically 
impossible at home (George 1993: 60). As the statecraft of democratic countries has 
long promoted negative identification vis-a-vis enemy states in the form of laws and 
regulations, as well as public propaganda, any significant departure from the 
conventional course of action by state policy elites invited resistance and criticism from 
the parliament and the conservative media. 
This section will venture into the murky cognitive domain of ideas, identities 
and norms, a frontier least developed by theorists and practitioners of engagement. It 
will seek to explain the causal relationship among ideas, identities and norms as the 
rudimentary foundation of comprehensive engagement. This section will draw on the 
tradition of 'conventional constructivism', nurtured by Wendt, Finnermore and Sikkink, 
who are 'largely positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates of 
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bridge-building among diverse theoretical perspectives; the qualitative and process-
tracing case study is their methodological starting point' (Checkel 2004: 230). 
2.1.1. Ideas 
The power of ideas in making policy choices has steadily attracted attention from many 
theorists. I Weber (1958: 280) states: 
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet 
very frequently 'world images' that have been created have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of 
interest. 
In fact, world images, based on identities fossilized in the course of the long span of 
history, have tied up the options of state policy elites when they have attempted to 
launch strategies of engagement that inevitably accompany economic incentives for 
enemy states, as well as punishments. In many cases, they abandoned new initiatives 
over time and returned to the domestically safe conventional policies aimed at 
containing enemy states, resulting in the reproduction of old enmities and 
confrontations instead of opening up new possibilities of resolving the protracted 
conflict of state interests through dialogue. 
The architects of the Sunshine Policy were the protagonists who realized earlier 
than others that the conventional approaches could no longer address the entangled 
inter-Korean relationship, caught in a vicious cycle of dialogue, confrontation and 
crisis.2 They had 'new ideas' about how to alleviate the long-running enmity and pave 
the way for an eventual integration of the two Koreas. In the process of translating their 
ideas into policies, the architects of the Sunshine Policy endeavoured to shift South 
Koreans' identities and their attendant norms vis-a-vis North Korea. 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3) argue that 'ideas influence policy when the 
principled or causal beliefs they embody provide roadmaps that increase actors' clarity 
about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic 
situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in 
political institutions'. Gill (1990: 231) notes that ideas are the key to the understanding 
of political identity and the creation of domestic interests, while Sikkink (1993) and 
I See Checkel 1997; Jacobsen 1995; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Goldstein 1993; and Sikkink 1991. 
2 Long before taking office as president, Kim Oae-jung and his followers championed the idea of 
peaceful coexistence and unification, a depanure from the conventional concept of inter-Korean 
ideological rivalry and competition for legitimacy. See Kim OJ. (1997). 
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Holsti (1962) contend that states react differently to similar material situations because 
they have fundamentally different beliefs about specific circumstances. In 
demonstrating the power of ideas, President Kim and his advisors reacted differently to 
a series of provocative North Korean actions and pursued consistent policies along their 
own roadmap. Thus, the South Korean policy elites, guided by a roadmap based on their 
new ideas, sought to imbue South Koreans with new identities vis-a-vis North Korea to 
reach their goal of inter-Korean reconciliation. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, when President Kim and his followers belonged to the 
opposition party or academia, they were branded as 'communists' or 'socialists', and 
faced prosecution by South Korea's predominantly anti-communist administrations. 
When Kim became president in 1998, they seized the chance to translate their ideas into 
a set of policies to bring about inter-Korean rapprochement. In Checkel's (1997: 130) 
view, the current trend of idea-based research has the potential to explain the anomalies 
left unsettled by structural or interest-based theories. As the Sunshine Policy is based on 
new ideas, therefore, the employment of an ideational approach to analyze it can be 
expected to shed new light. In fact, the Sunshine Policy is an anomaly, if analyzed by 
traditional structural approaches. In particular, these approaches cannot explain the 
ideational motives behind the facts that South Koreans travelled to a North Korean 
mountain resort in spite of an exchange of fire between the naval vessels of the two 
Koreas and the Kim administration risked the deterioration of a traditional alliance with 
the United States in order to keep friendly ties with North Korea. 
2.1.2. Identity Shifts 
As an individual has many identities related to his/her roles, such as brother, son and 
journalist, so a state has multiple identities as an ally, an enemy, a neutral, and so on. As 
different ideologies 'not only coexist, compete, and clash, but also overlap, affect and 
contaminate each other' (Therborn 1980: 79), different identities also find themselves 
interacting incessantly with the result that the boundaries of identity lines become 
blurred. Constructivists argue that the dynamics of international relations are not 
imposed by the international system, as insisted by neo-realists, but are socially 
constructed (Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1992; Dnuf: 1989). These social interactions 
give birth to state identities and interests. Furthermore, constructivists contend that 
identities are malleable and thus subject to change through further social interactions. 
Chafetz et al. (1999) note that repeated social interaction is the key for the transition 
from negative to positive identification. 
When do state identities change then? Chafetz el al. (ibid) stress that a given 
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identity remains robust if it fits the social setting and rewards the actor. Hence, a state is 
compelled to seek a new identity if the given identity, which has become inappropriate 
in the new social setting, does not meet state interests. In the process of pursuing new 
identities compatible with state interests, identities and interests are co-constituted (Hall 
1999: 147). If the interaction goes without interruption, a state comes to regard its 
destiny as tied to that of another state, creating group loyalty which is emotional, rather 
than rational (Hampton 1999: 239). In doing so, the state becomes free from relative 
gains calculations and negative identification with the other state, thus being liberated 
together from the Hobbesian anarchy of the struggle of all against all (Wendt 1994). 
Constructivists have used this process to account for the process of building 
peace and cohesive security communities between democratic countries, rather than to 
explain relations between adversaries. This dissertation aspires to apply this logic to 
relations between antagonistic states, because identities are malleable and state interests 
are also subject to change. In fact, it is hard for state policy elites to promote the general 
public's identity shifts vis-a-vis an enemy state, if the two states find themselves in the 
Hobbesian world of suspicion and enmity, but not entirely impossible if a status quo 
state makes extraordinary efforts. 
A state identifies itself in relation to foreign states as a result of collective 
experiences. For example, South Koreans' identification of North Korea as an enemy 
state dates back to the collective memory of the fratricidal Korean War. However, the 
war was one isolated historical incident. What made South Koreans fortify their 
negative identification vis-a-vis North Korea were not only the actions of North Korea, 
such as a series of attempts to assassinate South Korean political leaders, but also the 
policies and propaganda machines of successive South Korean governments that needed 
the presence of North Korea as an enemy in the process of solidifying their otherwise 
fragile legitimacy. Hence, institutionalized nonns, deriving from negative experiences 
and interactions, give birth to and fortify an enemy identity, as observed in Chapter Two. 
South Koreans' collective identity guided them to adopt specific attitudes 
towards North Korea in the fonn of identity-derived nonns. These nonns, which were 
internalized in the provisions of laws and institutions, such as the National Security Law 
(Appendix II), banned all unauthorized contacts with North Koreans. This law is so 
draconian that it even punishes citizens for praising the North Korean system or 
ideology, and has become the object of criticism from international and domestic human 
rights organizations (Kim and Park 2001). Internalized nonns also guided the South 
Korean government to adopt a tit-for-tat-style strict reciprocity and resort to the tactics 
of threatening military means in resolving the conflict of interests. As the United States 
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demonized the Soviet Union in political hyperbole and expansive rhetoric to win public 
support for its containment policies (Litwak 2000: 87), successive South Korean 
governments reproduced enmity against North Korea during the Cold War by inflating 
the threat the latter posed (Moon 2001: 304). In fact, South Korean laws and institutions, 
which pinpoint North Korea as a prime enemy and threaten to punish any act of 
sympathizing with or supporting North Korea, were mirror images of their North 
Korean counterparts (Lee 1.S. 2000: 111). The Pyongyang regime also maintained laws 
and institutions hostile to South Korea, envisaging the communization of the Korean 
Peninsula as its ultimate goal. 
In retrospect, the existing norms, which restricted all forms of contacts with 
North Koreans, became an obstacle to South Korean policymakers who embodied new 
ideas in the post-Cold War world. These existing identity-driven norms (hereafter 
identity norms) limited the scope of action the government could choose, because the 
society, in a micro-economical sense, was already in a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in 
which it is impossible to make one identity group better off without making the other 
identity group worse off. In fact, the group identifying North Korea negatively enjoyed 
privileges during the Cold War as a ruling class, while those with positive identification 
faced persecution.3 
As identities cannot be switched overnight, a government, upon discovering that 
the dominant identification vis-a-vis an enemy state does not serve national interests, 
needs to embark on a project to dilute and phase out the established identity norms, 
which could eventually lead to identity shifts through positive interaction between 
adversaries. Kowert and Legro (1996: 452) call those norms 'behavioural norms' as 
'behavioural prescriptions for the proper enactment' of given identities. Hence, the Kim 
administration had no choice but to re-educate individuals about North Korea, reverse 
public perceptions, and promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. As trust 
building is of paramount importance in the process of comprehensive engagement (Ha 
2(00), this process of re-education and persuasion might enable the 'killing two birds 
with one stone'. It aims not only to enlarge the domestic support base for an 
engagement policy, but also to convince the enemy state that the status quo power is 
3 As a piece of remarkable evidence regarding the existence of a privileged group based on the 
established identity and its impediment to any reform drive, North Korean Chairman Kim long-iI. 
regarded as a dictator. told visiting South Korean media executives in Pyongyang on 12 August 2000: 
'We have not revised the Workers' Party platform, authored in 1945. Since it was authored in the 1940s 
right after national liberation, it contains a lot of radical expressions. Among the party cadets are those in 
advanced age who worked side by side with the President (Kim II-sung). Therefore. we cannot revise it 
easily. If we revise it, a lot of people working in the sector will have to step down. If we revise the 
platform. they will think I have decided to purge them' (Munwha /lbo. 14 August 2000). 
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serious about launching new policies based on a different identification. If the 
government's efforts are successfully translated into action, the former enemies are set 
to enter into the phase of close interaction, which would help to get rid of the 
established identity norms and eventually lead to the shift of identities between them. 
In fact, it is impossible to engage an enemy state while depicting it as a constant 
source of threats. As the interpretation of threats from enemy states is an inalienable part 
of the identity held by the status quo power and there are no stable identities (Campbell 
1992: 10), the United States has oscillated in implementing strategies of engagement 
vis-a-vis enemy states. In Campbell's (ibid) view, the identity of a state, which is 
'contained and reproduced by foreign policy', serves as the basis for norms by which 
future conduct is judged and threats are translated. Therefore, the practitioners of 
comprehensive engagement need to peddle new identity norms in order to achieve the 
goal of collective identity formation. Only a status quo power is capable of taking this 
step, since an enemy state, like North Korea, alienated by stronger states around it, is 
prone to be gripped by fears and to exaggerate threats from the outside world to 
promote its internal solidarity. In fact, a state needs to change its attitude and behaviour 
first, if it wants to change those of the other state (Home 2001). 
This process of re-education and persuasion is crucial since a democratic state 
cannot pursue a policy without solid domestic support. Having praised some good 
behaviour of an enemy state as a sign of progress in bilateral dialogue and interaction, 
the state then needs to project positive images of the target state to the domestic and 
international public. In fact, the history of the Cold War was a history of vilifying and 
demonizing enemies. Therefore, it is important to launch efforts to give the public a 
balanced picture of enemy states, especially about their strengths as well as their 
weaknesses. A different picture of enemy states and the subsequent interactions with 
them might then lead to a new conclusion that they are no longer enemies. In sum, the 
Sunshine Policy can be seen as a set of identity norms based on a different identification 
of North Korea, just as the 'New Thinking' of the Soviet elites was a 'norm', based on a 
strategic reconceptualization of national interests (Kowert and Legro 1996: 452). 
2.1.3. The Life Cycle of Identity Norms 
A norm is generally defined as 'collective expectations for the proper behaviour of 
actors' or 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Identity politics, guided by identity norms, is a 
logical endeavour by the status quo power to engage an enemy state. As identity norms 
make much more powerful claims on behaviour than causal beliefs (Herman 1996: 285), 
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it is not an easy job for the state elites to embark on this process of shifting identity 
norms. However, the window for a specific policy opens when the state feels the dire 
need to revamp national interests based on established identity norms, the outside 
environment is conducive to the emergence of new identity norms, and an increasing 
proportion of the domestic public is ready to embrace them. 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), international norms evolve in a 
three-stage life cycle: emergence, cascade and internalization, as shown on Figure 3.3. 
This norm life cycle is based on Sunstein's (1997) idea of 'norm cascade', which takes 
place after a 'tipping point'.4 
Figure 3.3 Norm Life Cycle 
Norm emergence 
Stage 1 Tipping 
Point 
'Norm cascade' 
Stage 2 
Source: Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896). 
Internalization 
Stage 3 
However, this thesis finds that the three-stage process of international norm life 
cycle, devised to explain such norms as women's suffrage and the special status of 
medical personnel and those wounded in war, cannot be equally applied to the life cycle 
of norms guiding state identities. Although the identification and measurement of norms 
are a formidable task, this section will explain why and how the life cycle of identity 
norms takes a distinct dynamic, unlike those of international norms. In a small but 
significant departure from the dynamics of international norm life cycle, this thesis 
proposes a stage of 'norm collision' between those of norm emergence and cascade to 
capture the moments when existing and emerging norms are in contention for 
predominance. This modification is indispensable because the shift of identity norms, 
unlike that of international norms, requires structural transformation, such as the end of 
the Cold War, or domestic crises, and the contending identity groups in the domestic 
society are particularly sensitive to the shift of state policies. In sum, this dissertation 
4 In sociology, the tipping point theory suggests that if a certain behaviour, like drug use, rises above a 
certain point. it is set to rise rapidly, reflecting normative changes. 
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argues that identity norms evolve dynamically in four stages: emergence, collision, 
cascade and internalization, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 Identity Norm Life Cycle 
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This thesis does not argue that all identity norms undergo this distinctive four-
stage life cycle. Furthermore, all new identity norms cannot proceed to the stage of 
cascade, if they are not promoted jointly by norm entrepreneurs and an activist 
government in a favourable historical and social setting. s Nevertheless, this study 
contends that new identity norms, as seen in President Kim's Sunshine Policy and 
President Gorbachev's 'New Thinking', emerge and grow in this four-stage life cycle 
through fierce competition with their rival norms, deeply embedded in society. 
~ Norm entrepreneurs are able to 'frame' norms in such a way that they 'resonate' in a given society 
(Nadelmann 1990: 482). Meanwhile, a government could be named an 'activist' government, if it pursues 
a policy with 'an explicit plan of action tailored to serve specific purposes', just like the chancellorship of 
Willy Brandt, who implemented Ostpolitik (Clarke and White 1989: 6-7). 
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Stage 1: Emergence of Identity Norms 
Unlike international norms, which are actively built and promoted by norm 
entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), different identity norms already exist, 
having resulted from diverse interactions between the domestic and the foreign. In this 
stage, individuals or domestic groups, which embrace nascent identity norms 
prescribing unconventional attitudes vis-a-vis an enemy state, exist as minority groups 
in pluralistic societies without a voice in the policy-making process or face persecution 
in authoritarian societies by governments armed with dominant, conventional identity 
norms. The main forces peddling new identity norms or 'norm entrepreneurs' can be 
students, a dissident movement, the church or other actors, based on the positive 
identification with the enemy state. For example, student and dissident movements in 
South Korea, driven by leftist or nationalist ideologies, had been subject to harsh 
crackdowns by law-enforcement authorities for several decades, because, in calling for 
a dramatic increase of contacts and cooperation with North Korea, they clashed with the 
dominant, anti-Communist norms.6 Until the late 1980s, opposition leader Kim Dae-
j ung, who had devised the so-called 'three-stage approach to uni fication', had been 
labelled a 'pro-Communist' and faced persecution by South Korea's military regimes, 
including being kidnapped from Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Kim 
DJ. 1997). In the Soviet Union, dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and a network of 
committed activists, who identified the Western world positively, faced the same fate 
(Herman 1996: 292). Nevertheless, the decline of tension by the end of the 1960s and 
the detente of the 1970s enabled more Russians to positively identify the West, which 
began to be projected as an object of emulation among them owing to freedom and 
material abundance (Zubok 1994). 
As negative identification is institutionalized in the form of laws and regulations, 
it is too early for ordinary citizens to 'bandwagon' the new identity norms.7 In most 
cases, a majority of citizens and media organizations, sharing the same identity norms 
with the ruling elites, are also critical of the behaviour of the groups with new identity 
norms, describing them as rebels or insurgents posing a threat to state security. In a 
sense, the harsh treatment of dissidents reflects the state authorities' inability to embrace 
the diversity of public opinion, and thereby allows new identity norms to gain force 
throughout society to the extent that political or civic groups embodying the new norms 
can be created and consolidated sooner or later. Some members of parliament in the 
6 Chapter Four will deal with South Koreans' identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea in greater detail. 
7 The term. 'norm bandwagons', was coined by Sunstein (1997: 38). 
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establishment also start embracing new identity norms at this stage.8 
Stage 2: Collision of Identity Norms 
The first stage evolves into the second stage of norm collision when new identity norms 
meet the requirements of newly unfolding international and domestic environments. 
Even though international norms are posited to evolve directly from the stage of norm 
emergence to norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), identity norms are destined 
to undergo the stage of collision since, unlike international norms, any shifts in identity 
norms are detected by domestic groups with opposing identities in an early stage, thus 
creating a heated discourse on the national scale. Such international norms as human 
rights and protection of medical personnel in battlefields represent noble causes without 
much bearing on individual actors' well-being. In contrast, the shift of identity norms 
leads to the deprivation of vested interests and privileges enjoyed by the ruling class of 
a state that dwelled in the formerly predominant identity norms, and heralds the 
emergence of a new leadership armed with new identity norms. 
Structural or domestic shocks loosen actors' commitments to existing identities 
and norms, providing 'political capital for the proponents of change within a political 
system' (Kowert and Legro 1996: 473). At this stage, states are obliged to seek new 
identity norms and reconfigure their national interests reflecting the new realities. Since 
a changing international environment offered a window of opportunity to policy 
entrepreneurs (Checkel 1997), the stage of norm collision started on the Korean 
Peninsula with the crumbling of the Cold War template. In South Korea, opposition 
leader Kim Dae-jung, and intellectuals closely associated with him, founded the Kim 
Dae-jung Peace Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Region and the Forum of Democratic 
Leaders in the Asia-Pacific in 1994 to conduct joint research on national reconciliation 
(Kim DJ. 1997). In the Soviet Union, the political, ideological and moral crises of the 
overstretched empire forced state elites to modify their preferences and interests 
(Herman 1996; Checkel 1997), laying the ground for the collision of competing identity 
norms vis-a-vis the West from the final years of the Brezhnev regime. In particular, the 
intellectual community, primarily those belonging to the Institute of the World Economy 
and World Politics, played important roles in offering a radically different framework of 
interpretations for Soviet foreign policy, which did not project the West as an enemy 
(CheckeI1997; Herman 1996). 
At this stage, it is still too early for new norms to achieve dominance over the 
8 For example, an incumbent National Assemblyman was arrested in 1986 for contending 'the nation's 
goal is not anti-Communism, but unification'. 
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established norms. The domestic society starts exhibiting the phenomenon of 'norm lag', 
since a majority of individuals are still guided by the established identity norms as 
dictated by the old structure, such as the Cold War template, despite their search for new 
standards of behaviour. As Sunstein (1997: 37) argues, individuals have little control 
over normative change, thus requiring the intervention of a government. 
Activist Government. In some cases, the stage of norm collision could be divided 
into two phases. The initially murky phase of norm collision enters into a rather 
dynamic phase, when a political group with new identity norms takes power or the 
incoming power elite accepts new identity norms. In the other cases, the two phases are 
merged into one, if an activist government starts norm entrepreneurship immediately 
with the emergence of a new social setting, such as the end of the Cold War or domestic 
cnses. For example, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) kicked off the 
Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) soon after the end of the Cold War and managed to 
establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. In other 
cases, the inauguration of an activist government could be delayed, as President Kim 
took power more than 10 years after the end of the Cold War. Also in the Soviet Union, 
the policy shifts started when President Gorbachev came into power in 1985, although 
the pressures for the introduction of the New Thinking had been present since the final 
years of the Brezhnev era (Herman 1996: 277). 
After the inauguration of an activist government with new identity norms, 'norm 
bandwagons' take place, as individuals feel freer to reject old norms (Sunstein 1997: 38). 
The evolution into the stage of norm cascade, however, is an uphill battle for an activist 
government because the society remains polarized between opposing identity 
communities for the time being, and social groups subscribing to the established identity 
norms are all-out to protect their vested interests stemming from those norms. Unlike 
the dynamics of international norms, the roles of norm entrepreneurs and organizational 
platforms are played by dissidents and opposition political groups in the first phase of 
identity norm collision and by state elites and statecraft in the second phase. President 
Kim and his followers, armed with ideas suggesting a clear roadmap, could remain 
steadfast to the course they had initially set, playing the role of an activist government, 
whi Ie the Clinton administration's efforts to engage North Korea were subject to close 
scrutiny and opposition from the Congress, which virtually terminated the life of 
fledgling identity norms. 
As trust-building is one of the most important variables in forming a common 
identity, the activist government is required to maintain consistency in its policy making 
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and implementation processes. In the past, South Korean presidents had taken office 
vowing to forge better relations with North Korea but backed away whenever they 
encountered troubles caused by the isolated regime or opposition by the domestic 
constituents. Even though an activist government vows to maintain consistency, it is 
almost impossible to remain consistent in every contact and negotiation with the target 
state. The Kim administration also showed tactical inconsistencies and oscillations, 
which hampered the progress of identity shifts.9 
In order to change norms on the domestic front, an activist government could 
use various means, such as education and persuasion (Sunstein 1997: 56). In fact, 
President Kim and his advisors did not spare efforts to convince South Koreans that 
there was no other feasible option than the Sunshine Policy in mellowing North Korea's 
attitude towards the South (Kim 2002; Moon 2001; Kwon 2000; MOD 2000; MOD 
2003).10 Rather than resorting to 'arguing' II in changing people's mind in a polarized 
society, the Kim administration tried to 'persuaded2 the public by making use of their 
privileged institutional platform. 
On the inter-state level, however, a social process, which is able to create a 
communicative environment, is more important than the framing of specific messages 
9 Because of its comprehensive and proactive nature and its aim of bringing about sweeping changes in 
North Korea, the Sunshine Policy could not appeal to the North Korean leadership at first (Suh 2002; 
Choi 2001; Park H.J. 2001; Paik 2000). Against the wishes of South Korean policy makers, the first inter-
Korean official dialogue, held in Beijing in April 1998, ruptured because North Korea, sceptical of South 
Korea's intentions, declined to make a commitment to the exchange of separated families in spite of 
South Korea's willingness to offer a large-scale shipment offertilizer (Chung S.H. 2(01). Since it was the 
first official dialogue. the South Korean government also stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity, losing 
a valuable chance to engage the Pyongyang regime (Lee W.S. 2(03). Later, the Kim government switched 
its tactics from strict reciprocity to flexible reciprocity to pave the way for more inter-Korean contacts. 
10 Discursive dynamics, such as the employment of the Aesop Fable's metaphor 'sunshine', plays a 
significant role in motivating the public to embrace new ideas, thus making contesting discourses and 
policies unacceptable over time. The frequent use of the term, chi5nggyongbulli or the separation of 
economy from politics, also won a commanding position in the inter-Korean discourse, which will be 
analyzed in detail in Chapter Six. For the effect of discourse, see Price (1997). 
II 'Arguing' draws upon Habermas (1984)' theory of 'communicative action', defined as a process in 
which people interact to respond to the crisis of modern society failing to meet individual needs and come 
to reach a reasoned consensus on common actions to address the ills created by modem society. 
According to Risse (2004: 288), 'Arguing constitutes a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new 
information, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and moral knowledge, and - most 
importantly - can reflexively and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and standards of 
appropriate behaviour'. Also see Risse (2000). Nevertheless, Habermas's theory, based on the notion of 
rationality, presupposes and emphasizes the role of consensus, while neglecting the 'politiCS of difference' 
that draws attention to the marginalized identity groups of the society. 
12 The mission of norm entrepreneurs is 'persuasion'. defined as a process by which 'agent action 
becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective' 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 914). The key tool for persuasion is to craft a 'frame' used to 'fix 
meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, 
and propose solutions to ongoing problems' (Barnett 1999: 25). Also see Checkel (2001). 
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(Payne 2(01). Therefore, an activist government needs to create social and institutional 
frameworks leading to the increase of the domestic public's positive interaction with 
those from the target state. As an activist government, the Kim administration promoted 
cross-border exchange and cooperation by streamlining and abolishing practices 
hampering interaction. It championed such new identity norms as 'more contacts', 
'more dialogue' and 'more cooperation' to create the social setting for South Koreans' 
identity shifts and North Korea's voluntary behavioural change (MOD 2003: 36). In the 
course of increasing interactions, both sides became convinced that they were no longer 
enemies, a realization that opened up the possibility of building a common identity. 
In the second phase of norm collision, new identity norms cause the 
psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance by clashing with the existing norms 
and institutions. In the life cycle of international norms, norm violators suffer from 
cognitive dissonance in the stage of cascade, which leads them to change their attitude 
and behaviour in search of self-esteem and conformity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
As far as identity norms are concerned, however, it is appropriate to view cognitive 
dissonance as taking place in the stage of norm collision rather than in the stage of 
cascade, owing to the early detection of state policy shifts by domestic groups with 
opposing identities. Therefore, new identity norms, promoted by state elites in the form 
of state policies, cause individuals, who cling to the established identity norms, to suffer 
from cognitive dissonance even before the tipping point, which is the threshold between 
norm emergence and cascade. 
Stage 3: Norm Cascade 
The third stage of norm cascade, defined as a stage of 'rapid shifts toward new norms' 
(Sunstein 1997: 38), unfolds as the enemy state starts to abandon its antagonistic 
attitude in response to an activist government's successful norm entrepreneurship. A 
majority of individuals change their identities vis-a-vis the enemy state, which in turn 
leads to a surge in mutual exchange and cooperation. Norm cascade is not a unilateral 
process limited to one state, but an interactive one between the two former adversaries. 
Attitudinal changes are motivated through close interactions and parallel reform of each 
other's images and policies. In inter-Korean relations, the historic summit between 
President Kim and Chairman Kim in June 2000 marked the watershed of bilateral 
relations, or a tipping point, which caused ramifications of multi-level dialogue and 
cooperation. As the summit brought profound changes in inter-Korean relations with 
new institutions set in motion and new interests vested in new interests groups 
positively identifying North Korea, Moon (200 1: 316) argues that a return to the old 
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way of doing business is politically and morally unthinkable and unacceptable. In the 
Soviet Union. the Gorbachev administration's unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons, 
withdrawal of troops from East Gennany and toleration of the collapse of communist 
regimes in eastern Europe received a favourable reception in the United States and other 
Western states, creating a momentum for a norm cascade. Russians were convinced in 
terms of redefined national interests and worldview that the motherland was no longer 
an enemy of the Western world, but an important part of it (Hennan 1996). 
As South Korea experienced troubles and setbacks, the process of losing an 
enemy was not easy for North Korea as well. The dilemma of the North Korean 
leadership, which had previously identified Kim as a democratic leader fighting 
dictators in South Korea, was exacerbated because Kim's election as the South Korean 
President removed one of the major rationales for its propagandistic attacks on the 
South Korean government. The Pyongyang regime also feared that his election might 
fan a movement for democratization and power shifts in North Korea (Lee 1.S. 2000). 
Despite its initial hesitation, North Korea started showing signs of emerging from its 
post-Cold War isolation, because its outlaw status plunged it to an endless cycle of 
military and economic crises and the Pyongyang leadership became convinced that the 
Sunshine Policy, unlike those of the previous South Korean governments, might help to 
ease its economic hardship and contribute to regime survival. Since identity shifts 
involve reciprocal steps by the former enemies. North Korea's timely response to the 
Kim administration's efforts to promote identity shifts in South Korean society was 
crucial in creating a positive domestic environment for inter-Korean rapprochement 
(Kim and Park 2001: 327; Kim and Yoon 1999: 108-112; KINU 2000a; KINU 2000b; 
Hwang 2000; Ku 2000). President Kim and his advisors pursued policies aimed at 
eliminating the structural templates of the Cold War such as 'ideology, institution, and 
mind sets deeply embedded in the region', eventually winning the hearts of North 
Korean leaders (Moon 2001: 305; Choi and Jung 2000). 
One hazard in this stage of norm cascade is the possible occurrence of the 
phenomenon called 'norm perturbation'. 13 This phenomenon, which hampers the 
smooth progression of the identity nonn life cycle, may take place when new identity 
norms face what has been identified as 'structural interception'. This temporary 
regression to the Hobbesian structure, epitomized as fear and suspicion of each other, 
unfolds when states involved in the evolution of identity norms come to believe that the 
13 The term. norm perturbation. was originally used to describe a simultaneous existence of different 
norms when an activist government makes efforts to change the existing norms by 'seeding lots of pilot 
projects'(New Yorker. 20-27 October 1997. pp. 170-181). 
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adoption of new identity nonns is not readily translated into the realization of their state 
interests. Even though the possibility of structural interception is endemic in the process 
of identity shifts, it also depends on the propensity of a hegemonic power. For example, 
the United States as a polity requires the presence of an enemy as part of its identity 
creation process (Campbell 1992) or out of the need to maintain its military-industrial 
complex (Wendt 1999). Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union or North Korea 
does not meet the state interests of the United States or at least the sectarian interests of 
certain privileged groups in the United States, identity politics runs the risk of being 
hampered by the power politics of the hegemonic power. Since the presence of North 
Korea as a state attempting to develop nuclear weapons and missiles met the immediate 
interests of the Bush administration seeking to build a missile defence system, the 
resurgence of a North Korean nuclear weapons problem was seen by the South Korean 
leadership as a balancing act by the United States to deter the process of inter-Korean 
rapprochement leading to North Korea's resocialization into the international 
community.14 This phenomenon caused a heated debate among South Koreans about 
whom they believe themselves to be as a polity and whether they should remain docile 
in the anns of US patronage or break free and stay the nationalist course of integration. 
The progress of nonnative evolution also depends on whether an activist government 
could remain in power. 
Nevertheless, as detailed in later chapters, this thesis finds that identity norms in 
the stage of cascade do not go loose overnight but wait for the arrival of a more 
favourable international environment. In some cases, the structural interception may 
offer a valuable opportunity to solidify the 'we' identity between fonner adversaries. In 
his research on the creation of a transnational identity among Italian city states in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Cronin (1999) found that the collective experiences of the city 
states during their fight against the intervening foreign power, the Austrian Hapsburgs, 
helped to create a new national identity among themselves and accelerate the Italian 
integration. In the case of Russia, the positive identification with the West suffered a 
temporary regression when President Boris Yeltsin warned of a looming 'cold war', 
which reflected Russians' trauma reSUlting from its weakened international status and 
internal conflicts over whether it could re-emerge as a master of its own fate (Hennan 
1996). In this mature stage of collective identity fonnation, actors increasingly find 
themselves facing a common fate, which will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 
14 Ironically. West Germany also had diplomatic troubles with the United States in the late 1970s when 
East· West relations deteriorated with Washington discarding the policy of detente. Chancellor Schmidt, 
who was committed to the principles of Ostpolitik, called for more US responsiveness to the 'good 
Brezhnev who is promoting detente and who needs our help' (Dunbabin 1994: 280). 
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Seven. 
Stage 4: Norm Internalization 
The final stage of norm internalization comes in the form of the institutionalization of 
new identity norms vis-a-vis an enemy state. The established laws and regulations give 
way to new institutions reflecting their emerging friendship, partnership or brotherhood. 
South Koreans' identity norms, portraying North Korea as a partner or a brother, have 
not yet reached this stage partly because of the 'norm perturbation' identified in the 
previous stage. Whether they will reach this stage depends on how a norm cascade picks 
up momentum again, since internalization is located only at the extreme of a norm 
cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904). Meanwhile, Russia's integration with the 
global economy rendered obsolete 'the two-camp view' among Russians (Herman 1996: 
275), a proof that new identity norms have reached the stage of internalization. Despite 
the painful restructuring process and economic troubles, Russia, a country which was 
vilified as the 'evil empire' by President Reagan in the 1980s, ended the twentieth 
century as 'a normal middle-income, capitalist economy' (Shleifer and Treisman 2004: 
38). If so, what might be the driving force to make the identity norm cycle proceed to 
the phase of internalization? As constructivists have already found, consistent and 
strenuous entrepreneurship by policy elites in a favourable social setting is behind such 
successful identity shifts, as championed by norm entrepreneurs like Kim and 
Gorbachev. 
2.2. The Inter-State Level: the status quo 
The domestic level of comprehensive engagement, involving identity shifts, might be no 
more than a sand castle if it is not bolstered by a set of policy tools to maintain the 
status quo, because comprehensive engagement is basically a strategy implemented by a 
status quo power in order to ameliorate the behaviour of a target state. As soon as a 
status quo power takes coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, the conceptual 
framework of comprehensive engagement is seriously eroded. Therefore, the adoption 
of coerci ve measures is only a tactical choice to warn an enemy state against launching 
certain actions transgressing international norms. However, the status quo power, once 
on a path of comprehensive engagement, would find it hard to change its course of 
action, because the other two parameters of comprehensive engagement, identity shifts 
and integration, will impede it from deviating from the status quo trajectory. To outside 
observers familiar with the strategic mix of carrots and sticks, this intransigence in the 
choice of policy options makes comprehensive engagement, based on the dialectical 
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interaction of the three levels, look anomalous, if not totally abnormal. As 
comprehensive engagement is a process of building trust between adversaries, the 
mamtenance of the status quo is the only possible strategic option. In fact, enforcing the 
status quo requires an adequate mix of incentives and punishments, as demonstrated in 
the international control of fissile materials or dual-use products through economic 
sanctions. However, the implementation of this approach is heavily inclined to the use 
of incentives rather than punishments, while coercive means are applied only to 
maintain the status quo principle. 
On the part of the enemy state, if it takes over means to shatter the status quo, 
for example, nuclear weapons, this development heralds an end to the engagement 
option, because the other state or a group of the other states are no longer a status quo 
power or status quo powers. Nevertheless, the status quo does not change overnight, 
even though an enemy state obtained nuclear weapons. Although the decision on 
whether the status quo was broken should be made strategically, the simple possession 
of nuclear weapons does not change the overall constellation of power, given the 
overwhelming size of the status quo powers, some of which already possess a large 
arsenal of nuclear weapons, as illustrated by the recent cases of India and Pakistan. The 
decision over whether the status quo is still in shape is also heavily affected by the 
policy elites' identities vis-a-vis the target state. As Wendt (1999: 255) put it, 'Five 
hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean 
ones'. Therefore, North Korea's nuclear weapons, regardless of their number, are 
unlikely to pose imminent threats to the South, if the former is no longer an enemy to 
the latter, as illustrated in the previous section. 
This new interpretation of national security, influenced heavily by the shifting 
identities vis-a-vis North Korea, led the South Korean policymakers to introduce new 
prescriptions for the trauma arising from North Korea's declared possession of 'nuclear 
deterrence'. For them, the North Korean nuclear weapons programme was not the target 
of a surgical strike, but an agenda in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, which could 
be traded with security guarantees and economic benefits (MOU 2003). As their 
identification of North Korea has been shifting from an enemy to a partner or a brother, 
South Korean policymakers were relieved of a perception of imminent threat and terror, 
which in tum made them rule out a military strike as a policy option, unlike Israelis who 
attacked and demolished a nascent Iraqi nuclear weapons site in 1981. 
This section will elaborate on the importance of the status quo as a parameter of 
comprehensive engagement from a constructivist perspective and then identify a set of 
policy tools to maintain the status quo, namely deterrence, limited sanctions and 
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political dialogue. 
2.2.1. A Constructivist Worldview 
As demonstrated in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is not easy for a status quo power 
to renounce military options, when it came to believe that an enemy state was on a 
revisionist course by, for example, attempting to develop WMD. Morgenthau (1948) 
identified the fear of an adversary's potential military attack or steady but significant 
economic growth, which could be translated into military power in the future, as the 
main causes of war. Nevertheless, Wendt (1999: 261) differentiates enemy images into 
'real' ones, as the Nazis were to the Jews, and 'chimeras', as the Jews were to the Nazis. 
In the case of 'chimeras'. a sense of fear is not an adequate interpretation of realities, 
but the product of negative identification based on an ill-conceived worldview or enemy 
images. This section will draw on Wendt's structural constructivism to paint a 
worldview from a constructivist perspective and then refine his approach by introducing 
insight from the English School,15 mainly from Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, since 
Wendt's world remains impoverished despite his improvement of the neo-realist 
worldview. In fact. the English School was one of the main sources of inspiration for 
Wendt (ibid: 247) when he borrowed Wight (1991)'s metaphors of Hobbesian, Lockean 
and Kantian structures. The aim of this section is to highlight why the status quo needs 
to be one of the key principles in strategies of comprehensive engagement for a status 
quo power, when it seeks to transform the dynamics of state-lo-state relations from the 
Hobbesian culture of enmity to the Lockean culture of rivalry. 
Questioning the neo-realist argument that the self-help system is prevalent in the 
international system, defined as anarchy, Wendt (1999) envisions three different 
structures of anarchy, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, and explains how interests, 
norms and identities are internalized in each structure. 16 Wendt (ibid: 247) argues that 
states in each structure view each other as enemies, rivals or friends, respectively, as a 
role determinant. Wendt (ibid: 270) concludes that the Westphalian system is not the 
Hobbesian structure because temporary regression to a Hobbesian condition occurs only 
when a powerful state. such as France (the Napoleonic Wars) and Germany (the rise of 
Hitler), had an internal revolution and jettisoned Lockean norms. Even in these 
examples. what those revisionist states wanted was the surrender of other states. not a 
war (ibid). According to Wendt. those states are also forced to comply with Hobbesian 
15 On the English School. see Wight (1991) and Bull (2002). 
16 Anarchy. referring to a self-help system without any centralized authority. is an ambiguous term 
(Milner 1991). Wendt (1999: 141) uses the term. 'culture'. defined as 'socially shared knowledge'. to 
convey the same meaning as anarchy. 
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norms, because the interests of revisionist states lie in conquering other states. 
In the Lockean anarchy, meanwhile, states recognize each other's sovereignty as 
a right, thus turning it into an institution shared by many states (ibid: 280). Therefore, 
states behave in a status quo fashion toward each other even in the event of conflicts. 
Wars, motivated to conquer other states, are rare and, when they take place, other states 
tend to act in a collective manner to restore the status quo (World War II, the Korean 
War and the Gulf War) (ibid: 283). Hence, the deeply internalized sovereignty norms in 
the Westphalian system make states heavily biased toward the status quo (ibid). 
Finally, friendship in the Kantian anarchy guides states to follow two rules: '(1) 
disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and 
(2) they will fight as a team if the security of anyone is threatened by a third party (the 
rule of mutual aid)' (ibid: 298). These two rules of friendship enable states to form 
'pluralistic security communities' and 'collective security' (ibid). In the Lockean culture, 
states are prevented from conquering other states out of their respect for sovereignty, but 
under the system of pluralistic security communities, states are prevented from even 
attacking, partly because of deterrence or sanctions by status quo states against 
revisionists. If the Kantian culture is deeply internalized, 'states identify each other, 
seeing each other's security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as 
literally being their own' (ibid: 305). In this situation, international interests are their 
own national interests, thus generating other-help. 
In spite of its rich philosophical and historical hue, Wendt's systematic 
constructivism has been subject to criticism from fellow theorists. Ringmar (2001: 285) 
attacked Wendt's constructivism as one-sided because the formation of identities is seen 
only from the perspective of the system, thus ignoring the fact that identity is a problem 
each state and each statesman has to grapple with. Wrever (1998: 94) noted: 
If constructivism works from within instead, it can for instance try to explain 
how a concept like 'Europe' is stabilized by its inner connections to other -
perhaps more powerful - 'we-identities' such as states and nations. This 
demands that one is open to the fact that multiple we-identities overlap. 
Having considered the criticism that his structural constructivism runs the risk of 
reductionism, Wendt (1999: 156) stressed the concept of 'supervenience' as a non-
causal, non-reductive relationship between structure and agency. According to Wendt 
(2004: 3(0). structure could be realized by many different states, but is still supposed to 
supervene on those states in this 'asymmetric, one-way dependence'. 
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This dissertation draws on Wendt's structural constructivism but departs from 
Wendt's arguments that fall short of addressing the shifting identities of individual states 
and their potential impact on structure. 17 Basically, Wendt's three structures are ideal 
prototypes that cannot be operationalized in international politics in which the 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian dynamics unfold simultaneously. IS When the United 
States invaded Iraq, for example, an invasion is a typical form of the Hobbesian 
dynamics, but Britain's involvement in the war to fight the common enemy could be 
interpreted as a form of Kantian dynamics as a partner of collective security. At the 
same time, France, Germany and Russia remained as rivals sceptical of the legitimacy 
of the war, which is a form of Lockean dynamics. 
Wendt (1999)'s claim that today's world, the Westphalian system, is a Lockean 
culture, which might undergo an historically progressive transformation over time into 
the Kantian culture through, for example, collective identity formation, is as vague as 
Waltz (1979)'s argument that the international system is the Hobbesian anarchy 
throughout history. As Smith (2000: 160) pointed out, Wendt's world is devoid of any 
process for the construction of agents, since his attention is focused on the structural 
level that is dominated by a single culture. Wendt also failed to pay due attention to the 
aforementioned multiple realization of different cultures on the structural level at the 
given time, while treating 'structures of interaction' between states as a description of 
the world from agents' point of view. 19 
In a departure from the neo-realist logic that anarchy has only a single logic of 
self-help, Wendt developed a sophisticated theory of social construction by envisioning 
three different anarchies and explaining how identities and norms are internalized in 
each anarchy. However, Wendt (ibid: 246)'s adherence to systematic theory forces him 
to regard states as given and argue that there is only one culture in a given structure at a 
given time in a parsimonious manner, precluding the possibility of the simultaneous 
existence of different cultures on the structural level. Most importantly, Wendt fails to 
explain the contemporary world by contending that this world is a predominantly 
Lockean world of rival states and the temporary regression to the Hobbesian world is 
17 In this line of thought, see Smith (2000). 
I H According to Wight (1977). the best example for the coexistence of the international system. 
international society and world society is the Greek city states. Basically. Greek cities form an 
international system because each city takes into account the behaviour of other cities before making 
deciSIons. However. the cities, at the same time. form an international society. as they are bound by 
common rules. mterests and mstitutions under the pan-Hellenic order. Furthermore. the Greek city states 
are held together by a common culture. effectively forming a world society. For example. Persia was part 
of a single international system with Greek city states. but did not belong to the Greek international 
society. Also see Bull (2002: 14). 
19 See Wendt (1999: 147). 
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exceptional and takes place only when powerful states dump Lockean norms. This 
observation exposes a sizeable fault line in interpreting the reality unfolding in the post-
Cold War world, since it fails to account for the US's frequent military interventions 
worldwide and the prevalence of the self-help system on the part of the target states. 
To better illustrate the simultaneous existence of different cultures on the 
structural level and offer a better analytical account of the configurations of the world at 
the tum of the 21 51 century, this section presents an imaginative map. On this map, 
shown in Figure 3.5, the world, lacking in a singular dynamics tantamount to a Kuhnian 
paradigm, is divided into three different zones, the realist zone, the realist/liberal zone, 
and the liberal zone, even though it does not posit that states, for example, belonging to 
the realist zone or the liberal zone, purely embody the ideals of political realism or 
liberalism. States in the realist/liberal zone are supposed to feature both tendencies 
almost evenly, but still with different proportions. This zoning is also compatible with 
Bull's (2002: 39) argument that the modem international system reflects all three of the 
elements singled out by Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian traditions, as it simultaneously 
represents the elements of war and struggle, trans-national solidarity, and cooperation. 
Figure 3.5 Fractal World Map 
Source: modified from a fractal in Edgar (1990: 77). 
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Therefore, the EU belongs to the liberal zone, while a majority of states in the 
world find themselves in the realist/liberal zone. This classification reflects the reality 
facing the contemporary world, as Keohane and Nye (1977) noted in their seminal work, 
Power and Interdependence, that most situations unfolding in this world fall somewhere 
between the two portraits drawn by realists and neo-liberal institutionalists. In this 
zoning, the United States belongs to the realist/liberal zone, since it is the main player 
acting in accordance with the rules of the international system, resorting to violence to 
resolve conflicts. At the same time, the United States is one of the most developed states 
maintaining close economic interdependence with the rest of the world, bolstered by a 
solid foundation of collective security. In the same vein, China and Russia belong to this 
zone, although their level of interdependence, which started with the end of the Cold 
War, is not mature. Meanwhile, a handful of states, including North Korea, belong to the 
realist zone. Insofar as those states form the realist zone, the Hobbesian culture is an 
endemic part of international life, as those belonging to the realist/liberal zone are 
tempted to resort to Hobbesian norms, as demonstrated in the US's frequent military 
intervention in other states. 
This map employs the metaphor of a mathematical theory, called fractal 
geornetry20 to illustrate the simultaneous existence of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian 
cultures - in the world as a system, in a state as a unit belonging to the system and in an 
individual as an entity belonging to the unit. If we apply this theory to the explanation 
of international relations, as seen in this modified asymmetric fractal world map, the 
image of the international structure, which embodies Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian 
cultures, is reflected in each state, or vice versa, thus meaning that every state possesses 
both realist and liberal features, although their proportions vary. On this fractal map, the 
black lines, forming endlessly repeated octagons, represent the demarcation of state 
boundaries or Hobbesian norms blocking interdependence between states and even 
clogging communication within a state. In a rather exaggerated manner, Europe is seen 
as an entity without borders, 2 I while North Korea appears completely clogged by 
20 According to Lauwerier (1991: Introduction xii), 'Fractals are characterised by a kind of built-in self-
similarity in which a figure, the motif, keeps repeating itself on an ever-diminishing scale. A good 
example is a tree with a trunk that separates into two branches, which in turn separate into two smaller 
side branches. and so on'. Efforts to introduce the concept of fractals to explain human society are 
underway in many fields. For more information. visit the Internet site. 
http;/lwww.geocilies.com/arno 3/4/4-22.html (accessed on 30 December 2002). 
21 Burton's (1972: 43) 'cobweb model' of global structure is in full bloom in Europe, where 'there are so 
many direct communications, or systems, that a world map which represented them would look like a 
mass of cobwebs superimposed on one another, strands converging at some points more than others and 
being concentrated between some points more than between others. The boundaries would be hidden 
from view'. 
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Hobbesian tendencies, evoking the image of a billiard ball. Hence, Europe is an 
anomaly in this predominantly Lockean world of rival states, while North Korea is a 
legacy of the Hobbesian world of the past. As it is a map of imagination, we can 
arbitrarily designate the big octagon in the centre as the United States or North America, 
or the vast territories combining Russia and China. 
Even though it offered a fresh insight by recognizing the coexistence of the 
international system, international society and world society at the given time, the 
English School reached a rather premature conclusion that the whole world is an 
international system, siding with the realist thinkers. If we borrow Wight's (1977) 
metaphor of Greek city states, the unified Europe corresponds to a world society, while 
Europe and a majority of states outside Europe forms an international society as entities 
sharing common rules, interests and institutions.22 For example, they are the members 
of the WTO. Lastly, the whole world, which comprises North Korea, forms an 
international system, or the Hobbesian structure in Wendt's terms. 
Anarchy is another name for chaos (Milner 1991: 69), but Waltz (1979) and 
Wendt (1999) presumes a single dynamics in a parsimonious manner, thus sacrificing 
the explanatory power of their perspectives. If there were only a single dynamics on the 
structural level, states have no reason to make strategic calculations over whether to use 
material power or enter into cooperation. In a nutshell, this dissertation finds it apt to 
conclude that the structure is not realized by a uniform culture but an amalgam of 
competing cultures that exist simultaneously at a given time. Since the structure 
supervenes on agents, it contains the attributes of those agents, which cannot be 
reducible to each agent. This argument of a multicultural structure does not preclude the 
possibility that a single culture could be dominant on the structural level at any given 
time. In fact, we are able to observe that there is a predominant culture, which is 
constantly challenged by the less potent cultures. The Lockean culture has become 
dominant after the end of the Cold War, but the culture of Lockean rivalry is genetically 
unstable since it finds itself somewhere on the enmity-friendship continuum and thus 
runs the risk of being degenerated into one extreme course, enmity or friendship. In this 
vein, Bull (2002: 50) recognized the existence of order in international society, but 
stressed that the order is 'precarious and imperfect'. In sum, the world we see does not 
it In an International society, the minority rule and racial discrimination, which took the form of 
apartheid, is intolerable. as seen in the South African case. This shared norm prompted states to take 
sanctions against the Afrikaner-dominated South African government. an action that had apparently 
eroded their short-term strategic calculations and economic benefits. Ifwe apply Klotz's (1995: 19) 
argument on 'autonomous systemic norms'. such as property rights or racial equality, to this case, 
international society's response to the South African policy could be interpreted as a competition between 
two norms: sovereignty and racial equality. 
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feature homogeneity, but only embodies a dominant culture, buttressed by such an 
institution as sovereignty in the Lockean culture. Since it is only a dominant institution, 
it is challenged by Hobbesian tendencies at some times and Kantian dynamics at others. 
As proof of this argument, we can witness NATO's military intervention in Kosovo or 
the European integration process. Nevertheless, the dominant culture is born, maintains 
its status, and loses its influence through what Wendt (1999: 313-69) defined as a 
process of structural change, highlighted by 'complex learning,23 and internalization of 
norms and identities. 
Drawing a map is an effort to harness reality into the frame of time and space. In 
other words, it shows what the world looks like at a given time and gives a hint as to 
how the world will undergo transformation. History tells us that the maps, drawn at the 
time of the Westphalian system or the Cold War, have different configurations. For 
example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China have apparently 
changed the configurations of the map, as they could be interpreted as political events 
which expanded the realist/liberal zone dramatically. In this vein, the configuration of 
the three zones in Figure 3.5 is a feature that was captured when the status quo is in 
shape in this predominantly Lockean world. When the United States invaded Iraq and 
like-minded states joined the war in 2003, the realist zone became temporarily enlarged 
to engulf all the warring states, turning the Hobbesian culture into the dominant feature 
of this particular world map. 
This form of theorizing could bridge the gap in the discourse between structure 
and agency. While maintaining the respective qualities of structure and agency, this 
theorizing makes room for dynamic interaction and inter-permeability between them. 
Since structure is represented by a dominant culture at a given time, the dominant 
culture constrains the behaviour of individual agents but cannot completely control their 
possible deviation. 
Gi ven all these features of structure and agency, historical transformation could 
not be characterized as Wendt (1999),s linear progression from the Hobbesian structure 
to the Kantian structure via the Lockean structure, but as the transformation of 
proportions and qualities among the three cultures existing simultaneously on the 
structural level, with the Hobbesian culture losing the share of the past and the Kantian 
culture gaining vigour over time. 
A map on the three different zones might still be a simplified view of the world 
with multiple characters. However, this thesis finds it efficacious to illustrate the global 
21 In contrast to 'simple learning' that results in behavioural change, 'complex learning' constructs 
identities and interests. See Nye (1987). 
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distribution of three major forces: material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox 
1981). The different proportions of both realist and Ii beral tendencies mean that each 
state or zone has different identities, which are in tum expressed in the form of realist or 
liberal tendencies on the structural level. Wendt (1999: 170) notes: 'To have an identity 
is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation, and as such the 
concept of identity fits squarely into the belief side of the desire plus belief equation'. 
Therefore, identities can correspond to regime types, like capitalist states, fascist states 
or monarchical states (ibid: 226). In other words, fascist or monarchical states show 
strong realist tendencies, while capitalist states exhibit inclinations towards 
interdependence in a liberal manner or towards dependency in a Marxist manner in 
which their aim might be the exploitation of those in the periphery. Ruggie (2000: 34) 
explains the way each state with a given identity interacts at the international level by 
noting that the world is a structure made up of 'socially knowledgeable and competent 
actors who are subject to constraints that are in part material, in part institutional'. Even 
though individual states could feature distinct behavioural patterns vis-a-vis a foreign 
state, their membership in each zone and internalized identities and norms also serve as 
a standard of behaviour. As an expression of their collective identities, for example, 
European states, which find themselves in the liberal zone, are less inclined to use 
coercive measures against such states as Iraq and North Korea in comparison with the 
United States. 
If the United States and a majority of states in the realist/liberal zone resort to 
forcible means to resolve conflicts of interests, the whole world might return to the 
Hobbesian culture. If the European experiment eventually succeeds and other states 
follow in the footsteps of Europe, this phenomenon, once considered an anomaly, could 
take over the status of quasi-universality. It might be interesting to witness who will 
eventually win the bet between Keohane (1993: 297), who predicted the success of the 
European integration project, and Mearsheimer (1990), who warned the world of a 
dawning crisis in his famous article, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the 
Cold War'. 
Any given structure is subject to transformation since interactions between 
agents belonging to the different cultures create what Bull (2002) defined as 'tension'. 
We can witness the prevalent tension between the Lockean culture and the Hobbesian 
culture. Though smaller, there are also some forms of tension between the Lockean 
culture and the Kantian culture, as demonstrated by one between the United States and 
some EU states, such as France and Germany, which were generally reluctant to 
mobilize force to resolve the Iraqi issue despite the pressure of the United States. When 
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the United States embarked on the path towards war with Iraq in 2003 in an ultimate 
expression of its material power,24 Europe, the liberal zone, witnessed not only 'a great 
divide' in its relations with the realist/liberal zone, represented by the United States, 
(New York Times, 18 February 2003), but also a serious division within its own zone 
into Old and New Europes (New York Times, 13 February 2003).25 
Despite its normative supremacy in this predominantly Lockean world, the logic 
of the status quo has frequently been challenged by the United States resorting to 
coercive actions to address conflicts worldwide and by Europe seeking to solidify the 
grand scheme, similar to Burton (1986)'s 'global society'. Given the dominant but still 
precarious status of Lockean norms and the potent residue of the Hobbesian norms of 
the past, this dissertation argues that the status quo principle vis-a-vis an enemy state is 
a desirable option for a status quo power, since it is crucial for the creation of an inter-
state environment for the target state's voluntary change and integration with the rest of 
the world. In this line of thought, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's 
subsequent economic interdependence with the Western world are defined as a salient 
example of the simultaneous realization of this dissertation's twin ideas of the status quo 
and integration on the basis of identity shifts. This approach is similar to the 'gradualist, 
non-revolutionary methods' taken by the Fabians in the process of promoting social 
democracy in Britain (Britain 1982: 269). 
2.2.2. Tools for Maintaining the Status Quo 
The aforementioned worldview is the guiding principle In devising policy tools to 
implement the politico-military level of comprehensive engagement aimed at 
maintaining the status quo. The most decisive way of settling disputes with enemy states 
is the mobilization of force, because they are not prone to cave in to the outside 
diplomatic pressure or coercive means short of war. This was what the international 
24 This shift of US policies from containment to dominance was clearly seen in President George W. 
Bush's 31-page strategic statement to the Congress, titled 'The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America' (Washingtoll Post, 21 September 2(02). The report called for the unilateral, pre-
emptive use of force to protect the United States from potential attacks by 'rogue states', such as Iraq and 
North Korea. In spite of US assertiveness, the trans-Atlantic schism is partly due to the relative decline of 
American hegemony over other states (Kennedy 1988; Calleo 1987; Bell 1976; Rosecrance 1976), 
especially over key European states, although the United States sustains its relative preponderance in four 
structures of the world economy: security, production, monetary and knowledge structures (Strange 1987; 
Gill 1990), Since Gaddis (2003: 175) argues that 'authority relies on legitimacy' and 'hegemony rests 
upon a foundation of consent', the Bush administrated has apparently sacrificed its authority and 
hegemony in its pursuit of a questionable form of 'justice', 
25 The Ne ..... York Times (4 June 2(03) quoted the director of a survey firm, which conducted a poll in 21 
countries. as saying: The war had widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further 
inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global 
public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era - the U.N, and the North Atlantic alliance', 
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community witnessed during the 1990-1 Gulf War and the following war against Iraq in 
2003. Nevertheless, the notion of comprehensive engagement rules out the use of 
military action as a means to resolve conflicts, since there are other ways to serve the 
same purpose. In fact, the questions of legitimacy and civilian suffering arose over the 
use of military force even against a despotic leader, like Iraq's Saddam Hussein. 
Sandole (1988: 39) argued that it would be in the best joint interests of all actors to 
pursue cooperative resolution of their conflicts, given the high costs of destructive 
conflict. Rosecrance (1986: 88) noted that the contemporary world's destructive power 
had made large-scale territorial ambitions an impossible strategy, unlike the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries that represented the 'apex of the military political system'. 
Then what are the next possible means of preventing crises and maintaining the 
status quo? Snyder and Diesing (1977: 10) note that the 'central problem of crisis 
statesmanship is how to achieve an optimum blend of coercion and accommodation in 
one's strategy, a blend that will both avoid war and maximize one's gains or minimize 
one's losses'. Nevertheless, the so-called 'carrot-and-stick' policy, used by the South 
Korean government during President Kim Young-sam's five-year tenure (1993-8), was 
ineffective in changing North Korea's behaviour, sporadically heightening crises on the 
Korean Peninsula. The attitude of North Korea or Iraq shows that these states are 
particularly resilient against the threat of force even by a superpower like the United 
States. 
Then comes a peaceful conflict resolution based on the principle of the status 
quo, although this approach always takes time and its feasibility is constantly under 
close scrutiny and criticism by hard-liners. Nevertheless, the status quo principle, if 
pursued jointly with identity shifts and integration, could serve as an important pillar for 
strategies of comprehensive engagement. In fact, the maintenance of the status quo is an 
interactive process, because South Korea's efforts to maintain the status quo on the 
Korean Peninsula are not feasible unless the Pyongyang regime makes equally 
strenuous efforts to survive as an independent state. Taking into account North Korea's 
identity, as well as regime durability, South Korean policymakers sought ways to 
establish a structure of peace as part of their efforts to guarantee the coexistence of the 
two Koreas without a military crisis (Moon 2001). Basically, the status quo power needs 
to adopt measures to thwart any revisionist action by the enemy state, while 
endeavouring to alleviate its security concerns that it might be absorbed in the course of 
expanding interactions. This section will identify three tools for the maintenance of the 
status quo: deterrence. limited sanctions and political dialogue. By preventing crises and 
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'transforming,26 conflicts, these tools help to forge an international environment for the 
resocialization of enemy states. 
Deterrence. As comprehensive engagement is defined as a policy employed by a 
status quo power, any significant change in power constellations, shattering the status 
quo, leads automatically to an end to engagement. Therefore, Neville Chamberlain's 
policy towards Nazi Germany was not called engagement, but appeasement, because 
Britain was not a status quo power both economically and militarily, which could 
enforce the rules of the game vis-a-vis the Third Reich. Even though a state, which 
embarks on strategies of comprehensive engagement, enjoys the position of a status quo 
power, any engagement policy must start on the basis of a strong sense of deterrence. 
Without any strong commitment to its interests and a clear-cut warning against any 
action infringing on its interests, the status quo power might give a wrong signal by 
employing strategies of engagement and invite an enemy state to launch an attack to 
shatter the status quo, as Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 against US interests (George 
1993: 71-8). 
In implementing comprehensive engagement vis-a-vis an enemy state, therefore, 
deterrence is the bedrock for the maintenance of the status quo. As North Korea is 
basically a revisionist state dissatisfied with the current status quo, the outside world 
needed to implement a wide range of measures, employing both military power and 
psychological warfare. As seen in the inter-Korean exchange of fire between naval ships 
in the West Sea in 1999 and 2002, analyzed in detail in Chapter Six, the South Korean 
military needed to thwart territorial encroachment by North Korea by military means, an 
incident that demonstrated the principle of in-kind response and specific reciprocity in 
the event of military provocation (Moon 2001). At the same time, the South Korean 
government demonstrated its strong alliance with the United States based on the Mutual 
Defence Treaty and held joint military exercises (ibid). In this vein, the Sunshine 
Policy's first principle, 'no tolerance of armed aggression', is aimed at conveying a 
strong message of deterrence to North Korea, because the signalling of its willingness to 
employ military means to keep its interests is one of the key requirements of deterrence 
(KINU 2000b; George and Smoke 1974). In the course of exercising deterrent measures, 
however, the status quo power is required to act in order not to escalate an isolated 
warfare into a major one. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to take an optimal level of deterrent measures, since 
states suffer from a wide range of predicaments and security dilemmas such as fear, 
26 In most cases, conflicts are not resolved. but transformed (Miall et al. 2000: 21). 
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suspicion and relative gains dilemma, imposed by an anarchical international order. 
Logica11y, the first step for a status quo power to take to transform an enemy state is to 
ameliorate its dilemmas, although realist theorists are unlikely to agree with this idea, 
because they believe these dilemmas are intrinsic among states in the anarchical 
international system. 27 North Korea is a state gripped by fear of a possible outside 
attack because of its dwindling state capabilities in both military and economic terms. In 
this situation, the primary goal of the North Korean government was not political 
domination or economic growth, but survival in an adverse environment (Kang 1998: 
257). On the basis of this observation, the Kim Dae-jung government did not give much 
significance to North Korea's military provocations and maintained its economic 
engagement in order to avert possible col1apse. 28 The Kim government focused on 
preventing a crisis since it also took into account the fact that North Korea's military 
firepower was deadly enough to tum Seoul into a 'sea of fire' anytime it wants.29 Once 
a dispute escalates into a crisis, it believed North Korea, caught in a security dilemma, 
might be forced to resort to military means, which are simple and clear-cut, rather than 
any other options. At the same time, it could not be ruled out that hard-liners in South 
Korea might resort to military means, which might escalate tension in an irreversible 
manner. 
In fact. South Koreans also suffered from similar security dilemmas. Han (1998: 
125) argued that inter-Korean relations represented a textbook case of security 
dilemmas. The five major security agendas that have to be addressed by South Korea 
are the prevention of war; the prevention of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear 
weapons; the implementation of policies addressing North Korea's fear of collapse; 
conventional arms control; and multilateral arms control and security cooperation (ibid). 
Jervis (1976: 424) pointed out that states regard other states as more centralized and 
calculating than they are, while perceiving others' actions as autonomous rather than 
reactive to their own actions. In the past, South Korean policymakers had this 
perception of North Korea and took strong counteraction.3o Even though it is highly 
27 Jervis (1976: 82) noted: 'The security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated'. 
28 In his book. Korean Endgame (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Selig Harrison shows 
how the ill-based scenario of North Korea's possible collapse paralyzed US policy. In fact. an absolute 
majority of publications predicted North Korea's imminent collapse after the death of North Korean 
leader Kim II-sung. but recent books. like Harrison's. started to foresee North Korea's gradual opening up 
and transformation. which will help the regime to survive the current economic hardship. 
29 The threat was issued by Pak Yong-su, chief North Korean delegate. during an inter-Korean dialogue 
in 1994. escalating tension on the Korean peninsula. 
lO One of the cases is the 1996 North Korean submarine infiltration into South Korean waters. See the 
opposing views at the websites. www.koreascope.orglenglishisub/2/nklO 7.htm and 
www.kimsQft.com/korea/nk-sub.htm (accessed 15 August 2(03). 
85 
risky to mistake an enemy for a friend, but not so costly to take a friend for an enemy, 
Jervis (ibid) argues that the cost of overestimating the other state's hostility is also high. 
As a prescription for this dilemma, he (ibid: 82) stressed that actors should care about 
the way the others feel and make efforts to develop trust for mutual benefit by noting: 
'The first step must be the realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, that 
they are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires'. 
Then, how should states deal with weapons possessed by an enemy state? Jervis 
(1976: 83) argues that if each side is freed from its unwarranted fear of the other, it is 
permissible to maintain some level of arms in order to grant both sides a reasonable 
means for deterrence. On the Korean Peninsula, permitting North Korea to keep its 
conventional weapons is inevitable for mutual deterrence, although its WMD should be 
traded for the outside world's secure guarantees (Kim K.N. 2002a). In fact, North 
Korea's admittance of a nuclear weapons programme could be seen as a response to 
President George W. Bush's State of the Union address in January 2002, when North 
Korea, Iraq and Iran were designated as states constituting the 'axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world,.31 As analyzed in Chapter Seven, North Korea is 
believed to have spurred its secret nuclear weapons programme in violation of the 1994 
agreement with the United States, since it had no option but to resort to the self-help 
system in the face of threats of an attack by a superpower which denies its existence. 
Harrison (2002: 277-8) claims: 'The North is likely to accept limits on its missile 
program only in return for changes in aspects of the U.S. conventional military presence 
that it regards as threatening, and the willingness of the United States to modify its 
nuclear posture will critically affect whether and when Pyongyang gives up its nuclear 
option'. Noting that the real question is not what North Korea will do, Harrison (ibid: 
270-71) advised the United States to give up its threat to use nuclear weapons against 
North Korea as a policy option first, thus inducing North Korea to surrender its nuclear 
weapons. In this vein, the Kim administration did not pay much attention to the 
reduction of conventional weapons, but focused on the elimination of North Korea's 
nuclear weapons programmes. 
Limited Sanctions. Engagement does not rule out the imposition or threat of 
sanctions (Suettinger 2000: 28; Reissner 2000: 46). Since certain types of economic 
cooperation, including the export of militarily sensitive technologies, can quickly 
change a military balance (Liberman 1996), embargoes on such items as dual-use goods 
31 The text of the address is available at the White House Internet site: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2oo2/01l2oo20129-ll.html(accessed 12 December 2002). 
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are an important tool for the maintenance of the status quo. As observed in Chapter Two, 
the United States imposed a total embargo on exports to North Korea right after the 
breakout of the Korean War. A wide range of sanctions, under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act, had been 
in force for five decades, virtually isolating North Korea from the international 
community. It was in 1999 when President Clinton lifted restrictions on trade, travel and 
banking against North Korea in return for North Korea's declared moratorium on 
ballistic missile tests. Despite the lifting of some sanctions, Rennack (2003) said that the 
US administration kept other sanctions against North Korea for four primary reasons: 
'(1) North Korea is seen as posing a threat to U.S. national security; (2) North Korea is 
designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international 
terrorism; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; 
and (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'. Under the criteria, the United States 
restricts 'some trade, denies trade in dual-use goods and services, limits foreign aid, and 
opposes entry into or support from international financial institutions' (ibid). 
Since his inauguration, President Kim requested the United States to lift 
economic sanctions against North Korea in a consistent manner to pave the way for the 
North's resocialization into the international community (Park K. Y. 2001: 73). In fact, 
Kim was responding to North Korea, which criticized the US government for inflicting 
the current economic debacle through its decades-long imposition of economic 
sanctions. Even though it had raised no objection to the imposition of sanctions on the 
trade of military products and dual-use goods, the Kim government called on the United 
Slales to hft restrictions to facilitate North Korea's entry into such international 
financial organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), but to no avail (Moon 2001: 312). 
The Kim government's position is based on the conviction that the use of 
economic sanctions against the world's arguably most closed economy could not bring 
about any tangible effects (Elliott: 1997: 100). The problem has been further 
compounded as North Korea has been ruled by an authoritarian government, which is 
less responsive to the pain inflicted by economic sanctions than a democratic 
government (ibid: 106). In particular, the United States exhausted almost all possible 
leverages as it has virtually banned all trade and financial ties with North Korea since 
the Korean War. Therefore, any US attempt to impose economic sanctions requires 
international cooperation, particularly support from North Korea's neighbouring 
countries. However, China has been very reluctant to join other countries in introducing 
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sanctions against its socialist ally (Kim S. 1999). One exceptional step was its three-day 
suspension of oil shipment to North Korea in March 2003 in an attempt to press the 
North to agree on a three-way dialogue to diffuse the nuclear weapons tension (New 
York Times, 16 April 2(03). However, it was a symbolic step and China still remains the 
most recalcitrant state, as far as the imposition of economic sanctions is concerned. 
The effectiveness of a sanctions strategy depends on what North Korea really 
wants by attempting to develop nuclear weapons. If North Korean leader Kim wants to 
use them as a bargaining chip in its endeavour to revive its moribund economy, a 
combination of carrots and sticks will work to enlist his cooperation in resolving the 
nuclear issue. If he wants to keep nuclear weapons as a vital means of deterrence, 
however, any attempt to impose sanctions will only expedite the North's secret 
programme (Elliott: 1997: 109). Therefore, the resolution of the nuclear weapons 
problem is possible only through the alleviation of North Korea's security concerns. 
Political Dialogue. Once deterrence and limited sanctions are in force, the next 
step is to launch dialogue, both official and unofficial. In fact, previous South Korean 
governments managed to open dialogue with the North Korean regime, but could not 
maintain it to produce tangible results. To forge an atmosphere for dialogue, the status 
quo power needs to reshape its attitude towards the enemy state. One remarkable step 
the Kim administration took before and during dialogue was to show respect to the 
Pyongyang regime. According to Wendt (1999: 171), 'Actors learn to be enemies, for 
example. by being treated by others in ways that do not recognize their right to life and 
liberty'. Meanwhile. positive image emerges from mutual respect and recognition, 
especially through the recognition of sovereignty, which means a state has an equal 
status in the eyes of other states (ibid: 237). Prior to the inter-Korean summit in June 
2000, President Kim kept praising North Korean Chairman Kim as a reliable leader. For 
example. Kim stated in an interview with Japan's Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) on 
9 February 2000: 'I understand that Kim Jong 11, general secretary of North Korea 
Workers' Party, has good judgment and insight as a leader' (Park K.Y. 2001: 85). The 
comment, made on the eve of an announcement on the inter-Korean summit, apparently 
helped North Korea to change its attitude in a reciprocal manner and to pursue its course 
of dialogue with the South. Even in the middle of a controversy over Pyongyang's 
nuclear weapons programme, President Kim called Kim Jong-il the 'most intelligent' 
leader (Financial Times, 25 January 2(03). 
Political dialogue, especially at the highest levels, is important because North 
Korea is a state that fits nicely into the realist mould of a unitary actor which denies 
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penetration by the outside world. Although Scott (1965) noted as long ago as the mid-
1960s that states are being penetrated to an unprecedented degree in the contemporary 
world, the North Korean 'billiard ball' is not the case. It is true that some forms of 
penetration are taking place in North Korea, as non-governmental organizations (NGDs) 
are increasingly engaging in humanitarian activities to feed starving North Koreans. 
However, it is hard to define it as a genuine form of penetration because these activities 
are under tight state control. 
Because of North Korea's closed state system, the most appropriate option is to 
open the highest-level channel of dialogue, preferably a summit meeting, which would 
reduce the 'ratification' process of Putnam's (1988) 'two-level game.'32 Former US 
ambassador to South Korea, Donald Gregg, who called North Koreans 'rank-conscious', 
supports this approach. Gregg cited a North Korean vice minister during a meeting in 
Pyongyang as saying, 'you know, you and I get along very well, but you and I can't 
solve these problems. It's got to be somebody at a much higher level' ,33 A summit is 
not merely a meeting between top leaders, since the various stages of organizing a 
summit, including preparations, the meeting itself and the follow-up process, involve 
multiple contacts and negotiations between the two sides (Han Sung-joo 2001: 192-3). 
It is also recommended to expand channels of dialogue to enable the state to express its 
possible grievances through dialogue, not through violent means. 
Therefore, South Korean policymakers put priority on the opening of 
government-level dialogue, preferably a summit, rather than approaching the other 
sectors of North Korean society (Levin and Han 2002). They showed a lack of 
enthusiasm over the resumption of the idling four-party peace talks, which involve 
assistant minister-level officials from North and South Korea, the United States and 
China.34 The Kim government kept the process of organizing the summit secret partly 
because of the possible intervention of the powerful opposition party and media 
organizations, as well as the neighbouring powers. In fact, the success of inter-Korean 
n According to Putnam. there are two levels in negotiations: international and domestic. The term 
'ratification' means the domestic process in which proposed international deals are approved or rejected 
by the pertinent domestic constituents. 
:1:1 This interview with Gregg was conducted by Bernard Gwertzman. consulting editor for the Council on 
Foreign Relations on March 7. 2003. It is available from www.cfr.org (accessed 15 April 2003). 
34 In a reply to a lawmaker at the National Assembly. Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong said, The four-
party talks had been held a few years ago when there was no channel of dialogue with North Korea. Now 
that South and North Korea operate various channels of dialogue, I don't find it useful' (Yonhap News 
Agency, 30 December 2002). The four-party talks, aimed at replacing the current Armistice Agreement. 
which ended the Korean War. with a peace treaty, was once lauded as the sole channel of strategic 
dialogue between the United States and China. although the topic of the meeting was confined to the 
replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. 
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dialogue, Just like inter-German dialogue before unification, depended on how to 
maintain secrecy regarding details of agreements because the South needed to save the 
face of the North (KINU 2000b: 75). 
2.3. The Global Level: integration 
All major wars in the past, including the Napoleonic wars or World War II, were 
provoked by revisionist states which, dissatisfied with the status quo, pursued territorial 
ambitions. However, the post-Cold War era, which witnessed the triumph of democracy 
and the market economy, has more or less tamed states' territorial ambitions and 
motivated them to pursue economic ambitions, thus creating a world of close 
interdependence and integration. Even in the case of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
the Bush administration endeavoured to foster democracy and the market economy and 
devise an effective 'exit strategy' rather than to prolong territorial occupation. 
As argued in the previous section, integration is closely linked to the progress of 
the other two levels of comprehensive engagement: the status quo and identity shifts. As 
the ultimate goal of comprehensive engagement is the enemy state's resocialization into 
the global community, the process requires the construction of a structure of peace to 
induce a fundamental change in the enemy state (Han Sung-joo 2001). 
The schemes of integration by liberals and constructivists converge in their 
emphasis on how state or regional identities affect the process. Ikenberry (2001a: 402) 
said that the expansion of economic, political and security bonds would help to create a 
sense of common political identity, thus facilitating interdependence and integration. 
Wendt (1999: 364-5) hinted at the convergence of liberalism and his theories in 
explaining interdependence, although he noted that liberal democracy is not the only 
pathway to a Kantian culture. Unlike realists, who believe interdependence might 
increase a state's vulnerability, liberals and constructivists believe that interdependence 
helps to foster a common identity. In sum, the two theories are mutually complementary 
in explaining the creation of an interdependent entity with a common identity. 
However, the process of engaging an enemy state is not analogous to 
industrialized states' efforts to create a well-articulated regime or institution. Therefore, 
the initial stage of integration with an enemy state is possible through the asymmetrical 
exploitation of cheap labour or natural resources, i.e., oil in Iraq or tourism in North 
Korea, or in the form of economic assistance or compensation for the dismantlement of 
WMD. These economic and humanitarian actions are analogous to what Ikenberry 
(2001 a) describes as efforts to 'open up' and 'tie down' an enemy state. 
Since this dissertation deals with strategies of engagement with an enemy state, 
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regime and integration theories have only a limited explanatory power. Nevertheless, 
many theorists analyzed inter-Korean economic cooperation from the perspectives of 
integration theories. Therefore, this section will first review integration theories and 
constructivists' contributions to them before identifying the tools for an enemy state's 
integration into the global economy. 
2.3.1. Integration Theories 
Since many scholars defined the Sunshine Policy as a functionalist or neo-functionalist 
approach aimed at integrating the two Koreas (Moon 1999; Kim and Yoon 1999; Ku 
2000; Park K.Y. 2(01), this section will first review the theory of functionalism. 
Preached by David Mitrany, functionalism departs from the conventional approach to 
political conflicts and prevention of war, since it did not try to approach war and peace 
directly by 'organizing around the points of national conflict', but indirectly by binding 
together the common interests of the states involved (Claude 1971: 380).35 In principle, 
functionalism recommends the logical course of taking up the less difficult job first 
before tackling the harder ones. In Mitrany's (1966: 38) terms, functionalism is an 
approach which could 'overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international 
activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the 
natIons would be gradually integrated'. As Haas (1964: 6) notes: 'Functionalists, in the 
specific sense of the term, are interested in identifying those aspects of human needs 
and desires that exist and clamour for attention outside the realm of the political'. Haas 
(ibid) calls for the need to weave an ever-spreading web of international institutions, 
starting initially with the less controversial issue areas and then moving to the political 
sphere. Claude (1971: 384) singles out two underlying theses in functionalism: the 
separability-priority thesis and the ramification or spill-over thesis. The former assumes 
that it is possible to separate economic and social dimensions from political ones. Under 
35 Claude (1971: 381-2) notes the three basic assumptions and prescriptions of functionalism as follows: 
First. war is viewed as an objective condition of human society. rather than man's native instinct. in a 
departure from the perspectives of realists who attribute the causes of war to human factors, such as fear. 
Hence. such factors as poverty. misery. ill health. illiteracy, economic insecurity. social injustice. 
exploitation and discrimination are regarded as the underlying causes of war. Once the causes are defined, 
the prescriptions for these symptoms are also clear: the elevation of living standards and attainment of 
higher levels of health. literacy and social justice. Second, functionalism attributes war to the institutional 
inadequacy of the states system in its belief that states are increasingly inadequate organizations to handle 
and promote the economic and social health of mankind. Therefore, functionalism calls for the demolition 
01 the artlticlal ZOning arrangements of nation states in favour of organizing layers of social nets in 
accordance with their particular requirements. Third, functionalism calls for an overhaul of man's attitude. 
habit and feeling on war. as well as allegiances fostered by the states system. It envisages a world in 
which loyalties will be shared by states and international organizations capable of providing commodities 
that states are no longer able to offer. 
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this assumption, functionalism stresses that the treatment of economic and social 
problems should take priority. The other thesis presumes that economic or social 
interactions could develop into political ones. 
The priority of politics in the Cold War era, marked by the rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, gave birth to neo-functionalism, notably in the 
works of Haas (1964) and Lindberg (1963). As Claude (1971: 405) says, 'If some 
version of political unity should develop in Western Europe, this happy result will have 
to be entered on the record not as a political by-product of economic and social 
cooperation but as a consequence of the skilful use of such cooperation as a political 
tactic, a consciously adopted means to a political end'. 
The Sunshine Policy has many parallels with the functionalist or neo-
functionalist approach. Under what he termed as a 'flexible dualism', Moon (1999: 39) 
summarized the functionalist side of the Sunshine Policy as follows: '(1) Easy task first, 
and difficult tasks later; (2) Economy first, politics later; (3) Non-governmental 
organizations first, government later; (4) Give first, and take later'. As previous South 
Korean governments failed to resolve the inter-Korean stalemate partly because of their 
adherence to the principles of 'government first, civil society later', 'politics first, 
economy later' or 'political-economic linkage', and 'the primacy of mechanical 
reciprocity', Moon (ibid) noted that President Kim's 'incremental, pragmatic and 
functionalist' approach symbolizes a paradigm shift in Seoul's policies towards 
Pyongyang. The Sunshine Policy also encouraged North Korea to promote cooperation 
with the international community in pursuit of its own interests rather than to 
compromise its interests. As Claude (1971: 386) observes, '[fJunctionalism proposes not 
to squelch but to utilize national selfishness; it asks governments not to give up the 
sovereignty which belongs to their peoples but to acquire benefits for their peoples 
which were hitherto unavailable, not to reduce their power to defend their citizens but to 
expand their competence to serve them'. 
Though a neo-functionalist approach reflected the ideas of President Kim and 
his advisors, real inter-Korean integration, albeit in a fledging state, failed to follow the 
envisioned nexus between the government and the civil society and between politics 
and economy. In the Korean situation, the neo-functionalist metaphor of spill-over did 
not proceed smoothly, partly because each pressure for spill-over has been closely 
monitored and checked by the North Korean government, still stuck in a realist 
penchant for survival and security (Park M.L. 2000: 159; Ku 2000: 163). In this sense, 
intergovernmentalism is amply relevant in the Korean situation. because all efforts have 
been made through direct or indirect negotiations between the two governments 
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representing North and South Korea in the absence of a supranational body. 
Intergovermentalism, associated with the work of Hoffman (1966), is a realist 
integration theory, which stresses the role of state governments in supervising the 
direction and pace of integration. In a rebuttal of the neo-functionalist spill-over thesis, 
Hoffman (ibid) notes that national governments control the possible spill-over to areas 
of high politics, while tolerating it in areas of low politics, where spill-over does not 
directly affect national interests. 
Furthermore, the Korean situation has, from the beginning, denied the formation 
of supranational entities or officials. In fact, there has been no political space for 
supranational entrepreneurship, described by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) as a 
necessary condition for European integration, since it transforms ad hoc agendas, 
pursued by each state, into common European interests. In the absence of such a 
supranational figure as European Commissioner Jacques Delors, the inter-Korean 
process of integration was largely coordinated by President Kim's right-hand man Lim 
Dong-won and his North Korean counterpart Kim Yong-sun. a close associate of 
Chairman Kim, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
In sum, functionalism is too idealistic to be applied to the Korean situation. As 
Stone Sweet et al. (2001: 4) argued that traditional approaches to international regimes 
by Keohane (1984) and Krasner (1983) and even integration theories. such as 
intergovernmentalism. do not explain European integration, it is even harder to analyze 
the Sunshine Policy from the perspectives of neofunctionalism or intergovermentalism. 
Haas (1989: 37) noted that integration theory is a Euro-centric one without relevance 
elsewhere. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to test the Sunshine Policy against the 
two theories, because the improvement of inter-Korean relations failed to reach the level 
of the European integration in spite of some progress made during President Kim's five-
year tenure. 
2.3.2. A Constructivist Approach to Integration 
By the early 1970s, neofunctionalism had become somewhat lacklustre, and even one of 
its creators, Haas, acknowledged the theory's shortcomings on both the theoretical and 
empirical frontiers. 36 Moravcsik (1998: 16) notes the predictions of neofunctionalism 
were indeterminate because a list of alternative outcomes arose: spill-over. spill-back, 
J6 Haas (1964: 9) views that the functionalist tradition dates back to the pre-industrial and pre-national 
era of Guild Socialism when occupational groups were able to take up practical problems. a practice 
which is no longer possible because of the rise of the territorially-bounded states. Haas (ibid: 20) also 
sheds light on the Marxist legacies in the functionalist theory of war in which the chief cause of interstate 
conflict is the unequal distribution of economic benefits. 
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spill-around and encapsulation. Portraying the rise and decline of neofunctionalism, 
Moravcsik (ibid) contends: 'when integration stagnated, scholars criticized 
neofunctionalism; when integration progressed, they rediscovered it'. Keohane and 
Hoffmann (1991) conclude that spillover is not automatic, but necessitates prior 
intergovernmental bargaining. Haas (1975: 86) proposes that 'the study of regional 
integration should be both included in and subordinated to the study of changing 
patterns of interdependence', while Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, 
Henry Nau and many other leading authorities in the discipline of international relations 
conclude that the European Union should be viewed as an international regime to 
manage interdependence (Moravcsik 1998: 15).37 
In the middle of this disarray, constructivism started to offer insights for 
European integration scholars (Marcussen 2000; Christiansen et al. 1999; Checkel 
1998b; Riss-Kappen 1996). As Wendt (1999: 344) argued that interdependence is one of 
the key variables for collective identity formation, one of the main constructivist 
research projects has been to explain the causal relationship between the formation of 
collective identities and the process of integration as a European polity (Christiansen et 
al. 1999). In fact, integration resulting from identity shifts is an area that cannot be 
adequately covered by neo-liberal institutionalists. Checkel (2004: 237) contended that 
the EU process had outgrown the research boundaries of regime theorists and entered 
into the domain of 'a polity in the making'. 
Unlike the time-consuming bargaining between industrialized states to build 
mutually agreeable regimes or institutions, the promotion of interactions, based on 
identity shifts between adversaries, takes apparently different dynamics. Given the 
nature of an enemy state, there are a set of policy tools to improve bilateral relations, 
which include humanitarian aid, large-scale investment and even bribes. As economic 
interactions between adversaries are routinely subject to close scrutiny by the 
parliament and the media, states pursuing comprehensive engagement might have to 
rely on secrecy or deception at the tactical level, as observed in Chapter Two. As 
comprehensive engagement is an asymmetrical interaction between a status quo power 
and an enemy state, the initial outcome of economic interactions takes the form of one-
way investment and assistance. 
In the process of Korean integration, the crucial watershed might be whether 
South Korea could be projected as the 'reference society' for North Koreans embodying 
:17 Nevertheless. regime theory has limitations in offering insight to integration between states of 
asymmetrical status In terms of power and the size of the economy. since the theory. just like classical 
integration theories. is based on interactions between equals. 
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a pan-Korean ideal, just as Italian principalities emulated Piedmont as their 'reference 
society' (Cronin 1999: 286). As inter-Korean interactions have broadened North 
Koreans' knowledge about the outside world, especially about South Korea, their 
possible efforts to emulate their South Korean counterparts will become a catalyst for 
interdependence and the construction of a transnational identity. 
As observed above, this section will use both liberal and constructivist 
approaches to explain the process of inter-Korean integration. The Sunshine Policy, in 
some instances, was operationalized in accordance with functionalism's separability 
thesis, since, despite the heightening tension and security concerns, prompted by North 
Korea's nuclear weapons programme in October 2002, inter-Korean economic 
interactions kept up momentum. We could find historical parallels from the cases of 
Anglo-German and US-Japanese trade that persisted in the years leading up to World 
War II (Liberman 1996). Even though political and security problems hampered the 
smooth and speedy implementation of economic and social projects, President Kim's 
leadership made it possible for those projects to be implemented amidst security risks. 
To complement this separability thesis, this section uses the concept of identity shifts as 
the underlying force to promote integration between the two Koreas. 
2.3.3. Tools for Integration 
Taking into account the possibility of asymmetric inter-Korean interdependence in 
terms of the size of the two economies, the Kim administration envisaged the creation 
of an inter-Korean economic community, which would in turn contribute to the process 
of fostering a regional community in Northeast Asia (MOU 2003: 36). Before the 
inauguration of the Kim administration, a large amount of investment in North Korea 
had been unrealistic, but the identity shifts between the two adversaries during the Kim 
administration, observed in the previous section, opened new possibilities in inter-
Korean economic cooperation and integration. The Kim administration mobilized a 
wide range of tools from humanitarian aid to bribes as an activist government 
propagating new norms of more contacts, more dialogue and more cooperation. Even 
though the adminIstration had been subject to criticism by political opponents for 
propping up a dictatorial state which was known to keep thousands of its own citizens in 
concentration camps and millions under the poverty line, the Kim administration firmly 
believed that inter-Korean economic integration would ameliorate North Korea's 
behaviour and improve North Koreans' quality of life for the eventual prosperity of the 
Korean nation (MOU 2003: 30). 
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Humanitarian Aid. As the building of trust is the first step for a status quo 
power's engagement with an enemy state, humanitarian aid is the easiest way it can 
adopt without being subject to accusations of appeasement or bribery. According to the 
Ministry of Unification (2003), the South Korean government's assistance to North 
Korea steadily increased during the five-year period of the Kim administration: US$11 
million in 1998, US$28 million in 1999, US$79 million in 2000, US$70 million in 2001 
and US$83 million in 2002. It also facilitated civilian assistance to North Korea: US$20 
million in 1998, US$19 million in 1999, US$35 million in 2000, US$65 million in 2001 
and US$51 million in 2002 (ibid). Since 1994 when the Agreed Framework was 
established, the United States also emerged as North Korea's primary benefactor despite 
their confrontation over WMD and other issues (Neilan 2000). 
Bribes. Bribes seek to move the bribee to serve the briber's interest (Noonan 
1984). Even though they raise ethical questions, bribes have been part of a state's policy 
tools for a long time. As seen in the headline of The Times (8 March 2003), 'US Bribes 
Pushing UN Waverers Into Support of War', bribery has been one arm of a modem state. 
Of course, the US case does not necessarily mean the transfer of cash, but a wide range 
of benefits, comprising 'substantial trade, aid packages and security guarantees', which 
are tantamount to bribery (ibid). 
In the case of inter-Korean dealings, shrouded in secrecy, an actual payment of 
cash was made to the North Korean regime via secret channels, which will be analyzed 
in greater detail in Chapter Six.38 South Korean prosecutors, who probed the alleged 
cash-for-summit case, concluded that the Hyundai Group paid US$100 million to the 
North Korean regime on behalf of the Kim administration before the inter-Korean 
summit in 2000, which was part of Hyundai's remittances amounting to US$450 million 
(Yonhap News Agency, 25 June 2003). Although Kim's key aid, Lim Dong-won, 
contended that it is non-sensical to link what he called 'the voluntary, policy-level 
assistance' to the summit, prosecutors noted that the remittance of the cash was part of 
the deal between North and South Korean officials which made the summit possible. 
Large-Scale Investment. Another important step for strengthening economic 
interdependence between adversaries is to make large-scale investment to make use of 
38 Moon (2002: 29) nOled. 'Seoul's traditional North Korea policy was guided by two sets of implicit 
operating logic. One is the clandestine management of inter-Korean relations and the other is its domestic 
political utilization. A breakthrough in inter-Korean relations via Park Chung-hee 4 July communique, 
Chun Doo-hwan's near success at the summit meeting with Kim II-sung, and Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik 
and inter-Korean rapprochement were all engineered through clandestine operations'. 
96 
the target state's cheap labour, natural resources or land. This process will help to 
increase linkages between the enemy state and the outside world, while offering the 
state an opportunity of experimenting with the capitalist mode of production. 
As the North Korean economy was fragile and the level of inter-Korean 
economic interdependence extremely low, the Kim administration attempted to expand 
South Korean companies' investment in North Korea with the ultimate goal of creating 
an economic community on the Korean Peninsula (MOU 2003). For example, 
Hyundai's development of a tourist resort on the eastern coast and an industrial complex 
in Kaesong, close to Seoul, were among the major South Korean investments in North 
Korea. To protect its investment, Hyundai required a government-level safety guarantee, 
thus working to broker a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas 
(Chosun /lbo, 12 June 2003). This may be regarded as an example of functionalist 
ramification or spill-over. Haas (1989: 50) says that functionalist theory has no set order 
between political and military talks and economic and social talks, although political 
breakthroughs are in demand before developments in one sector will spill back into 
further measures for detente. 
Infrastructure. In what it called the 'Iron Silk Road' project, the Kim 
administration sought to connect inter-Korean railways, which will be eventually 
extended to the Eurasian railway networks via the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and 
the Trans-China Railway (TCR) (MOU 2003: 168; KIND 2000b: 64). The project was 
part of the 2000 summit agreement between the two Korean leaders who pledged to link 
inter-Korean railways and roads, which have been severed since the Korean War. In fact, 
this project has the potential to revolutionize transportation in Northeast Asia by linking 
the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) to the TSR and the TCR and tum South Korea into a 
transportation hub (MOU 2003: 168). The Kim government also made efforts to fulfil 
its obligations, specified in the 1994 US-North Korea nuclear deal, under which North 
Korea suspended nuclear activities in return for the provision of two LWRs. Despite 
escalating tensions over North Korea's admittance of a nuclear weapons programme in 
October 2002, the Seoul government exhibited a strong will to continue the construction 
work, in defiance of the Bush government's efforts to stop the project as a punitive step 
against the North. As of January 2003, about 1,400 engineers and construction workers. 
including 713 South Koreans, were based at the construction site in Yongbyon, North 
Korea (MOU 2003: 321). 
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3. The Goals of Three-Level Engagement 
A status quo power embarks on strategies of comprehensive engagement vis-a-vis an 
enemy state to achieve a set of policy goals, namely, the improvement of bilateral 
relations and the enemy state's resocialization into the international community. In the 
absence of this process of resocialization, as mentioned in the previous sections, it is 
impossible to ameliorate an enemy state's behaviour violating international norms, such 
as proliferation, terrorism, counterfeiting or drug trafficking. 
3.1. National Goals: institutionalization and federalization 
Although the status quo thesis of comprehensive engagement, observed in the previous 
section, envisages the expansion of cooperation between a status quo power and its 
enemy state as independent entities, the process of collective identity formation and 
economic integration between them might make the territories of a closed-off enemy 
state become porous, eventually blurring their territorial integrity. Even though a status 
quo power works to maintain the status quo as part of a trust-building process, it is up to 
the two states, involved in this new dynamics of identity shifts and economic integration, 
whether to choose peaceful coexistence, leaving borders robust, or further integration, 
weakening the importance of the borders between them. 
In the case of the Sunshine Policy, it had two clear goals in inter-Korean 
relations: institutionalization and federalization. Since North and South Koreans belong 
to one nation despite territorial division and unification remains a paramount national 
goal for both North and South Korea, President Kim and his advisors sought to 
institutionalize inter-Korean affairs as part of their efforts to achieve a more ambitious 
goal of federalizing the two Koreas. 
Institutionalization. One of the most tangible outcomes of President Kim's 
efforts to institutionalize inter-Korean affairs was the North-South Joint Declaration 
(Appendix IX), issued after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. As mentioned above, 
President Kim sought to reactivate the 1991 Basic Agreement, a document similar to the 
1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany. Although the German treaty legally 
protected bilateral relations from any disruptive actions taken at home and abroad in a 
positive international and domestic environment (Giessmann 2001), the inter-Korean 
agreement failed to survive the 1994 nuclear crisis and the lack of trust between the two 
Koreas. Therefore, President Kim focused on creating a binding framework between the 
two Koreas, which was able to weather any international or domestic shocks. For 
President Kim, the reactivation of all steps specified in the Basic Agreement was a 
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shortcut to the institutionalization of inter-Korean relations. In this sense, the Sunshine 
Policy achieved disputable outcomes, although the policy, in practice, managed to foster 
exchange and cooperation between the two sides even in the middle of the resurgence of 
the North Korean nuclear weapons problem in October 2002. 
Federalization. In his analogy to the US federalist process, Claude (1971: 439) 
noted: 'The facts of life in the United States are that the federal government will 
compromise with a recalcitrant state, not threaten to bomb its cities; it will consult with 
labour leaders and revise a controversial legislative policy, not send the army into 
pitched battIe against the nationwide membership of aroused labour unions'. Convinced 
that the state of decades-long national division and confrontation cannot immediately 
develop into the stage of unification, the Kim administration envisioned the creation of 
a confederation as an interim stage leading up to unification (MOD 2003: 38). 
According to President Kim's 'three-stage' approach to Korean unification, a 'union of 
republics' or a confederation, which makes it possible for the two Koreas to keep their 
current systems and ideologies, is the first step on the road to unification, while a 
federation, which is based on one system, namely democracy and the market economy, 
is only possible after the lapse of a considerable time (Kim DJ. 1997; Kwon 2000). 
One of the most controversial points of the inter-Korean summit declaration of 
2000 was an agreement to initiate a debate on unification by envisioning an inter-
Korean confederation, since there are common elements in the South's proposal for 
confederation and the North's proposal for a loose form of federation as the formulas for 
unification (Moon 2001; KIND 2000b).39 In the past, successive North and South 
Korean governments have authored and revised unification formulas for propaganda 
purposes rather than as a concrete step for unity. One of the reasons why the two Korean 
leaders talked about federalization during the summit was that it looked safe for both of 
them, since it involves the delegation of clearly defined powers over time. As Claude 
(1971: 425) puts it, '[g]overnment is a big, brave word; federalism is the little, cautious 
word'. 
3.2. International Goals: resocialization 
By noting that 'the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart 
but how to bring them actively together', Mitrany (1966: 28) envisioned a working 
peace system based on a horizontal linkage between states. Since the erosion of 
alliances and deepening diplomatic and economic isolation are the main sources of 
39 The summit debate on confederation will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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insecurity for a state, the status quo power needs to open the way for an enemy state to 
expand its relations with the international community. On the international level, South 
Korean policymakers paved the way for North Korea's resocialization into the 
international community by helping it to normalize diplomatic relations with the world's 
key powers and join major international and regional organizations. 
Diplomatic Normalization. The culmination of efforts to maintain the political 
status quo and create the environment for economic integration is the target state's 
diplomatic normalization with the world's powerful states. The Kim government 
succeeded in enlisting support for North Korea's resocialization from its allies and 
friends across the world in a favourable international milieu. It nudged the United States 
and Japan to improve ties with North Korea, realizing the exchange of high-level 
envoys between the United States and North Korea in October 2000 and paving the way 
for Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to visit Pyongyang in September 2002. 
In particular, President Kim called on European leaders during the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) in Seoul in 2000 to normalize relations with North Korea, enabling Britain, 
Germany and many other European states to set up official ties with the North. North 
Korea's external relations with the world's major powers will be analyzed in detail in 
Chapter Five. 
Accession to World Organizations. A state endeavours to join international 
organizations as a way to win prestige and economic benefits. The process of North 
Korea's diplomatic normalization with the Western powers proceeded in parallel with its 
accession to regional and international organizations. From the outset, the Kim 
administration sought to create a favourable international atmosphere to enable North 
Korea to join as many international organizations as possible, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) (Korea Times, 11 May 2000). In fact, North Korea's accession 
to the ARF offered it a rare chance of resocialization with the international diplomatic 
community. North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun, who participated in the 
seventh ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 2000, held first-ever bilateral talks with US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei and other 
dignitaries, as well as with South Korean Foreign Affairs-Trade Minister Lee Joung-
binn. The Kim administration also pursued diplomatic normalization between North 
Korea and the world's major donor countries, since it would lead to the lifting of 
economic sanctions imposed against it for half a century and its accession to 
international lending institutions. i.e .. the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB (Moon 
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2002: 29). However, North Korea's stalled process of diplomatic normalization with the 
United States and Japan could not result in any progress on this frontier. 
4. The South Korean Decision-Making Process 
The legacies of the failure of liberalism, which had blossomed in the 1920s and 1930s, 
are still intact worldwide in the form of the 'distaste for appeasement, the 
disillusionment with idealism' (Banks 1988: 9). As noted in Chapter Two, the US 
administration is virtually in a straitjacket as far as its engagement policy vis-a-vis an 
enemy state is concerned, because of Congressional scrutiny and objections. As Haass 
and O'Sullivan (2000: 179) identified in their research, any strategies seeking to offer 
incentives to an enemy state are prone to touch off intense rivalries between the 
executive and congressional branches of government. Nevertheless, George (1993: 13) 
stressed the need to create a 'systematic, empirically grounded, and differentiated theory 
of appeasement' in order to successfully engage an enemy state. 
With South Korean society entering into the stage of mature democracy, how 
could the Kim administration pursue comprehensive engagement in the face of close 
scrutiny by the opposition parties and media organizations? From the outset, Moon 
(1999: 41) called for transparency in order to build a domestic consensus in the process 
of implementing the government's North Korea policies. Nevertheless, a democratized 
society has not always been a liability to the Kim administration seeking to shift the 
conventional policies vis-a-vis North Korea. In fact, democratization in South Korea 
opened the way for the overhaul of the government's policies, a development which was 
impossible in the past when the political culture, which had been heavily authoritarian 
and bureaucratic, hampered fundamental changes vis-a-vis the North (Kim, I.P. 1998: 
12). In this sense, the Sunshine Policy was a definite departure from the inconsistent, 
sentimental and erratic policies of past South Korean governments, which had been 
receptive to the equally frivolous, unpredictable policies of the North (Moon 1999: 38). 
This section will identify the Kim administration's key political actors and 
processes for information processing and crisis prevention. The Sunshine Policy, pushed 
by President Kim and his advisors, would have been impossible unless South Korea's 
governing system had been organized to implement it. President Kim could preclude a 
debate on any alternative to the Sunshine Policy thanks to the peculiarities of the South 
Korean political system, characterized by a top-down policy culture (Kim J.Y. 2003). 
4.1. Actors 
Challenging the rationalist premise that a state is a unitary actor, decision-making 
101 
theories decode the 'black box' of a state's domestic political processes (Holsti 1995: 
47). Behaviouralists find that policymakers are not rational individuals, but ordinary 
people swayed by personal ambitions, misperceptions, bureaucratic interests and so 
forth. Their findings shed light on the complex processes of budgeting, weapons 
acquisitions and, especially, crisis management. 
The bureaucratic politics model portrays policymakers and government agencies 
as entities with conflicting perceptions, values and interests, thus putting priorities on 
personal or bureaucratic interests (Allison 1971; Halperin 1974). The saying, 'Where 
you stand depends on where your sit', best explains this tendency (Holsti 1995: 49). 
Hence, organizational norms, prior policy commitments, organizational inertia and 
standard operating procedures are supposed to shape and distort the flow of information, 
decision-making and implementation of these decisions. However, critics of the 
bureaucratic politics model pointed out that the presidential system inhibits bureaucratic 
bargaining and haggling to a certain extent, because the president in the United States, 
for example, is not an ordinary player in a bureaucratic game, but the final decision 
maker who is also capable of appointing the members of the core decision making 
group (ibid: 50). In the South Korean presidential system, in particular, the president 
reigns over the three branches of the state, administration, legislature and judiciary, and 
wields enormous power in a predominantly Confucian society. As Moon (1998: 269) 
says: 
The most salient aspect of developmental statism is executive dominance and 
bureaucratic unity. Security decision making during the Cold War period was 
centralized in the hands of a few political elites such as the president, the 
presidential staff, the Ministry of National Defence, and the Agency for 
National Security Planning (ANSP, formerly KCIA). Legislative intervention, 
bureaucratic fragmentation, and politicization of security practice were 
virtually blocked. 
Moon (ibid) observes that executive dominance was alive and well in South Korea 
where the president and his staff commanded enormous influences over the formulation 
and the implementation of security policy. However, he did not fail to mention that 
democratic reforms had fostered the delegation of power to bureaucratic agencies. In 
particular, the dilemma of security policy coordination was aggravated when President 
Kim Young-sam, predecessor of President Kim Dae-jung, showed not only lack of 
commitment to but also lack of expertise in security affairs. As George (1993: 15) says, 
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'When the game of bureaucratic politics cannot be tamed by strong leadership at higher 
levels, information and knowledge become instruments of the struggle between 
competing policy advocates'. Kim and Park (2001: 335) argued that the political 
leadership of the President is indispensable for efficient policy coordination between 
various government agencies. 
President and Bureaucracy. By forming an inner group of key policymakers, 
President Kim had personalized South Korea's policy-making and implementation 
process to meet the requirements of his policy of engagement with North Korea (Levin 
and Han 2002; Moon 1999). Since President Kim and his key followers took office with 
ready-made policy principles on how to deal with North Korea, the policy elites had 
virtually neglected the process of pooling public opinion (KINU 2000b). Reminiscent of 
the Nixon-Kissinger team, the Sunshine Policy was conceived and implemented by the 
two key players, President Kim and Lim Dong-won, called the policy's 'architect'. 
Throughout President Kim's five-year term, Lim served as senior presidential secretary 
for foreign affairs and national security (February 1998 - May 1999), unification 
minister (May 1999 - December 1999), director of the National Intelligence Service 
(NIS) (December 1999 - March 2001) and again unification minister (March 2001 -
September 2001) until he was forced to step down after the National Assembly's no-
confidence motion. However, he was installed one week later as special advisor to the 
president for national security and unification, virtually dominating the process of 
policy implementation and injecting a sense of consistency to Seoul's North Korea 
policy for five years (Kim J.Y. 2003). 
To enhance inter-ministerial policy coordination, the administration restructured 
and regularly convened the NSC standing committee, comprising the heads of the 
Ministry of Unification (MOU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), 
the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS). 
Although military officers did not personally embrace the Sunshine Policy, the military, 
as an institution, showed moderate support of the policy (Levin and Han 2002) or 'were 
born to serve superiors' (Korea Times, 25 June 1998). Among the Cabinet members, the 
unification minister, whose bureaucratic interests lie in the promotion of inter-Korean 
exchange and cooperation, was empowered to chair the NSC standing committee. In 
particular, Unification Minister Lim Dong-won contributed to producing well-
coordinated policies by preventing any inter-agency rivalry (Kim J.Y. 2003). As a result 
of this coordination, the public announcements made in the wake of those meetings had 
always been dull but consistent, because they repeated the same phrases: a peaceful 
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solution of any problem involving North Korea and the continuation of inter-Korean 
ex.change and cooperation. 
Opposition Party. President Kim's party, representing the southwestern province 
of Cholla, retained minority status vulnerable to close policy scrutiny by a powerful 
opposition party throughout his five-year tenure. Even .though Kim's Millennium 
Democratic Party (MDP) formed a coalition with Kim long-pil's United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) before the 1997 presidential election, the ULD, led by the diehard 
conservative politician, had been an impediment rather than a supporter of the Sunshine 
Policy. Therefore, the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) incessantly attacked 
the Kim government during his five-year tenure for making 'one-sided' concessions to 
North Korea and manipulating the inter-Korean summit for domestic political purposes 
(KINU 2000b; Levin and Han 2002). The opposition party's arguments centred on the 
principle of strict reciprocity in inter-Korean dealings and the verification of North 
Korea's WMD programmes, striking the same chord as President George W. Bush's 
administration. Therefore, the Kim government sought to avoid parliamentary 
involvement in pursuing strategies of engagement in the same way as the Clinton 
government signed an agreement, not a treaty, with North Korea in 1994 to bypass a 
ratification process by the Senate, which might have raised objections to the inclusion 
of incentives worth US$4.6 billion (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000). 
The presence of powerful opposition groups erected hurdles to the smooth 
implementation of the Sunshine Policy. For example, the Kim administration failed to 
revise or repeal the draconian National Security Law (NSL) hampering inter-Korean 
ex.change and cooperation. Nevertheless, the opposition party was regarded as failing to 
come up with a viable alternative to the Sunshine Policy because of the lack of 
information and expertise and its focus on domestic political considerations rather than 
a genuine improvement of inter-Korean relations (KINU 2000b). 
Press. Democratization in Korea has elevated the status and influence of the 
press in South Korean society to the extent that Park H.W. (2002) argues that the media 
has become one of the power centres by taking over the status of the once unrivalled 
military in the South Korean power structure. The enhanced status of the media, 
however, was one of the liabilities for the Kim administration because the three mass-
circulation newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, Joongang !lbo and Donga !lbo,40 represented 
40 The three newspapers. which claim more than one million in circulation respectively, take a lion's 
share in the South Korean newspaper market. 
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conservative voices and Cold War mentalities in South Korean society (KIND 2000b). 
The only alternative voice was Han kyo reh , which had carried progressive, pro-North 
Korean views since its founding in 1988 (Levin and Han 2002; Park H.W. 2002; KINU 
2ooob). In his contents analysis of the two rival newspapers in South Korea, Chosun 
Ilbo and Hankyoreh, which epitomized the polarization of public opinion, Park H.W. 
(2002) noted that the former, the oldest and the largest in terms of circulation, devoted 
its space to criticizing the Sunshine Policy for being nai"ve and idealistic, while the latter, 
by contrast, upheld the policy as a realistic option for inter-Korean rapprochement. The 
discrepancy of opinions, represented by the two newspapers, however, was attributable 
to their selective quotations of news sources, which resulted in consistently biased 
reports throughout the five-year period of Kim's presidency (ibid). 
In the face of the critical voices of such influential press organizations, President 
Kim and his advisors had no option but to maintain secrecy in their dealings with North 
Korea, as shown in Hyundai's transfer of US$450 million to North Korea, discussed in 
Chapter Six. They pursued major policy accomplishments in a relatively short time 
rather than paying attention to transparency and morality in the process (Levin and Han 
2000). As long as the Kim administration achieved notable progress in inter-Korean 
relations, such as a summit and the reunion of separated families, all South Korean 
media organizations welcomed them regardless of their editorial policies (KINU 2000b). 
Private Sector. Given North Korea's poor infrastructure and political and 
economic insecurity, South Korea's private sector did not show much enthusiasm in 
pursuing business deals with the North in the past. After President Kim's inauguration, 
two South Korean business organizations, the Federation of Korean Industries and the 
Korean Federation of Small Business, sent investment teams to North Korea to explore 
the possibilities of launching new business projects, but their initial attention was not 
translated into actual investment (Levin and Han 2002). The only exception was the 
Hyundai Business Group, led by the North Korean-born tycoon Chung Ju-yung, which 
had attempted to virtually monopolize all business deals with North Korea, including 
tourism and the construction of an industrial park. Before the inter-Korean summit in 
2000, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, which enabled South Koreans to travel to 
North Korea from November 1998 for the first time in the history of national division, 
was the only tangible achievement of the Sunshine Policy. Furthermore, Hyundai 
executives, who wanted to secure political guarantees for their future investment in 
North Korea, brokered the inter-Korean summit. Hyundai's activities and their 
connection to the summit meeting will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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Civil Society. Amidst fierce ideological confrontation during the Cold War, state-
sponsored anti-Communist organizations had been created to assist the South Korean 
government's ideological warfare with its North Korean counterpart.41 However, South 
Korea's 'bureaucratic-authoritarian regime' has become the victim of its own success, 
since the state's economic development, engineered by the military regimes, resulted in 
the growth of the middle class, thus fostering civil society in an expanding public sphere 
with contesting identity groups (Han Sang-jin 2001). The rise of South Korea's 
international economic status, coupled with steady democratization, offered a fertile 
environment for the growth of civil society to which a South Korean government of any 
political background needed to pay attention (Steinberg 2003). Even before the end of 
the Cold War, various South Korean student and dissident organizations identifying 
North Korea positively started to contest the anti-Communist regimes' monopoly of the 
unification debate. With the inauguration of President Kim, they were given freedom to 
launch their various agendas, including inter-Korean festivals, cultural exchanges, and 
humanitarian assistance, which will be illustrated in detail in Chapter Four. 
As the emerging civil space represented various ideologies and ideas, the South 
Korean government and newspaper organizations conducted a number of public surveys 
to measure public opinion, even though all the actors attempted to interpret public 
opinion to meet the interests of their own ministry or agency (Levin and Han 2002). As 
public opinion was regarded as one of the key factors affecting South Korean politics, 
the Kim administration conducted opinion polls more frequently than previous 
governments in order to justify its policy of engaging North Korea (MOU 2003: 334). 
In particular, it made use of public polls to demonstrate citizens' support for the 
engagement option. The MOU (ibid) contended that an average 70 per cent of South 
Koreans supported the Sunshine Policy during the five-year period of Kim's presidency. 
4.2. Information Processing 
Facing the presence of diverse interest groups In society, the Kim administration 
adopted a unique way of information processing, similar to Kolh's (1975) 'Royal-Court 
Model' in which the foreign policy-making process is highly centralized by the 
president and core advisors. Critics, like Levin and Han (2002). noted that the policy-
making process had been closed to the President's aids, thus blinding the administration 
and alienating domestic political actors. As suggested by Holsti (1995), the group 
41 Among the major groups are the Korea Freedom League. the National Council for Freedom and 
Democracy. the Korea Veterans Association and the Constitution Law Advocates. 
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dynamics model investigates the decision-making process in a small-group context, 
given that foreign policy decisions are normally made by a small group of key 
policymakers. In some instances, the group, made up of personnel with expertise and 
experiences, perform much better than individuals in evaluating the situation and 
making a recommendation to the Chief Executive. However, the group dynamics exhibit 
inherent weaknesses because the members of the group are under pressure to work in a 
team, thereby restricting extensive information searches, hampering efficiency, 
suppressing minority opinions inside the group, and prematurely ruling out policy 
options running against group norms. Challenging the conventional wisdom that strong 
cohesion among the members of a group enhances performance, Janis (1972) coined the 
tenn 'groupthink' to argue that this cohesion might hamper reality testing and sound 
infonnation processing and judgement. Snyder and Diesing (1977: 333) divide 
bargainers into two groups: the rational and the irrational. Rational bargainers have low 
confidence in their initial judgement at the start of a crisis, and then constantly modify 
their assessments when new infonnation is received; while irrational bargainers, similar 
to Steinbruner's (1974: 131-53) cybernetic theory, rely on a rigid belief system because 
they are confident of their sufficient knowledge of their opponents' ultimate aims, 
bargaining styles, preferences and internal problems. The following figures show the 
two models. 
Figure 3.6 The Rational Bargaining Module 
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Source: Snyder and Diesing (1977: 333). 
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Figure 3.7 The Irrational Bargaining Module 
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Compared with the rational bargaining module, the irrational bargaining module 
shows a simplified process, because the phases of expectations and strategy are immune 
to change. As bargainers are supposed to know all about what is going on and assume 
everything falls into their belief system, they only change tactics, if necessary, before 
sending their messages. Though slightly idealized, this irrational bargaining module fits 
into the typical information-processing pattern of the Kim administration, which 
adopted a rigid belief system and automatically responded to the new information or 
provocation by North Korea under an already set strategy. In sum, President Kim and 
his followers, shrouded in secrecy and bolstered by their conviction on the legitimacy of 
the engagement option, could ensure consistency and efficiency in information 
processing. Their beliefs in the viability of the Sunshine Policy worked as 'information 
screens', thus determining the selection and use of North Korea-related information 
(Kim J.Y. 2003: 288). Snyder and Diesing (1977: 337) point out there is a high 
possibility that this category of bargainers might be betrayed by their colleagues or 
allies, who take from them control over strategy. In fact, the Kim administration, which 
had implemented engagement strategies jointly with the Clinton administration, lost its 
partnership with the US administration soon after President Bush's inauguration. 
4.3. A South Korean Model of Crisis Prevention 
A rational approach posits that policymakers are able to determine and list what are the 
national interests in an hierarchical order and examine all alternatives, while the 
108 
behaviouralists argue that it is impossible to make such calculations involving an 
enormous cost in time and intellectual resources, especially in a crisis, which leads them 
to choose shortcuts in place of an analytic model (Halperin 1974). Snyder and Diesing 
(1977: 6) defined an international crisis as 'a sequence of interactions between the 
governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but 
involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war'. The first act, 
potentially causing a crisis, is called the 'challenge', while this challenge may be 
motivated by a 'precipitant'. There are two kinds of precipitants. The general precipitant 
is an intolerable situation caused by a variety of reasons, while the specific precipitant is 
the direct pretext for the challenge. Once a challenge is launched, there should follow 
'resistance' by the challenged party if a crisis is to occur. For example, a crisis breaks 
out when one party launches a specific challenge with a specific demand, which is 
responded to by the other party in the form of an ultimatum for the withdrawal of the 
demand. The standoff leads to the stage of 'confrontation', which is followed by war or 
resolution of the crisis in the form of capitulation or compromise. These crisis phases 
are illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.8 Crisis Phases 
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Source: Snyder and Diesing ( 1977: 15). 
109 
Confrontation 
Capitulation or 
Compromise 
War 
Resolution 
In contrast, the practitioners of the Sunshine Policy created a unique mechanism 
in which there is no confrontational response or resistance to the challenge by North 
Korea, thus effectively preventing it from developing into a crisis. Hence, the challenge 
is transfonned or remains intact, without crossing the crisis threshold, as shown in 
Figure 3.9. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, regarded as a dove in the hawkish Bush 
administration, was supportive of President Kim's Sunshine Policy and shared the 
notion that it was not desirable to provoke a military crisis by setting deadlines or 
issuing an ultimatum for North Korea to meet US demands.42 
Figure 3.9 Crisis Prevention Phases of the Sunshine Policy 
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This crisis prevention mechanism, put into practice to deal with North Korea's 
repeated violations of the western sea border, as well as its brinkmanship in connection 
with nuclear weapons programmes, will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
42 At the height of international tension after North Korea's admittance of a nuclear weapons programme 
in October 2002. Powell even refused to characterize as a crisis North Korea's expUlsion of nuclear 
inspectors and declaration that it would begin manufacturing plutonium from spent nuclear fuel (New 
York Times 30 December 2(02). Guardian (30 December 2(02) also reported. 'China isn't worried about 
North Korea. Russia is openly scornful. There is a well grounded assumption that too much attention 
merely inflates a problem into a crisis'. 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter proposed comprehensive engagement as a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the Sunshine Policy. Given its hefty requirements without any immediate quid 
pro quo from North Korea, the Sunshine Policy was lauded by Steinberg (1999: 58) for 
being an initiative that could not have been taken by an ordinary politician, but by a 
statesman able to look beyond the near future and wait for the judgement of history. 
Since the judgement of history is a time-consuming process and the Sunshine Policy 
could not produce a quick behavioural change on the part of North Korea, the Kim 
administration has been subject to criticism at home and abroad. In fact, the moments of 
euphoria following the inter-Korean summit were short-lived and President Kim faced 
the harsh reality that the window of opportunity was closing with the inauguration of 
President Bush and North Korea's failure in making timely decisions in response to the 
South's initiatives. As the detente policy of the Nixon-Kissinger team could not fare 
well partly because of Congressional obstacles, as observed in Chapter Two, President 
Kim's Sunshine Policy could not proceed smoothly owing to policy changes resulting 
from the shift in US leadership. The opposition party-dominated parliament also forced 
President Kim to bypass the National Assembly and bring politics directly to the people 
(Chang 2001). George (1993: 57) noted that the process of resocialization might 
encounter problems in securing domestic and international understanding and support, 
as well as bureaucratic failure in implementing policies, envisioned by top policymakers. 
History, as Gaddis (1982: 344) says, does not tolerate the coincidence of strategic vision 
with strong authority for very long, which apparently decorated the first half of Kim's 
presidency. Even though it could not fare well throughout President Kim's five-year 
tenure because of the changing international and domestic milieu, the Sunshine Policy 
achieved a remarkable improvement in inter-Korean relations. South Koreans' identity 
shifts vis-a-vis North Korea were in progress, as manifested in the election of President 
Roh Moo-hyun, the continuation of inter-Korean contacts on various levels, and 
fledgling economic integration between the two Koreas, which will be illustrated in 
greater detail in Chapter Four. 
III 
Chapter Four. Historical Overview of the Korean Divide: 
structure and norms 
1. Introduction 
As adumbrated in Chapter Two, rationalist theories, based on the assumption that the 
state is a unitary, rational actor, offered a set of analytical tools to produce compelling 
explanations of the Cold War confrontations between the two opposing blocs. By the 
same token, North and South Korea, the two contesting states on the Korean Peninsula, 
represented a microcosm of the global ideological divide. The relevance of these 
theories, based on material power, has been seen to be so convincing as to all but 
preclude parallel research on inter-Korean relations from the perspectives of such 
ideational factors as identities and norms. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War situation 
gave rise to efforts to investigate security practices in East Asia with a new set of tools 
that mixes both material and ideational factors. I 
Taking into account the changes in the security landscape in East Asia, this 
chapter aims to analyze and illustrate a number of dramatic moments when ideational 
factors emerged salient over material factors in both North and South Korea. It argues 
that the rationalist approaches are necessary but not sufficient for explaining the entirety 
of the post-Cold War situation on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, such rationalist 
theories fall short of examining why South Korean President Kim implemented the 
Sunshine Policy and how markedly South Koreans shifted their identities vis-a-vis 
North Korea, as well as their perception of unification, after Kim's inauguration as 
president in 1998.2 Hence, this chapter focuses on shedding light on ideational factors 
to explain the Sunshine Policy, implemented by President Kim in a consistent manner in 
spite of constant attacks by a phalanx of critics who called it an 'appeasement policy', 
'buying-off North Korea' or nothing more than a 'give-away policy' (Paik 2002: 35). 
During President Kim's five-year tenure, the identity shifts of South Koreans vis-a-vis 
North Korea became so dramatic as to put the traditional Seoul-Washington alliance at 
stake in pursuit of friendly inter-Korean relations and provide a robust defence against 
periodic attempts by President George W. Bush's administration to use coercive means 
against North Korea (New York Times. 3 March 2003; Yonhap News Agency. 19 March 
I For pioneering research in this field, see Alagappa (1998); Hook (1996); and Katzenstein (1996b). 
2 In an opinion survey conducted in 2003, for example, 92 per cent of the respondents renounced any use 
of force against North Korea to stop it from developing nuclear weapons and opted rather for rather 
delayed unification (Korea limes, 25 June 2(03). 
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2003; Cossa 2002). 
The Sunshine Policy reaped rewards, culminating in an inter-Korean summit and 
President Kim's winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. During this period, 
ideational forces reigned supreme over structural forces in inter-Korean politics, partly 
because the Clinton administration cooperated with the Kim administration in launching 
an engagement policy in spite of the lingering anti-North Korean sentiment in the 
Republican-dominated Congress and other sectors of American society, which stemmed 
from the Korean War, as well as North Korea's violation of such international norms as 
non-proliferation, anti-terrorism and human rights. 
The heyday of the Sunshine Policy did not last long following President Bush's 
adoption of hard-line policies towards North Korea, which changed fundamentally the 
atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula, subjecting the two Koreas to the domain of the 
Hobbesian culture, stemming from the deeply embedded negative norms held by the 
United States vis-a-vis the North. In the State of the Union address in January 2002, for 
example, President Bush reinforced the US's negative identification of Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea by demonizing them with the term, the 'axis of evil'. Since North Korea 
was pinpointed by the superpower as one of the main enemy states in a global war 
against terrorists and proliferators, the Hobbesian structure, reminiscent of the Cold War 
era, was poised to regain sway over the Korean Peninsula, deterring South Koreans' 
shift of collective identities vis-a-vis North Korea and stirring up anti-Americanism in 
South Korea where many resisted the Bush administration's approaches towards North 
Korea. These developments effectively turned the Korean Peninsula into a battlefield 
between different identity norms regulating the behaviours and policies of South Korea 
and the United States. This chapter aims to analyze these contending norms, since the 
overall argument of this dissertation, as dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Three, is 
that these shifting identities and their attendant norms played a decisive role in shaping 
the policies of the Kim administration. 
This chapter provides an historical overview of structural and ideational forces 
to stress why ideational approaches offer insights and understanding their structural 
counterparts are unable to provide in analyzing the Sunshine Policy. First, this chapter 
reviews North Korea's key policies in the international and domestic context. In this 
process, we will trace the origin of the norms which had enabled North Korea to build 
the present political, economic and social system, and analyze whether these norms 
could remain salient in North Korean society after the end of the Cold War. On the basis 
of this analysis, this chapter will juxtapose the policies of successive South Korean 
governments, thus seeking parallels and, in particular, clues as to why they have 
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changed their strategies and tactics in dealing with North Korea. By using the identity 
norm life cycle, proposed in Chapter Three, this chapter will highlight the process of 
South Koreans' identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea under the leadership of President 
Kim. 
2. North Korea: structure and norms 
The most frequently used level of analysis to account for the behaviour of small states is 
the international system. This is because foreign policy decisions, made by small states, 
are considered to be reactions to external conditions. Neo-realism determines that weak 
states, like North Korea, are preoccupied with the question of survival in a self-help 
system, as they lack the necessary means for self-defence (Waltz 1979: 111; Handel 
1981: 36). Even though this neo-realist approach can be viewed as apt in explaining 
North Korea's endeavours to survive in an adverse international environment, it lacks in 
accounting for the underlying ideational forces which made North Korea pursue 
isolationism and self-reliance in spite of the structural shifts in the international system 
resulting from the end of the Cold War. 3 Here, political realism loses its explanatory 
power, thus offering room for constructivism to explore North Korea's motivation to opt 
for an isolationist course. This section aims to illustrate how the structural shifts 
affected North Korea's political and economic destiny and what made North Korea 
remain resilient to the structural changes, thereby identifying the salient ideational 
forces in North Korean society. Overall, it aims to explain how the Sunshine Policy 
emerged as a set of South Korean policymakers' strategies to deal with a state exhibiting 
two seemingly incompatible features: economic fragility and political stability. 
2.1. North Korea and Structure 
The end of the Cold War prompted many Western scholars to paint a pessimistic future 
for East Asia, since they viewed states in this region as 'ripe for rivalry' because of 
disparities in economic and military power, the existence of a wide range of political 
systems, the underdevelopment of regional institutions and, most importantly, the 
absence of the structural stability previously enjoyed in the bipolar world (Friedberg 
1993/4; Betts 1993/4; Christensen 2001). In particular, North Korea's WMD 
programmes have been cited as one of the major threats to regional stability along with 
Japanese rearmament and Chinese adventurism (Eberstadt 1999; Betts 1993/4). Despite 
:1 After the collapse of the Communist bloc, North Korea found itself in a hostile environment, 
surrounded by capitalist states. North Korea shares the same official ideology of communism only with 
China. which itself has moved towards the capitalist market economy, while the other states in this region. 
South Korea. Japan and Russia. are now all capitalists. 
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such gloomy forecasts, however, East Asia in the post-Cold War period has in fact 
enjoyed political stability and economic growth, making some experts raise questions 
about the validity of these perspectives (Kang 2003a). 
In Europe, the unification of Germany in 1990 was precipitated by a structural 
shift resulting from the collapse of the Soviet bloc. If this structural transformation was 
powerful and far-reaching enough to end the division of Germany, what impact did it 
have on the Korean Peninsula? Compared to the German situation, its impact cannot be 
said to have been decisive, because the division of the peninsula persisted despite the 
collapse of the Communist system in the Soviet Union and eastern European states. 
One of the most evident post-Cold War developments on the Korean Peninsula 
has been North Korea's economic collapse, which opened the possibility of both 
unification and another war. The end of the Cold War metaphorically dragged North 
Korea down to the status of an orphan who lost her ideological parents overnight. Even 
though North Korea's economic growth had been showing signs of fatigue from the 
1970s onwards, in fierce competition with the capitalist South, the overall situation was 
not critical until the end of the Cold War. Another striking feature, however, is the 
miraculous health and stability of North Korea's dictatorial political system in spite of 
the well-known economic hardships. This section will demonstrate how North Korea 
emerged as a vibrant industrial state in East Asia in the 1970s and then crashed to 
become one of the world's poorest states. 
2.1.1. North Korea's Rise 
The seemingly irrational pride held by North Koreans in their state and the system they 
built is not totally unfounded if we consider that the North had been superior in terms of 
per capita income to South Korea until the early 1980s (Harrison 2002: 26-28). It is not 
clear exactly when South Korea caught up with North Korea in terms of per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) because of difficulties in securing reliable North Korea-related 
data. According to South Korea's National Unification Board, which was renamed the 
MOU in February 1998, South Korea was already superior to North Korea with US$591 
to US$579 in 1975. Although North Korea's economic policy originating from the 
Soviet model of planned economy showed signs of slowing down because of structural 
problems in the 1960s (Kim I.P. 1998: 3-4), the dire situation it has faced since the late 
1990s is a recent development requiring close scrutiny. 
North Korea was founded on 9 September 1948 during the Soviet occupation of 
the northern part of the peninsula aimed at disarming the Japanese colonialists. Since 
Japan's 1910-45 occupation of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, relatively rich in 
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natural resources, had been an industrial region with a number of facilities it inherited 
from the Japanese colonial period, while South Korea's main industry was agriculture 
(Kim H.J. 1998). With the blessing of the Soviet Union and China, which was translated 
into the provision of assistance, such as oil and other raw materials, North Korea could 
spur its industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, while its southern rival was still at the 
fledging stage of economic development amid years of political turmoil and social 
instability (Gills 1996; Kang 1998: 242-3). Joan Robinson, a Cambridge economist, 
lauded North Korea's economic growth after her visit in 1964, saying 'all the economic 
miracles of the postwar world are put in the shade by these [North Korean] 
achievements', and Harrison Salisbury, an American journalist of East Asian affairs who 
visited North Korea in 1972, noted, 'On a per capita basis it is the most intensively 
industrialized country in Asia, with the exception of Japan' (quoted in Kim H.J. 1998). 
Unlike eastern European states, which depended on the Soviet Union for their security 
and economic stability, North Korea exercised diplomatic skill in balancing the Soviet 
Union and China against each other (Kang 1998; Kim H.J. 1998) and extracted every 
possible form of assistance from the two powers. In sum, one of the rationales for North 
Koreans' pride in the system they created is the legacy of this earlier developmental 
stage. 
2.1.2. North Korea's Decline 
North Korea's heyday in a favourable international climate did not last long, dogged by 
a planned economy no longer able to achieve remarkable results in competition with the 
capitalist market economy of South Korea (Kang 1998: 243). By the mid-1980s, indeed, 
North Korea had fallen far behind South Korea in terms of every indicator, causing 
widespread fear and an acute security dilemma in the North. The economic collapse 
resulted from the fragility of North Korea's economic system, based on heavy industry 
without a balanced capability of producing consumer goods, and the failure to introduce 
timely reforms in order to adjust to the changing international environment (Gills 1996: 
265). The situation was exacerbated when its two patrons, the Soviet Union and China, 
reduced their assistance during the finals years of the Cold War (Park H.1. 2001). The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the dramatic decline of Soviet aid to North 
Korea from US$260 million in 1980 to nil in 1990 (Kang 1998: 244). 
These changes forced North Korea to test the capitalist mode of production, but 
on a very limited scale. In 1984, the North Korean parliament first enacted the Joint 
Venture Law, which led to the establishment of the Chosun International Joint Venture 
General Company in 1986 aimed at attracting foreign investment (Kim and Koh 1998: 
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58-9). After the collapse of the communist bloc, the North Korean government 
introduced further reform programmes in December 1991 by adopting a law to establish 
the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (Kim J.P. 1998: 6).4 This action was 
taken soon after North Korean President Kim II-sung and Premier Yon Hyong-muk 
made inspection tours of the special economic zones in China in October 1991 (Kim P.S. 
1998). A senior North Korean economic official reported that the Rajin-Sonbong zone 
attracted 65 investment contracts totalling US$370 million in 1997 (Kim J.P. 1998: 8), 
but the internal rivalry between conservative hard-liners and moderate pragmatists 
persisted as to whether the state should discard its isolationist policies, eroding the 
confidence of overseas investors. Eventually, the Rajin-Sonbong zone showed the 
symptoms of what Rozman (1998) called 'flawed regionalism' and failed to create an 
attractive environment for foreign investment due to the Pyongyang government's 
dubious commitment to an open-door policy and the poor infrastructure in the area 
(Hughes 2002a: 137). 
North Korea's failure to introduce sweeping economic reforms has partly been 
attributed to the system of hereditary succession, called the first Marxist dynasty in the 
history of mankind. As the senior Kim pursued isolationist policies based on self-
reliance, the junior Kim was not in a position to discard his father's legacies overnight. 
These hereditary legacies were compounded by eight traits of a totalitarian dictatorship: 
(1) a single official ideology, (2) a single party led by one man, (3) a secret police which 
controls through terror and violence, (4) a monopoly on the media, (5) a monopoly on 
the effective use of all weapons of armed combat, (6) a centrally planned command 
economy. (7) the control of law and justice, (8) a tendency towards expansionism 
(Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). North Korea is believed by many commentators to 
embody all of these characteristics (Kim H.J. 1998: 19), although the last trait regarding 
the tendency towards expansionism has been marred by the structural and economic 
reasons despite its expansionist official goal of 'liberating South Korea from its status as 
a US colony'. 
North Korea's decline brought about crises on three fronts: diplomatic. 
economic and military (Oh 1998). On the diplomatic front. Seoul and Pyongyang had 
been locked in a fierce competition to win international recognition since the 
establishment of their respective governments in 1948 (Ahn 1986: 183-5). As part of 
4 The Rajin-Sonbong zone is linked to the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP). 
sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and participated in by South Korea. 
Japan. China. Russia and Mongolia. Nevertheless. the TRADP has made no significant progress because 
of the 'over-proliferation of varying regionalist conceptions' and 'mismatched economic and political 
interests' (Hughes 2002a: 118). 
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this competition, North and South Korea waged a game of numbers in their efforts to 
win diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible across the world, but 
North Korea has been soundly defeated since 1976, when the numbers drew even. A 
decisive blow to North Korea, however, was its failure to establish diplomatic relations 
with the two most important powers across the ideological divide, the United States and 
Japan, whilst South Korea succeeded in normalizing ties with the Soviet Union in 1990 
and with China in 1992. North Korea's diplomatic failure deepened its isolation, since 
the United States continued to impose a wide range of economic embargoes in response 
to the Korean War and a series of terrorist attacks launched by North Korea, as 
examined in Chapter Two. On the economic front, foreign analysts estimate that the 
operation rates of North Korean factories dropped to 30 to 50 per cent in the mid-1990s 
due to a lack of electricity and raw materials. This situation was inevitable partly 
because Russia decided to discontinue barter-based trade with North Korea in 1991 and 
China followed suit in 1993 (Cha 1998: 161; Park H.J. 2001: 69). The economic crisis 
was exacerbated by chronic food shortages, caused by a series of natural calamities in 
the late 1990s, such as floods and droughts, and lack of irrigation facilities and 
agricultural chemicals. On the military front, the end of the Cold War resulted in the 
disappearance of North Korea's allies, which made the government look elsewhere for 
modem weapons and relevant technology. North Korea's overall economic hardship hit 
the military sector hard, scaling down military budgets, reducing training hours, and 
eroding fighting morale. The decline of North Korea's conventional military power gave 
rise to its ambition to develop nuclear weapons from the late 1980s onwards. Noland 
(2000) suggests that North Korea had sought to strategically reposition itself within the 
international community and ensure its long-term viability as a state by possessing 
WMD, vital for deterrence purposes, while scaling down its conventional forces and 
pursuing economic reforms. 
In sum, the North Korean leadership, fearful of the impact of the overthrow of 
Communist Party rule in eastern Europe, chose to stick to the established authoritarian 
system, given that the maintenance of the political status quo was less risky than a 
process of political and economic reforms that might run out of control (Kim P.S. 1998: 
68). Therefore, North Korea had no choice but to pursue a path of 'muddling through', 
while holding the nuclear card, after the international environment became unfavourable 
to it following the inauguration of President George W. Bush. In the realm of neo-
realism, North Korea's confrontational attitude towards the superpower is an anomaly, 
given that the theory views the policy of a small state as reactive to structural shifts and 
outside influences. While confronting the Bush administration, which was threatening to 
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take coercive actions in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, North Korea 
maintained relatively close relations with South Korea. Strategically, the North tried to 
keep either Seoul or Washington on its side and drive a wedge between them. 
North Korea's decline, in fact, offered a unique rationale for the proponents of 
the Sunshine Policy, since the policy itself aimed to help North Korea to tide over the 
economic hardship and to move towards integration with South Korea and the 
international community. Basically, South Korean policymakers assumed that North 
Korea had no option but to take the course of China or Russia, which is a choice 
between controlled opening and reform while keeping its political system intact or a 
comprehensive opening and reform while substituting communist rule for a democratic 
system. In either case, South Korean policymakers were ready to assist North Korea to 
ensure its 'soft landing' (Office of the President 2001). 
2.2. North Korea and Norms 
With a level of analysis based on the international system showing signs of weakness 
despite its powerful interpretation of North Korea's place in the world during the Cold 
War period, as seen above, ideational approaches offer a compelling approach to 
analyze the attitude and behaviour the state adopted after the Cold War. As detailed in 
Chapter Three, a state is not purely made up of the material capabilities it possesses, but 
a socially constructed organism, which has its own identity and charts its own future 
course of action. The North Korean leadership carved out juche sasang (the ideology of 
self-reliance) as a set of powerful domestic norms, which guided the whole nation to 
pursue an isolationist course. As these domestic norms have been deeply embedded in 
the North Korean society, the development of nuclear weapons was an evitable choice 
for self-defence in the face of the permanent threats of a nuclear strike from the United 
States.5 Hence, North Korea's mobilization of the self-help system, which is basically 
isolationism, clashed with the prevailing international norm of nuclear non-proliferation, 
which is a form of interventionism. This section investigates how identities and their 
attendant norms guided North Korea and the international community, in particular the 
United States, to adopt specific attitudes and actions towards each other. 
2.2.1. International Norms 
Some international norms are not produced on a consensus basis, but created and 
S The sporadic threats of invasion by the United States provided the rationale for the necessity of what a 
North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman referred to as 'nuclear deterrence' against possible US attacks 
(Yonhap New Agency, 10 January 2004). North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes will be analyzed in 
greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
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promoted by hegemonic powers. Since World War II, American grand strategy could be 
characterized as much by the mobilization of its military power as by the creation of 
international norms serving its national interests and propagation of liberal democracy 
(Ikenberry 2oo1b; Johnston 2001). Once these hegemonic norms are established, other 
states are persuaded, socialized, or forced into adopting them. Therefore, nuclear non-
proliferation renders a powerful constraint against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
non-nuclear states (Paul 2003). 
For the United States, North Korea is identified as a war criminal (the Korean 
War), a terrorist state (the 1987 bombing of a civilian airliner and the 1983 attempt to 
kill the South Korean president)6 and a 'rogue state' (because of its attempt to develop 
WMD). In fact, North Korea had been mostly a neglected state in the bipolar Cold War 
world. It was only in the early 1990s, when it started winning extraordinary attention 
from the United States and other states because of its suspected nuclear weapons 
programme, that the salience of the North rose internationally. The non-proliferation 
issue helped North Korea to rise from near invisibility to a major trouble spot with 
which the international community had to come to terms (Barry 1998). For the United 
States, North Korea is regarded as a perennial 'rogue state', which is basically different 
from other states, like India and Pakistan, now armed with nuclear weapons after the 
1998 nuclear tests. As observed in Chapter Two, the military-led Pakistani government 
was cooperative with the US efforts to fight terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, thus transforming its image as a pariah state. Washington even lifted many of 
the sanctions, introduced following its nuclear testing, in return for Pakistan's 
authorization of the US's use of its airspace and military bases during its invasion of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Cameron 2002: 136). Historically, the United States has 
tolerated authoritarian regimes, such as those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as long as they 
are pro-American (Gaddis 2003: 171). 
North Korea's sudden visibility on the international radar screen as a state 
simultaneously seeking to develop nuclear weapons as it neglected its starving 
population fortified negative images of the North as an enemy state or a failed state 
(Yang S.c. 1999: 178-9). The situation was exacerbated because of its use of 
brinkmanship in negotiations with the United States and South Korea, which were 
seeking to neutralize its nuclear programmes. In dealing with North Korea, successive 
US administrations have shown ambivalence and have oscillated between two policy 
options: engagement and containment. Former US ambassador to South Korea, James 
Laney, said, 'American policy (toward North Korea) is shaped out of a collage of 
6 For further information. see Oberdorfer (2001). 
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various sectors of opinions and some are more impatient than others' (Quoted in Barry 
1998: 96). The hard-liners in the US administration had better access to conservative 
journalists such as Lally Weymouth, Charles Krauthammer and William Safire, who 
played a crucial role in spreading negative images of North Korea as a state whose 
leadership thinking and decision-making process are unfathomable and whose 
behaviour is an outcome of an utterly different value system (ibid: 101-2). 
The first nuclear crisis was eventually settled with the United States and North 
Korea signing the AF in October 1994, which had not only frozen North Korea's 
nuclear programmes but also outlined a course of action for diplomatic normalization. 
However, the Clinton administration moved at a snail's pace in improving ties with 
North Korea despite the agreement; and, when the time finally came to consider 
normalizing relations seriously, the impending 2000 presidential election meant it was 
too late to put the proposed roadmap into practice. Therefore, the AF, which charted US-
North Korea relations, amounted to naught after the winner of the election, President 
George W. Bush, designated North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' in 2002. 
What factor has frozen US-North Korea relations in the frame of Cold War 
antagonism, eliminating any chance for the two states to move on? In fact, the 
antagonism between North Korea and the United States since the 1990s can be viewed 
as an outgrowth of the deeply embedded suspicion and hatred of each other since the 
Korean War. Although the numbers are not certain, the widely accepted casualty figures 
during the three-year war are that 900,000 Chinese and 520,000 North Korean soldiers 
were killed or wounded, as were about 400,000 U.N. Command troops, nearly two-
thirds of them South Koreans. The number of US soldiers killed amounted to 36,000, 
leaving a deep scar in the American psyche (Oberdorfer 2001: 9-10). 
For the United States, the main rationale for the stationing of 37,000 troops in 
South Korea since the armistice in 1953 has been the prevention or deterrence of 
possible North Korean provocations. Regardless of the nuclear crisis, North Korea has 
been regarded as an enemy state, which poses security threats to the United States and 
its allies. As a punitive action against the Communist regime following the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the United States has maintained 'blanket sanctions' for the past five 
decades under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as analyzed in Chapter Two. It was 
September 1999 when President Clinton announced his decision to ease a number of 
sanctions against North Korea, but this decision did not affect other sanctions regarding 
counter-terrorism or non-proliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit the 
121 
export of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of US assistance.7 
The process of building a negative image of North Korea as an enemy state was 
not simply an independent process propelled by the United States and like-minded 
countries. On the part of North Korea, the United States was also the archenemy that 
had foiled its attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula by force and perpetuated national 
division by stationing its forces in South Korea. For half a century, its state-run 
propaganda machines have demonized the United States as 'imperialist'. This residual 
hatred, stemming from historical antagonism and grievances, is what appears to be the 
most influential force driving US-North Korea relations (Barry 1998). In sum, North 
Korea remained an outlaw state without complying with such international norms as 
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism. Certainly, there have been huge costs that came 
with being labelled a 'rogue state' in international society, since it entails a loss of 
reputation, trust, and credibility for the North (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
2.2.2. Domestic Norms 
What made North Korea become what former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
called a society 'caught in kind of a time warp' or 'the most isolated country in the 
world, unmoved by the winds of change that have swept the region'? (Quoted in Barry 
1998: 103). To answer this question, this section will analyze the powerful domestic 
norms governing all walks of life in North Korea, which had cut the state completely off 
from the rest of the world and yielded the two major outcomes mentioned earlier: 
political stability and economic devastation. As outlined in the previous section, North 
Korea had been a 'free rider' during the Cold War, positioning its diplomatic locus 
skilfully somewhere between the Soviet Union and China and securing large amounts of 
military and economic assistance from these two bordering Communist powers. In spite 
of this material reliance on its neighbouring states, North Korea kept some distance 
from the Soviet Union and China in terms of Communist ideology and carved out a set 
of norms, known as juche (self-reliance),8 superseding the Marxist doctrines with a 
blend of nationalism and Confucianism (Park H.S. 1996; Kim, I.P. 1998; Harrison 2002: 
15-18). Park H.S. (1996: 2) noted that juche is not simply an ideology, but a belief 
system which made North Korea 'politically centrist, ideologically paternalist, 
7 For further information. see the website of the US Department of State: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkor917.htm (accessed 20 February 2003) 
8 North Korean leader Kim II-sung first proclaimed the ideals of the juche ideology to the public on 28 
December 1955 (Kim 1.S. 1960). Many scholars refer to juche as an ideology. since North Korea calls it 
juche sasang (juche ideology) (Park H.S. 1996; Gothel 1996; Dh and Hassig 2000; Armstrong 1998). 
This chapter. however. describesjuche as a set of norms as the 'standard of appropriate behaviour for 
actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). 
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economically collectivist, ethnically racist, diplomatically isolationist, and culturally 
nationalist'. In fact, the definition of juche was evolving over time in the face of new 
challenges and opportunities to incorporate new ideas and resolve contradictions arising 
from the conflicting ideas of nationalism and socialism (Gothel 1996). 
Eventually, juche, as 'constitutive norms', transformed North Koreans, 
espousing its ideals, into a unique identity community, or the juche cIan.9 Gothel (1996: 
24) argues that juche helped North Koreans to 'discover their own identity in the 
construction of the country'. One of the remarkable cases in which juche evolved into a 
tool for national identification was the introduction of a slogan, urisik sahoejuui 
(socialism of our style).10 Building on the ideals of juche, North Korean ideologues 
sharpened its ideological focus and policy orientation in the name of 'socialism of our 
style'. In fact, they coined the new slogan after the collapse of socialist states worldwide 
to stress that the North Korean style of socialism, which is not based on those of the 
Soviet Union or its satellite states in eastern Europe, but on juche, would remain robust 
despite the new wave of structural changes, which resulted in the worldwide retreat of 
the socialist movement. By declaring its adherence to the twin ideas of socialism and 
isolationism, North Korea also resisted the intervention of the United States and other 
states in its domestic affairs and pursued 'a policy of military self-defence, economic 
self-sufficiency and ideological nationalism' (Park H.J. 2001: 93). Armstrong (1998: 32-
4) noted: 
[S]ocialism of our style is a defensive attempt at national identity mobilization, 
the legitimation of an incomplete nation-state which finds itself besieged not 
only by stronger external powers, but by a powerful competitor for the mantle 
of national legitimacy on the Korean peninsula in the form of an affluent, 
hostile Republic of Korea to the south. 
Nationalism is one of the underlying ideas of juche. By the 1980s, North Korea 
shifted the focus of its governing ideology from Marxism-Leninism and socialist 
internationalism to 'a solipsistic nationalism which emphasized the uniqueness of the 
Korean experience, represented by the Great Leader and the expanding cult of the Kim 
II Sung family' (Armstrong 1998: 32-4). Eckert (1996) traces the roots of this ideology 
9 Constitutive norms refer to those which 'create new actors. interests. or categories of action' 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). 
10 The term. urisik sahoejuui. first appeared in the North Korean magazine Worker in December 1990 in 
a direct reaction to the collapse of socialism in Russia and east European countries. even though it was the 
outgrowth of the decades-long North Korean discourse of self-reliance (K wak 1998). 
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to the nation's history by noting: '}uche was, in effect, a passionate and unrestrained cri 
de coeur against centuries of perceived incursion or subjugation by external forces that 
had sought to weaken or destroy the country'. In 1998, this nationalist penchant evolved 
into another slogan for national mobilization, dubbed kangsongdaeguk konsol 
(construction of a strong, prosperous country)' (Park H.J. 2001; Kim H.J. 1996).11 
While traditionalists stressed North Korea's economic dependence on the Soviet Union 
and China. the revisionist school, which is based on a leftist interpretation, recognized 
Kim II-sung as the leader of an anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period and 
his efforts to build an independent state, different to those satellite states in eastern 
Europe where the Soviets transported their system and personnel directly and exercised 
complete control. This initiative to create an autonomous, self-reliant state, coupled with 
North Korea's economic superiority in the initial developmental stage over South Korea, 
derided as a 'colony of US imperialists', has given the Communist regime a sense of 
pride as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula (Kim H.J. 1998: 24-7). 
In fact, the Soviet troops pulled out of North Korea soon after the establishment of the 
North Korean Communist regime in 1948, while US troops have prolonged their 
presence in South Korea. Although the South Korean military took over peacetime 
operational control from the United States in 1994, wartime operational control is still in 
US hands to date, offering a rationale for North Korea's propaganda offensives. 
Drawing on these historical experiences, North Korean ideologues incorporated 
the nation's traditionally strong Confucian ideologies, eventually elevating juche to a 
national religion (Park H.S. 1996).12 Here arises the holy trinity unique to North Korea: 
Kim II-sung the father, Kim Jong-il the son and juche the holy spirit (Harrison 2002). 
Cumings (1993) notes that the first statue of Kim II-sung was unveiled on Christmas 
Day in 1949, suggesting a systematic attempt to present him as a secular Christ. Since 
Kim II-sung was North Korea's founding father and architect of juche, the North Korean 
leadership took advantage of the nation's strong Confucian tradition as a means of 
creating the emotional bondage between Kim II-sung and every citizen of North Korea 
and strengthening the personality cult of the Kim family (Gothel 1996: 24_5).13 
At first, espousing juche as the governing ideology was a domestic process of 
II Rodong Shinmun (22 August 1998) first used the term, kangsongdaeguk konsol. charting the future 
course of the state centring on building an economically strong state on the basis of political, military and 
ideological foundations. represented respectively by such slogans as the consolidation of the Kim long-il 
regime. the military-first policy and 'socialism of our style'. 
12 North Korea also employed the ideals of juche in film-making, since 'art is no more than a 
revolutionary instrument', according to North Korean ideologues (Lee H.J. 2000: 31). 
13 'Since Confucianism placed excessive emphasis on both the ruler in the society and the father in the 
family. Kim II-sung was easily assigned the status of Father of the Nation' (GotheI1996: 26). 
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solidifying the regime through political mobilization, even though it had been, at the 
same time, a reaction to outside conditions and pressures. While stressing self-reliance, 
the North Korean propaganda machine derided the United States as an 'evil' state, 
which ran a puppet regime in South Korea (Moon 2001: 304). This was bolstered in the 
memory of middle-aged North Koreans, who could not forget the ferocious US 
bombardments during the Korean War. This hatred was reproduced and instilled into 
younger generations, who were socialized through the education system to stab puppets 
of US soldiers with toy rifles and bayonets (Barry 1998). Hence, the end of the Cold 
War pitted North Korea against the United States, but the North Korean leadership had 
little room to manoeuvre in its policies towards the United States because of the deeply 
embedded public identification of the United States as an enemy state. The 1994 nuclear 
crisis further bolstered the belief of North Korean policymakers that the United States 
might launch a military strike against their nuclear facilities, if they do not abide by the 
NPT. For several decades, North Korea has always stood under the threat of the US 
first-use of nuclear weapons despite the 1978 US declaration pledging not to use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the NPT (ibid). 
Could this norm of self-reliance be sustainable in North Korean society for the 
foreseeable future? In fact, North Korea has given rise to both social coherence and 
incoherence after the end of the Cold War. Even though its economic vulnerability as a 
bankrupt state depending on assistance from the capitalist West and South Korea caused 
a dilemma for North Korean policymakers, nationalism, coupled with Confucian 
traditions, has given the state durability and longevity (Harrison 2002: 6). In spite of the 
presence of potent domestic norms, there were some pockets of pragmatists in North 
Korea who wanted to establish better relations with the United States, but their attempts 
could not overcome the dominant norms in North Korean society, thus propelling the 
state to seek to develop nuclear weapons as the only means of guaranteeing its survival 
and the only bargaining chip it could use in future negotiations with the United States to 
win huge compensation to jumpstart its moribund economy, as well as diplomatic 
recognition (Laney 2003; Kim Sung-hyoung 2003). Even though the North Korean 
leaders created and propagated the ideals of juche, they could not 'adapt it to changing 
conditions', since it is a dogma assumed to be true all the time, as well as the source of 
authority and legitimacy (Oh and Hassig 2000: 13). Once indoctrinated, 'the masses are 
not a revolutionary force but a great conservative impediment to change in North Korea' 
(ibid: 39). Nevertheless, North Koreans' pride in their own system and hatred harboured 
against the United States give clues to what North Korea really wants. According to 
some analysts. the international community's recognition of the legitimacy of North 
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Korea as a sovereign state is the key. Former US President Jimmy Carter (Quoted in 
Barry 1998) said in an interview after his 1994 trip to North Korea where he tried to 
arrange an inter-Korean summit at the peak of the nuclear crisis: 
The North Koreans are not on their knees begging for economic aid from the 
United States, and they're not begging that the United States have diplomatic 
relations. They look upon themselves as a proud and respected and sovereign 
nation who would like to have this relationship on a mutually respectful basis 
because they think it would be better for the United States to have normal 
relations with North Korea and it would be better for North Korea to have 
normal relations with the United States. But they don't look upon those things 
as rewards or bribes to be given to them if they yield on something. 
North Koreans interpreted Carter's trip to their capital as an expression of 
respect to their state, because he was the first former US president to visit North Korea. 
In particular, the way North Koreans perceived Carter's visit might be far different from 
the general belief, showing signs of possible normative changes in North Korea, in case 
the international community treats North Korea as a sovereign state. Chun (2001) 
argues that the process of identity formation should not be viewed endogenously on the 
Korean Peninsula, because exogenous influences have been more influential throughout 
history. Coupled with these exogenous influences, contradictions took place in North 
Korea as the population had no choice but to rely on food aid from the international 
community from the late 1990, setting the stage of the further erosion of the North 
Korean norms of self-reliance. 
3. South Korea: structure and norms 
Since the inauguration of President Kim in 1998, the South Korean government pursued 
a set of consistent, conciliatory policies towards North Korea, refraining from taking 
any provocative steps against the Pyongyang regime and offering steady humanitarian 
and economic assistance. Despite the superiority in its relative power over North 
Korea,14 South Korea did not adopt any measure to bully North Korea into accepting 
concessions. This behaviour is anomalous from the perspective of neo-realism and neo-
liberalism, which see state actions as being driven by rational responses to pressures 
14 According to MOU (2003: 30), South Korea is in a position to playa central role in charting the future 
of the Korean nation, since the gap between North and South Korea is enormous in terms of economic 
power and military strength, given the sufficient deterrent power of the combined US-South Korean 
forces. 
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emanating from the so-called anarchical international system. Despite the Bush 
administration's demand for the coordinated adoption of coercive actions against North 
Korea to press it to give up its nuclear weapons programme, the South Korean 
government resisted the introduction of any punitive steps against North Korea in an 
effort to maintain inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. 
This section will argue that an analysis based on the realist proposition of the 
international structure falls short of explaining the Sunshine Policy. It employs the 
constructivist approach to analyze South Koreans' identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea, 
which created the public space for the Kim administration's adherence to the Sunshine 
Policy in spite of a series of international and domestic obstacles. Before embarking on 
an analysis of South Koreans' identity shifts by using the identity norm life cycle, 
proposed in Chapter Three, this section will first shed light on how the international 
structure, represented by bipolarity and the 'balance of terror' during the Cold War, had 
constrained the behaviours and policies of major actors on the Korean Peninsula. Then 
it will provide an historical review of the policies of successive South Korean 
administrations and the evolution of South Koreans' identity norms vis-a-vis the North. 
3.1. South Korea and Structure 
The Korean Peninsula was di vided along the 38th parallel in 1945 when the United 
States and the Soviet Union engaged in a division of labour to disarm Japanese colonial 
forces. At first, the United States possessed no ambition or plan to occupy the southern 
half of the peninsula, but Soviet territorial ambitions, demonstrated in the East 
European theatre, especially in Poland, prompted it to send troops to minimize the 
amount of territory to come under Soviet control (Henderson: 1968: 121). In spite of the 
breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the structural stability of bipolarity stemming from 
the 'balance of terror' between the democratic and communist blocs had constrained the 
imperialist options of major actors on the Korean Peninsula, perpetuating the division of 
the peninsula even after the end of the Cold War. Although the peninsula was gripped by 
localized Cold War confrontations sporadically, successive South Korean governments 
endeavoured to deter possible North Korean aggression and ensure security by taking 
either strategies of containment or engagement. The conditions imposed by the 
international structure were so dominant and far-reaching that no South Korean 
government could be completely free from it. Therefore, it was after the end of the Cold 
War that South Korea started contemplating various ideas and policies to resolve the 
outstanding problem of national division (Westad 2001). 
Despite the stated goal of unification in the post-summit declaration issued by 
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President Kim and Chairman Kim in 2000, South Korea's Unification White Paper 
(MOU 2003: 31) puts more weight on a 'virtual unification', which is attainable through 
free travel and exchange between the peoples from the two Koreas, than any form of 
legal and institutional integration in the near future. It rules out the possibility that the 
two Koreas, which had been in a spiral of conflicts as states with different systems and 
ideologies for five decades, could achieve institutional, ideological and territorial unity 
through peaceful means in the short term. Therefore, the goal of the Sunshine Policy, 
defined as a status quo policy in Chapter Three, was to maintain national division rather 
than to pursue unification by absorption (Moon 2001, 1999; Lee C.M. 2001). The 
Sunshine Policy won international endorsement, especially from China and Russia, 
former socialist friends of North Korea. In particular, China, which pursued a 'two-
Korea policy'. offered support to the idea of the status quo because the collapse of 
North Korea might result in a large-scale influx of refugees and the disappearance of a 
buffer zone (Kim, Samuel 1999). 
In retrospect, the history of the Korean division has been a history of 
outstanding endeavours to maintain the status quo on the peninsula since the Korean 
War, despite periodical deviations by ambitious North and South Korean governments 
and the United States (KINU 2000b). In this respect, the Sunshine Policy is in tandem 
with past South Korean governments' policies vis-a-vis North Korea. The first example 
of the status quo, demonstrated in the closing months of the Korean War, was the 
superpowers' efforts to maintain the status quo ante bellum. In spite of South Korea's 
ambition to unify the peninsula by force, the United States moved on to sign the 
Armistice Agreement with China and North Korea in 1953 (Kim H.J. 1992; 2003).15 
Since then, the two Koreas entered into fierce competition in order to emerge as a 
standard bearer of the Korean nation in an intense ideological and economic rivalry, on 
the one hand, while endeavouring to take the upper hand in addressing the Korean 
Peninsula-related issues amid the constant intervention of neighbouring powers, on the 
other. As observed in the previous section, North Korea enjoyed relative superiority 
over South Korea in the first three decades after national division, but its centrally 
planned economy started declining in the early 1980s, while South Korea achieved 
rapid economic growth. Despite the reversal of the economic equilibrium, the two 
Koreas enjoyed a 'cold' peace in the shackles of the Cold War for five decades. 
In the middle of this cold peace, however, President Park Chung-hee's 
administration seriously considered invading North Korea in January 1968 when North 
15 For information on the Korean War. see Kim H.I. (1989); Cumings (1981); Lowe (1986); and Acheson 
(1969). 
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Korean commandoes attacked his presidential house in a foiled attempt to assassinate 
him, and Pueblo, a US military intelligence ship, was seized by North Korea. 
Nevertheless, the United States thwarted South Korea from striking back in retaliation, 
working again to maintain the status quo (Kim HJ. 2003: 7; Han SJ. 2002: 631). 
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Cold War ended in the European theatre, 
but not in the political landscape of East Asia. The legacies of the Cold War were intact 
in East Asia in a localized form, as seen in the sporadic tensions in the Taiwan Straits 
(Alagappa 1998: 1). On the Korean Peninsula, the fall of the Soviet Union and the death 
of North Korea's founding father, Kim II-sung, prompted fears of the state's possible 
collapse in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, North Korea showed an unswerving will to 
survive famine and the collapse of its centrally planned economy. From the structural 
point of view, the presence of China, which remains as a socialist ally of North Korea, 
has been one of the main reasons that made the state's survival possible in an adverse 
international environment. Since the division of the nation, elites on both sides of the 
DMZ had no desire to relinquish their vested interests to change the status quo (Haas 
1989: 39; Young 1989: 96; Sohn 1989: 63). 
The North Korean nuclear weapons crisis. touched off by its 1993 declaration to 
leave the NPT, brought North Korea and the United States to the brink of war once 
again in 1994, when Washington had seriously considered a 'surgical' strike on North 
Korea's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (Oberdorfer 2001: 323; Haass 1999: 51; Kim 
Sung-hyoung 2(03). President Kim Young-sam and his advisors, shelving their earlier 
hard-line stance towards North Korea, endeavoured to stop the Clinton administration 
from launching a pre-emptive attack, thus working to maintain the status quo on the 
Korean Peninsula yet again. As shown by this nuclear weapons crisis, the Kim Young-
sam administration came under criticism for inconsistency in its policies towards North 
Korea, although it used the term, the carrot-and stick policy (Oberdorfer 2001: 282). As 
North Korea's economic situation worsened further, South Korea was forced to choose 
one among the options of containment, benign neglect, or engagement. If it had chosen 
a containment policy, it would have risked war. Even if it had adopted for a policy of 
benign neglect, it would have helped North Korea earn more time to develop WMD, 
potentially creating a bigger problem for the future. Hence, it chose an engagement 
policy in the name of the Sunshine Policy, believing no viable alternative existed. 
In spite of structural constraints, the two Koreas entered into cooperative 
arrangements many times over half a century, which seemed to be very durable in their 
initial stage. Nevertheless, they defected easily from the arrangements, in response to 
changes in the international or domestic milieu. What made them leave the agreements, 
129 
which they had so painstakingly negotiated and created? Some analysts compare this 
quagmire to a zero-sum game, mired in numerous but fruitless rounds of negotiations 
and agreements (Kang 1998; Oh 1998). According to political realism, a state, worried 
or uncertain about the relative gains of other states in the anarchical international system, 
chooses a less durable cooperative arrangement to facilitate its defection (Grieco 1995). 
In fact, inter-Korean cooperation had been hard, if not almost impossible, throughout 
history partly because North and South Korea assessed the benefits of interaction in 
relative gains terms. This game theoretical approach is convincing in explaining the end 
product of decades-long interactions between the two Koreas. 
Nonetheless, the structural impact of the end of the Cold War on the Korean 
Peninsula resulted in some short-term, positive developments in inter-Korean relations. 
Sensing the end of the Cold War, the Roh Tae-woo government (1988-93) introduced 
the so-called Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) aimed at establishing diplomatic ties with 
such Communist states as the Soviet Union and China, as well as improving relations 
with North Korea. The new policy, making use of structural shifts, awarded South 
Korea diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union in 1990 and by China in 1992. Inter-
Korean relations also enjoyed a heyday, culminating in the signing of the Basic 
Agreement in 1991 (Appendix III). However, inter-Korean rapprochement did not last 
long because the subsequent crisis, provoked by North Korea's nuclear weapons 
programme, invited the intervention of the United States. In fact, the Basic Agreement, 
lauded as a Magna Carta in inter-Korean relations, was a gentlemen's agreement 
without any provision for penalties in the event of defection (Cha 1998). When the 
nuclear crisis heightened in 1993, North Korea decided to defect from the Basic 
Agreement because it had nothing to gain and there was no mechanism to prevent its 
defection. After the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim II-sung in July 1994, 
South Koreans also suffered from recurring threat perceptions because of 'the fact that 
North Korea launched the Korean War and is prepared to do the same again; the fact 
that North Korea has maintained its offensive strategy envisaging a surprise attack with 
the objective of a communization of the entire peninsula; the military advantage 
maintained by North Korea; the North Korean quest for long-range missiles combined 
with a clandestine nuclear weapons programme' (Han y'S.1998: 114). The previous Kim 
Young-sam administration, upon facing the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim in 
1994, further aggravated inter-Korean relations by disclosing Soviet documents that 
pinpointed him as the very person behind the Korean War and preventing South Korean 
dissident groups from dispatching a mourning delegation to Pyongyang. 
Surveying the history of inter-Korean relations, Cha (1998) argued that a 
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necessary condition for the initiation of inter-Korean dialogue had been a change in the 
external security environment. For example, the 1972 Joint Communique came after 
Sino-American rapprochement and superpower detente, while the 1991 inter-Korean 
breakthrough also was preceded by the end of the Cold War. If so then, what has broken 
up bilateral negotiations? First, the change in the international environment hampered 
the development of inter-Korean relations. The inter-Korean rapprochement after the 
1972 Joint Communique was hijacked by the demise of superpower detente and Sino-
American rapprochement. Second, the rupture of inter-Korean dialogue could be 
attributed to the disparity in the strategic objectives of the two Koreas. South Korea 
sought a functionalist approach to start exchange and cooperation in non-political areas 
first, where the two sides are able to reach an agreement easily, while North Korea tried 
to tackle political and military issues directly by seeking to sign a peace treaty with the 
United States, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and an arms reduction 
agreement (KINU 2000b). Meanwhile, the two Koreas acted in the direction of keeping 
the status quo through what Wendt (1999) called 'adversary symbiosis' rather than 
forging a friendly relationship in their belief that any hasty improvement of inter-
Korean relations would be detrimental to the interests of their respective states. 
In sum, both structural and normative analyses shed new light on the continuity 
of the Korean division, but the structural approach fails to explain the 'discontinuity', 
demonstrated by the durability of inter-Korean cooperation that started with the inter-
Korean summit in June 2000 with the potential of bringing about far-reaching 
consequences on inter-Korean relations and the regional political landscape. The 
following section will employ the constructivist approach to explain why the inter-
Korean relationship changed markedly during the Kim administration and how the 
momentum of rapprochement could be maintained under the new Roh Moo-hyun 
administration. 
3.2. South Korea and Norms 
The previous section explained how structural forces held sway over inter-Korean 
relations, while indicating that structural explanations could not adequately account for 
the momentous shift in South Koreans' attitude vis-a-vis North Korea and the inter-
Korean relationship during the Kim administration. In particular, the structural approach 
marginalizes the social processes that spawned new thinking among South Korea's state 
policy elites and private actors vis-a-vis North Korea. 
This section will employ a constructivist approach in order to explain the 
evolution of the South Korean governments' policies vis-a-vis North Korea and capture 
131 
the moments when normati ve forces emerged salient over structural forces. In fact, 
norms exert crucial influences upon a state's behaviour, far more than allowed for in the 
orthodox neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to international relations (Hook et al. 
2001). Katzenstein (1996a: 2) contends that issues dealing with norms, identities and 
culture have become more salient in the debate on national security following the end of 
the Cold War. 
This section will demonstrate the robustness of ideational forces, promoted by 
the Kim administration in spite of structural constraints, in order to set in motion the 
new dynamics of positive identification between the two formerly antagonistic states. 
Although a state's policy is a set of decisions made in the constraints of evolving 
structural and normative environments, this chapter argues that the Sunshine Policy 
moulds conveniently into the case in which a group of policymakers imbued their ideas 
with legitimacy and endeavoured to internalize them within national and international 
society. As elaborated in Chapter Three, their roles are similar to those of norm 
entrepreneurs, defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as activists working to 
propagate international norms, such as the protection of medical personnel in 
battlefields. In the same vein, President Kim and his key followers endeavoured to 
establish a new modus operandi in South Korea's relations with the North Korea, thus 
generating a remarkable shift in South Koreans' perception of North Korea from an 
enemy to a partner or a brother. The administration's projection of North Korea as a 
partner or a brother helped South Koreans to free themselves from the decades-long 
obsession of containing or balancing their Northern neighbours. Witnessing the shifts in 
public perception, the Kim administration made it clear that South Korea would pursue 
de facto unification, rather than de jure unification (Moon 1999: 42; Han Y.S. 2002: 60). 
By using the identity norm life cycle, proposed in Chapter Three, this section 
will elucidate the driving force in the progress of inter-Korean relations and, in 
particular, how the Kim administration had worked to inspire the domestic constituents 
and the international community to change their identities and norms vis-a-vis North 
Korea. To answer these questions, this section will introduce an historical overview of 
South Korea's policies vis-a-vis North Korea and the changing identity norms of South 
Koreans from the division of the Korean Peninsula to the end of the Kim administration. 
Especially after the introduction of the Sunshine Policy, the image of North Korea as the 
South's enemy has been on an irreversible decline in terms of intensity and magnitude 
(Yang S.C. 1999: 181), as illustrated in the public opinion survey discussed in Chapter 
Seven. The Sunshine Policy, albeit short-lived in its real sense if we count only 
President Kim's five-year tenure. is a stark reflection of the political and economic 
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vicissitudes of the two rival states on the Korean Peninsula. In the course of a history 
spanning half a century, we can clearly witness the two stages of 'emergence' and 
'collision' .of South Koreans' new identity norms projecting North Korea as a partner or 
a brother. Therefore, this chapter offers a radically new understanding of the genesis of 
these new identity norms and their emergence in fierce competition with the established 
identity nonns. In the middle of the 'nonn cascade' stage, however, identity nonns 
clashed with structural forces, which hampered the process of their consolidation. 
Nevertheless, this section shows that the process of collective identity shifts remained 
robust despite structural constraints, propelling further inter-Korean integration. 
Stage 1: Emergence of Identity Norms 
Since the dawn of the Cold War, South Korean politics have featured an ideologically 
unipolar culture in which a conservative, anti-Communist orientation enjoyed unrivalled 
domination in the absence of any political party representing progressive ideas (Kim 
and Park 2001: 332). This ideological propensity reached such an extreme that Han 
Hong-gu (2001) was able to portray South Korean society as a sterilizer of any 
Communist ideologies. Buttressed by this ideological unity in South Korean society and 
ordinary citizens' hatred of North Korea, the Cold War structure forced successive 
South Korean governments to maintain the status quo in inter-Korean relations for 
several decades, thus failing to start any process of constructing a pan-national identity. 
As analyzed in Chapter Two, constructivism can help to explain this 
phenomenon of 'adversary symbiosis' with its emphasis on deeply embedded norms 
(Wendt 1999: 274). For several decades, the two Koreas had needed each other to 
solidify their own systems and purge opponents in the name of state security, which was, 
at heart, nothing more than regime security (Moon 1998: 268; KINU 2000b). At the 
same time, the two states have sought to maintain the status quo on the Korean 
Peninsula since the Korean War, entering into periods of cooperation at times but 
defecting from cooperative arrangements at others. Once negative identification was 
institutionalized in the form of laws and regulations, this type of collective identification 
remained influential and sporadic military crises further consolidated negative 
identification on both sides (Kahl 1998/9: 123-24). In this ideologically sterilized 
environment, this section sheds light on the moment that the seed for the sprouting of 
new identity nonns embodying pan-national ideals and the penchant for inter-Korean 
cooperation and exchange had been sown. 
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President Syngman Rhee's Policy: Northward Invasion 
For nearly two decades following the Korean War, North and South Korea had no 
record of significant contacts, because neither recognized the legitimacy of the other. 
South Korea's inaugural president, Syngman Rhee (1948-60), stuck to his ambition of 
unifying the Korean Peninsula, thus refusing to sign the Armistice Agreement in the 
closing months of the Korean War and holding onto the option of a northward invasion 
(Kim H.J. 2003: 4; Kim and Park 2001: 326; Harrison 2002: 157; Wada 2001: 84). 
Rhee's decision to walk away from official negotiations to establish the Armistice 
Agreement provided a basis for North Korea's refusal to hold dialogue with South 
Korea to discuss a peace treaty for the next several decades under the rationale that 
South Korea is not a signatory to the agreement (Choi 2001: 108). 
During his 12-year-long term of office, President Rhee explicitly expressed his 
intention to invade North Korea to topple the communist regime, although his remarks 
were seen as political rhetoric, made in the absence of both military capabilities and US 
support for an option that would inevitably shatter the status quo (Lee H.J. 1969: 311-
12; Cha 1998: 150). Okonogi (1977: 313) said that radical policies aiming to unify 
Korea by force served both Rhee and Kim II-sung in consolidating domestic power and 
legitimacy. The ensuing asymmetric development of military strength between North 
and South Korea resulted in Pyongyang's invasion in 1950 to start the first hot war of 
the Cold War (ibid: 313-15). 
Following the war, the South Korean National Assembly revised the already 
draconian NSL in December 1958 to add provisions to muzzle the rising voices critical 
of the Rhee government and crack down on anti-government activities as well as on any 
pro-Pyongyang movements (Kim H.J. 2003: 3). 16 Once identity norms were 
16 The NSL was enacted on I December 1948 right after the birth of South Korea. When the South 
Korean parliament revised the NSL on 24 December 1958. which authorized law-enforcement authorities 
to exercise arbitrary power upon anti-government forces. the United States recalled its Ambassador 
Walter C. Dowling in 1959 in a show of displeasure. This was the first time that the United States had 
recalled its ambassador to protest against the South Korean government. If we apply the identity norm life 
cycle to this dynamics of negative identification. the enactment of the NSL marked the moment that 
South Koreans' identities and their subservient norms. projecting North Korea as an enemy and denying 
any form of dialogue and contact. were internalized. which is the final stage of the four-stage life cycle 
outlined in Chapter Three. These identity norms were born when the United States and the Soviet Union 
divided the peninsula in 1945 to disarm Japanese colonialists. In spite of the artificial division. inter-
Korean exchange went on. although the people started feeling a sense of 'otherness' in regard to each 
other. The stage of norm emergence proceeded to the second phase of norm collision in 1948 when North 
and South Korea established independent governments. which in turn played the role of activist 
governments propagating identity norms prescribing a set of attitude and behaviour toward each other. 
The stage of norm cascades came with the Korean War in 1950. an historical incident that had irreversibly 
strengthened the negative identification of each other. Wrapping up this identity norm life cycle, the South 
Korean National Assembly codified identity norms banning any acts or behaviours sympathizing with 
North Korea, let alone communication and contact. 
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internalized in the form of laws, the Rhee government adopted harsh measures to 
enforce them to the extent that opposition leader Cho Pong-am, who founded the 
Progressive Party and called for peaceful unification rather than unification by force, 
was executed in 1959 after being indicted for engaging in espionage acti vities for North 
Korea (Han H.G 200 1). In fact, Cho was rather a centrist politician who founded the 
nation's first social democratic party renouncing both capitalism and communism 
(Donga /lbo, 18 March 1999). While accusing his political opponents of collaborating 
with communists, the Rhee administration created anti-communist organizations, 
including the Anti-Communist Youth Corps, as a vanguard to mobilize the 'hegemonic 
ideology', often accompanied with brutal violence (Han 1974: 26-31). 
President Park Chung-hee's Policy: Economy First 
President Park Chung-hee (1961-79) diverted his attention to South Korea's economic 
development and achieved rapid industrialization (Gills 1996: 145-89), even though it 
was within the context of building a strong state to achieve unification by force (KINU 
2000b). His policy shared a common ground with Rhee's approach because both 
governments considered unification to be achievable only by overthrowing the North 
Korean communist regime. 
Despite the presence of antagonism in the public sphere, the North and South 
Korean governments managed to open a secret channel of dialogue beginning in May 
1972 between the South's intelligence chief Lee Hu-rak and his North Korean 
counterpart Kim Yong-ju, creating the 4 July Joint Communique. This first major 
document regulating inter-Korean relations stipulated that unification should be sought 
through (1) the independent efforts of the two Koreas, without intervention by external 
powers; (2) peaceful means without using force; and (3) the promotion of national unity 
that transcends the ideological divide (Cha 1998). The communique became the basis 
for the establishment of the North-South Coordinating Committee, the primary 
government channel of dialogue, and the hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang (KINU 
2000b). In 1973, President Park also issued a special foreign policy statement, called the 
23 June Statement, in which his government pledged not to oppose Pyongyang's 
participation in international organizations and the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas 
into the United Nations. 
This unprecedented attempt to forge reconciliation between the two Koreas, 
which came after the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, did not 
last long and the government-level dialogue became eventually deadlocked in August 
1973 (Ahn 1986: 235). Instead of launching serious talks on the future of the two 
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Koreas, the delegates clashed over who provoked the Korean War and why the South 
Korean intelligence agency had kidnapped then-opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, 
reflecting the lingering animosity and suspicion towards each other (Cha 1998). While 
South Korea sought to achieve a phased increase of inter-Korean exchanges to build 
trust and promote mutual understanding, North Korea called for drastic measures, 
including the suspension of the arms race, the withdrawal of US forces and the 
establishment of a peace treaty (KINU 2000b). 
In the backyard of President Park's 'iron-fisted rule', chaeya, a group of 
dissidents who covered a wide spectrum of ideological positions from leftists to 
nationalists to rightists, emerged, marking a notable chapter in the history of South 
Korea's democratization movement (Chung Chul-hee 2002). Included in the list of 
dissidents were Chang Jun-ha (editor of Sasanggye), Paek Ki-wan (leader of a grass-
roots movement), Ham Sok-hon (civil rights activist), Rev. Moon Ik-hwan (pastor and 
civil rights activist), Kye Hun-je (civil rights activist) and Ri Young-hee (professor and 
writer), who had become a spiritual fountain for the leftist and nationalist student 
movements in the 1980s. In particular, the Coalition for Human Rights Movement in 
Korea, formed in 1977 and headed by Ham Sok-hon and Rev. Moon, issued a statement, 
entitled 'The Human Rights of Fifty Million People', to present a new idea that 
unification is a key step for the improvement of human rights for both North and South 
Koreans (Sohn 1989: 130). The dissident leaders defied the government's authority, 
which was expressed in the form of a monopoly on the unification debate, and called for 
more proactive initiatives for national unification (KINU 2000b; Han Sang-jin 2001). In 
the context of this dissertation, the rise of the dissident movement in defiance of 
President Park's authoritarian rule can be said to have marked the birth of new identity 
norms vis-a-vis North Korea, which prescribed new behavioural standards in inter-
Korean relations in support of more contacts, more dialogue and more cooperation. 
With President Park sticking to security-first policies, Kim Dae-jung, leader of 
the opposition New Democratic Party, came up with a series of progressive ideas in the 
1970s, including 'the establishment of a South Korean national institute to plan an 
appropriate unification policy; open discussion of unification based on liberal theories; 
and the encouragement of academic and political studies of Communism; tension 
reduction between the two Koreas; non-political exchanges of journalists and athletes; 
free letter exchanges; and the guarantee of the surrounding four powers - the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China - to deter a major war on the Korean 
peninsula' (Kang 1999: 5). However, these nascent movements faced harsh crackdowns 
by the law-enforcement authorities because South Korea's authoritarian system could 
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not tolerate ideological diversity and private inter-Korean exchange. Kim's pursuit of 
inter-Korean reconciliation as a dissident leader during the era of South Korean military 
regimes won him a reputation as a 'dangerous pro-North Korean agitator' (Kim H.J. 
2003: 36). The organizational platform of the dissident and opposition movements was 
also too weak to propagate new identity norms. 
President Chun Doo-hwan's Policy: Pragmatism 
A series of pragmatic actions by President Chun Doo-hwan (1981-8) yielded some 
achievements in inter-Korean relations, but faced the same fate as other zero-sum game 
approaches because of the lingering mistrust and animosity between the two Koreas. 
According to an opinion survey, conducted in January 1985, 61.3 per cent of South 
Koreans responded that war is possible between the two Koreas (Ahn 1986: 254). 
Inter-Korean dialogue under President Chun came unexpectedly when North 
Korea expressed the intention to offer relief aid to South Korean victims of a severe 
flood in September 1984 (ibid: 233). Although it was questionable whether the North 
Korean offer was a gesture of compatriotic love or simply a piece of propaganda 
offensive, the South Korean president surprisingly accepted the offer. This unexpected 
tum created the atmosphere for a spate of inter-Korean meetings and exchanges in 1984 
and 1985, including vice-ministerial talks, inter-parliamentary conferences, and 
discussion of athletic exchange. In total, sixteen meetings took place, including five 
economic council meetings, three Red Cross sessions and two parliamentary meetings 
(KINU 2000b). The highlights of these contacts were the exchange of performance 
troupes and reunions of separated family members (Foley 2003). In fact, these inter-
Korean exchanges were a surprise to many observers because they came right after the 
1983 North Korean terrorist attack, which killed half of the South Korean cabinet 
during President Chun's visit to Rangoon, Myanmar, an incident underlining the deeply 
embedded enmity between the two Koreas. Chun barely escaped the attack and returned 
home cancelling his remaining itinerary. This second major inter-Korean dialogue in the 
history of national division was brought to a standstill in February 1986 when North 
Korea suspended future talks, protesting against Team Spirit, a joint US-South Korean 
military exercise. I7 In fact, the joint military exercise has been one of North Korea's 
main reasons for suspending inter-Korean dialogue thereafter. 
Domestically, President Chun attempted to muzzle any public debate on his 
11 For instance. about 200.000 South Korean and US troops participated in the joint military exercise 
south of the DMZ. involving ground. sea and air forces. which put North Korean forces on full alert 
(Oberdorfer 2001: 152). 
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government's North Korea policies, thus implementing extensive political repression. In 
the early 1980s, opposition leader Kim Dae-jung was indicted on charges of anti-state 
activities and sentenced to death before being freed under US pressure, and the two 
other opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim long-pil, were banned from 
engaging in political activities (Levin and Han 2002: 64). During his imprisonment, 
Kim Dae-jung, called 'a communist' by the South Korean ruling elites at that time, 
devoted himself to devising the 'three-stage approach' to the Korean unification (ibid). 
The 1980s had been marked by an unprecedented upsurge of street 
demonstrations by students calling for national unification and the withdrawal of US 
forces, even though their slogans were still interpreted as too radical to appeal to 
ordinary citizens (KINU 2OOOb: Bedeski 1994: 27). South Korea remained an 
ideological wasteland to the extent that an incumbent National Assemblyman was 
arrested in 1986 for contending that 'the nation's goal is not anti-Communism, but 
unification' . 
Stage 2: Collision of Identity Norms 
The end of the Cold War provided fertile ground for South Koreans' new identity norms 
to gain robustness and be able to challenge the predominant norms regulating inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation. Entrepreneurs of new norms obtained more visibility 
in the public sphere through their bold actions, such as secret trips to North Korea, and 
media reports that had reflected the diverse features of South Korean society after being 
freed from the censorship of the past's authoritarian regimes. Even though the early 
norm entrepreneurs faced crackdowns by state authorities, their movements assumed the 
central stage of public discourse in South Korea, brightening the possibility that those 
groups could be emancipated eventually from the rule of the dominant groups sticking 
to the norms reflecting the Cold War mentality. 
President Roh Tae-woo's Policy: Nordpolitik 
Timed with the end of the Cold War, President Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) orchestrated a 
policy of inter-Korean rapprochement, although it did not last long because of a crisis, 
touched off by North Korea's nuclear weapons programme in 1993. President Roh 
issued the '7 July Declaration' in 1988 through which Seoul expressed its intention to 
normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, while offering to help 
North Korea to improve its ties with Seoul's allies (Kim D.C. 1990: 191). The 
declaration envisioned the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the United States, 
Japan, the Soviet Union and China as part of the efforts to ensure stability on the 
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Korean Peninsula (ibid: 192). Roh's Nordpolitik, aimed at normalizing ties with North 
Korea's allies, the Soviet Union and China, was possible amidst the structural shifts, 
expedited by the end of the Cold War, which also prompted North Korea to reluctantly 
change its policies. For example, China shocked North Korea in May 1991 by 
conveying the message that it would not veto South Korea's entry into the United 
Nations, which opened the way for the two Koreas' simultaneous accession to the world 
body in September (KINU 2000b). 
The Roh administration managed to create two agreements of great significance 
in the history of inter-Korean relations in December 1991: the Basic Agreement 
(Appendix III) and the loint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
Cha (1998) noted that the Basic Agreement is an improved version of the 1972 Joint 
Communique: first, it followed the format of an international treaty, including the 
parliamentary ratification process, in an effort to make it a binding document; second, 
the agreement acknowledged the legitimacy of each system and called for, among other 
things, the suspension of defamatory propaganda, the negotiation of a peace treaty, the 
linking of severed railways and highways, the reunion of separated family members and 
the revival of postal and communication links; and, third, the agreement laid out an 
institutional roadmap for unification by specifying the timetable for the creation of a 
liaison office and joint committees for security affairs and cooperative exchanges. It 
also included the establishment of a hot line between the two military authorities, arms 
reduction talks, prior notification of troop movements and exercises, and the exchange 
of military personnel and information. Amid the heightening North Korean nuclear 
crisis, however, further inter-Korean contacts were deadlocked in January 1993 when 
North Korea declared the suspension of dialogue, citing the joint US-South Korea Team 
Spirit military exercise. 
The end of the Cold War has seen an upsurge of intensified activities by South 
Korean students and dissidents seeking to directly contact their North Korean 
counterparts, but the NSL, which has been in force to thwart all forms of inter-Korean 
contacts, erected hurdles for these movements. In 1989, a series of secret trips by South 
Korean students and dissidents to North Korea came as a shock to the Roh 
administration and ordinary South Korean citizens, touching off a heated debate on 
unification and the possible revision or abolition of the stiff law. Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, a 
long-time dissident, visited North Korea and met North Korean leader Kim II-sung in 
March, followed by novelist Hwang Sok-young in April, Rep. Suh Kyung-won in June 
and student activist 1m Soo-kyung in the same month (KINU 2000b; Hart-Landsberg 
1998: 198). In particular, an unprecedented trip by the female student to Pyongyang to 
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attend the thioeenth World Festival of Youth and Students was regarded as one of the 
greatest achievements by Hanchongnyon. a pro-North Korean umbrella student 
organization. and turned the discourse on unification into a mainstream debate in South 
Korea's public sphere (ibid: 199). For student activists, the nationalist penchant of 
North Korea's governing ideologies, as observed in the previous section, was seen as an 
alternative path to South Korea's dependence on the United States and pursuit of 
consumerism denying distributive justice (Bedeski 1994: 103). The Supreme Couo 
upheld the lower couos' rulings in a strong punitive action against the unauthorized 
travellers to Nooh Korea for violating the NSL. The rulings of the South Korean couOs 
were interpreted as reflecting the Roh government's belief that it was premature to 
authorize civilian unification movements, despite the end of the Cold War (Korea Daily 
News, 26 September 1990). 
Another milestone in the dissident and leftist movement in the 1980s was the 
spread of the minjung (masses) movement that draws on 'shamanism, traditional folk 
tales and peasant rebellions in an attempt to create a uniquely Korean liberation 
theology' (Bedeski 1994: 104).18 The new grass-roots movement added a significant 
dimension to South Korean society and led to the establishment of Chonminnyon, a pan-
national body of dissidents, in 1989 and Pomminnyon or the Pan-National Alliance for 
the Reunification of Korea, in 1990, which had branch offices in Japan, Europe and 
North Korea. In particular, Pomminnyon's main objectives included the peaceful 
reunification of Korea, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, abolition of the 
NSL and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. As their 
specified goals were almost identical with those of the North Korean regime, it has been 
branded as an anti-state organization, benefiting North Korea, under Article 7 of the 
NSL. Significantly, the rise of student and leftist movements in the 1980s put an end to 
the South Korean government's monopoly on the unification debate (Cho-Han and Lee 
2000: 71). In spite of the golden opportunity for national unity, bestowed by the end of 
the Cold War, however, South Korea remained caught in an intense ideological 
polarization, which perpetuated its status as the last vestige of the Cold War, along with 
the North. 
President Kim Young-sam's Policy: Inconsistency 
The five-year term of President Kim Young-sam (1993-8) was eventful, spanning the 
Nooh Korean nuclear crisis and South Korea's worst economic crisis in history in the 
wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Every indication showed that President 
18 For more information, see Han Sang-jin (1986). 
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Kim harboured the ambition to emerge as the first president of a unified Korea because 
North Korea's economic situation was in tatters and the state lost its founding father in 
July 1994 (Kim H.1. 2003: 12; Kim K.S. 2002: 100). In his inauguration speech on 25 
February 1993, Kim declared: 'No allies can be better than the nation. We are ready to 
meet at any time and any place' (Donga [lbo, 26 February 1993). Moon (1998: 275) 
interpreted this remark as the emergence of minjok anbo (national security), comprising 
both North and South Koreans, as a new security identity in South Korea, where kukga 
anbo (state security) had been predominant thus far. Under the new guideline, the MND 
redefined its security policy by expanding the scope of security from the protection of 
South Koreans to the preservation of the political and territorial integrity of the entire 
Korean nation, comprising North and South Koreans, as well as overseas Koreans (ibid). 
Despite President Kim's initially conciliatory steps towards North Korea, his 
government failed to maintain momentum mainly because South Korea's strong anti-
Pyongyang forces, assisted by the conservative media organizations, as touched on 
earlier, dominated the policy-making process and the public sphere, taking advantage of 
the Kim government's lack of clear goals and principles regarding North Korea policies 
(KINU 2000b: Park K.Y. 1998). As public opinion turned negative in the face of North 
Korea's provocations, including the nuclear weapons crisis of 1994, the Kim 
government became increasingly sensitive towards them and eventually succumbed to 
the hard-line, conservative voices in society. 
The nonnative forces shackling South Korea's policy options were vividly 
illustrated by the action taken by the Kim government after the death of North Korean 
leader Kim II-sung. Kim died only a few weeks before he was scheduled to meet the 
South Korean leader for a summit, which was agreed upon for the first time in the 
history of the divided nation. Despite its initial acceptance of the North Korean leader as 
a dialogue partner, the South Korean government exhibited profound disarray in 
reacting to his death and yielded to the conservative nonnative forces, which lurk deep 
in the mentality of South Koreans especially in times of crises. Chosun /lbo, a mass 
circulation newspaper in South Korea, played a pivotal role in driving public opinion in 
the direction of labelling the late Kim as the very 'culprit' of the Korean War, effectively 
restraining student and dissident efforts to send a delegation to his funeral in North 
Korea (Han Sung-joo 2001: 195). Sensing the rising anti-Pyongyang sentiment, the Kim 
government ruled out the possibility of expressing condolences over his death. Instead, 
it put its anned forces on high alert, publicized Soviet documents pinpointing Kim for 
provoking the Korean War, and launched a crackdown on attempts to express tributes to 
Kim's death, events that froze inter-Korean relations for the remainder of the Kim 
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administration (Chun 2000: 78; KINU 2000b). 
President Kim's attitude assumed the height of inconsistency in the South 
Korean government's North Korea policies (Mazzar 2000: 313). South Korean 
policymakers swayed between the ambition to achieve national reunification and the 
wisdom that unification by absorption might tum out to be disastrous to the prosperity 
of South Korea. The United States was also taken aback by occasional wholesale South 
Korean shifts to the right, including the incident after Kim's death (Barry 1998). Chun 
(2000: 77) and Paek (2000: 33-5) collected key statements by President Kim, testifying 
to the remarkable inconsistency of his attitude and policies towards North Korea. For 
example, Kim made conciliatory remarks, such as 'No alliance partner is better than 
compatriots (25 February 1993)'; 'Within my term, I will make utmost efforts to 
achieve an inter-Korean confederation (20 January 1994),; 'I want to meet (North 
Korean) President Kim at any time. We have rice to donate (4 April 1994)'; 'We would 
not spare any efforts to extend a helping hand to North Korea regardless of whatever it 
wishes (7 March 1995),; and 'We are willing to buy foreign rice to assist North Korea 
(22 June 1995)'. In almost the same period, however, Kim made anti -Pyongyang 
remarks: 'I cannot shake hands with a partner armed with nuclear weapons (3 June 
1993),; 'Now is the most dangerous moment when North Korea might provoke any 
contingency (27 May 1994)'; 'In an interview with CNN, (Kim II-sung) stated three 
times that North Korea would not collapse, a strange act that made me presume that he 
has a health problem (20 July 1994),; and 'Washington is too nai·ve and flexible in its 
talks with North Korea (27 October 1994),. 
On top of this inconsistency, the Kim government maintained a virtual 
diplomatic doctrine for five years: 'All roads to the world go through Seoul'. Although 
the doctrine was originally intended to help North Korea to improve its relations with 
the international community, the South Korean government did not want the United 
States to improve its relations with North Korea ahead of inter-Korean relations (Barry 
1998; Moon 1998). As North Korea had attempted to improve ties with the United 
States and other Western countries while refusing to hold dialogue with South Korea, 
the Seoul government's doctrine only served the role of impeding North Korea's 
contacts with Western countries. 
President Kim Dae-jung; Emergence of an Activist Government 
This section sets the stage for an analysis of the dramatic policy shift that led to inter-
Korean rapprochement. In fact, the demands for new ideas, which could lead to South 
Koreans' identity shifts toward North Korea, had been already in the offing in South 
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Korean society. As witnessed in the previous section, the dominating Cold War template 
left the South Korean public divisive and antagonized against different groups sharing 
different ideas, which perpetrated the symbiosis of different identities and norms (Moon 
1999; Kim and Park 200l). In particular, a majority of South Koreans exhibited two 
contrasting features: 'a strong Cold War ethos (anti-Communist and anti-North Korean 
sentiment) and a strong desire to overcome such an ethos' (Kim and Park 2001: 320). 
To shatter this eqUilibrium, South Korean society required the emergence of an 
activist government, armed with a new set of policy tools, as illustrated in Chapter 
Three. President Kim's knowledge and adherence to non-violence are attributed to his 
access to the great ideas and philosophies of Mohandas Gandhi, lawaharlal Nehru, 
Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King (Kim H.l. 2003: 36). President Kim's policy is 
a logical outcome of his knowledge-based ideas, since he was a member of an 
international network of pro-democracy leaders and human rights activists, which could 
be regarded as a form of what Haas (1992) identified as an epistemic community, 
defined as a network of professionals equipped with policy-relevant knowledge and 
experiences in a particular domain. 
The Sunshine Policy was not conceived overnight. As early as September 1994, 
Kim (1994a: 33), then-opposition leader, called on the United States to 'be patient and 
stick to the "sunshine policy" which proved to be the only effective way to deal with 
isolated countries like North Korea'. Kim, speaking at the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington DC, also praised Carter's efforts to broker reconciliation between the two 
Koreas. Moon (2001: 281) said that Kim invoked the analogy of sunshine to press the 
US government to take a soft-landing policy towards North Korea. Throughout his 
career as a democracy fighter, Kim Dae-jung (1994b: 223-4) had been a champion of 
peace, which is well documented in his three principles of peace: peaceful co-existence, 
peaceful exchange and peaceful unification. In particular, the objective of peaceful 
exchange was the 'restoration of a common national identity through political, 
economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian interactions and expansion of common 
interests through increased economic exchanges' (Moon 2001: 288). Under these 
principles, President Kim sought to shift South Koreans' identities vis-a-vis North 
Korea by promoting a wide range of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. 
Upon taking office as President, President Kim embarked on a quest to 
dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula. President Kim's new ideas 
and public support on his engagement option were evidently demonstrated in his speech 
made at the University of London on 4 April 1998 immediately after his inauguration 
(Office of the President 1999): 
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The Republic is now able to push a North Korea policy with self-confidence 
arising from firm public support. I have been steadfast in advocating what I 
call 'sunshine policy' which seeks to lead North Korea down a path toward 
peace, reform and openness through reconciliation, interaction and 
cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry out such ideas step by 
step. 
Basically, previous South Korean governments shared the ideas of ending hostilities 
between the two Koreas and laying the groundwork for peaceful coexistence, although 
they could not stick to such ideas in the face of domestic and international constraints. 
Despite its unique features as an engagement policy, the Sunshine Policy is in line with 
the engagement policies or initiatives of the previous South Korean governments: the 4 
July Joint Communique under President Park Chung-hee; Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) 
and the 7 July Declaration under President Roh Tae-woo; and President Kim Young-
sam's engagement policy in the first half of his administration (Kim and Park 2001: 
328-9). However, Moon (1999: 36-46) argues that the policy represented a sweeping 
departure from those of the previous governments in terms of consistency and integrity, 
elevating it to the level of President Kim's philosophy. 
The central argument of this section is that the momentous tum in inter-Korean 
relations under President Kim's five-year tenure was the product of normative evolution 
and consistent policy entrepreneurship by President Kim and the administration's key 
policymakers, boosted by the readiness of the public sphere to embrace their ideas to a 
greater extent. Redefining state interests in a new post-Cold War milieu, the leadership 
jettisoned confrontational polices and advocated a consistent engagement option to 
soften North Korea's attitude. As identity is the link between norms and interests that 
motivate behaviour (Herman 1996: 283), the South Korean leadership attempted to 
inspire the public with the way they identified North Korea and reduce South Koreans' 
endemic security dilemma. As elucidated in Chapter Three, President Kim, as a norm 
entrepreneur making use of his organizational platform and information, repeatedly 
portrayed North Korean Chairman Kim as a 'reliable figure' and resorted to 'persuasion' 
rather than 'argument' in an effort to craft a new frame in the South Korean psyche, thus 
fixing meanings and proposing solutions to inter-Korean problems. 
Kim's inauguration as President, ending his career as a life-long dissident leader 
armed with his own ideas and principles of inter-Korean relations and unification. 
helped to open new policy windows (Lee W.S. 2003). When President Kim took office 
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in February 1993, he was ready to announce the three core principles of his Sunshine 
Policy (MOD 1999). The first principle is no tolerance of armed provocation by North 
Korea. As seen in the exchange of fire between the naval vessels of the two Koreas in 
June 1999, South Korea showed its strong determination not to tolerate any anned 
provocation by North Korea. 19 In fact, the naval clash gave a boost to the Sunshine 
Policy's credibility, proving that it was not merely an appeasement policy but a security 
policy with teeth. Despite its triumph in the naval skirmishes, South Korea did not make 
use of the North Korean provocation as an excuse to launch a stepped-up counterattack 
against North Korea, thus maintaining the principle of the status quo. The second 
principle is the abandonment of any attempt to unify the nation by absorption in a 
formula similar to Gennan unification. In fact, German unity heightened the prospects 
of a similar integration process on the Korean Peninsula, apparently frightening the 
North Korean elites who were struggling to remain in power through the maintenance of 
the current system. As this fear negatively influenced inter-Korean relations, it was 
necessary for the Kim government to officially declare that it had no intention of 
absorbing North Korea by any means. The third principle is the promotion of exchange 
and cooperation between the two Koreas. Right after taking office, President Kim called 
for the expansion of inter-Korean relations through the revival of the 1991 Basic 
Agreement. Even though he failed to revive the agreement, President Kim signed the 
Joint Declaration with Chairman Kim after their summit in 2000 and maintained 
exchange and cooperation even after the North's admission to a nuclear weapons 
programme in October 2002. 
In spite of the collision of competing identity norms in the public sphere, 
President Kim and his advisors remained steadfast to the course of engaging North 
Korea. Even though South Korea has a strong presidential system, President Kim faced 
fierce criticism from the opposition GNP and conservative media organizations, which 
remained tied to established norms and emphasized the enemy side of North Korea. 
There were also differences in policy priorities among key actors of his own presidential 
house, the bureaucracy and the ruling party (Steinberg 1999). Nevertheless, they could 
not defeat the unswerving willpower of President Kim and his advisors, given the 
closed, streamlined South Korean policy-making process, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
The new identity norms, pushed by the leadership, clashed with the established 
norms in South Korean society, which were predominantly anti-Communist and 
security-oriented (Paik 2002: 21). As remarkable examples of 'norm collision', this 
section identifies two phenomena: cognitive dissonance and a clash with existing 
19 The West Sea naval incidents will be examined in detail in Chapter Six. 
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institutions. 
A. Cognitive Dissonance. 
It did not take much time for the proponents of the Sunshine Policy to disrupt the 
cognitive framework of South Koreans, who had been indoctrinated for decades by 
successive anti-Communist regimes to react in a tit-for-tat manner to any provocative 
step taken by North Korea and to believe that the Seoul government holds the monopoly 
over assessing and making decisions on any issues related to North Korea (Korea Times, 
25 June 1998). In fact, the identity of South Korea as a major actor on the Korean 
Peninsula has been constituted in its constant interpretation and, in many instances, 
exaggeration of threats posed by North Korea during the Cold War and onwards, just 
like the discourse of American identity constitution was impossible without Soviet 
threats during the Cold War (Campbell 1992). Since stasis in identity constitution means 
death to a state (ibid: 11), South Korea experienced fierce confrontations between 
groups with contending identities at times of great change after the Cold War. 
The end of the Cold War led to the 'bipolarity of the political orientation', 
spawning political and social confrontations and tension between the state and the 
business circle over the autonomy of inter-Korean business activities (Kim and Park 
2001: 332). Only four months after President Kim's inauguration, the South Korean 
government faced crucial moments of judgment with regard to two sensitive inter-
Korean issues: a tourism project pushed by Hyundai, one of South Korea's largest 
business conglomerates, on Mt. Kumgang in North Korea and the discovery of a North 
Korean submarine in South Korean territorial waters. At that time, the late Hyundai 
tycoon, Chung Ju-yung, announced that his group had signed an agreement with North 
Korea to organize pleasure boat services to Mt. Kumgang. Initially, the project did not 
look feasible because the previous South Korean administrations made it a rule for 
businesses to secure the North Korean government's official guarantee of the safe 
passage of South Korean travellers. According to conventional beliefs, such a trip would 
be possible only after the North and South Korean authorities first held official talks to 
address all related issues. Vice Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, who later became 
unification minister in January 2002 and retained the post under the new Roh Moo-hyun 
government, raised the possibility that the government would not officially meddle in 
the process, while allowing such a state-run agency as the Korea National Tourism 
Organization (KNTO) to sign a deal on the safe passage of South Koreans. The vice 
minister's remarks came as a shock to both the political and business worlds, as well as 
the public, because a similar project by a South Korean ferry company was aborted 
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under the Kim Young-sam government due to the stiff requirements. 
As for the North Korean submarine infiltration, the Kim government also 
showed a completely different attitude from that of the Kim Young-sam administration. 
Without labeling it as an 'infiltration' into South Korean waters, the government rather 
accommodated the North Korean insistence that it was an accidental violation of 
tenitorial waters because of a 'mechanical problem'. In September 1996 when another 
North Korean submarine ran aground in South Korean waters, then-president Kim 
Young-sam immediately defined it as a 'provocation' by North Korea and ordered every 
possible action to punish the infiltration, including sanctions by the U.N. Security 
Council. Facing a similar incident in 1998, the MND sought to adopt the same hard-line 
action against the infiltration, but the presidential house stopped the ministry from 
taking additional steps. Since professional military organizations display strong 
adherence to organizational behaviour leading to deterrence failure because of their 
'common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests' (Sagan 1994: 68), the 
presidential house needed to intervene immediately to prevent the escalation of tension. 
Contemplating the attitudinal changes of the South Korean government, a MOFAT 
official commented at the time: 'Up to now, the people have been brainwashed by the 
past regimes. It will take time for them to adapt themselves to the new government's 
policies' (Korea Times, 25 June 1998). 
Since multiple identities co-exist in society, the projection of North Korea as a 
partner or a brother was not the creation of the Kim administration, as demonstrated in 
the previous section. Throughout history, South Koreans' images of their North Korean 
neighbours have been positioned somewhere between the two extremes of brothers and 
enemies, showing ideational dualism (Moon 2001; Kim and Park 2001). Therefore, the 
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance can be seen as part of the process in which those 
in power, making use of their advantageous status and various state organs, tried to 
reframe the public's cognitive structure, thus bringing about noticeable identity shifts. In 
particular, the Sunshine Policy served to propel the public to perceive the North 
Koreans as brothers. 2o In fact, the Sunshine Policy was the first policy to place greater 
emphasis on the brother side of North Korea than the enemy side in resolving problems 
stemming from national division and foreign intervention. As North Korea was 
supposed to be a brother, the policy focused on how to foster brotherhood to effectively 
lay the groundwork for unification in a phased manner, since immediate unity was seen 
20 A series of surveys conducted by South Korean newspapers and government branches indicated that an 
absolute majority of South Koreans supported the Sunshine Policy and started holding positive images on 
North Korea. Those survey results will be presented later in this section. 
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as detrimental to national interests (Office of the President 2001). In fact, national 
division, which had lasted for half a century, made the divide something natural to the 
younger generations, while the traqma-struck generations would retire or die before 
long (Galtung 1989: 14; Haas 1989: 39). 
If we introduce a fraternal twin brother metaphor to the Korean situation, it 
reflects the fact that the tilting economic capabilities in favour of South Korea 
apparently formed a hierarchical relationship on the Korean Peninsula in terms of 
economic power, thus turning North and South Korea into a mischievous little brother 
and a benevolent big brother. Therefore, the Sunshine Policy was, on the one hand, an 
attempt to free inter-Korean relations from the constraints of the international structure, 
while, on the other, an endeavour to tum North Korea into an identical twin brother, a 
state similar to South Korea based on democracy and the market economy. Under this 
rationale, South Korea, the stronger elder brother, should be patient for the time being 
despite North Korea's periodic attempts to undermine the process in order to allow it to 
reciprocate South Korean measures at an undetermined time and in an underdetermined 
way, rather than applying the principle of strict reciprocity, used by the previous South 
Korean governments (Han Y.S. 2002: 59). 
B. Clashes With Existing Institutions. 
Although the United States dropped North Korea from its attention whenever it was off 
the front pages of the newspapers (Barry 1998), South Koreans faced different realities 
as cohabitants of the peninsula and sought to put an end to the long-running inter-
Korean tension. As new norm entrepreneurs, President Kim and his advisors sought to 
remove anti-North Korean laws and regulations to win the heart of the North Korean 
leadership and facilitate future inter-Korean exchange. In fact, the anti-North Korean 
attitude is deeply inscribed in the South Korean Constitution, as its Article 3 states, 'the 
territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the peninsula and its adjacent islands'. 
Since the South Korean government is the only legitimate entity under the Constitution, 
the North Korean regime is an illegitimate and anti-state organization (Kim and Park 
2001: 329). When the Kim administration set out to tear down institutionalized anti-
Communist and anti-North Korean norms in South Korea's laws and regulations, public 
attention became focused on two major documents, the National Security Law and 
annual defence white paper, which embodied the spirit of the Constitution. 
National Security Law. For an activist government seeking to promote exchange 
and cooperation between adversaries, established laws and regulations, which are in 
148 
force to prevent cross-border interaction, have been the greatest obstacles. Therefore, 
the Kim government tried repeatedly to revise the National Security Law, which was 
once regarded as a bulwark of South Korea's democratic system against North Korea's 
ideological onslaughts. Even before Kim's inauguration, South Korea's left-wing camp 
had long launched an offensive to eliminate the NSL, the Anticommunist Law, and the 
Military Secrecy Act (Moon 1998: Kim and Park 2001). The government stepped up 
efforts to revise the law after the U.N. Human Rights Committee, an arm of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, told it that the Supreme Court's 
ruling on a case involving violations of the law runs counter to the civil rights covenant 
because it infringes on the freedom of expression (Korea Times, 25 December 1998). In 
particular, the law's Article 7, which aims to punish those who praise North Korea or 
instigate anti-state activities, has been used as a legal tool by authoritarian regimes to 
crack down on dissident movements and promote their own regime security (Kim and 
Park 2001: 33). 
Despite his wishes, President Kim could not push ahead with the revision of the 
law partly because his party was in a shaky coalition with the ULD, a conservative party 
with a strong anti-Communist ideological background.21 Therefore, it had no option but 
to suspend the parliamentary process in the face of strong resistance by the coalition 
partner and the main opposition GNP, led by Lee Hoi-chang. Instead of pushing for a 
revision of the law, the Kim government simplified and loosened the regulations 
governing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, particularly those regarding the prior 
notification of inter-Korean contacts. It also dropped North Korea from the category of 
anti-state organizations through a new interpretation of the NSL, as long as Pyongyang 
did not take steps to jeopardize the South Korean system and security (MOU 2000). By 
making use of his prerogative power, the Kim government granted a large-scale special 
amnesty, including the restoration of all civil rights of former student activist 1m Soo-
kyung, pastor Moon Kyu-hyun, former National Assembly member Seo Kyung-won 
and novelist Hwang Suk-young, all of whom had been imprisoned by previous 
administrations for making unauthorized visits to North Korea in violation of the NSL 
(Chosun Ilbo, 21 February 1999). 
The irony involving the NSL was that there was no public demand for the 
prosecution of President Kim Young-sam and his followers for contacting North Korean 
21 Kim Jong-pil, a former Army officer who joined the 1961 military coup to topple the democratically 
elected government. later became the chief of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency. During the 
presidential campaign in 1997. Kim Dae-jung had no option but to enter into a coalition with Kim Jong-
pil. because he represented a minority political force in the Korean political landscape. See also Kim and 
Park (2001). 
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leader Kim II-sung in 1994 to organize a summit or President Kim Dae-jung for 
travelling to North Korea in 2000 for a summit, although the NSL was in force to punish 
arbitrary contacts with North Korea (Kim and Park 2001: 321). In fact, South Koreans 
were already prepared to accept new realities after the Cold War in spite of the existence 
of out-dated laws and institutions banning such acts, which demonstrated the reality that 
the established legal framework was not compatible with the changing inter-Korean 
relationship (ibid). As mentioned in Chapter Three, norm lag takes place simultaneously 
with norm collision, as the dominant identities and their subservient norms cannot 
immediately reflect structural shifts and domestic pressures, created through new types 
of social interaction. Even though the established identities and norms are outmoded, it 
takes time for new identity norms to emerge dominant in a given society. In particular, 
the conservative forces, enmeshed in a Cold War mentality, were still in every comer of 
society. Kang (2001: 26-30) noted that the characteristics of the 'Cold War forces' are 
their affiliation with dictators and aversion to democratization; the classification of 
North Korea as an enemy; their alliance with foreign forces for the purpose of 
maintaining their political, economic and social status; and their loathing of peaceful 
unification and preference for unification in the form of invasion or absorption. 
Defence White Paper. In a major peace gesture, the Kim administration stopped 
issuing the annual defence white paper in 2001, which had pinpointed North Korea as 
the 'prime enemy' of South Korea. At first, the Seoul government sought to delete the 
'prime enemy' part from the white paper, an attempt that touched off a major 
controversy in South Korean society. At that time, conservatives strongly opposed the 
elimination of the term, which was first included in the white paper in 1995.22 In fact. 
the Kim government faced mounting pressure from both North Korea and the 
conservative forces in South Korea. When the MND issued the white paper in 2000 
right after the inter-Korean summit, Rodong Shinmun, the official newspaper of the 
North Korean Workers' Party, denounced it as a 'declaration of another confrontational 
policy'. The MND decided not to issue the white paper in 2002 for the second 
consecutive year to avoid a controversy, although Chong Wa Dae and the MOU 
requested it to delete or revise the expression 'prime enemy' (Hankook !lbo, 24 May 
2002). Despite some newspapers' criticism of the decision as a 'cowardly act', the Kim 
government strove to maintain conciliatory policies towards North Korea in a consistent 
22 The term was introduced to the white paper after a North Korean delegate to an inter-Korean meeting 
at the truce village of Panmunjom threatened to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire' at the climax of the nuclear 
weapons crisis in June 1994. 
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manner throughout his presidency. 
Despite partial achievements in these attempts, the Sunshine Policy could pass 
through this stage of norm collision, because the administration made strenuous efforts 
to the extent that it even promoted the private-level unification debate and activities 
(Chung H.B. 2(02). The administration published a wide range of books and leaflets to 
publicize the Sunshine Policy and promote the understanding of the policy's key 
principles in both Korean and English. 23 President Kim and his advisors were confident 
that they could change or at least mitigate domestic opposition to his engagement policy 
through education and persuasion. Convinced there was no other option than the 
Sunshine Policy, they thought that if there were opposition to the policy, it must have 
derived from 'ignorance and misunderstanding' of the policy (Moon 2001: 292). 
Stage 3: Norm Cascades 
The Sunshine Policy, which opened an era of inter-Korean rapprochement through an 
inter-Korean summit in June 2000, dramatically broadened and strengthened the 
foundation of pro-reconciliation forces in South Korea, creating a solid basis for 
cooperation between the two Koreas in the future (Paik 2002: 34l4. Joongang llbo (1 
January 2(02), a conservative newspaper that maintained an anti-Sunshine Policy stance, 
published an opinion poll on New Year's Day of 2002, showing 59.9 per cent of those 
surveyed supported the Sunshine Policy. As to the question, 'Do you think the Sunshine 
Policy should continue in the next government?' 34.5 per cent said it should continue, 
while 53.7 per cent were of the opinion that it should continue with modification (ibid). 
The turning point of South Koreans' identity shifts vis-a-vis North Korea and its 
leadership was the inter-Korean summit. According to surveys released immediately 
after the summit, 97 per cent of the respondents noted that they came to hold a positive 
image of North Korea and its leadership, while an absolute majority dismissed the 
possibility of North Korea launching a war against South Korea (Moon 2001: 307; 
Korea Herald, 19 June 2(00). The summit played a pivotal role in changing the images 
of North Korea 'from a rogue state to a rational and normal state' and its leader Kim 
from a 'monstrous, erratic dictator' to a 'rational, competent leader' (Moon 2001: 307). 
The images of North Korea and its leader, Chairman Kim, underwent so drastic a 
23 For more information on books written in English. see MOV (1999). 
24 According to MOV (2003: 341-3), the government offers various assistance to South Korean private 
organizations working to promote exchange and cooperation with North Korea. As of December 2002, a 
total of 103 organizations were registered with the ministry, which comprise 42 (general unification 
activities). 25 (research). 18 (humanitarian assistance), 17 (exchange and cooperation) and one 
(education) . 
151 
change that the supporters of inter-Korean rapprochement created an Internet website 
fan club, devoted to Kim Jong-il (Monthly ioongang, August 2000), a phenomenon 
which provoked both optimism over future inter-Korean ties and pessimism over the 
possible 'ideological chaos after the Summit' (Kim and Park: 2001: 320). 
In addition, the election of Roh Moo-hyun in a presidential election in December 
2002 symbolized the public endorsement of the Sunshine Policy because he had vowed 
to carryon the policy as one of his campaign promises (New York Times, 21 December 
2002), while his rival Lee Hoi-chang vowed to launch a hard-line policy to terminate 
North Korea's nuclear programmes (Financial Times, 17 December 2002). Right after 
the election, The New York Times (21 December 2002) reported, 'the election results 
show, encouragingly, that Mr. Kim's basic goals of expanding democracy and reaching 
out to the North enjoy continued support, especially among an affluent younger 
generation' . 
Interactive Process of Norm Cascades. One notable feature in the stage of norm 
cascades was an interactive process between the two Koreas, given that the remarkable 
attitudinal change of South Koreans had been very much dependent on the behavioural 
changes on the part of the North Korean leadership. On the day of his arrival in 
Pyongyang, President Kim received a red carpet welcome from Chairman Kim, while 
the frantically cheering citizens lining the roads in Pyongyang were telecast live to the 
world, leaving a deep impression on South Koreans (Moon 2000). Before and after the 
summit, North Korean leader Kim visited China twice in May 2000 and in January 2001 
to witness China's economic developments and subsequently introduced shinsago 
un dong (new thinking movement) designed to implement economic reforms (Moon 
2001: 312). In addition, state-run North Korean newspapers stopped carrying articles 
critical of South Korea. Two major North Korean newspapers - Rodong Shinmun, the 
organ of the North Korean Workers' Party, and Minju Choson, an official paper of the 
North Korean government - abolished a section devoted to criticism of the South (ibid: 
306). Chairman Kim alluded to the possible revision of the by-law of the Workers' Party, 
which called for the liberation of South Korea by revolutionary forces (ibid: 304), a 
gesture welcomed by President Kim with his pledge to revise the NSL. 
On the occasion of the third anniversary of the 2000 inter-Korean summit, 
former President Kim Dae-jung contended in an interview that the summit had brought 
about far-reaching consequences in North Korea in which new laws were enacted to 
introduce the market economy in 2002 and North Koreans have increasingly become 
'positive and friendly' towards their South Korean counterparts (Yonhap News Agency 
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15 June 2003). A statement by James Hoare, who set up the British Embassy in 
Pyongyang and served as charge d'affaires for two years, upheld Kim's remarks. In a 
seminar,25 Hoare said: 
After the Sunshine Policy, a large number of South Koreans visited North 
Korea. You can see South Korean fertilizer bags everywhere. More and more 
North Koreans are seeing South Koreans as brothers, not enemies. 
International Reactions. The Sunshine Policy received an accolade from the 
international community, with President Kim winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for 
his contribution to promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. President 
Kim and his advisors had not only attempted to improve inter-Korean relations, but also 
helped North Korea to establish diplomatic ties with major countries around the world.26 
Although it failed to nudge the United States and Japan to establish diplomatic ties with 
North Korea, South Korea succeeded in helping North Korea to set up official ties with 
European powers, including Italy (4 January 2000), Britain (12 December 2000), and 
Germany (1 March 2001). By the end of the Kim administration's term, North Korea 
had established diplomatic ties with 13 European Union (EU) members, except for only 
France and Ireland. The Kim government's policy was a significant departure from the 
previous government's policy, which called on Seoul's allies to improve relations with 
North Korea in parallel and harmony with inter-Korean relations, often souring its 
relations with the United States and Japan (Yang S.c. 1999). Other events, which could 
be regarded as the Sunshine Policy's achievements, were North Korean chief military 
officer Jo Myong-rok's trip to Washington and US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 (Oberdorfer 2001: 435-441). In fact, the 
Kim administration was on the verge of depriving the United States of its perennial 
enemy, North Korea, through its successful implementation of the Sunshine Policy. 27 
'Norm Perturbation '. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the evolution of South 
Koreans' identity norms plunged into the pitfall of 'norm perturbation' in the stage of 
'norm cascades' because they faced an adverse international environment, created by 
25 The seminar. titled 'Reflections on Two Years in Pyongyang, North Korea', was hosted by the School 
of East Asian Studies, the University of Sheffield on 7 May 2003. 
26 North Korea's external relations will be featured in detail in Chapter Five. 
27 In a special statement marking the third anniversary of the 2000 summit, Kim Dae-jung recalled that 
North Korea and the United States had a remarkable chance of improving their relations, with Washington 
guaranteeing Pyongyang's security and economic survival and Pyongyang discarding its nuclear weapons 
and missile programmes (Yonhap New Agency, 15 June 2003). 
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the US government's war on terrorism and categorization of North Korea as part of the 
'axis of evil'. The dramatic consolidation of new identity norms was not welcomed by 
powerful states surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which do not regard North Korea as 
a friendly state, resulting in a collision of identity norms held by South Korea and such 
the powerful countries as the United States and Japan. The Sunshine Policy also faced a 
temporary setback on the domestic front, losing its once overwhelming support from the 
South Korean public because North Korea, threatened by the Bush administration's 
hard-line stance, failed to respond to South Korean initiatives in a timely manner and 
South Korea's poor economic outlook made citizens lose enthusiasm in offering 
assistance to North Korea (Levin and Han 2002; Moon 2001; Chung S.J. 2001). When 
US leaders strengthened their anti-Pyongyang rhetoric especially during President 
Kim's trip to Washington in March 2001, North Korea unilaterally called off the fifth 
inter-Korean ministerial talks and declined to form a single team for the international 
table tennis championship, held in Osaka from April 23 (Chung S.J. 2001). 
The policy discrepancy between South Korea and the United States, exacerbated 
by North Korea's admittance of a nuclear weapons programme, provoked South 
Koreans' endemic security dilemma and eroded the foundation for the bilateral alliance. 
Conservative columnist William Safire (New York Times, 3 March 2003), criticizing 
South Korea's stance in regard to the North's REU programme, called it a 'neutral' state, 
while classifying Japan and the Philippines into the category of US allies. In fact, 
Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, witnessing the collapse of the 1994 AF, took a 
neutral stance, when he told the parliament in July 2003 that 'I cannot say with 
conviction who is responsible for the breakdown of the Geneva nuclear agreement' 
(Yonhap News Agency. 11 July 2003). This policy gap stemmed from the fundamental 
differences of the two countries' approaches towards North Korea. With Seoul sticking 
to a status quo policy, Washington pursued regime change in North Korea that, in the 
worst case, might involve an invasion. This US stance was not compatible with the 
South's status quo policy, advocated by the other major powers in this region, China, 
Japan and Russia (Moon 1999). China, which regards North Korea as a buffer zone, is 
the staunchest supporter of a status quo policy because it does not want to see North 
Korea break down or absorbed by South Korea (Han Sung-joo 2001). Japan and Russia, 
more or less, adopted similar policies. The three states also favoured North Korea's 
gradual opening and reform, as well as its integration into the international community. 
Washington's displeasure over inter-Korean rapprochement was expressed in the 
form of obstructing the inter-Korean process of linking the severed railways across the 
border (Yonhap News Agency. 13 November 2002). Earlier, the North and South Korean 
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authorities created an agreement designed to facilitate the construction works inside the 
DMZ. According to the agreement, the dispatch of officials supervising the construction 
works was to be notified to each other through a military hotline between the North and 
South Korean authorities. However, the US-led U.N. Command, citing the Armistice 
Agreement, called on North Korea to notify a list of officials through the channel of the 
Military Armistice Commission, inviting a hysterical reaction from both North and 
South Korea.28 
The shifting identities between North and South Koreans also attracted a cynical 
comment from Japan. Ishiba Shigeru, director general of the Japanese Defence Agency, 
told South Korean Prime Minister Goh Kun during his visit to Seoul on 29 March 2003, 
'As far as we know, North Korea's Rodong missiles cannot reach the United States and 
they will not be used against their compatriots, South Koreans. Therefore, the Japanese 
share the fear that they might be aiming at Japan' (Yonhap News Agency, 29 March 
2003). Earlier in Tokyo, the director general suggested in a testimony to parliament that 
Japan needed to acquire long-range missiles possibly to make a pre-emptive attack on 
North Korea in case Pyongyang prepares to launch its missiles, although he softened his 
position later in the face of Japan's predominant anti-militarist norms. 
Despite the propagation of new identity norms in South Korea, North Korea's 
confrontation with the United States and Japan hampered the process of norm cascades, 
because this stage was highly dependent on North Korea's good behaviour, given the 
interactive nature of norm cascades. 
Robustness of 'Norm Cascades'. What made the New York Times columnist see 
South Koreans as 'neutrals' was the Kim government's increasing efforts to separate 
inter-Korean relations from the constraints of the international structure, primarily from 
US-North Korea relations. Steinberg (1999: 63) said that crucial differences of priority 
and emphasis between the two countries are inevitable because South Korea's national 
interests are defined, first, by the peninsula, and second by Northeast Asia, while those 
of the United States are worldwide, as seen in its global efforts to stop nuclear 
proliferation. In this phase of 'norm cascades', South Korea witnessed the rise of anti-
Americanism stemming from President Bush's hard-line stance vis-a-vis North Korea 
and the death of two schoolchildren in a road accident caused by a US military vehicle, 
which led to widespread anti-American rallies. Upon facing mounting US and domestic 
pressures, the practitioners of the Sunshine Policy promoted inter-Korean 
rapprochement in the direction of the unshackling of inter-Korean relations from the 
28 This dispute will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
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volatile US-North Korea relations. 
First of all, the new security and social environment on the Korean Peninsula, 
forged by the inter-Korean summit and increased inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation, posed serious challenges to South Korea's security alliance with the United 
States and touched off a debate on the restructuring of the US-South Korea security 
framework. During the Cold War, South Korea's foreign and military policies have been 
one arm of the US's global strategies aimed at containing communist states. Even after 
the end of the Cold War, Seoul's policies could not be free from the constraints of US 
influences, because East Asia remained a region caught in lingering Cold War rivalries 
mainly due to the presence of the communist states, China and North Korea. Hence, any 
policy towards North Korea required close consultations and joint strategies among the 
United States and its two treaty allies, South Korea and Japan, with the assistant 
minister-level Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOC) playing the 
coordinating role on a regular basis. The inauguration of US President Bush and his 
subsequent hard-line policy towards North Korea undermined the process of fine-tuning 
the policies of the three countries, creating a schism in coordination especially between 
Seoul and Washington. The South Korean government attempted to maintain its 
exchange and cooperation with North Korea even in the middle of the US-North Korea 
confrontations over Pyongyang's REU programme. Although the US government's 
efforts to stop the North Korean nuclear programme had required strong support from 
both South Korea and Japan, Seoul's determination to keep close inter-Korean relations 
on track profoundly frustrated US policymakers. 
This insurmountable gap in North Korea policies led to a review of South 
Korea's diplomatic and security relations with the United States under the new Roh 
Moo-hyun administration. In public speeches and press briefings, President Roh and his 
advisors increasingly mentioned such phrases as 'independent national defence', 
'independent diplomacy' and 'the establishment of a horizontal US-South Korea 
relationship' (Yonhap News Agency, 19 April 2003; 16 January 2004), all referring to 
South Korea's efforts to restructure its diplomatic and security relations with the United 
States in order to embrace the new environment unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. In a 
sense, these developments supported the validity of alliance theory in that, once a 
common threat withers, alliances are often tom apart or lose their raison d'etre (Feske 
1997; Walt 1987, 1989). However, the reason why South Korean policymakers and the 
public sphere were caught in a lengthy debate regarding its alliance with the United 
States was that they wished to restructure the alliance in a mutually beneficial way, as in 
the case of NATO. 
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While stressing the principle of peaceful resolution of all North Korea-related 
problems, the South Korean government remained steadfast in its attachment to an 
engagement option, maintaining government-level meetings and private exchanges with 
North Korea. Since the inter-Korean summit in 2000, the evolving inter-Korean 
relationship gave birth to a new word, minjok kongjo (coordination as the same 
nation).29 In the face of the Bush administration's hard-line stance against North Korea, 
Moon (200 1) called for the strengthening of minjok kongjo to overcome the challenges 
resulting from the shifts in US policies. At the eleventh inter-Korean ministerial meeting 
held in Seoul in June 2003, the North Korean delegates stressed the importance of 
kongjo in the face of US pressure, although the South Korean delegates, expressing 
consent on the proposal, endeavoured to persuade the North to agree to the resumption 
of a six-party meeting to resolve the nuclear issue (Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2003). 
The use of the word in inter-Korean relations caused profound bewilderment to many 
observers. with the proponents of the Sunshine Policy interpreting it as evidence of the 
development of inter-Korean cooperation and the opponents dismissing it as North 
Korea's strategy to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States (Yonhap 
News Agency, 10 January 2003; 15 May 2003; 29 January 2004). In sum, the progress 
of inter-Korean dialogue and the consolidation of an inter-Korean channel as a venue to 
address various issues facing the whole nation have increasingly driven South Korea 
and the United States to reinterpret or revise their traditional security framework to 
reflect the changes in inter-Korean relations. 
South Koreans' changing identities vis-a-vis North Koreans were also reflected 
in their perception of whether North Korea might provoke war against South Korea. 
According to a series of opinion surveys by Gallup Korea, 69.2 per cent of respondents 
expressed concern over the possibility of war in 1992 but the figure dropped 
continuously to 52.7 per cent in 1995, 43.1 per cent in 1999 and 32.8 per cent in 2002 
(ACDPU 114 2003). However, the figure rose slightly to 37.1 per cent in a survey, 
conducted on 25 February 2003, because of the US-North Korea dispute over the HEU 
programme. Asked whether they anticipated unification within the next ten years, 68.4 
per cent reacted negatively, while 20.7 per cent responded positively (ibid). This means 
a significant drop in South Koreans' anticipation of unification, compared with the 
previous Gallup survey in 1993 when 37.9 per cent were optimistic over the possibility 
of unification with ten years. 
29 The term. kongjo. was originally used to describe the three-way process of formulating North Korea 
policies among South Korea. Japan and the United States. 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter offered a comprehensive overview of the diverse norms reigning supreme 
on the Korean Peninsula amidst structural constraints. In particular, it sought to 
demonstrate why North Korea's isolationist policies have not changed even after the 
structural upheaval of the international system, prompted by the end of the Cold War, 
and what made South Korean governments and the public revamp their identities vis-a-
vis North Korea in a phased manner over the lapse of half a century. 
So far, many analysts have approached inter-Korean issues with a rather 
monolithic belief that the sea change in inter-Korean relations stemmed basically from 
the shifts in the structural parameters of the relationship, as with the end of the Cold War. 
They also resorted to the metaphors of the zero-sum game to explain the changes of 
inter-Korean relations by noting that the 'basket case' of the North Korean economy in 
the wake of the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and South Korea's rise as one of the 
world's economic powerhouses provided South Korean policymakers with the 
confidence to adopt in their bold engagement policy vis-a-vis North Korea. 
Accommodating the realist approach in an eclectic manner, this chapter argued rather 
that the most salient factor, which prompted the change of South Korea's strategies of 
engagement with North Korea, was a normative revolution, engineered by President 
Kim and his advisors, given that the previous Kim Young-sam administration did not 
bring about changes to inter-Korean relations in the same structural template. 
By juxtaposing the North and South Korean cases, this chapter pointed out that 
the entrepreneurs of new identity norms had fought fierce battles against the prevailing 
norms regulating the behaviour of North Koreans (self-reliance) and the international 
community (North Korea as nuclear weapons proliferator) to achieve their goal of 
security and integration. It is to be seen whether these remarkable identity shifts, which 
took place during the Kim administration, were an anomaly limited to this period. 
Nevertheless, it is not hard to find evidence, which suggests that the identity shifts of 
South Koreans would persist during the Roh Moo-hyun government. Even conservative 
forces acknowledged that the rightist and conservative forces which had emerged 
triumphant in the 'war of ideologies' against the leftist forces during the 1945-53 period, 
buttressed by the United States, and remained as the mainstream forces until very 
recently, succumbed to the progressive and leftist forces, led by the Roh government, 
which now enjoys ideological preponderance (Han Sung-jo 2003; Lee K.S. 2003). 
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Chapter Five. Case Study I: The Sunshine Policy and North 
Korea's External Relations 
1. Introduction 
If Chapter Four highlighted the historical trajectory of identity shifts set in motion by 
successive South Korean governments and adopted by the general public vis-a-vis 
North Korea, this chapter seeks to establish an understanding of one of the Sunshine 
Policy's international goals: North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the world's 
major powers. As argued in Chapter Three, the Sunshine Policy not only strengthened 
inter-Korean relations, but also opened a window of opportunity for North Korea, when 
it pursued diplomatic normalization with the United States, Japan, European countries 
and others. Its main objective was the recovery of diplomatic equilibrium on the Korean 
Peninsula, which was heavily tilted in favour of South Korea owing to its rising 
international status after the Cold War. As a status quo power, South Korea was 
prepared to help North Korea to achieve its long-cherished dream of establishing 
diplomatic ties with the Western powers, since it was already enjoying political and 
economic cooperation with China and Russia, the former allies of North Korea, in a 
solid framework of formal diplomatic ties. In this process of resocialization, the South 
Korean leadership believed that inter-Korean relations could gain stability, thus 
preventing North Korea's collapse and promoting the Korean nation's collective 
prosperity, as well as meeting South Korea's immediate state interests. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the South Korean leadership's ideas and 
identity shifts, which helped North Korea and the world's major powers to forge better 
relations. The second section proceeds to analyze developments in bilateral relations 
between North Korea and the world's major powers. First, in terms of US-North Korea 
relations, this section aims to examine the heyday of the Sunshine Policy from the inter-
Korean summit in June 2000 to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright'S visit to 
Pyongyang in October 2000. The next section, on Japan-North Korea relations, will 
discuss Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's surprise trip to Pyongyang in 
September 2002, which marked a momentous shift in Japan's foreign policy. Finally, it 
will document North Korea's establishment of diplomatic relations with the EU and its 
key members. In each case, this chapter will shed light on the Kim administration's 
attempts to nudge both North Korea and the other parties towards the establishment of 
diplomatic ties, which demonstrated the South Korean leadership's identity shifts and 
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embodiment of new policy options to ensure peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula. 
Although the Kim government's efforts were not successful in helping North 
Korea to obtain diplomatic recognition from the United States and Japan during its 
period in office, this chapter focuses on the South Korean policy elites' identity shifts 
vis-a-vis their North Korean counterparts, which freed them from the dynamics of a 
zero-sum game and the shackles of the relative gains dilemmas, preached by realists. 
Therefore, the Kim government pressed the United States, Japan and other states to 
establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, even ahead of inter-Korean 
rapprochement (Yang S.c. 1999: 183). 
Since this chapter intends to analyze the momentous change of foreign policies 
by the United States, Japan and the EU members towards North Korea after the 
introduction of the Sunshine Policy, it is not appropriate to test all three levels of 
comprehensive engagement proposed in Chapter Three to analyze the South Korean 
government's policies. Therefore, it will focus on testing the domestic level 'of three-
level comprehensive engagement by shedding light on the identity shifts of the South 
Korean leadership, which helped those countries to revolutionize their policies towards 
the North. Each case study will be followed by the 'findings' section to sum up the 
discussion. 
2. Ideational Changes and Policy Shifts in South Korea 
If the Sunshine Policy were a moving vehicle, it had definitely two wheels like a bicycle. 
In other words, the Sunshine Policy's smooth progress depended not only on the 
advancement of inter-Korean relations, but also on North Korea's improved ties with 
such key foreign powers as the United States and Japan, thus helping to end the long-
overdue Cold War confrontation on the peninsula (Moon 2002; Kang 1999). In 
particular, the policies of successive US administrations vis-a-vis North Korea have 
been a prime determinant of the overall security atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula 
since the end of the Cold War. In dealing with North Korea-related issues, Japan, 
immersed in an inherent inertia resulting from domestic and international constraints, 
played more of a secondary or supporting role (Hughes 2002b; Kamiya 2003). 
During the Cold War, North Korea faced an insurmountable barrier in improving 
its relations with the Western countries despite its sporadic efforts to tap Western 
resources through diplomatic normalization, basically because the Korean Peninsula 
was caught in confrontation and rivalry on the diplomatic front. North Korea's 
diplomatic forays were partially successful during the Cold War, when it could establish 
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official relations with neutral states, such as Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, 
and four NATO members, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Portugal (Foster-Carter 
2000). However, a majority of Western countries that enjoyed friendly ties with South 
Korea were reluctant to follow suit. Even after the end of the Cold War, North Korea 
faced overwhelming obstacles both at home and abroad, when it launched initiatives to 
improve relations with the Western countries. In sum, the two Koreas and other key 
actors had devised their security policies based on deeply embedded animosity and 
mistrust, which hampered the smooth progress of post-Cold War rapprochement on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
2.1. Ideas of Cross-Recognition by the Four Powers 
The policy of detente, which was on the continuum of metamorphosing US policies 
during the Cold War, gave birth to the idea of the cross-recognition of the two Koreas 
by the surrounding four powers: the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. 
Even though the Korean Peninsula had been the centre of superpower rivalries, the basic 
idea behind this new initiative was that North and South Korea should become masters 
of their own fate. In an address to the 30th UN General Assembly in 1975, US Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger attempted to revive the stalled process of inter-Korean 
reconciliation by proposing a 'conference among all countries directly involved in the 
Korean Armistice Agreement' and 'the cross-recognition of North and South Korea and 
the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations' (Kim H.J. 1984: 
105). Nevertheless, North Korea rejected the offer, insisting it would stick to bilateral 
negotiations with the United States, since South Korea is not a signatory of the 1953 
Armistice Agreement, which ended the Korean War, and thus not a 'real power' (ibid). 
At that time, North Korea, which had a grand design of unifying the Korean Peninsula 
on its own terms, viewed the idea of cross-recognition as a conspiracy by South Korea, 
the United States and Japan to perpetuate the division of the nation (Kim H.N.1994: 
112). President Park Chung-hee also became uneasy over Kissinger's attempt to use 
Beijing as a channel to persuade North Korea to accept the presence of US troops in the 
short term with its commitment to an eventual pullout over the long term (Oberdorfer 
2001: 144; Chin 2003: 303). President Chun Doo-hwan, who took power after Park's 
assassination in 1979, echoed Kissinger's vision of the simultaneous entry of the two 
Koreas into the United Nations and their cross-recognition by the four powers. During a 
summit with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who visited Seoul in May 1986, 
for instance, President Chun articulated these ideas and secured her support (Hoare 
2002). 
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The idea of cross-recognition was revived with the end of the Cold War. In a 
policy statement in 1988, dubbed the '7 July Special Declaration', President Roh 
envisaged the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers as a preparatory 
step to launching his ambitious Nordpolitik, designed to establish diplomatic ties with 
the Soviet Union and China. Nonetheless, North Korea, which sought rather to develop 
nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, as well as a foundation for political survival, 
was not ready to end the decades-long mistrust. It therefore started to sow the seeds of 
trouble with the United States and Japan, which were equally unprepared to draw closer 
to the Communist state struggling to survive (Lim 2002). 
The end of the Cold War on a global scale presented the South Korean 
government, led by President Roh, with a chance to markedly improve its relations with 
the Soviet Union and China. In particular, Roh's surprise summit with Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco on 4 June 1990 came as a shock to North Korea. 
Seoul set up diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1990 and with Beijing in 1992, 
irreversibly altering the balance-of-power structure on the Korean Peninsula, which had 
been based on the two-plus-four arrangement in which North Korea, on the one hand, 
enjoyed strong backing from the Soviet Union and China~ and South Korea, on the other, 
from the United States and Japan. This diplomatic triumph for South Korea was 
translated into humiliation for the rival regime, a situation that aggravated the already 
tilting equilibrium between them in terms of both political and economic power. 
Witnessing the South's successful diplomatic ties with its former and present allies, 
North Korea poured its diplomatic energy into restoring the strategic balance on the 
Korean Peninsula (Kim H.N. 1994: 115). What North Korea faced on its diplomatic 
frontier were strong Western economies with a list of preconditions for diplomatic 
normalization, a far cry from the Soviet Union, which accepted South Korea's pledge to 
offer US$3 billion in loans in return for early diplomatic normalization. 
As observed above, ideas of cross-recognition floated around for decades on 
the Korean Peninsula, but there had been no political actor capable of consolidating 
those ideas into actual policies with a clear roadmap. During the brief periods of inter-
Korean rapprochement in the early 1970s and in the early 1990s, the South Korean 
government had been rather 'ambiguous on how it conceived Pyongyang's identity' 
(Woo 2003: 525). In this sense, this dissertation argues that the Kim administration, as 
an activist government and entrepreneur of new identity norms in the project of 
promoting North Korea's resocialization into the international community, could offer 
principled ideas with policy relevance to North Korea and the Western states, when they 
struggled to search for ways to end their decades-long enmity. As a leader embodying a 
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nationalist zeal, President Kim had not spoken in the voice of the Cold War leaders, but 
articulated a completely different set of national interests, which could be realized 
through North Korea's rapprochement with those countries. 
2.2. Stumbling Blocks for North Korea's Resocialization 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, North Koreans have been socialized into thinking of 
themselves as dwelling in an earthly paradise guided by a genius leader, thus 
establishing 'self-reliance' as powerful norms in a totally isolated society. Nevertheless, 
North Koreans had the potential to emerge from this cocoon of isolation, if the 
international community showed them more respect, as demonstrated by former US 
President Jimmy Carter's trip in 1994. Even though North Korea wished to regain its 
place in the world, the process of its resocialization into the international community 
faced a large array of obstacles. This section identifies three prime obstacles for North 
Korea with the aim of elucidating what happened when the Sunshine Policy removed 
one of them. 
First, the two post-Cold War South Korean administrations, led by Presidents 
Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) and Kim Young-sam (1993-8), welcomed North Korea's 
improved relations with the Western countries as part of their state propaganda projects. 
In many cases, however, the South Korean leadership was not fully ready to embrace 
rapprochement between them. Energetically pushing his Nordpolitik, President Roh 
focused his policy on establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, 
hampering the other side of the cross-recognition equation: North Korea's diplomatic 
normalization with the United States and Japan. For example, President Roh urged 
Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in January 1991 not to push ahead with 
normalization talks with North Korea, which could outpace the speed and depth of the 
inter-Korean rapprochement process, a request that became 'a de facto condition of all 
Japan-North Korea normalization attempts' (Hughes 1999: 73). 
The situation worsened when President Kim Young-sam, in spite of the 
notorious inconsistency of his North Korea policies, maintained one principle 
throughout his five-year tenure: all roads lead to the world via Seoul. This doctrine was 
an insurmountable hurdle for North Korea, when it sought to improve relations with the 
Western powers, since South Korea demanded that inter-Korean relations be improved 
before North Korea was given a chance for any meaningful dialogue with its allies and 
friends. Mindful of South Korea's attitude, the United States, Japan and the European 
countries were reluctant to start the process of diplomatic recognition. In addition, the 
North Korean regime was not in a position to promise any immediate return for these 
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possible diplomatic forays, while South Korea remained a sizable market and security 
partner for them (Akaha 2002b). It is worth recalling that the 1994 AF (Appendix V), a 
nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea, called for upgrading 
bilateral relations to the 'ambassadorial level'. From the beginning, however, the Kim 
Young-sam government, enmeshed in Cold War enmity, was critical of the deal, given 
that it could buttress the fragile North Korea regime against its wishes of an early inter-
Korean reunification. In short, the Kim Young-sam administration harboured misgivings 
about US-North Korea contacts and frequently erected hurdles in their path. Even at the 
zenith of the nuclear crisis in 1994, for example, Kim opposed the third round of 
diplomatic talks between the United States and North Korea until North Korea agreed to 
the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys. South Korean Ambassador Jang Jai-ryong 
(Interview: 2003) noted: I 
If there were no Sunshine Policy, Secretary Albright's trip to North Korea 
would have been impossible. We could not agree to the idea of sending her to 
North Korea under the Kim Young-sam administration, because we were very 
much concerned over such an idea itself.... When the United States was 
locked in a course of confrontation with North Korea and escalated tension, 
we worked to alleviate it. When the United States showed signs of getting 
close to North Korea, we intervened to stop the process. Under the Kim Dae-
jung administration, we offered a free hand to the United States. 
The Kim Young-sam government also intervened in the negotiations between 
Japan and North Korea, since President Kim was not in favour of the progress of Japan-
North Korea relations ahead of inter-Korean rapprochement (Shigemura 1999: 284; 
Nakanishi 2001: 65). When Japan offered 500,000 tons of rice to North Korea in a 
peace gesture in 1995, Kim strongly denounced the action as an act of interference in 
the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Regarding the diplomatic constraints 
imposed on Japan's efforts to improve ties with North Korea, Hughes (2002b: 70) 
noted: 
The effect of Japan's increasing de facto submission of its bilateral diplomatic 
policy to developments in North-South relations, and trilateral coordination 
I Ambassador lang. who served in the two key MOFAT posts. director general of the North American 
Affairs Bureau under the Kim Young-sam administration and deputy foreign minister under the Kim Oae-
jung administration. is in the best position to compare the two governments' policies. 
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amongst the US. South Korea and Japan has been to both open up and 
constrict its channels for engagement with North Korea. In one sense, Japan's 
cooperation with the other two powers has legitimised its more direct 
involvement in Korean Peninsula security affairs. In other ways, however, it 
has limited its room for diplomatic manoeuvre by handing a near veto to 
South Korea over normalization efforts, if not dialogue and summitry, based 
on the renkei [linkage) policy, which is itself also subsequently contingent in 
practice upon progress in US-DPRK relations. Japan has thus imposed a near 
international 'double-lock' on its diplomacy towards North Korea, which 
comes at the bottom of the pile. The practical outcome of this situation for 
Japan has been that it has been obliged to synchronise attempts to restart 
nonnalization talks with North Korea in step with improvements in North-
South and North-US relations. 
Second, what Western countries called North Korea's 'rogue' policies and 
behaviour, ranging from the development of WMD and missiles to terrorism, prevented 
it from meeting the criteria of the United States and other Western countries for 
establishing diplomatic ties. Nuclear and missile programmes that North Korea regarded 
as both pivotal to its survival as an independent state and indispensable as bargaining 
chips for nonnalization talks were, at the same time, stumbling blocks for North Korea, 
when it pursued diplomatic recognition and the supply of Western capital and 
technology for its economic recovery and eventual political survival. When Vietnam, for 
example, started experimenting with the market economy and sought a better 
relationship with the United States, its staunch enemy since the Vietnam War, a number 
of US veterans groups and parts of the Vietnamese-American community opposed the 
idea of diplomatic nonnalization, but their opposition was not strong enough to thwart 
the Clinton administration from moving towards the establishment of full diplomatic 
ties in 1995. as discussed in Chapter Two. Vietnam, unified by the Communists. had no 
archrival like South Korea. thus feeling no need of nuclear weapons to guarantee its 
survival. 2 
Third, the United States and Japan showed inconsistency in their poliCies 
2 It is still to be seen whether the US-Vietnam rapprochement process has parallels with the US-North 
Korea relationship. However. the development of US-Vietnam relations from adversaries to partners has a 
significant bearing on US-North Korea relations. given how quickly structural changes, like the end of the 
Cold War. can transform relations between the two former adversaries in spite of the lingering animosity, 
unless there are conspicuous obstacles like nuclear programmes. For more information. see Sidel and 
Gray (1998). 
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towards North Korea, resulting in oscillations in their basic approaches about whether to 
engage or contain North Korea. The Pyongyang regime's nuclear and ballistic missile 
programmes attracted excessive attention from Washington and Tokyo, while its 
cooperative gestures failed to win due reception from them. As seen in the 1994 AF, 
North Korea apparently tried to trade off its nuclear programmes for better relations 
with the Western countries on the basis of the recalculation of its national interests in the 
post-Cold War situation, but the process of easing tension and building trust between 
them was time-consuming and thus vulnerable to the changing policies of different US 
and Japanese administrations. 
2.3. Identity Shifts and North Korea's Window of Opportunity 
As a frontline state whose paramount mission was to contain Communist expansionism, 
South Korea could not think about any independent diplomatic initiative towards North 
Korea during the Cold War. When President Kim took office in 1998, however, there 
had been conspicuous signs that South Korean diplomacy was becoming more 
independent and proactive in its aim of dismantling the lingering Cold War structure on 
the Korean Peninsula (Paik 1999). In fact, President Kim and his followers were deeply 
aware of how the peninsula's division was imposed by the outside powers at the end of 
World War II against the wishes of the Korean people and how they could emerge from 
this quagmire. To remove the legacies of the Cold War on the peninsula, they were 
convinced that it was essential to forge better relations not only between the two Koreas, 
but also between North Korea and the Western powers through the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. Contending that North Korea's security dilemmas could not be 
alleviated by South Korea's endeavours alone, President Kim sought to achieve two 
aims at the international level: Pyongyang's diplomatic normalization with the United 
States, Japan and other Western countries, on the one hand, and the creation of an 
international milieu conducive to its economic opening and reform, on the other (Kim 
J.Y. 2003; Kim K.R. 2000). Even though the situation in North Korea was not receptive 
to an engagement option, the Sunshine Policy paved the way for key neighbouring 
states to opt for engagement with the North (Cha 2001). In this respect, President Kim's 
policies marked a significant departure from those of previous South Korean 
governments. 
Soon after his inauguration, President Kim removed one of the three major 
obstacles, mentioned above, which had obstructed North Korea's attempts to improve 
its relations with Western countries, and emerged as an honest broker for diplomatic ties 
between them. Kim ended the doctrine of the past administrations, namely, 'all roads to 
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Pyongyang must go through Seoul', in which diplomatic contacts with North Korea 
became hostage to the non-operational inter-Korean dialogue. 3 Kim gave a freer hand 
to Western countries in launching diplomatic negotiations with North Korea. When 
progress was tedious, Kim even imbued them with ideas on how to build better relations 
with North Korea. Witnessing the rapprochement process between North Korea and the 
Western states, the South Korean public welcomed it in principle, convinced that this 
process would create a favourable effect on inter-Korean relations. The opposition 
parties and conservative newspapers raised some doubts and concerns about the 
consequences of these diplomatic processes, but did not raise strong objections to the 
Kim government's endeavours to accelerate Pyongyang's rapprochement process with 
Seoul's allies. 
3. North Korea's Bilateral Relations 
This section will elucidate how a momentous ideational shift and voluntary jettisoning 
of antagonistic policies by one of the two states, caught in a long-running intense spiral 
of rivalry and confrontation, could help the other state to escape diplomatic isolation 
and reach a new horizon in its relations with the rest of the world. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, the US's diplomatic recognition of North Korea could be regarded as a 
step tantamount to guaranteeing the isolated state's political status quo and integration 
with the global community. North Korea, which needed US security guarantees before 
starting to reform itself, sought to sign a peace treaty or a non-aggression pact with the 
United States. In this sense, the Sunshine Policy fared well until the end of the year 
2000 when North Korea was one of the rare success cases of a joint engagement 
strategy by South Korea and the United States and the Clinton administration was 
moving to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang (Mazarr 2000). The inter-Korean 
summit in June 2000 boosted confidence in South Korea, which wanted to expedite the 
process of inter-Korean rapprochement through North Korea's resocialization into the 
international community. Before and after the inter-Korean summit, North Korean 
strategists also demonstrated their masterful diplomatic skill. Just before the summit, for 
example, Chairman Kim unexpectedly visited China to further consolidate North Korea-
China ties in anticipation of sweeping changes ahead. Following the summit, Kim 
invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang to patch up the floundering 
relationship with Russia. With the blessing of its traditional allies, the North Korean 
3 The citation is from a seminar publication, 'Japan's Policy Toward North Korea'. held at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington DC on 1 March 2000 under the auspices of the Japan Foundation Center for 
Global Partnership and the Social Science Research Council. The text is available at 
http://www.jpf.go.jpljlregionj/cgp..j/inteVabeloriginaVreport_OS.pdf (accessed 12 November 2(03). 
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leadership mulled over taking the next step: a North Korea-US summit and a North 
Korea-Japan summit. Chairman Kim proceeded with confidence toward resolving the 
Korean Peninsula questions by stepping up bilateral negotiations with those enemy 
states (Yoo 2000). 
Pundits say that there is no 'if' in history. Nevertheless, this dissertation cannot 
help but raise the question: what might have happened if Al Gore had defeated George 
W. Bush in the 2000 US presidential election? The external environment for the 
Sunshine Policy started to falter when Bush was elected as the new US president, and 
the outgoing President, Bill Clinton, abandoned his engagement option in the waning 
months of his presidency. Even though he found it hard to persuade the United States to 
revitalize its normalization process with North Korea, President Kim did not lose his 
enthusiasm and diverted his attention to urging the EU and Japan to start the process of 
diplomatic normalization with the North. 
3.1. The United States and North Korea 
After the end of the Cold War, the debate on the decline of US hegemony was quickly 
replaced with another discourse over whether it had emerged as a 'hyperpower' 
(Kennedy 1989; Ikenberry 2002). Given the US's preponderant status in global politics, 
it was quite a natural course of action that North Korea, which lost its allies after the end 
of the Cold War, should focus its foreign policy on normalizing relations with the 
United States (Snyder 2000: 62; Ahn 2002: 46). Despite its desire to forge an improved 
relationship with the United States, however, North Korea had gained a reputation for 
being a master in playing South Korea off against the United States, or vice versa, since 
its main leverages were WMD and both the South Korean and US policies vis-a-vis 
North Korea had oscillated (Sigal 2oo0b). With the Kim administration launching the 
Sunshine Policy, the Pyongyang regime felt no need to use the same tactic, since Seoul 
renounced coercive steps in dealing with North Korea. This section will probe the 
remarkable progress in US-North Korea relations at the end of the Clinton 
administration and underline the role of the South Korean government when the two 
states moved to put the long-running enmity behind them and exchanged high-level 
officials as a preliminary step towards diplomatic normalization. 
3.1.1. The United States: an apathetic superpower 
When successive US administrations gave priority to addressing North Korean 
questions as part of their global strategies of non-proliferation of WMD after the end of 
the Cold War, they seldom paid attention to the improvement of bilateral relations with 
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North Korea, an enemy state since the Korean War. Therefore, the United States 
dispatched Undersecretary of State Arnold Kantor for a high-level meeting with North 
Korean Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun on 22 January 1992 in New York to 
assist South Korean President Roh Tae-woo's diplomatic initiatives aimed at the cross-
recognition of the two Koreas by the four surrounding powers, rather than launching 
serious talks to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea (Barry 2000; Kang E. 
2002). On the one hand, the US administration's diplomatic overtures towards North 
Korea demonstrated receptivity to the policy shifts of respective South Korean 
governments, as demonstrated in this example, while, on the other, it maintained inertia 
by showing a lukewarm response to the North Korean proposal that they hold regular 
high-level talks.4 
In spite of US inattention to such diplomatic overtures, North Korea launched a 
number of initiatives to ensure its survival by seeking US security guarantees. The two 
states opened the first round of official talks in June 1993 to discuss a wide range of 
issues, including the North's nuclear weapons programme. During his talks with US 
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju 
devoted his time and energy to securing written assurances regarding the suspension of 
Washington's hostile policies towards Pyongyang, the end to threats of nuclear strikes 
and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. Wrapping up the talks, the two sides 
agreed to '[a]ssurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; 
peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of 
fullscope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference 
in each other's internal affairs; and the support for the peaceful unification of Korea' 
(Appendix IV).5 
The nuclear crisis, which started in 1993, brought them to the brink of a second 
Korean War but the process of resolving the crisis in a package deal was, in fact, a 
golden chance for them to end the decades-long enmity and establish diplomatic 
4 Taking a stand against the US administration's neglect of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the 
standing committee of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), cancelled his trip to the UN 
General Assembly in September 2000, complaining of American Airlines' excessive security checks 
against his delegation (Segye /lbo, 10 September 2000). Kim, the head of state according to the North 
Korean Constitution, was on this journey to participate in the Millennium Summit, but the US airline staff 
launched strict security checks mandatory for nationals from states on the US terrorism list. 
S North Korea opened an Internet site, www.uriminzokkiri.com. on 5 November 2003. According to one 
of the articles on the site, titled 'From the March of Hardship to the March of the Paradise (sic)" US chief 
delegate, Robert Gallucci, initially declined to include such words as 'mutual respect for each other's 
sovereignty', since the two states, which fought a war, had no diplomatic relations. However, he made 
concession on this later. In return, North Korea decided to suspend formal withdrawal from the NPT. 
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relations.6 Nevertheless, North Korea chose to keep its nuclear weapons programmes 
intact, as it continued to face hostile policies from the United States, including more 
threats of the use of force, which in tum created a vicious cycle of threats of the use of 
force, commitments to mutual respect, and then the breaking of those commitments. 
Therefore, such phrases as 'mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs' have become cited frequently in major US-
North Korea documents, including the 2000 US-North Korea Joint Communique 
(Appendix X), but were never translated into action. 
3.1.2. President Clinton's Policy of Engagement 
As George Kennan's insight was reshaped into President Truman's strategies of 
containment at the beginning of the Cold War, Clinton, as the first post-Cold War US 
president, sought to find a grand catchword for his foreign policies and eventually 
settled on the concept of 'democratic enlargement' (Brinkley 1997). Nevertheless, the 
Clinton administration could not come up with a coherent policy vis-a-vis North Korea 
during its first term, partly because it attempted to act in concert with South Korea, 
which was ruled by conservative forces swaying between the options of containment 
and engagement (Harrison 1997). In a sense, the Clinton administration had no reason 
to hurry in establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea, since the latter was abiding by 
the provisions of the AF, thus alleviating US concerns on nuclear proliferation (Paik H.S. 
1999). Throughout US-North Korea relations, the US administration's top priority had 
been to prevent North Korea from arming itself with nuclear weapons and their delivery 
vehicles, rather than to launch steps to improve relations with North Korea (Sigal 
2000a). 
Against this conventional belief, however, President Clinton's policy towards 
North Korea took a turn in his second term, which led to serious efforts to normalize 
diplomatic ties with the reclusive state. Heralding this policy shift, US Ambassador to 
Seoul, James Laney, made a speech in May 1996, titled 'Beyond Deterrence', which 
called for the use of economic incentives to signal the shift of Clinton's policies towards 
active engagement (Harrison 1997). Nevertheless, it was still premature for Washington 
to make full-fledged efforts in the direction of improving ties with Pyongyang partly 
because of the presence of a South Korean administration hostile to such a development. 
The Republican-dominated Congress also erected hurdles to the implementation of the 
AF and the improvement of bilateral ties (Paik H.S. 1999). 
Since he wished to wrap up his tenure as president with a notable diplomatic 
6 North Korea's nuclear programmes will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
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achievement and put his name on an important chapter in US post-Cold War diplomacy, 
Clinton diverted his attention to the world's two f1ashpoints: the Middle East and the 
Korean Peninsula. The president sensed the window of opportunity opening wide when 
President Kim made an historic trip to Pyongyang for a summit with Chairman Kim in 
June 2000. Clinton endorsed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's plan to hold a tete-
a-tete meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun on 28 July 2000 on 
the sidelines of the ARF in Brunei, the first of its kind in history. Clinton's strategy of 
engagement was rewarded when senior-level talks between North Korean Vice Foreign 
Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US Ambassador Charles Kartman starting on 27 
September 2000 created a breakthrough in bilateral relations. On 6 October, the two 
sides announced the Joint US-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism in which 
North Korea renounced all forms of terrorism and the United States declared it intended 
to drop the North from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states. The statement had 
virtually cleared all obstacles for the dropping of North Korea from the US list of 
terrorism-sponsoring states, except for North Korea's continued provision of shelter to 
Japanese Red Army Faction terrorists.7 In October 2000, the two countries exchanged 
high-level officials, National Defence Commission Vice Chairman Jo Myong-rok and 
Secretary of State Albright. Vice Chairman Jo's trip, designed to reciprocate former 
Secretary of Defence William Perry's visit to Pyongyang in 1999, had been decided at 
the Kim-Kartman talks (Kim K.S. 2001). The Joint Communique (Appendix X) issued 
at the conclusion of Vice Chairman Jo's four-day visit to Washington on 12 October 
2000 resolved to look into the possibility of converting the Armistice Agreement into a 
peace treaty. It also included a commitment to the improvement of bilateral relations 
through mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs, a moratorium on North 
Korea's missile tests for the duration of the bilateral negotiations, and Secretary of State 
Albright's trip to Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for President Clinton's future visit.s 
Albright arrived in Pyongyang on 23 October for a three-day visit and met Chairman 
7 In 1970, the nine members of the group hijacked the Japan Airlines' plane, Yodo, which left Haneda 
Airport for Fukuoka, and took it to Pyongyang. Three of them remain in North Korea to date (Donga /lbo, 
1 April 1998). In fact, President Kim was the main actor behind the US move to drop North Korea from 
the terrorism list, since the US action would clear the way for North Korea's admission to the IMF and 
the World Bank. The US International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118) requires the US 
administration to oppose any move by the IMF and World Bank to extend loans or financial assistance to 
states on the list. In spite of President Kim's efforts, the Clinton and Bush administrations kept North 
Korea on the list, primarily because Japan urged them not to drop it from the list until the North Korean 
government resolves all Japanese concerns, including the Red Army hijackers and the kidnapping of 
Japanese citizens (CRS 2003b; Nakanishi 2(01). 
8 The text is also available at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42zc.htmland 
www.state.gov/www/regionsleap/001012_usdprkjointcom.html(accessed 12 January 2004). 
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Kim twice. Since Albright received a red carpet welcome but failed to address technical 
details about the North's missile programmes, the two states held expert-level talks in 
the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur in November the same year. Even though he did 
not relinquish his plan to visit North Korea until the last days of his presidency, Clinton 
was in some senses unlucky since the United States faced the first potential 
constitutional crisis because of a delay in the announcement of presidential election 
results from Florida, making it almost impossible for him to leave for North Korea. To 
his dismay, George W. Bush, who was hostile towards North Korea, was declared 
winner, dashing any hopes of a visit to the North. This section will examine the major 
diplomatic events from the Perry process to Clinton's final judgement on his visit to 
North Korea and highlight what role President Kim and his advisors played in 
persuading the two enemies to start talking and move towards normalizing their 
relations. 
Congressional Gridlock and the 'Perry Process'. The Clinton administration, 
which had successfully defused the nuclear crisis in 1994 through a bilateral deal with 
North Korea, faced increasing pressure in its second term from Republican 
Congressmen who called for the repeal of what they described as a policy of 
'appeasement' or a bad precedent, which rewarded the North's 'rogue' behaviour (Wit 
2002a: 177). Harbouring scepticism regarding North Korea's commitment to the 
controversial deal under which it agreed to freeze its nuclear programme in return for 
the annual delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and two 1,000-megawatt 
LWRs, the Republican-controlled Congress erected obstacles to the shipment of HFO. 
When in 1998 North Korea fired a rocket over Japan and drew international suspicion 
regarding the nature of its underground facility in Kumchang-ri, President Clinton was 
subject to a more specific demand: a comprehensive review of his administration's 
policy toward North Korea. In fact, a 'North Korean crisis scenario' was tailor-made for 
Washington's hawks, who wanted to increase US defence budgets to erect a costly 
missile shield, reminiscent of President Reagan's 'Star Wars' missile defence system 
(Cheong 1999). 
In the face of this pressure, Clinton appointed former secretary of defence 
William Perry as North Korea policy coordinator on 12 November 1998. who was 
regarded as a man of integrity and drew bipartisan respect and support (Frye 2000). At 
first, Perry's appointment was seen as Clinton's political tactic to alleviate the mounting 
attacks by the Republican-dominated Congress against his North Korea policies, since 
he wanted to salvage the troubled 1994 agreement, regarded as one of his foreign policy 
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achievements. 
Once appointed as policy coordinator, however, Perry embarked on a nine-
month review of US policies, eventually authoring a report, which was 'a product of 
trilateral coordination rather than of a unilateral deliberation by the United States' 
(Moon and Kim 2000: 117). While producing the report, Perry conducted extensive 
consultations with those from South Korea and Japan, making use of the framework of 
the TCOG, a channel of assistant minister-level officials created to fine-tune the policies 
of the three countries, and other high-level channels of communication. Perry also 
travelled to North Korea in May 1999 on a fact-finding mission, becoming the highest-
ranking US representative to visit since former US president Jimmy Carter went to 
Pyongyang in June 1994 to broker an inter-Korean summit. Perry met North Korean 
officials, including No. 2 man, Kim Yong-nam, and held discussions on missile and 
nuclear issues, as well as the improvement of US-North Korea relations. Even though 
the contents of his proposal during his visit were kept secret for the time being, it was 
later disclosed that Perry proposed a comprehensive plan, including a package of 
political and economic incentives, if North Korea abandoned its nuclear and missile 
programmes (Korea Times, 21 May 1999). At that time, there was controversy about 
whether Perry had set a 'red line' that North Korea was not supposed to cross and, if it 
did, what might be the response of the United States, South Korea and Japan. At first, 
Perry was ambivalent, since he faced a series of requests and demands from both 
domestic and international actors. On some occasions, Perry hinted at the possibility of 
implementing economic blockades or taking military action if North Korea refused to 
cooperate and continued to pursue its clandestine programmes (New York Times, 12 
March 1999), while emphasizing, on the others, that it was necessary to exhaust all 
diplomatic means first, since there was no time limit for US engagement with North 
Korea (Korea Times, 26 March 1999). The publication of the Perry Report was initially 
expected in early 1999, but was delayed to incorporate the result of the Kumchang-ri 
inspection in May 1999 and North Korea's response to the US overture for a better 
political and economic relationship (International Herald Tribune, 27 March 1999). 
Perry, who wanted to keep the military option open, faced trouble in fine-tuning 
the different positions of the countries involved. In particular, he faced the recalcitrant 
Kim Dae-jung government, which ruled out any use of military means and strongly 
advocated comprehensive engagement (Yonhap News Agency, 3 March 1999). Perry 
also launched consultations with Japan, which supported tougher action against North 
Korea, and with China, which raised objections to any US hard-line stance. As for the 
process of Perry's consultations with the South Korean government, then-South Korean 
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National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won (Interview: 2003) recalled: 
Since President Clinton was seen to be very soft on North Korea, Perry was 
appointed as a policy coordinator upon the request of the Congress because he 
was the very man who planned to attack North Korea in 1994 as secretary of 
defence. We launched many rounds of consultations. As national security 
advisor, I alone had eight rounds of talks with him. I urged him to introduce a 
comprehensive engagement policy as part of President Kim's scheme to 
dismantle the Cold War structure and launch steps for mutual threat reduction. 
Eventually, Perry accepted this initiative, creating a turning point in which the 
policies of the United States and South Korea hit the identical chord. 
When Perry finished his report, the United States and North Korea reached a 
landmark agreement in a meeting between Ambassador Charles Kartman and Vice 
Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan in Berlin on 12 September 1999 by exchanging 
commitments to the relaxation of economic sanctions and a moratorium on further 
missile tests, regarded as one of the important accomplishments of the Perry process. 
Buoyed by this diplomatic feat, Perry submitted his report, entitled 'Review of United 
States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations' (Appendix VII), to 
President Clinton and the US Congress on 15 September. On 17 September, the 
President announced the partial lifting of economic sanctions, followed by North 
Korea's announcement on 24 September that it would suspend missile tests to create a 
favourable environment for the impending negotiations with the United States. 
The Perry process had produced many desirable consequences for peace and 
security on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. First, it alleviated the security 
concerns caused by North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. The Perry Report 
sets the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes as its short-
and mid-term goal, while the long-term goal was to establish diplomatic relations with 
North Korea. In this process, it stressed the prevention of another war, the preservation 
of the 1994 nuclear deal, trilateral Seoul-Tokyo-Washington coordination, and policy 
consistency. As an immediate outcome of the Perry process, the Berlin missile 
agreement succeeded in harnessing North Korea's long-range missile programmes, 
which had come to be regarded as global security threats since the test of the Taepodong 
I missile in August 1998. The Perry Report also worked as a shield against attacks by 
hawks in Washington wishing to nullify the AF through which the North's nuclear 
programmes were restrained. 
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Second, the partial lifting of economic sanctions, which were a monument of 
North Korea's enmity with the United States (Sigal 2000b), demonstrated the serious 
commitment by the United States, South Korea and Japan towards launching 
engagement with North Korea. Even before the announcement of the Perry Report, the 
United States and North Korea started exploring the possibility of improving their 
relations, once the Kumchang-ri underground facility was inspected by a US team and 
found to be an empty tunnel. As suspicions over North Korea's nuclear facilities were 
partially cleared, the two states intensified talks on the issue of addressing North 
Korea's development and exports of ballistic missiles. Perry's visit to Pyongyang in 
May 1999 also spawned the idea of a reciprocal visit to the United States by a high-level 
North Korean official in late 1999. 
Finally, the Perry Report could be regarded as a vindication of President Kim's 
Sunshine Policy in the sense that both envisioned comprehensive engagement with 
North Korea. In the process of three-way consultations, Perry was apparently convinced 
that there was no option but to take a comprehensive approach in cooperation with 
South Korea and Japan. In his report, Perry acknowledged the importance of Seoul's 
policy shifts towards North Korea, by noting that the Sunshine Policy 'creates 
conditions and opportunities for U.S. policy very different from those in 1994'. Even 
though Japan did not fully embrace the approach because of the North's missile 
programmes, it chose to remain in the framework of three-way coordination to jointly 
cope with North Korea's future provocative actions (Moon and Kim 2000). In the 
report's concluding remarks, Perry stressed consistency by noting: 
We should recognize that North Korea may send mixed signals concerning its 
response to our recommended proposal for a comprehensive framework and 
that many aspects of its behavior will remain reprehensible to us even if we 
embark on this negotiating process. We therefore should prepare for 
provocative contingencies but stay the policy course with measured actions 
pursuant to the overall framework recommended. 
Thanks to the close consultations with South Korea, the analysis of the current 
situation and future steps envisioned by the Perry Report matched those of the Sunshine 
Policy. Therefore, South Korea and the United States could produce a 'fairly smooth 
working relationship' (Wit 2oo2a: 187). Wendy Sherman (2002: 136), who succeeded 
Perry as US policy coordinator, noted that the three architects of the Perry process, the 
United States, South Korea and Japan, presented North Korea with two paths: a positive 
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path heading for its resocialization into the international community and a downward 
path leading to 'further isolation and even greater deterrence'. Chairman Kim took the 
positive path, even though 'the path has never been straight, never been steady, 
sometimes has taken a serious detour' (ibid: 137). 
Against the wishes of the Clinton administration, the Perry Report failed to win 
support from the Republican-dominated Congress that opposed the partial lifting of 
economic sanctions in return for North Korea's moratorium on missile tests. Benjamin 
Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, was one of the 
outspoken critics of the Perry Report, harbouring scepticism about the North's 
intentions on nuclear and missile programmes and dismissing the Berlin agreement as 
nothing more than another US concession to North Korean brinkmanship (Frye 2000; 
Paik 1999; Kim S.H. 1999). The Republican hawks viewed the Clinton administration 
as having failed to deal with North Korea's clandestine programmes, in spite of the fact 
that North Korea emerged as the largest recipient of US assistance in East Asia.9 
President Kim s Role in High-Level Exchange. The Perry process created a 
grand conceptual roadmap for US-North Korea rapprochement, but the actual progress 
in bilateral relations was slow-moving, since the US government's attention to North 
Korea ebbed quickly, while waiting for a North Korean envoy to reciprocate Perry's 
earlier trip (Barry 2000: 44). Nevertheless, the historic inter-Korean summit in June 
2000 created a new momentum in US-North Korea relations, since Chairman Kim's 
images and statements, telecast to the world during President Kim's three-day visit to 
Pyongyang, convinced the countries concerned that North Korea was seriously on the 
course of reforming its policies and joining the international community. Upon returning 
to Seoul on 15 June 2000 from his three-day stay in Pyongyang, President Kim did not 
waste time in reproducing his breakthrough in inter-Korean affairs on the other front: 
North Korea's resocialization into the international community. Kim called President 
Clinton the next day to explain the outcome of his visit to North Korea, while Clinton 
offered to keep in touch to discuss the next steps by the two countries (Kukmin /lbo, 17 
June 2000). For an additional debriefing on his visit, Kim dispatched his National 
Security Advisor Hwang Won-tak to Washington DC. In his meeting with Clinton, 
Hwang conveyed Chairman Kim's oral message to Clinton, leading to speculation in 
Washington's diplomatic community that the message covered such issues as the status 
9 As of June 2002, the total US food assistance to North Korea since 1995 amounted to 1.9 million metric 
tons, worth approximately US$620 million (Lee H.K. 2002: 74). Although the aid was made mostly via 
the World Food Programme (WFP), the US was the largest donor state to North Korea in terms of scale 
(ibid). 
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of US forces in South Korea, the stalled high-level contacts between the United States 
and North Korea, and Chairman Kim's desire to improve relations with the United 
States (Dong a !lbo, 19 June 2000). Hwang (Interview: 2004) noted: 
President Kim believed that, given North Korea's system, talking to lower-
echelon officials hardly produced results, since the message was not properly 
conveyed to the leadership. Therefore, President Kim asked the United States 
to send a person who can talk directly with Chairman Kim Jong-il. 
In a show of support, the United States partially lifted economic sanctions 
against North Korea on 19 June 2000, which was, in fact, a step fulfilling the previous 
commitment, made in 1999 during the US-North Korea talks in Berlin. Despite this, the 
United States kept intact key sanctions regarding the exports of military products and 
dual-use goods, MFN favours to North Korean products, and loans by international 
financial institutions to North Korea (Munwha [lbo, 19 June 2000). Only one week after 
National Security Advisor Hwang's trip to Washington, Secretary of State Albright 
made a surprise trip to Seoul, touching off speculation that the secretary needed to 
survey the opinions of key policymakers in Seoul since the process of inter-Korean 
rapprochement had made remarkable progress in terms of speed and scale and thus 
might hamper Washington's efforts to stop North Korea from pursuing nuclear and 
missile programmes (Hankook !lbo, 19 June 2000; Chosun llbo, 24 June 2000). 
Nevertheless, the general atmosphere in Seoul was gripped by the euphoria resulting 
from the historic summit. When asked about whether she planned to meet her North 
Korean counterpart Paik Nam-sun on the sidelines of the ARF in July, Albright did not 
rule out such a possibility in a joint press conference in Seoul with South Korean 
Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 24 June 2000). Assessing the 
developments following the summit, US Ambassador to Seoul, Stephen Bosworth, 
quipped that even though the United States appeared to have taken the front seat, South 
Korea was actually 'in the driver's seat' (Hankook [lbo, 29 June 2000). 
Meanwhile, Chairman Kim was mulling over the next step: the dispatch of 
senior North Korean officials to the United States to reciprocate Perry's trip to 
Pyongyang in 1999. In an exclusive interview with US-based Korean journalist Moon 
Myung-ja, Chairman Kim clearly hinted at his intention of improving bilateral relations 
with the United States, noting he wished to 'make two friends rather than one [South 
Korea]' (Chosun [lbo, 12 July 2000). As touched on earlier, even though North Korea's 
nominal leader Kim Yong-nam's trip to New York for the UN Millennium Summit was 
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cancelled as a result of a controversy over excessive security checks by a US airliner, 
President Kim, who attended the summit in New York, was given opportunities to 
secure endorsement on the inter-Korean rapprochement process from US President 
Clinton, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
Commenting on North Korean Vice Chairman Jo's trip to Washington DC in an 
interview with Naeil Shinmun (9 October 2000), President Kim floated the possibility of 
Secretary of State Albright visiting North Korea. Kim revealed that when he asked 
Secretary Albright, who visited Seoul right after the inter-Korean summit in June, to 
send to North Korea a senior official who could talk directly to Chairman Kim, Albright 
replied she would visit Pyongyang first (ibid). Later, Clinton also confirmed the fact in a 
press conference that President Kim requested him to hold a direct meeting with 
Chairman Kim to create a breakthrough in bilateral relations, as he already had done 
with Chairman Kim (Segye Ilbo, 10 October 2000). When Clinton made a 
congratulatory call to Kim, who was announced as the winner of the 2000 Nobel Peace 
Prize, President Kim also urged Clinton to visit North Korea for the settlement of peace 
on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia (Hankyoreh, 16 October 2000). When they 
met again in Brunei on the sidelines of the APEC summit on 15 November 2000, 
President Kim told Clinton: 'I hope you will take up this issue with confidence on the 
basis of the outcome of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to North Korea. 
We will welcome whole-heartedly if you make up your mind to visit North Korea' 
(Donga llbo, 16 November 2000). Clinton responded that he was still considering 
visiting North Korea. 
The sequence of events outlined above demonstrates that President Kim was the 
driving force of US-North Korea rapprochement. Specifically, the exchange of special 
envoys between the United States and North Korea came at the request of President 
Kim, who told President Clinton that high-level contact was a shortcut to any in-depth 
discussion of pending issues, given the nature of the North Korean system. Albright told 
a press conference at the National Press Club after her trip to Pyongyang: 10 
Our approach was developed in close consultations with our allies in Seoul. 
President Kim Dae-jung has said publicly that the best way to move forward 
with Pyongyang is to focus on specific security, economic and humanitarian 
issues. He has also made clear that, given the DPRK's authoritarian structure, 
progress can only come through direct discussions with Chairman Kim Jong-
10 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Address at National Press Club, Washington DC, 2 November 
2000, http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42zn.html (accessed 11 October 2003). 
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il and his closest advisors. 
In fact, the historic June summit between President Kim and Chairman Kim laid 
the groundwork for the dramatic tum in US-North Korea relations in October 2000. 
Further noting, 'I would never have been able to go to Pyongyang if President Kim had 
not gone there first', Albright said that President Kim's Sunshine Policy and Chairman 
Kim's response to it had changed the political dynamics in Northeast Asia. Albright 
even emulated President Kim's approach towards North Korea and its leader Kim by 
describing Kim as a superb dialogue partner with a sense of determination and 
leadership (Kyunghyang Shimmun, 25 October 2000). Just as President Kim had 
repeatedly lauded Chairman Kim as a man of trust, Secretary Albright, based on her 
personal contact with him, expressed her own impression of Kim as being 'practical, 
decisive, and well prepared for our discussions' .11 
President Kim and his advisors took an increasingly proactive policy to broker 
relations between North Korea and the United States. At the height of South Korea's 
diplomatic success, Time magazine (13 October 2000) noted: 
Kim Dae Jung not only persuaded North Korea's notoriously recalcitrant 
leadership to engage in talks towards normalizing relations; he also managed 
to convince the United States - which had been far from convinced by his 
'Sunshine Policy' - that a sea-change was possible in relations between the 
two Koreas. The fact that a North Korean leader made a first-ever visit to the 
White House this week, and that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright plans 
to visit Pyongyang later this year, would not have been possible without the 
South Korean leader's efforts. 
South Korean media organizations also interpreted the US-North Korea rapprochement 
as a positive development for inter-Korean relations, although some conservative 
newspapers remained suspicious over the North's intentions. 12 In an editorial, 
11 See Secretary of State Albright's address at the National Press Club in Washington DC on 2 November 
2000 (http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42zn.html, accessed 11 October 2003). 
12 When North Korea postponed inter-Korean programmes for over a month, such as the exchange of 
separated families, citing its lack of time and manpower owing to a series of talks with the United States, 
including Albright's visit, South Korean newspapers started reporting the negative side of US-North 
Korea rapprochement (Segye /lbo, 26 October 2000; Hankook /lbo, 27 October 2000). However, North 
Korea's notification on the resumption of inter-Korean exchanges soon helped them alleviate this 
scepticism. Taking a cautious attitude, some newspapers called for the centrality of the three-way 
coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea and diverted attention to concern about 
North Korea's human rights record (Munwha /lbo, 25 October 2000). Chosun llbo (27 October 2000) 
179 
Hankyoreh (26 October 2000), a progressive newspaper, 'whole-heartedly welcomed' 
Albright's trip .to Pyongyang, hoping her visit would further help inter-Korean 
rapprochement, while Chosun Ilbo (27 October 2000), a conservative newspaper and 
staunch critic of the Sunshine Policy, attempted to strike a balance by carrying both 
positive and negative comments by Joel Wit from the Brookings Institution, who called 
for the necessity of Clinton's visit to dismantle the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, 
and by Larry Wortzel from the Heritage Foundation, who opposed any US efforts to 
expedite rapprochement with the state, ruled by a 'dictator'. 
Former South Korean National Security Advisor Yim Sung-joon (Interview: 
2003) noted: 
South Korea played the role of a facilitator for US-DPRK negotiations to 
discuss the establishment of diplomatic ties. Following the 15 June inter-
Korean summit, US-DPRK negotiations were making substantial progress. 
When the United States considered the possibility of normalizing diplomatic 
relations with North Korea, we have clearly given the go-ahead to the United 
States. 
The national security advisor stressed that the resolution of concerns over North Korea's 
WMD through diplomacy was clearly compatible with US national interests, and 
President Clinton and Secretary Albright did not hesitate to take the path, initiated by 
the Perry process. In the past, South Korea's blockade and North Korea's WMD 
programmes were the largest obstacles to diplomatic normalization between the United 
States and North Korea. Therefore, Seoul's engagement policy and Pyongyang's 
commitment to non-proliferation and anti-terrorism created the same environment as 
one which the United States faced when it tried to normalize relations with Vietnam. 
Since a unified Vietnam did not have an archrival as South Korea and WMD 
programmes, the United States could proceed more quickly to normalize relations with 
it. 
North Korea s Flexibility in Missile Talks. The Perry process and the subsequent 
exchange of high-level envoys between the United States and North Korea created a 
reported the establishment of a special body of French human rights activists which called on the United 
States to stop the process of rapprochement with North Korea, a totalitarian system that incarcerated 
150,000 residents in concentration camps. A conservative columnist mentioned US Secretary of State 
Albright'S failure to raise North Korea's human rights record during her visit to Pyongyang (Munwha !lbo, 
31 October 2(00). 
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breakthrough in their missile talks to the extent that President Kim's special advisor Lim 
Dong-won (Interview: 2(03) contended that President Clinton had planned his trip to 
Pyongyang since the settlement of all remaining differences was on the horizon. 13 
Citing US government officials, The New York Times (6 March 2001) reported that 
Chairman Kim 'promised in confidential talks not to produce, test or deploy missiles 
with a range of more than 300 miles'. Regarding the exports of missiles, North Korea 
offered to suspend the sale of missiles, missile components, technology and training, 
while dropping an earlier demand that it be compensated US$I billion in cash annually 
for three years. The negotiators from the two countries launched further talks on the 
detailed methods of US aid in order to compensate North Korea's financial losses 
resulting from the suspension of missile exports with US food or economic assistance. It 
was a precious chance to stop North Korea's missile exports, since the state was at the 
'center of proliferation ripples', with Iran and Pakistan heavily dependent on the North's 
missile technology (Kim C.S. 2(01). As for the long-range missiles, North Korea hinted 
at the permanent suspension of missile tests if a third country were to agree to launch its 
satellites, a suggestion that was taken up during a meeting between Chairman Kim and 
Secretary Albright and that opened the way for expert-level talks in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, on 1-3 November 2000. Secretary Albright, who visited Pyongyang to 
prepare for Clinton's trip, succeeded in securing Chairman Kim's personal commitment 
to the moratorium on missile tests. Albright noted in a press conference following her 
trip: 14 
Indeed, during the October 23 mass performance we attended together, an 
image of the DPRK Taepodong missile appeared. He immediately turned to 
me and quipped that this was the first satellite launch and it would be the last. 
Earlier, Vice Chairman Jo, in his meeting with Clinton, called for diplomatic 
normalization, while expressing Pyongyang's willingness to stop the development of 
long-range missiles in return for the international community's financial assistance in 
helping North Korea to launch satellites. At that time, US-North Korea diplomatic 
normalization was not seen as a matter of 'possibility', but a matter of 'time', as both 
n For the outcome of US-North Korea missile talks in the waning months of the Clinton presidency, see 
Michael Gordon. 'How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea' (New York Times, 6 March 
2(01); CouncIl on ForeIgn Relations. 'leiter to George W. Bush, President of the United States of 
Amenca'. a'allable at httpllwww.ceip.orglfileslprojectslnpp/resourceslcfrletterkorea.htm (accessed 20 
February 20(4); and P.lk (2001). 
,. The tell! IS a\'allable at hnp:/luscmbassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42zk.html (accessed 25 January 2004). 
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sides were nearing an agreement on the North's development and export of missiles, the 
key issues to be tackled before diplomatic normalization. 
In an article, titled 'How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea', 
The New York Times (6 March 2001) reported that the Clinton administration, in fact, 
made an excessive demand going beyond the commitments Chairman Kim made to 
Albright by calling on Pyongyang to 'ban the production, testing and deployment of all 
missiles with a range of more than 180 miles that could carry a 1 ,ODD-pound payload -
the same standard that Mr. Perry had cited in his 1999 talks'. Despite some progress in 
discussions over financial help for the launch of satellites in a third country and 
compensation for the suspension of exports of short- and medium-range missiles, the 
two countries failed to iron out all their differences over details on the control of the 
range of missiles, North Korean technicians' participation in the satellite launch, 
verification methods, and the destruction of the already-deployed missiles (Kim K.S. 
2001). In particular, the North Korean leader declined to accept inspection as a method 
of verification, since the United States operates other means to monitor compliance with 
satellite and other technical devices. He also refused to include the already-deployed 
missiles as targets for removal despite the US position that they pose serious security 
threats to Japan and US troops stationed in South Korea and Japan. 
If Clinton had visited Pyongyang, he would no doubt have had an opportunity to 
secure further concessions from Chairman Kim. The Clinton administration, which 
sought to secure a watertight commitment from North Korea ahead of the summit, had 
apparently no understanding of the decision-making process of the authoritarian state in 
which 'agreements should first be resolved at the highest level, leaving details to be 
worked out later by subordinates' (New York Times, 6 March 2001). 
Clinton s Final Decision. A policy outcome is an amalgam of various factors 
affecting the decision-making process. President Clinton's decision not to visit North 
Korea epitomized the level of frustration the top policymaker experiences when his 
advisors were seriously divided over the pros and cons of the trip. The time frame, 
allotted to the decision-making process, also affected the final outcome significantly 
since the window of opportunity was closing with the end of his tenure and with the 
winner of the 2000 presidential election not having been declared because of the vote 
recount in Florida. Clinton himself was also to blame for failing to take swift action 
partly because of the confusion over the result of the US presidential election and partly 
because of his lack of determination to follow through. However, the decisive factor that 
had ditched Clinton's plan was the election of George W. Bush, whose transition team, 
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including Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, refused to endorse any deal created by 
an outgoing president. 
Chairman Kim dispatched 10 as part of his efforts to dramatically improve North 
Korea's relations with the United States by inviting President Clinton to Pyongyang 
(Kim K.S. 2001). President Clinton also responded to this peace gesture by sending 
Secretary Albright on 23-5 October to prepare for his future visit. Albright conferred 
with Chairman Kim on two occasions to remove all obstacles for President Clinton's 
visit to North Korea. The exchange of high-level envoys created a remarkable air of 
rapprochement between the two countries, since it led to serious talks on removing the 
last obstacle to diplomatic normalization between the two countries: ballistic missile 
programmes. During her visit to Pyongyang, Albright and Chairman Kim also discussed 
terrorism, human rights, security issues, easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula and 
the future exchange of diplomatic missions. Albright's trip was a milestone in a 
roadmap envisioned by the Perry process. Thanks to her visit, there was the strong 
likelihood that Washington would soon remove Pyongyang from the list of terrorism-
sponsoring states. 
Despite such progress in bilateral negotiations, however, President Clinton faced 
an insurmountable division among his advisors. Following her trip, Secretary Albright 
reported favourable outcomes to President Clinton, recommending his trip to 
Pyongyang for a summit with Chairman Kim. Clinton told reporters during a photo 
opportunity with President Kim in Brunei on 15 November 2000 on the sidelines of the 
APEC summit, 'Secretary Albright, as you know, had a very good trip to North 
Korea', IS indicating his desire to follow through. During his summit with President 
Kim, nevertheless, Clinton said he had not yet reached a decision on whether to visit 
North Korea, although he was reviewing all developments since the inception of the 
Perry process, including Albright's visit to Pyongyang and the follow-on missile talks in 
Kuala Lumpur. On the other side of the spectrum, Clinton faced a group of opponents to 
his trip, including National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, let alone the 
Republication-dominated Congress. Berger suggested it was not appropriate for the 
president to make an overseas trip at the time of a potential 'constitutional crisis' 
resulting from the Florida vote recount (Harnisch 2002; New York Times, 6 March 2001). 
Defence Secretary William Cohen and the loint Chiefs of Staff also erected obstacles, 
contending that North Korea should agree first to destroy existing missile stocks 
threatening Japan and US troops in South Korea (ibid). At the same time, Clinton faced 
criticism from conservative academics. Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar at the American 
IS The text is available at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul/wwwh42zr.html (accessed 16 December 2003). 
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Enterprise Institute, claimed that Clinton's trip to North Korea was not convincing since 
North Korea had not taken any significant step indicating it was serious about 
improving bilateral relations (Time, 6 November 2000). Kongdan Oh, a research staff 
member of the Virginia-based Institute for Defence Analysis, and Ralph Hassig, a 
consultant in Washington, who are co-authors of North Korea Through the Looking 
Glass, noted that the US and South Korean officials ignored human rights conditions in 
North Korea, while rewarding and strengthening the Pyongyang regime (ibid). 
As last-minute measures, Clinton mulled over sending Ambassador Wendy 
Sherman to North Korea for direct talks with Chairman Kim to resolve the remaining 
issues in bilateral missile negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur (New York Times, 6 March 
2001). As his trip had become impossible, Clinton even sent an invitation to Chairman 
Kim to visit Washington, to be cordially turned down by Pyongyang (ibid). On 28 
December 2000, Clinton announced his decision not to visit North Korea, citing the lack 
of time to conclude missile talks. Clinton did not fail to mention, 'The engagement 
policy of President Kim Dae-jung and his personal leadership have spurred this process 
and earned the world's admiration,.16 As illustrated by Secretary Albright (2003), the 
proponents of the missile defence system took advantage of North Korea's potential 
threats as a clear vindication for the construction of the costly 'Star Wars' system 
instead of engaging the state to remove one of the key sources of the threats. President 
Kim's Sunshine Policy created an environment for North Korea and the United States to 
proceed to establish diplomatic relations, but the election of George W. Bush has 
effectively derailed the process. 
3.1.3. Findings 
North Korea and the United States were on the threshold of materializing President 
Clinton's trip to Pyongyang, which could alleviate their decades-long enmity and help 
establish diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future. This case study pinpoints the 
driving forces of and the impediments to this process. First, President Kim's Sunshine 
Policy was the catalyst for this process of US engagement from the authoring of the 
Perry Report. Even though the exchange of high-level envoys between the United States 
and North Korea involved strong determination by the leaderships of the two 
antagonistic states, President Kim's groundbreaking trip to Pyongyang contributed to 
changing the political dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, enabling President Clinton to 
interpret this as an historic opportunity to end the Cold War and foster peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, North Korea was prepared to normalize 
16 The text is available at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoullwwwh42zt.html(accessed 14 November 2003). 
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relations with the United States by dispatching Vice Chairman Jo to Washington with a 
mission to invite Clinton to Pyongyang and make concessions over its missile 
programmes. The isolated state clearly recalculated its state interests, which were, in the 
past, based on self-reliance and the fear of threats from the outside world, and chose to 
join the international community by abandoning its missile programmes in return for 
economic assistance. Third, the largest obstacle to Clinton's trip, therefore, was not 
North Korea's position regarding its missile programmes, but the opposition of the US 
policy community and the election of George W. Bush. Both sides had managed to iron 
out outstanding differences in their negotiations on North Korea's production, 
deployment and exports of ballistic missiles. If Clinton had visited North Korea, he 
would have been provided with an opportunity to reach a compromise and secure clear 
commitments from Chairman Kim. Fourth, the South Korean public, despite some 
scepticism, reacted favourably to the process of rapprochement between the United 
States and North Korea, since South Koreans' perception and identities vis-a-vis North 
Korea and the United States were undergoing profound changes. Newspapers in South 
Korea positively reported Albright's visit, even though scepticism lingered over the 
possibility that North Korea might accelerate the process of rapprochement with the 
United States, while shunning South Korea. 
In fact, the Sunshine Policy was introduced not because North Korea had 
already started changing its behaviour, but because a comprehensive engagement would 
enable North Korea to al1eviate its security dilemma, ameliorate its confrontational 
approaches towards the outside world, and eventual1y take steps to embrace the request 
by the international community regarding its nuclear and missile programmes. In this 
respect, the Kim and Clinton administrations showed short-term convergence of their 
policies, but the Sunshine Policy could not appeal to the conservative forces in 
Washington in the longer term, which called for North Korea's decisive shift of security 
policies as a precondition for any meaningful dialogue. 
3.2. Japan and North Korea 
If the US-North Korea enmity stemmed from the Korean War, the Japan-North Korea 
animosity dates further back to Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. 
Japan has official1y settled bilateral issues and problems arising from the colonial past 
through a normalization treaty with South Korea in 1965, but failed to create a 
breakthrough in its negotiations with North Korea to date. North Korea is the only state 
with which Japan could not liquidate its colonial past, which hampered Japan's 
independent political role as a regional power (Yang and Kim 2002: 56). Even though 
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North Korea was notorious as an unpredictable state, Japan's diplomacy vis-a-vis the 
North equally exhibited inconsistency and contradiction to the extent that Okonogi 
(2000) described this syndrome as 'the long swing between dialogue and deterrence'. 
When North Korea launched a Taepodong missile in 1998 or sent spy ships into Japan's 
territorial waters in 1999 and 2001, the Tokyo government suspended humanitarian aid 
and stepped up deterrence by launching joint research on missile defence with the 
United States and ordering the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to take stern measures 
against espionage ships. Nonetheless, Japan shifted gear to adopt strategies of 
engagement with North Korea whenever South Korea and the United States moved 
quickly to improve ties with the Pyongyang regime. Trapped by what Hughes (2000) 
called 'strategy-less North Korea strategy', Japan has shown ambivalence about 
whether it really wants to improve ties with North Korea and whether it is capable of 
launching consistent strategies to achieve its goal of diplomatic normalization. North 
Korea has equally shown unfaithfulness in its relations with Japan by demonizing it 
through a series of reports by state-run media organizations, on the one hand, and by 
soliciting aid and showing gestures for normalization talks, on the other. Cha (2001: 
555) noted that '[a]ntagonistic images are passed down generationally through family 
folklore, chauvinistic histories taught in secondary schools (probably much more in the 
DPRK than in the ROK and Japan), and government propaganda-perpetuated 
stereotypes, as a result of which such negative stereotypes become a part of one's 
identity'. After the two Koreas entered a phase of rapprochement after the 2000 summit, 
North Korea has almost suspended its invectives against South Korea, while picking 
Japan as a target of intensified vitriolic propaganda whenever it found Japan's attitude 
and behaviour unacceptable. 17 In return, Japan's rightist politicians and opinion leaders 
have taken advantage of the North's propaganda offensive as a pretext to suspend the 
engagement option and introduce measures to strengthen security preparedness, such as 
the joint US-Japan research on missile defence and the launch of two spy satellites on 
28 March 2003 (Yang and Kim 2002: 59-60; Yonhap News Agency, 30 March 2003). 
The Japanese media also played a decisive role in solidifying negative identification 
with the North (Kim Y.c. 2002: 24). 
Since Japan showed no sign of emerging from its diplomatic inertia, President 
Kim needed to create a favourable environment on the Korean Peninsula and press 
Japan to adopt resolute initiatives towards improving relations with North Korea. 
17 For example, North Korea steps up its propaganda offensives against Japan, when there are 
controversies over the 'past history' issue, such as the whitewashing of colonial brutalities in history 
textbooks and Japanese officials' visit to Yasukuni Shrine dedicated to. among others. war criminals. such 
as Tojo Hideki. the wartime premier who ordered the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. 
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Unlike the previous South Korean governments, the Kim administration supported 
Koizumi's engagement without any reservation, since it would constitute a significant 
step towards the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the surrounding four powers 
(Shin 2002: 66-7). In addition, the influx of Japan's large-scale economic assistance into 
North Korea after their diplomatic normalization could significantly reduce the huge 
'unification cost' South Korea would have to shoulder in the future and expedite North 
Korea's economic interdependence with the international community (Lee W.o. 2002: 
62-3). This section will first review Japan-North Korea relations historically and then 
shed light on President Kim's role in paving the way for Prime Minister Koizumi's trip 
to Pyongyang in 2002. 
3.2.1. Japan: the pendulum swings from deterrence to dialogue 
The end of the Cold War and the South Korean government's shifting policies allowed 
Japan to launch diplomatic initiatives to normalize relations with North Korea, regarded 
as one of the two grand tasks of Japan's post-World War II diplomacy along with the 
settlement of a long-running dispute with Russia over the return of the Northern 
Territories (Yang and Kim 2002; Park C.H. 2003). For Japan, it was an 'historical 
responsibility' to resolve all pending issues and set up official relations with Pyongyang, 
since North Korea, part of its former colony, is only separated by a narrow band of 
water, called the East Sea or the Sea of Japan, and Japan faced a series of political and 
security challenges posed by North Korea. 18 
Japan s Perception of Threats from North Korea. Accommodated safely under 
the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, Japan had not felt an immediate threat 
emanating from the neighbouring Communist states, such as the Soviet Union and 
China. The end of the Cold War and the unravelling of bipolarity, however, posed a new 
challenge to Japan, since it faced threats from North Korea, known as a renegade state 
seeking to arm itself with nuclear weapons (Katzenstein 1996). North Korea's test of 
what it termed a rocket carrying the 'Gwangmyongsong' satellite on 31 August 1998 
has irreversibly eroded the Japanese sense of security, as it flew over Japan and landed 
in the Pacific. Gripped by fear and frustration, Japan imposed sanctions against North 
18 Announcing Prime Minister Koizumi's trip to North Korea on 30 August 2002, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Fukuda Yasuo said in a statement, 'For over half a century since the end of the Second World 
War, diplomatic relations with North Korea have yet to be normalized, and it can be said that it is the 
historical responsibility of the Government to resolve the various issues between Japan and North Korea 
and to normalize diplomatic relations'. The text of Fukuda's statement is available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/regioniasia-paci/nkorealpmv0209/ccs0830.html(accessed 30 November 2003). 
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Korea, including the suspension of chartered flights, stoppage of humanitarian 
assistance, suspension of financial contribution to KEDO and a halt of normalization 
talks, while agreeing with the United States to launch joint research on the Theatre 
Missile Defence (TMD) (Paik H.S. 1999). Nevertheless, Japan's reaction to the missile 
test was ill-founded since the real threat to the Japanese archipelago was not the multi-
stage Taepodong missile, but the Rodong missile with a range of 1,300 kilometres, 
tested in 1993 and deployed in 1997 (Cha and Hwang 2002: 178). Therefore, the fuss 
was rather the outcome of the media's sensational reporting and political leaders' 
exaggeration of the actual threat. In the wake of the controversy over the missile test, 
the so-called North Korean spy ship incidents took place in March 1999 and in 
December 2ool. The March 1999 incident was symbolic since the Japan Maritime Self-
Defence Forces fired warning shorts at two North Korean vessels, which infiltrated into 
Japanese territorial waters, for the first time since World War II. 
During the Cold War, Japan's security policies were focused on the defence of 
the Japanese archipelago, but the end of the Cold War prompted Japan to expand its 
military role to support the operation of US forces in Asia and the Pacific region. Japan 
cited imminent threats from North Korea when it revised a series of defence-related 
documents to strengthen military activities in the framework of its military alliance with 
the United States. The process was partly a response to the US efforts to restructure a 
security framework in East Asia, orchestrated by Assistant Secretary of Defence Joseph 
Nye. The United States announced the Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific 
Region in February 1995 to implement Nye's (1995: 91) vision, epitomized by his 
famous line: '[s]ecurity is like oxygen - you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose 
it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about'. In November 
1995, Japan revised the National Defence Programme Outline for the first time in 20 
years to cope with the new security environment in the post-Cold War era. In April 1996, 
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and US President Clinton issued the 'U.S.-
Japan Joint Declaration on Security' that redefined their alliance for the 21 st century. In 
September 1997, Japan further strengthened its alliance with the United States by 
revising the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation of 1978 with the aim of 
enhancing Japan's rear area support for US military operations. Culminating in this 
process, which started in April 1996, the Japanese Diet passed a package of bills in May 
1999, submitted by the government in April 1998, to implement the revised guidelines 
and provide a legal framework for the Japan SDF to strengthen its logistical support of 
US forces during emergencies in areas surrounding Japan (Pae 2001). The joint US-
Japan efforts were designed to rectify and update the fragile side of the security alliance. 
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When the United States seriously considered preventive military strikes against North 
Korea's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in 1994, for example, Tokyo neither showed any 
political will nor ability to offer military support under the constitution. 
Nevertheless, many observers dismiss North Korea's threats as a pretext for 
Japan's military buildup to counterbalance the rising Chinese political and military 
power in East Asia (Kim Y.c. 2001; Garrett and Glaser 1997). Even though the United 
States and Japan insisted in an unequivocal manner that their military cooperation in 
'areas surrounding Japan', specified in the US-Japan Guidelines,19 is not a geographical 
concept but situational, China's suspicion was never alleviated, since it feared possible 
US-Japan military actions in the event of a cross-strait crisis (Guardian, 9 June 1999) 
Apart from the revision of security-related arrangements, Japan took a number 
of steps towards engagement with North Korea. For example, Japan agreed to offer 
US$1 billion to KEDO, which required $4.6 billion to build two LWRs in North Korea 
in return for its suspension of all nuclear activities. On 4 May 1999, it signed a contract 
with KEDO on the provision of the loan, which was endorsed by the Japanese Diet on 
29 June (Joongang [lbo, 1 July 1999). 
Diplomatic Nonnalization Talks. In spite of the presence of unresolved security 
and bilateral issues, such as a controversy over the 'past history', Japan has seen its 
relations with North Korea in light of the multiple relations unfolding on and around the 
Korean Peninsula (Akaha 2002b: 80). In particular, its initiatives towards North Korea 
came largely in the aftermath of the shifts of South Korea's policies, given that the 
success of its initiatives was impossible without the blessing of South Korea, an 
important partner in terms of economy and regional security (Kim Y.c. 2002). It was 
also important to secure consent from the US government as part of the three-way 
policy coordination between the United States, Japan and South Korea (Hughes 2002b; 
Hiramatsu 2003). Even though it was theoretically possible for Japan to normalize its 
relations with North Korea during the Cold War, as it did with the Soviet Union and 
China, it actually faced stiff objections from South Korea and the United States (Park 
C.H. 2003). In particular, South Korea wielded a virtual 'veto power' over Japan's 
initiatives towards North Korea (Oh and Hassig 2000: 162). 
Japan took its first major step to discuss diplomatic normalization with North 
Korea after South Korean President Roh Tae-woo issued the '7 July Declaration' in 
1988 under which Seoul pledged to help North Korea to improve diplomatic ties with 
19 The text for the US-Japan Guidelines is available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/Cworkisisin4_.htm 
(accessed 9 February 2(03). 
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Western countries, such as the United States and Japan (Kim Y.C. 2002). Seoul's 
decision was taken with the hope of realizing peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula through the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the United States, Japan, 
the Soviet Union and China. The Tokyo government made use of the new window of 
opportunity by dispatching a two-party delegation, led by Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) strongman Kanemaru Shin and Japan Socialist Party Vice Chairman Tanabe 
Makoto, to Pyongyang in September 1990. The visit created the controversial 'Three-
Party Joint Declaration' between the two Japanese parties and the North Korean 
Workers' Party, which, among others, called on the two governments to take steps for 
diplomatic normalization and urged the Japanese government to provide appropriate 
'compensation' for its colonial misdeeds. The use of the term, 'compensation', ran 
against the official Japanese policy of renouncing any provision of compensation or 
reparations for acts committed during the wartime and colonial periods. The agreement 
also meant preferential treatment to North Korea over South Korea to which Japan 
offered US$500 million in grant and loans in the form of 'economic cooperation' after 
diplomatic normalization in 1965. When Kanemaru visited Seoul to mitigate South 
Korean officials' concerns, President Roh did not reject the normalization process in an 
outright manner, but demanded that 'Japan should engage in prior consultations with 
South Korea regarding negotiations with North Korea; improve relations with North 
Korea in conjunction with similar progress in North-South dialogue; request North 
Korean acceptance of IAEA inspections; not extend economic cooperation to North 
Korea until after normalization; and encourage North Korea to become a responsible 
member of the international society' (Hughes 1999: 83). Even though the three-party 
declaration created an uproar in both Japan and South Korea, the atmosphere for the 
start of normalization talks was ripe with Prime Minister Kaifu announcing on 1 
October 1990 that Japan was ready for talks with North Korea. 
The first round of official normalization talks opened in January 1991 and 
proceeded into the eighth round until November 1992, to be only ruptured in a dispute 
over whether a Japanese abductee had taught a North Korean terrorist who bombed the 
KAL 858 passenger airliner in 1987. In 1991, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police 
Department contended at a press conference that there was a high probability that a 
Japanese woman, Taguchi Taeko, who had disappeared in 1978, was the woman, called 
Lee Eun-hye by the self-confessed North Korean terrorist, Kim Hyun-hee. Despite 
Japan's discovery of solid evidence about the abduction, North Korea continued to deny 
the existence of any kidnapped Japanese and called for a halt to a discussion on the 
issue (KCNA, 18 May 1998; 6 May 1998). DUring the Kim-Koizumi summit in 2002, 
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however, Lee and Taguchi were confirmed to be the same person, but among those who 
died in North Korea after their abduction by North Korean agents in 1970s and 1980s 
(Korea Herald, 26 September 2002). 
As North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993, 
escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government indicated it would 
suspend normalization talks indefinitely. Japan's status as a bystander in regional 
security issues has persisted since then, because such events as US-North Korea nuclear 
negotiations, the four-party peace talks and the exchange of senior officials during the 
waning months of the Clinton administration further aggravated Japan's sense of 
diplomatic incapacity (Paik H.S.1999). To break the diplomatic deadlock with North 
Korea, Japan further resorted to the same ice-breaking role of parliamentarians' visits by 
sending a delegation of the then three ruling parties -- the LDP, Social Democratic Party 
of Japan, and Sakigake -- led by former Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio of the 
LDP in March 1995 and a mission of the same three parties led by LDP General Council 
Chairman Mori Yoshiro in November 1997. Even though the Watanabe mission reached 
an agreement on the unconditional resumption of normalization talks in a meeting with 
Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun and the Japanese government offered 500,000 
tons of rice to North Korea, they failed to resume official talks amid a succession of 
incidents, including the start of US-Japan negotiations to revise the Defence Guidelines 
in April 1996, the infiltration of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters in 
September 1996, the defection of North Korean Workers' Party Secretary Hwang Jang-
yop in February 1997 and North Korean defector An Myong-jin's claim in March 1997 
that he had seen Yokota Megumi, a Japanese abductee, in Pyongyang (Kim Y.c. 2002: 
20-1). At that time, Japan's diplomatic initiatives could not win South Korea's blessing, 
since President Kim Young-sam insisted that the inter-Korean rapprochement should 
come first before North Korea could improve relations with Japan. In particular, 
President Kim expressed strong displeasure over Japan's attempt to outpace South 
Korea in the improvement of relations with the provision of 500,000 tons of rice, a 
volume that dwarfed South Korea's shipment of 150,000 tons in the same year. In a 
summit with Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in Osaka on the sidelines of the APEC 
summit on 18 November 1995, President Kim contended that Japan's provision of 
500,000 tons of rice gave the impression that Tokyo was 'interfering with the Korean 
unification process' by being duped by the North Korean regime attempting to drive a 
wedge between Seoul and Tokyo (Hankyoreh, 19 November 1995). In reply, Prime 
Minister Murayama, calling the assistance 'exceptional', backed away from an 
engagement option and promised not to make additional assistance to North Korea 
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without consultations with the Seoul government (Donga !lbo, 19 November 1995). 
With President Kim Dae-jung taking office in February 1998, Seoul tried to 
mend ties with Tokyo, damaged during the Kim Young-sam administration, by signing 
the Joint Declaration on the New Korea-Japan Partnership in the 21 st Century. Dumping 
the previous administration's policy of thwarting Japan from moving to improve ties 
with North Korea, President Kim started requesting Tokyo to take a proactive stance in 
improving relations with Pyongyang (Nakanishi 2001; Paik H.S. 1999). Following a 
US-North Korea deal on a moratorium of missile tests in September 1999, Japan 
partially lifted economic sanctions on North Korea in November, including a ban on 
chartered flights, and began preliminary contacts with North Korea for the resumption 
of normalization talks in December. A small breakthrough was recorded in December 
when a suprapartisan mission of Japanese parliamentarians, led by former Socialist 
Prime Minister Murayama, visited Pyongyang and signed a joint announcement with 
the Workers' Party urging their respective governments to resume talks on the 
normalization of diplomatic relations at an early date. The event led to the resumption 
of normalization talks in April 2000. Even though these ninth normalization talks could 
not yield a meaningful outcome, the two countries succeeded in organizing a meeting 
between their foreign ministers three months later in Bangkok on the sidelines of the 
ARE In their first-ever meeting, Foreign Ministers Kono Yohei and Paek Nam-sun 
agreed to resume diplomatic normalization talks, paving the way for the tenth round of 
talks in August and the eleventh round in October. The talks, however, ended without an 
accord, as the two sides exhibited differences over Japan's wartime misdeeds and North 
Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals. Izumi (2002: 224-5) noted that North Korea 
had apparently given priority to its improving relations with the United States during the 
fan of 2000 instead of maintaining the process of normalization talks with Japan. After 
another period in the doldrums, the twelfth round of talks took place in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, on 29-30 October 2002 right after Koizumi's historic trip to Pyongyang, as 
shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5 1 DiDlomatic Normalization Talks between North Korea and TaDan . 
... 
Round Dates Venue 
1 30-31 January 1991 Pyongyang 
2 11-12 March 1991 Tokyo 
First Wave 3 20-21 May 1991 Beijing 
4 29 August - 2 September 1991 Beijing 
5 18-20 November 1991 Beijing 
6 30 January - 1 February 1992 Beijing 
7 13-15 May 1992 Beijing 
8 5-6 November 1992 Beijing 
9 4-7 April 2000 Pyongyang 
Second Wave 10 21-24 August 2000 Tokyo 
11 30-31 October 2000 Beijing 
Third Wave 12 29-30 October 2002 Kuala Lumpur 
Source: Compiled from Yang and Kim (2002: 61). 
3.2.2. Prime Minister Koizumi's Policy of Engagement 
Traditionally, Japan followed in the footsteps of the United States, as it did in the 
normalization of relations with China. When President Kim urged Prime Minister Mori 
to improve relations with North Korea to assist inter-Korean rapprochement during his 
trip to Japan in September 2000, three months after the inter-Korean summit, Mori, in 
principle, agreed with Kim's request, but expressed concerns that the Japanese public 
would not endorse the government's assistance to North Korea, since it might buttress 
the North's military build-up (Japan Times, 25 September 2000; Kim H.S. 2003: 81). 
Even though Mori sent a letter to Chairman Kim requesting a summit and both sides 
were on the verge of agreeing to meet through a secret contact between former Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Nakagawa Hidenao and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in 
Singapore on 27 January 200 1, the unpopular Mori administration failed to push ahead 
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with the summit plan, since he created no breakthrough on such issues as the abduction 
of Japanese nationals and 'Japan's liquidation of its past'20 (Cha 2001: 562; Nakanishi 
2001: 72; Chosun !lbo, 2 September 2002; Donga Ilbo, 2 September 2002). When 
Koizumi took office as prime minister, his administration placed priority initially on 
aligning itself with Washington's North Korea policies, while paying little attention to 
any independent initiative towards Pyongyang (Kim H.S. 2003: 81; Lee W.O. 2002: 53). 
Therefore, Koizumi's trip to North Korea in September 2002 was seen as a rare 
diplomatic initiative Japan exercised as an independent state to the extent that it was 
called a political 'gamble' (Hughes 2002b; Hiramatsu 2003). 
Koizumi appeared to have made up his mind to visit Pyongyang around May 
2002, soon after North Korea made a commitment to a thorough probe into alleged 
cases of abduction and a notification of the outcome in the near future at the Red Cross 
talks between the two countries held in Beijing on 29 April 2002 (Park c.H. 2003: 10). 
To lay the groundwork for the summit, Japan's Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko first 
met her North Korean counterpart Paek Nam-sun on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in 
Brunei in July. The Red Cross societies of the two countries also held negotiations to 
discuss pending issues, including the abduction of Japanese nationals, in August. At last, 
the summit was agreed upon in Pyongyang during the two-day talks from 25 August 
between Tanaka Hitoshi, director general of the Asia and Pacific Bureau of the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), who had supervised the preparations for 
Koizumi's trip, and his North Korean counterpart. Before that, there had been more than 
30 informal contacts between the two sides, involving Chairman Kim's close associates 
and those from the Prime Minister's Office and MOFA from Japan (ibid). On 30 August, 
Japan and North Korea officially announced their agreement to organize a summit on 17 
September in Pyongyang. 
Nevertheless, Japan's engagement with North Korea involved great political and 
diplomatic risks. Koizumi thought he had resolved the decades-long controversy over 
the abduction of Japanese nationals through his surprise engagement with North Korea, 
but the very abduction issue derailed the process of diplomatic normalization, when 
North Korea notified Japan of the fact that eight of 13 abductees died prematurely. At 
home, Koizumi faced trouble with conservative forces opposing his engagement 
approach amidst a rising demand for a probe into the premature death of the abductees. 
On top of the domestic restraints, the United States sought to restrain Japan's diplomatic 
initiative especially after the revelation of North Korea's HEU programme in October 
20 North Korea has urged Japan to 'liquidate' its colonial past by issuing a clear-cut apology for its 
misdeed and making compensation. 
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2002. 
President Kim's Role in Koizumi's Trip. According to a survey in February 1998, 
when Kim took office as president, the country detested most by the Japanese people, 
regardless of their profession, was North Korea (Donga Ilbo, 10 February 1998). The 
anti-Pyongyang animosity, shared by the Japanese, worsened in August 1998 when 
North Korea test-fired its ballistic missile over the Japanese archipelago and in 1999 
when the Japanese Diet passed a set of bills to extend the scope of Japan's military 
activities to 'areas surrounding Japan' and North Korea interpreted the action as a 
declaration of war (Rodong Shinmun, 1 May 1999). As public opinion in Japan had been 
hostile to North Korea and Japanese leaders were not inclined to take any risk on the 
diplomatic front, there were not many people expecting a breakthrough in Japan-North 
Korea relations in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the historic inter-Korean summit 
in 2000 prompted the Japanese press and politicians to urge the Tokyo government to 
become more proactive in pursuing diplomatic normalization with North Korea in spite 
of the presence of a series of obstacles, including the abduction cases involving 
Japanese nationals (Kim Y.c. 2002). 
Since Japan showed no evident sign of taking peace gestures towards North 
Korea despite his breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, President Kim dispatched 
Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo to Tokyo in January 2002 to press Japanese leaders to 
start dialogue with North Korea (Segye [lbo, 17 January 2002). President Kim further 
made use of Koizumi's trip to Seoul in March 2002 to request him to adopt actions in 
the direction of normalizing ties with North Korea. President Kim was quoted by 
Mainichi Shimbun (1 September 2002) as telling Koizumi: 'He [Chairman Kim] is 
regarded as a weird man, but I don't think so. It may be fruitful to talk with him, since 
he is well versed in various affairs taking place in the world'. In a joint press conference 
with Kim following the summit, Koizumi (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 March 2002) told 
reporters: 
We will resume diplomatic normalization talks with North Korea based on the 
principle of the negotiated and peaceful resolution of all issues. However, we 
have such a thorny issue as the abduction of Japanese nationals. We will 
deliver our position clearly to North Korea and hold negotiations in a resolute 
manner. 
Soon after Koizumi's trip to Seoul, the two Koreas announced a South Korean 
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presidential envoy's trip to North Korea on 25 March, interpreted by the South Korean 
media as a desperate effort by President Kim to prevent the security environment on the 
Korean Peninsula from further deteriorating following President Bush's State of the 
Union address in January when he classified North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' 
(Chosun /lbo, 26 March 2002; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 26 March 2002). Koizumi 
revealed that he had been already told by President Kim about the envoy's trip to 
Pyongyang during his summit with him, hoping that North Korea would show sincerity 
in resolving the abduction issue (Hankyoreh, 27 March 2002; Hankook /lbo, 28 March 
2002). There were more indications that North Korea and Japan were moving to resume 
dialogue, brokered by President Kim. On 25 March, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda 
Yasuo said that Japan and North Korea were seeking to convene Red Cross talks at the 
earliest possible date to discuss the abduction issue. It was a response to the 22 March 
announcement by the North Korea Red Cross society that it would resume efforts to 
locate what it called 'missing Japanese nationals'. 
Before Koizumi's trip to Seoul, Japan took a number of hard-line steps against 
North Korea at the request of the Bush administration, such as searches of the 
headquarters of Chongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, and 
financial institutions, run by pro-Pyongyang residents, in November 2001, and the 
sinking of a so-called 'mysterious ship', believed to be a North Korean spy vessel, in 
December. In a protest against those incidents, the North Korean Red Cross society had 
suspended its search for missing Japanese. Noting Koizumi's trip to Seoul was the 
turning point of Japan's policy towards North Korea, Hankyoreh (27 March 2002) 
reported that, timed with Koizumi's trip, President Kim and Koizumi apparently 
prepared 'countermeasures' against the Bush administration's unilateralism in East Asia 
by playing an independent card: the dispatch of a South Korean envoy to Pyongyang. 
Celebrating the final match of the World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, 
President Kim and Prime Minister Koizumi held another summit meeting in Tokyo on 1 
July. Despite the second inter-Korean naval skirmishes in the West Sea, which took 
place at the end of the World Cup festival, President Kim declared he would maintain 
the Sunshine Policy and Koizumi also expressed his strong support of the engagement 
policy (Hankyoreh. 2 July 2002). In a meeting with ethnic Koreans residing in Japan, 
Kim said: 'Even though North Korea showed much more fierce reactions than now and 
threatened to make 100-fold, 1,000-fold retaliations following the 1999 Yonpyong 
Naval Battle, we were able to organize a summit meeting the next year' (Kyunghyang 
Shinmun, 2 July 2002). When Japan announced Koizumi's trip to Pyongyang, President 
Kim, welcoming the news, told Koizumi over the phone: 'It is very important to resolve 
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all problems through dialogue for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia. If the two leaders hold talks directly, I am confident that there would be 
significant progress in Japan-North Korea relations' (Chosun !lbo, 31 August 2002). 
Prime Minister Koizumi also called US President Bush to brief him on his forthcoming 
visit, while garnering his support. The United States, Japan and South Korea also held a 
TCOG meeting in Seoul on 6-7 September to coordinate their policies prior to 
Koizumi's trip to Pyongyang. A MOFAT official said on condition of anonymity that 
Seoul and Washington were notified of the actual agreement on the summit just two 
days before the formal announcement. However, the Seoul government was ready to 
welcome it despite the short notice, even though the United States was embarrassed 
despite its official statement of welcome. Professor Park Cheol-hee of the MOFAT-
affiliated Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), said Koizumi 
appeared to have taken the initiative without close consultations with the United States, 
thus eroding the basis of bilateral policy coordination on North Korea (Hankyoreh, 31 
August 2002). 
Even though President Kim's decisive, back-stage role in paving the way for 
Koizumi's trip was reported by Japanese newspapers following the announcement of his 
visit, the reports did not receive attention since the visit itself was a shock to many in 
view of the lingering animosity between the two states. Asahi Shimbun (31 August 
2002) reported that President Kim persuaded Chairman Kim via his envoy in April to 
normalize relations with Japan as soon as possible. Among Kim's recommendations 
were: first, recognize the abduction of Japanese nationals by explaining it was 
committed by some militant elements in North Korea; second, expel the hijackers of the 
Yodo airplane to enable the United States to lift economic sanctions and secure loans 
from the World Bank and other financial institutions; third, stress practicality and 
tangible gains over honour in the 'liquidation of the past'; and make a compromise on 
the issue of compensation for Japan's colonial rule in accordance with the South Korean 
example (ibid). A Chong Wa Dae official noted that President Kim made utmost efforts 
to persuade both parties to hold the highest-level talks, even though the actual summit 
was based on a decision reached by themselves (Donga llbo, 2 September 2002). 
One factor, which was unnoticed by the media and the academic community, 
was that Chairman Kim had actually accepted the envoy's advice and told Koizurni 
during a summit in Pyongyang that some 'rogue' elements of the past government had 
committed these crimes, expressing his apologies. Lim Dong-won (Interview: 2003), 
President Kim's special advisor on diplomacy, security and unification who visited 
North Korea as a presidential envoy, revealed further about his conversation with 
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Chairman Kim: 
At that time, I played a role of conveying President Kim's advice to Chairman 
Kim. I counselled Chairman Kim to tell Japan that the North Korean 
authorities had conducted a thorough probe into the allegations and found that 
the abductions were committed by some rogue elements of the past 
government. I added, 'You can say this, since you are not responsible for 
these abductions'. As for the issue of Red Army Faction members who 
hijacked the Yodoho, I told him: 'Don't take it as an issue of negotiations. 
Everything will be resolved if they are sent to a third country quietly. It is 
enough since you had protected them for decades'. In sum, I told him to 
introduce a new thinking and improve relations with Japan, since Japan's 
assistance is crucial for North Korea's economic reconstruction. 21 
Domestic Variables for Koizumi s Engagement. To explain Prime Minister 
Koizumi's policy choice in a comprehensive manner, President Kim's role must be 
augmented with an analysis of Japan's domestic politics, which prompted Koizumi to 
set out on a risky course of rapprochement with North Korea. Koizumi, who had once 
enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings of more than 80 per cent, faced ebbing 
popUlarity among the Japanese public since his dismissal of popular Foreign Minister 
Tanaka Makiko in January 2002. He was also under fire for failing to implement 
economic and political reforms, making many Japanese commentators contend that his 
motives for travelling to North Korea were tied in with his domestic troubles (Lee W.D. 
2002: 53; Rozman 2003). Koizumi attempted to secure a major political reward by 
taking a decisive step towards diplomatic normalization with North Korea. His 
adherence to the engagement option and North Korea's positive reception prompted 
many observers to speculate that Tokyo might establish ties with Pyongyang before the 
end of 2002 (Lee W.D. 2002: 55; Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 2002). 
In the past, successive Japanese administrations had attempted to adopt some 
proactive approaches towards North Korea, but it was Prime Minister Koizumi that 
grabbed the opportunity when the window of opportunity opened with President Kim's 
Sunshine Policy and visited North Korea to create a breakthrough in bilateral 
negotiations. The Mainichi Daily News (31 December 2002) picked Koizumi's trip to 
21 Following the talks, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman showed flexibility on the issue of the 
Japanese hijackers' return to Japan by saying that North Korea is not in a position to exercise authority 
over the issue (Lee W.S. 2003: 191). 
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North Korea as No.1 among Japan's top ten news of the year under the headline 'N. 
Korea Shocks Nation with Spy Ship, Abductions and Historic Meeting'. In contrast with 
the previous Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori administrations, which placed priority on the 
return of the Northern Territories from Russia, Prime Minister Koizumi, who took 
power as the leader of the anti-Hashimoto coalition, diverted attention to diplomatic 
normalization with North Korea (Park C.H. 2003). 
Koizumi's Ambition and Japan's Diplomacy. Since the Bush administration's 
Japan policy was shifting from 'burden sharing' to 'power sharing', Japan's room for 
independent diplomacy has significantly expanded in East Asia, which could favourably 
affect Japanese efforts to normalize relations with North Korea (Nam 2002: 46). Prime 
Minister Koizumi himself endeavoured to carve out Japan's role in East Asia by 
suggesting the idea of an 'East Asian community' in his major policy speech in 
Singapore at the end of a week-long, five-nation tour of Southeast Asia on 14 January 
2002, even though his inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in his envisioned 
community touched off a controversy (Soeya 2002; South China Morning Post, 15 
January 2002). Koizumi harboured a personal ambition to be recorded in history as a 
pioneer of friendly Japan-North Korea relations. Koizumi's trip to Pyongyang, 
compared to former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Beijing in 1972, marked a 
rare case of diplomatic autonomy from the United States, which has exercised great 
influence over Japan since the end of World War II. Professor Kitaoka Shinichi of the 
University of Tokyo described the visit as 'a historic success for post-war Japanese 
diplomacy' (Chuo Koron, November 2002). Rozman (2003: 529) argued that Japan's 
independent move lies in its frustration over its low political profile on the international 
stage, which made Ozawa Ichiro (1994) put that Japan is not a 'normal state'. 
Similar to President Kim's strategies of engagement, the Koizumi government 
attempted to inform the Japanese public of the progress in Japan-North Korea relations 
as part of the efforts to create a new image of North Korea (Hiramatsu 2003). Testifying 
to the progress in bilateral dialogue, the Koizumi government secured the custody of 
Takashi Sugishima, a former Nihon Keizai Shimbun reporter who had been detained in 
North Korea for two years, in February 2002, followed by the North Korean Red Cross 
society'S announcement in March on the resumption of a probe into Japanese 'missing 
persons', the Japan-North Korea Red Cross talks in April and the foreign ministers 
meeting in July. 
When Japan briefed the United States on Koizumi's trip to North Korea, the 
United States was not in a position to welcome his plan, since it came when the 
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administration was intensifying efforts to press North Korea to drop its nuclear and 
missile programmes. At that time, however, the Bush administration's top priority was 
the coming war in Iraq and the Koizumi administration could find a space for its 
independent diplomacy vis-a-vis North Korea (Chin 2002). When Japan notified US 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was in Tokyo for strategic dialogue 
on 27-8 August 2002, of an agreement on the summit, he requested the prime minister 
not to limit his discussion with Chairman Kim to bilateral issues, but cover a wide range 
of security issues Washington was interested in: (1) development and export of missiles, 
(2) nuclear weapons programmes, (3) production and trade of narcotic drugs, (4) 
printing of counterfeit money, (5) production of biological and chemical weapons, (6) 
withdrawal of forward-deployed army, (7) freedom of religion and (8) human rights 
(Weekly Post, 9 September 2002). Armitage also told Japanese officials that the United 
States had secured evidence that North Korea had been operating a second nuclear 
weapons programme based on enriched uranium in violation of the 1994 nuclear deal 
(Rozman 2003). Even though Washington's requests were partially reflected on the 
summit agenda, Koizumi's summit with Chairman Kim was largely focused on 
abduction and other bilateral issues. In 1990, when Japan was moving to begin 
normalization talks with North Korea, the United States criticized the late Kanemaru 
whose visit to Pyongyang created a diplomatic breakthrough because the Japanese 
action was a violation of the common US-Japan policy line (Shigemura 1999). Unlike 
Kanemaru's initiative, Koizumi had his own pressing humanitarian agenda, the 
resolution of the abduction issue, which helped him to secure the Bush administration's 
understanding of his visit (Nam 2002: 43). In sum, Koizumi desired to increase Japan's 
influences over the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic normalization with North 
Korea, which will eventually boost its status in East Asia (Chin 2002). 
Diplomatic Breakthrough and North Korea s Flexibility. The process of 
organizing the Japan-North Korea summit featured, among other things, policy 
innovation, outright secrecy and significant concessions. First, it was neither the LDP 
nor other Japanese parties but the MOFA, which played a central role in organizing the 
summit. Since the start of bilateral negotiations after the Cold War, Japanese politicians 
had played major roles as emissaries shuttling between Tokyo and Pyongyang, which 
made North Korean strategists think that, in view of their political influences, it was 
more important to foster good working relations between political parties rather than to 
engage in diplomatic talks to secure assistance from Japan. Since they commanded little 
expertise in the field of diplomacy, Japanese politicians created misunderstanding and 
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made blunders, for example, by agreeing to use the term, 'compensation', in the 'Three-
Party Joint Declaration' in 1990 (Kim YC. 2002: 27-8) and by telling North Korean 
officials repeatedly that 'the abduction issue is not problematic' (Shigemura 1999: 290). 
A significant change took place in 1997 after the Hashimoto administration started 
placing emphasis on governmental dialogue rather than the relationship between 
political parties. Second, the Japanese government kept the process of organizing a 
summit secret to the United States and South Korea by notifying them of only the 
agreement just days before its announcement. Previously, Japan's diplomacy 
endeavoured to remain in sync with those of the United States and South Korea, thus 
subjecting itself to the shifts of policies and priorities of those countries. Third, the 
summit was the outcome of shifting policies by Japan and North Korea, with the two 
states taking a more active posture in a departure from their conventional approaches on 
diplomatic normalization. Nevertheless, the prime catalyst, which made Prime Minister 
Koizumi make up his mind to hold a summit with Chairman Kim, was North Korea's 
unprecedented flexibility and shift in attitude over the abduction issue (Yang and Kim 
2002). Hiramatsu Kenji (2003), who was director of the Northeast Asia Division of the 
MOFA during the preparatory talks for the summit, recalled that the Japanese delegates 
had given a clear message to their North Korean counterparts that Japan would not 
proceed with negotiations unless North Korea fully addressed the abductee issue. 
Japan's two prominent experts on North Korea, Professor Okonogi Masao of Keio 
University and Professor Izumi Hajime of the University of Shizuoka, noted that 
Koizumi made up his mind to visit North Korea, since he secured Chairman's Kim's 
prior commitment to the resolution of the abduction issue on Japanese terms 
(Hankyoreh, 31 August 2002). Okonogi noted that Pyongyang opted for diplomatic 
normalization with Tokyo as part of its efforts to avoid the worst-case scenario after a 
US war on Iraq and secure economic assistance, while Izumi stressed that the settlement 
of the abductee issue was just the beginning of time-consuming diplomatic talks over 
such pressing issues as North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes (ibid). In sum, 
North Korea's agreement on a summit is regarded as a two-pronged strategy aimed at 
ameliorating the US attitude through its rapprochement with Japan and securing large-
scale assistance for the reconstruction of its ailing economy (Lee W.D. 2002: 52). 
The Outcome of Summit Diplomacy. In many respects, Koizumi's trip to North 
Korea can be regarded as successful, since he could hold a frank, constructive 
discussion about pending issues with Chairman Kim and produce the Pyongyang 
Declaration, including Kim's commitment to regional security and the resolution of 
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bilateral issues. First, Koizumi managed to clarify who had been responsible for the 
abduction of Japanese nationals and the appearances of 'mysterious ships' in and near 
its territorial waters, which were major hurdles for efforts to improve bilateral relations. 
In particular, the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals was the biggest issue between 
the two sides, because North Korea's previous denial of any misdeed led to the rupture 
of normalization talks. Determined to resolve the two pending issues with Japan, 
Chairman Kim, labelled as 'the apologetic kidnapper' by The Economist (21 September 
2002), admitted to the astonishment of the outside world that his subordinates had 
abducted 13 Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s to train spies about Japanese 
language and culture, but eight of the 13 were dead. Satisfied with his achievement in 
Pyongyang, Koizumi said in a statement after his trip to Pyongyang that Chairman Kim, 
in extraordinary frankness, acknowledged that 'persons affiliated with North Korea' had 
committed these abductions and offered clear-cut apologies, promising to prevent the 
recurrence of similar events. 22 As for the infiltration of spy ships into Japanese 
territorial waters, Kim also admitted that 'certain elements of the military authorities' 
had been involved in the incident. 23 Okonogi called it part of Chairman Kim's efforts to 
tidy up its past affairs in order to avoid having his country branded as a terrorist state 
and a target for regime change by the Bush administration (Chua Koran, November 
2002). Chairman Kim's admission of the past's wrongdoing and apology was a great 
surprise even to the South Korean public to the extent that the Kim Dae-jung 
government had faced criticism for his failure to raise the issues of South Korean 
abductees and North Korea's past terrorist acts during his summit with Chairman Kim 
in 2000. 
Second, Koizumi's trip helped to alleviate tension arising from North Korea's 
nuclear and missile programmes. Koizumi secured Kim's commitment to maintaining 
the moratorium on future missile tests without any time limit. Kim also expressed his 
intention to abide by the AF in 1994 to help to clear the suspicion of North Korea's 
nuclear programmes. Kim further requested Prime Minister Koizumi to convey his 
message to US President Bush that North Korea wants to reopen negotiations to 
22 The text is available at the Japanese Foreign Ministry homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
~aciln_korea/pmv0209/press.html (accessed 12 January 2004). 
3 The monitoring of a mysterious vessel followed a report from the US military on 18 December 200 1 
that it had spotted an unidentified ship approaching waters near Amami-Oshima Island via its 
reconnaissance satellite. Japanese patrol boats chased it before sinking it in the East China Sea on 22 
December 2001 after an exchange of fire. Originally, North Korea denied its connection with the vessel. 
According to a verbatim between Kim and Koizumi. Kim ordered a probe into the incident and found that 
it was a military drill by some North Korean special forces conducted without his knowledge (Munwha 
/lbo, 18 September 2002). 
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improve bilateral relations. North Korea's commitment to international security 
obligations gave confidence for Koizumi, who was hardly a foreign policy expert, to the 
extent that, right after his visit to Pyongyang, Koizumi stressed Japan's new role as an 
important player in addressing the region's security problems (Economist, 21 September 
2(02). 
Third, Japan and North Korea have reached a virtual agreement on the nature of 
its future grant aids and loans to be made in connection with its 1910-45 colonial rule. 
North Korea dropped its earlier demand that the money transfer be made in the name of 
'reparations' or 'compensation' and agreed on the concept of 'economic cooperation' 
and the mutual waiver of rights of property and claim, similar to those agreed upon with 
South Korea when they normalized relations in 1965 (Hiramatsu 2003). The declaration 
reads, 'Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the 
normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term 
loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through 
international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and 
providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for 
International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would 
be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely 
discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the 
normalization talks'. If the negotiations are successfully wrapped up, a normalized 
relationship with Japan means a windfall of an estimated US$4 billion to $10 billion for 
the Pyongyang regime (Yang and Kim 2002: 78). When South Korea and Japan 
normalized relations in 1965, South Korea secured US$500 million in grant and loans in 
the name of 'economic cooperation' but, at that time, the logic and rhetoric of South 
Korea's economic reconstruction and the solidarity of the anti-Communist bloc, led by 
the United States, reigned supreme over the 'liquidation of the past' in a legitimate way. 
Even though it is significant for the economically troubled North Korea to secure large-
scale economic assistance, the Kim-Koizumi agreement meant the repetition of a 
'distorted' model of compensation for the settlement of Japan's colonial rule and, 
therefore, a serious concession on the part of North Korea, which had demanded 
'compensation' for several decades (Lee W.D. 2002: 54; Shin 2002: 68). 
Fourth, it is significant for Japan and North Korea to have authored a written 
document in the form of the Pyongyang Declaration, since Chairman Kim's statements 
carry higher authority than anything else in North Korea. In inter-Korean relations, the 
2000 Joint Declaration by President Kim and Chairman Kim is a document, which has 
been most frequently referred to whenever the two sides tried to resolve problems. 
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Koizumi said in his arrival statement from Pyongyang, 'I believe that as long as the 
principles and spirit of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration are sincerely 
abided by, relations between Japan and North Korea will begin to make great strides 
from hostile relations to cooperative relations'. 
The Aftermaths of the Summit Diplomacy. In a show of consistency, Prime 
Minister Koizumi exhibited determination to pursue better relations with North Korea 
even after the North's admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Koizumi 
said. 'Japan is not considering changing its plan to resume Japan-North Korea 
normalization talks on 29 October' (Yonhap News Agency, 17 October 2002). When 
they resumed normalization talks on 29 October in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, however, 
the delegates from the two countries made little headway because they exhibited 
differences over the two main issues: the abduction of Japanese nationals and the 
North's nuclear weapons programme. North Korea made it clear that the nuclear issue 
could be resolved through its negotiations with the United States, not Japan (Rozman 
2003). Whilst North Korea viewed that diplomatic normalization and the extension of 
economic assistance could lead to the resolution of nuclear and missile issues, Japan 
prioritized the settlement of security issues over economic assistance. The only 
moderate progress in the negotiations was an agreement to set up a panel to discuss 
security issues from November, but it was foiled in an escalating tension over the 
North's HEU programme. 
Primarily, Chairman Kim's confession to the abduction issue could not placate 
anti-Pyongyang antagonism in Japan and only provoked further inquiries into the 
premature death of some of the kidnapped Japanese nationals, developments that 
hampered the Koizumi administration from further proceeding in the direction of 
normalizing relations with North Korea. The MOFA also faced criticism for failing to 
properly convey information on the dates of death of eight abductees to their family 
members and the Japanese Red Cross society, even though it secured the list, containing 
information on the dates of their death, hours before the summit started in Pyongyang. 
The fact that two of the abductees died on the same day made their parents in Japan 
raise the possibility that they might have been murdered. The other abductees also 
perished from mysterious illness or accidents in evidently premature deaths in their 20s, 
30s or 40s, which prompted their family members to dismiss the North Korean accounts 
as 'laughable lies' (Mainich Daily News, 2 October 2002). A suprapartisan organization 
of Diet members calling for the swift return of Japanese abductees passed a resolution to 
demand that the Tokyo government not reenter normalization talks until the abduction 
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issue was completely resolved. Taking issue with North Korea's abduction cases and 
Tokyo's hasty move to resume normalization talks, Koike Yuriko, a Diet member from 
the now defunct New Conservative Party, heightened her criticism of Koizumi for 
signing the Pyongyang Declaration in an article, entitled, 'Why the Rush to Reopen 
Normalization Talks with This Barbaric State?' (Seiron, November 2002). 
The resurgence of the anti-engagement bloc reflects the nature of Japan's public 
sphere, influenced heavily by the conservative forces. Japan's conservative media 
generated intense anti-North Korean sentiment and produced sensational reports that 
helped solidify the already deep antagonism of the general public towards North Korea 
(Hughes 2002b). For example, Japanese newspapers, citing an internal document of the 
North Korean People's Army, reported that Chairman Kim described Prime Minister 
Koizumi's trip to Pyongyang in September 2002 as the 'signal of capitulation', which 
poured cold water on the spirit of rapprochement between the two countries (Yonhap 
News Agency, 13 May 2003). In a column, carried on Hankyoreh (9 December 2002), 
Professor Wada Haruki called for balanced reporting on North Korea, since the 
'negative campaign' against the state, launched by Japanese television companies and 
magazines, had been detrimental to bilateral relations. 
As a result, the process of rapprochement between the two states was put to an 
end, weakening Koizumi's desire to create an early breakthrough in bilateral relations. 
In spite of Chairman Kim's surprise confession, the deeply embedded mistrust between 
the two states hampered the progress in bilateral negotiations to resolve the abduction 
issue. On 15 October 2002, the five surviving victims of the abductions returned home 
for tearful reunions with their family members, but the abductees, who married while in 
North Korea, came home leaving their children behind. In a response to the public 
uproar over the abduction issue, the Koizumi administration took a hard line by 
announcing the five abductees, who were authorized by North Korea to travel to Japan 
for up to two weeks, would remain in Japan indefinitely in breach of its agreement with 
Pyongyang. Negotiating the fate of the surviving abductees and their family members in 
North Korea, the two countries showed convergence around the notion that they must be 
allowed to make 'free decisions' about their own future, but differed over how the 
environment should be forged to allow them to make such free decisions. The MOFA 
stressed the creation of an environment that would allow the abductees and their family 
members to make 'free decisions', apparently presuming that they could not make 
decisions out of their free will once in North Korea. Facing Japan's demand that the 
family members of the five abductees be sent to Japan immediately, North Korea also 
stressed the 'free will' of the abductees and their family members, noting that the five 
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abductees should return to North Korea first to hold discussions with their family 
members about their future. Basically, North Korea holds a different mindset on the 
abduction issue. Pak Ryong-yon, deputy director general of the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry, told Japanese journalists that the issue is not a stumbling block to the 
improvement of bilateral relations, since Chairman Kim recognized the fact of 
abduction and promised to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of 
similar incidents (Joongang !lbo, 25 October 2002). The North Korean official went on 
to say that the abduction is no match with Japan's 'colossal crime' during its colonial 
rule of the Korean Peninsula in terms of scale and atrocity (ibid). 
On top of its domestic constraints, the United States pressed Japan to abandon its 
engagement option after the resurfacing of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem. 
Japan had little room to manoeuvre in order to move forward since the Bush 
administration put pressure on Japan to stop offering economic aid to North Korea until 
it agrees to forgo its nuclear programme (New York Times, 30 October 2002). Japan was 
also forced to urge North Korea to abandon efforts to pursue the HEU programme 
whenever the two sides held official negotiations. With its principle leverage in the 
negotiations abandoned, Japanese negotiators could not find any incentives to change 
North Korea's attitude over the abduction issue, making North Korea, disenchanted with 
Japan, solidify the belief that a breakthrough with the United States is the only solution 
to resolve pending issues. Prime Minister Koizumi told Presidents Kim Dae-jung and 
George W. Bush in a three-way summit on 27 October 2002 that Japan could not 
complete the process of negotiations to normalize ties in the absence of the resolution of 
security issues, including North Korea's HEU programme. 
Japan criticized North Korea's nuclear admission but did not declare a 
suspension of bilateral negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations in spite of the 
North's apparent violation of the Pyongyang Declaration issued by Prime Minister 
Koizumi and Chairman Kim. Even though Japan called on North Korea to take steps to 
alleviate international concerns over its nuclear programme as one of the issues of the 
normalization talks, the Tokyo government has rather prioritized the abduction case 
over the nuclear issue (New York Times, 29 October 2002). Then Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Fukuda Yasuo noted that the process toward diplomatic normalization will 
never proceed if North Korea does not abide by the Pyongyang Declaration, but added 
that Japan needs to maintain a channel of dialogue because, 'if we do not talk with 
North Korea and leave it alone, its nuclear development program may advance further' 
(quoted in Kamiya 2003: 19). The Japanese government's attitude mirrored the 
relatively calm response by the Japanese public to Pyongyang's overt nuclear ambitions, 
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in contrast to the intense level of fear, provoked by the ballistic missile test in 1998 
(ibid). When a North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman warned on 5 November 2002 
that it would resume ballistic missile tests unless Japan moves quickly to normalize ties 
with it, Koizumi played it down and expressed his intention to stick to the course of 
diplomatic engagement with North Korea by noting: 'I believe North Korea will not do 
anything to trample the spirit of the Pyongyang Declaration' (New York Times, 5 
November 2002). 
In spite of the upsurge in public antagonism against North Korea, one notable 
thing is that the public support of the Koizumi cabinet increased from 51 per cent to 61 
per cent after his trip to North Korea, according to a survey by the Asahi Shimbun (19 
September 2002). Among those surveyed, 81 per cent approved the Kim-Koizumi 
summit, meaning that the general public was in favour of the engagement option in spite 
of the demand by some Diet members and newspapers to suspend talks wi th Pyongyang. 
In another survey, however, 88 per cent expressed distrust over North Korea's 
explanations regarding the abduction issue, showing deeply bedded animosity towards 
North Korea (Asahi Shimbun, 7 October 2002) 
3.2.3. Findings 
Prime Minister Koizumi's failure in strategies of engagement with North Korea testifies 
to one of this thesis's main propositions that limited engagement, initiated with a mix of 
military deterrence and economic incentives without policy consistency leading to the 
public's identity shifts, runs the risk of only invoking old enmities. After a short period 
of engagement, Japan returned to the past's oscillations between containment and 
engagement, since it faced a set of obstacles: first, a dearth of strategies in dealing with 
North Korea mainly because of its geographical proximity and the North's ballistic 
missiles capable of hitting any target in Japan; second, the pressure from the United 
States calling for conformity in bilateral steps; and finally, the domestic constraints, 
caused by the deep seated animosity towards North Korea. 
The Sunshine Policy provided Prime Minister Koizumi with an opportunity to 
launch summit diplomacy, rare in the history of Japan's external relations. As Foreign 
Minister Kono Yohei noted in March 2000, Japan's basic approach to its diplomatic 
normalization talks with North Korea was the maintenance of renkei (linkage) with 
those of South Korea and the United States (Chosun !lbo, 7 March 2000). Since 
President Kim created an international environment for the improvement of Japan-North 
Korea ties by embarking on a rapprochement process through the 2000 inter-Korean 
summit and offered a free hand to the Tokyo government to move forward, Koizumi 
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could achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. In particular, President Kim advised Koizumi 
to consider summit diplomacy as an effective way of engaging North Korea in view of 
the scale of the pending issues, such as the abduction of Japanese nationals and security 
threats (Hiramatsu 2003). Thanks to the summit in which some stumbling blocks to the 
improvement of their relationship were cleared by Chainnan Kim's unexpected 
confession on the abduction and the spy ship infiltration, the two states have come to 
squarely face decades-old realities. This kind of candour is rare in diplomatic talks, even 
though it had an adverse impact on Japan's perception of North Korea. 
Nevertheless, Japan, predominantly an economic power, faced political and 
diplomatic constraints when policy elites sought to engage North Korea. The structural 
constraints were compounded by North Korea's deeply embedded animosity toward 
Japan, a factor that made Japanese strategists believe that North Korea might be tempted 
to launch missiles at Japan in the event of another war on the Korean Peninsula. The 
final report of the Task Force on Foreign Relations for Prime Minister Koizumi 
adequately reflects the situation by noting that 'the prime objective of Japan's North 
Korea policy is not to overthrow Kim Jong II's regime but to persuade Pyongyang to 
stop taking hannful actions externally and to initiate gradual refonn of its political and 
economic system domestically' (Kamiya 2003: 21). Like Seoul, Tokyo feared its 
possible involvement in an inadvertent war against North Korea, which might be started 
by the United States after the war in Iraq. Even though the United States is located far 
away on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the entire territories of Japan are within the 
ranges of North Korea's ballistic missiles. 
Japan's policies exhibited vulnerability to the shifting US policies towards North 
Korea. Whenever the United States intervened to resolve North Korea-related problems, 
Japan faced the cancellation of its negotiations with the North, as seen in the suspension 
of three waves of nonnalization talks after the nuclear crisis in 1994, President Bush's 
inauguration in 2001, and the emergence of the second nuclear weapons problem in 
2002. Heavily biased towards policy coordination with the United States, Japan failed to 
carve out its own room to manoeuvre as an independent actor (Yang and Kim 2002). 
Referring to this situation, Shigemura (1999: 281) argued Japan has no 'foreign policy', 
but 'following policy'. 
While the Kim administration showed enthusiasm and tenacity against all odds, 
the Koizumi government lost control over its North Korea policy amid the media 
bombardments. In particular, the 'missing persons' pressure groups and the mass media 
were emboldened to dictate North Korea strategies (Hughes 2002b). Without focusing 
on the settlement of Japan's colonial rule, the prime issue of normalization talks, 
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Professor Okonogi argued in a column that the Japanese government diverted its 
attention to the resolution of the abduction issue, reflecting the domestic public's 
antagonism vis-a-vis North Korea (Hankyoreh, 14 October 2002). Unlike the progress 
of US-Vietnam normalization talks in the absence of serious security issues, illustrated 
in Chapter Two, the Japan Defence Agency and other conservative forces, which shared 
the same hard-line approach on North Korea's nuclear and missile issues as the United 
States, meddled in the normalization process and called for the prior resolution of those 
issues (Kim yc. 2002: 30). 
Therefore, it will still take time for Japan to inject consistency into its policies 
towards North Korea because of structural and normative constraints. Japan's failure in 
diplomacy vis-a-vis North Korea reflects the fact that there is no consensus in Japan's 
public sphere as to whether to contain or engage North Korea. Even after it embarked 
on the course of engagement, the Koizumi administration exhibited inconsistency in its 
policies, since its identification with North Korea has been in confusion and oscillating 
between the images of enemy and partner. In a survey, reported by The Asahi Shimbun 
(7 October 2002), 44 per cent of respondents approved the resumption of diplomatic 
normalization talks with North Korea, while 43 per cent objected it. Amid this 
polarization of domestic opinion, Japanese politicians and diplomats found it safe to 
remain inactive without taking any proactive action. Coupled with this problem of 
identification, Japan has been long embroiled in a debate over whether to discard its 
passive defence posture and shift gears into an assertive stance to actively deal with 
regional security problems. In this long-running debate, the Japanese conservative 
forces made use of Pyongyang's potential threats to put an end of its traditional norm of 
anti-militarism and improve the SDF's capability in the direction of introducing more 
offensi ve posture. 
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of an activist government in South 
Korea bestowed Japan with a chance to normalize relations with North Korea, one of 
the top foreign policy goals of post-war Japanese administrations. Nevertheless, the 
Koizumi administration exhibited an inability in formulating and pursuing a consistent 
policy with a clear roadmap in relations with North Korea.24 
24 Breaking a two-year stalemate in bilateral relations, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea on 
22 May 2004 for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-iI. Even though Koizumi secured the 
release of five children of the Japanese abductees, he faced criticism for rewarding North Korea with 
250,000 tons of food aid and US$l 0 million worth of medical supplies without making any progress on 
the nuclear weapons dispute or fully resolving North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens. 
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3.3. The European Union and North Korea 
In contrast to the ill-fated strategies of engagement by President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Koizumi, the EU's policies vis-a-vis North Korea featured more steadiness and 
consistency. When they were convinced that the window of opportunity was opening 
wide owing to President Kim's Sunshine Policy, the EU and its member states, except 
for France and Ireland, seized the moments and markedly improved their relations with 
North Korea in 2000 and 2001. Uninfluenced by the Bush administration's scepticism 
and mistrust harboured against the Pyongyang regime, the EU pushed ahead with the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2001, following in the 
footsteps of its major member states, including Britain and Germany. 
To outside observers, the EU and its member states were able to move rather 
swiftly to set up diplomatic ties with North Korea since they held a smaller stake on the 
Korean Peninsula than the United States and Japan. Even though this observation is 
correct, the diplomatic initiatives by the EU and its members require further elaboration. 
In fact, the European diplomatic stance represents a clear distinction from the US's 
perception and worldview, epitomized by the simplistic classification of states into 
friends and foes. Europe's typical worldview has been coloured by an insightful 
consideration into the coexistence of different types of states on a long spectrum 
between the two poles, which helped them to expand the manoeuvring room in their 
diplomacy. 
This section will investigate which factors motivated the EU and its member 
states to take decisive actions leading to full diplomatic normalization with North Korea, 
while the United States and Japan fumbled on their way to the destination they once 
envisioned. As shown in Table 5.2, North Korea and European states normalized their 
relations in the form of two strong waves, reflecting the changing international 
environment and shifting policies by both North and South Korea. In the first wave, a 
group of five EU members set up ties with North Korea in an international atmosphere 
of detente in the early 1970s and temporary inter-Korean rapprochement, which 
produced the South-North Joint Communique on 4 July 1972. The second group of 
eight EU states established ties with North Korea in 2000 and 2001 when President 
Kim's Sunshine Policy fared well, leading to the first inter-Korean summit. This section 
will highlight what factors motivated the EU states to move proactively to set up 
diplomatic ties with North Korea, especially in the second wave coinciding with 
President Kim's tenure. 
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Table S.2 Diplomatic Normalization between North Korea and EU Members 
Countries Dates of Normalization 
Sweden April 1973 
Finland June 1973 
First Wave Denmark July 1973 
Austria December 1974 
Portugal February 1975 
Italy 4 January 2000 
Britain 12 December 2000 
Netherlands 15 January 2001 
Belgium 23 January 2001 
Second Wave Spain 7 February 2001 
Germany 1 March 2001 
Luxemburg 5 March 2001 
Greece 8 March 2001 
Source: MOFAT 
3.3.1. Europe: a new role as supporting player 
Historically, North Korea, which was caught in an intense rivalry with South Korea, 
attempted to set up diplomatic ties with as many countries as possible as part of its 
efforts to boost the legitimacy of the regime and attract capital and technology from 
advanced countries. Since the late 1950s, North Korea sought to increase contacts with 
western European countries in a departure from its old diplomacy confining itself to the 
Communist bloc, but its economic slowdown in the 1970s, coupled with trade deficits, 
default and incidents of illegal smuggling, hampered the development of bilateral 
relations (Kim H.S. 2001). After the end of the Cold War, North Korea strengthened its 
contacts with European countries and, in 1992 alone, dispatched delegations of 
government and party officials three times to a total of 12 countries (Han C.S. 1998). 
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The EU has also strengthened its presence in East Asia politically and 
economically after the Cold War, especially through bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks of dialogue, including the biennial Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit 
(Gilson 2000). Summarizing its principles and strategies, the Commission of the 
European Communities issued an Asia strategy report on 4 September 2001, titled 
'Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership' .25 The new report, 
focusing on strengthening the EU's political and economic presence in the region, was a 
revised version of its first Asia strategy paper, issued in 1994 under the title 'Towards a 
New Asia Strategy'. The report underlined, among other things, the EU's strengthened 
contribution to peace and security in Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula and East 
Timor. 
Historically, the EU's initiatives toward North Korea were part of its forward-
looking policy of engagement in the region, which is the locus of the world's major 
sources of military tension. The EU's North Korea policy has featured several 
characteristics, reflecting geopolitical and ideational factors. First, geographical distance 
and dearth of capabilities to project its power beyond Europe made the EU and its 
member states playa marginal or supporting role rather than a central role in resolving 
such serious security issues as North Korea's development of WMD and missiles. When 
South Korea, the United States and Japan resolved the first North Korean nuclear crisis 
in 1994 in a package deal and formed the KEOO in 1995 for the construction of two 
nuclear reactors and provision of heavy oil to North Korea, the EU belatedly joined it in 
1997 as a member of its executive council at the request of the United States and Japan, 
which desired the EU's increased role in nuclear non-proliferation and, especially, 
burden-sharing for the costly nuclear project (Orifte 2002: 158). As of November 2002, 
the EU had paid a total of 115 mi Ilion euros in funding for the organization since 1996. 
Even though the EU's financial contributions to the KEOO were not sizable compared 
with those by other board members in the US$4.6 billion nuclear project, its 
participation in the US-led organization paved the way for its involvement in security 
issues on the Korean Peninsula (Park C.B. 2002). Second, the EU, recognizing its 
marginal status, focused its efforts on non-security issues, such as the transfer of know-
how on market economics to North Korea, with the aim of transforming the command 
economy into a free market economy. It could be viewed as a division of work with the 
United States, which placed priorities on security issues. According to the EU's Country 
Strategy Paper 2001-2004, issued in 2000, the EU identified three priority areas in its 
25 The text for the Asia strategy report is available at 
http://europa.eu.intlcommlexternal_relationslasialrel/index.htm (accessed 15 November 2003). 
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North Korea projects: (1) institutional support and capacity building; (2) sustainable 
management and use of natural resources; (3) reliable and sustainable transport sector. 26 
Finally, the EU's involvement in Korean Peninsula issues featured a steady evolution in 
the direction of strengthened engagement, whilst the policies of the US and Japanese 
governments showed severe fluctuations. Even though it was a latecomer, the EU could 
gradually shift its policies in a relatively short time to the extent that it could recognize 
the North Korean regime in the form of diplomatic normalization. 
Those characteristics of the EU's policies were favourably received by North 
Korea in spite of its inherent reservations about any discussion of security and human 
rights issues. Since it considered the EU as a rising power, which could be potentially at 
odds with the United States over many international issues, North Korea welcomed the 
EU's multipolarization efforts, increasing attention to East Asia, and propensity toward 
engagement (Kim H.S. 2001; Rodong Shinmun, 3 May 2001). Nevertheless, North 
Korea has dealt with its expanding relations with Europe in the context of its relations 
with the United States. With the United States remaining as its archenemy, North Korea 
sought to use strengthened ties with the EU as a preliminary process leading to its long-
term goal of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States, while securing the 
EU's humanitarian and economic assistance for its short-term gains (Ahn 2002: 51). Its 
intention of maintaining diplomatic relations with the EU was also seen as its efforts to 
play it off against the United States, even though the depth of its ties with the EU did 
not reach the point that it could use its relations with the EU to win concessions from 
the United States (Chung S.J. 2002; Ku 2001). 
3.3.2. The EU's Policy of Engagement 
The EU's policy towards North Korea has not adopted any markedly different tones or 
dimensions when President Kim took office in 1998 to implement the Sunshine Policy, 
which eliminated any preconditions hampering the Western countries from improving 
relations with North Korea. Therefore, the momentous shifts of policies by the EU and 
its member states can be said to be the outcome of President Kim's policy 
entrepreneurship, which had become more conspicuous after the inter-Korean summit in 
June 2000. Kim II-soo (Interview: 2003), minister at the Korean Embassy in London, 
noted: 
In the previous administrations, we did not raise an outright objection to 
26 The text for the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004 is available at 
http://europa.eu.intlcommlexternaLrelationslnorth_korealcsp/index.htm (accessed 8 December 2003). 
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diplomatic nonnalization between our European allies and North Korea. Once 
European states took a serious step towards diplomatic normalization, 
however, we dissuaded them from following through, alleging the timing was 
not appropriate. It was only after President Kim Dae-jung took office that we 
requested them to improve ties with North Korea in a consistent manner. 
Unlike the United States whose foreign policy was based on a black-and-
white logic, European countries faced no domestic obstacle to the 
establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea partly because of the 
presence of socialist states from the Cold War era. 
Since the EU's North Korea policies have been supplementary and evolutionary 
with a heavy inclination towards non-security issues, its policies of engagement could 
fare well during and after the tenure of President Kim, who was reputed to have created 
an international environment for engagement by injecting consistency into South 
Korea's policies. Despite its relatively meagre status on the Korean Peninsula, the EU 
had a vision that the advantage of being a distant power without strategic interests on 
the peninsula could enable it to play the role of a mediator between the United States 
and North Korea. In fact, the EU took a series of steps to engage North Korea, 
especially when it was encouraged by the Kim administration. The Sunshine Policy 
started bearing fruit when the EU shifted its old tactics of keeping some distance in its 
diplomacy with North Korea and opened the first round of political dialogue with North 
Korea in Brussels on 2 December 1998 (Segye /lbo, 3 December 1998). As seen in 
Table 5.3, the political dialogue developed into a regular channel of negotiations 
between the two sides, with a total of five rounds of talks held during President Kim's 
tenure on an annual basis. 
The inception of the EU-North Korea dialogue came amid the deadlock in US-
North Korea negotiations to address North Korea's underground facilities in Kumchang-
ri, suspected to be accommodating nuclear facilities. Since the agenda of the ED-North 
Korea political dialogue comprised security issues as well as economic issues, such as 
the improvement of North Korea's agricultural structure and humanitarian assistance, 
the North's diplomatic initiative was interpreted as part of its efforts to increase pressure 
on the United States to agree to its demand for compensation in return for the US access 
to the underground facilities (Kukmin /lbo, 1 December 1998). 
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Table 5.3 EU-North Korea Political Dialogue 
Dates Venue Major Topics 
1 2 December 1998 Brussels Nuclear and missile issues, 4-party talks, 
economic reform, human rights 
2 24 November 1999 Brussels Establishment of liaison offices, food shortages, 
human rights, security issues 
3 25 November 2000 Pyongyang Improvement of bilateral relations, economic 
assistance, human rights, WMD 
4 27 October 200 1 Pyongyang Human rights, WMD, economic assistance 
5 15 June 2002 Pyongyang Human rights, WMD, economic assistance 
Source: compiled from Park C.B. (2002: 79). 
Individual Initiatives by EU Members. Despite a series of political dialogues 
with North Korea, the EU did not have any definite policy guideline on when and how 
its member states could establish diplomatic ties with North Korea. An EU spokesman 
said: 'The ED does not have collective relations with North Korea and it has been the 
policy up to now, and likely to remain, that it is up to member states. It is a bilateral 
issue,.27 When an increasing number of EU members were convinced that it was time 
to set up ties with North Korea, it turned quickly into a race among them, exhibiting the 
lack of internal coordination among the member states. 
Before the inauguration of President Kim, North Korea held diplomatic ties with 
only five EU members, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Sweden. Launching 
his Sunshine Policy, President Kim started encouraging EU members to improve ties 
with North Korea. The Pyongyang regime, on its part, paid attention to normalizing ties 
with ED members, especially after President Bush took a hard-line stance on North 
Korea. European countries were initially cautious in improving ties with North Korea, 
raising questions of WMD and human rights, but became more enthusiastic after the 
inter-Korean summit in June 2000 (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 21 October 2000). 
Nevertheless, major European countries did not respond immediately to North Korea's 
overture in September 2000 when Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun proposed diplomatic 
normalization in a series of letters to France, Germany, Britain, Belgium and the EU 
(Chung 2002). In a surprise tum, the ASEM summit, hosted by President Kim in Seoul 
27 The statement was reported on CNN.com on 20 October 2000 (accessed 22 December 2003). 
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in October 20()(), was a venue for the European leaders' endorsement of his Sunshine 
Policy. On the sidelines of the ASEM summit, President Kim held bilateral summits 
with 14 participating leaders, urging them to improve relations with North Korea in a 
show of support for the current process of inter-Korean rapprochement. 28 During the 
summit period, five EU members, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Belgium, announced their plan to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea, giving a 
boost to President Kim's Sunshine Policy. The EU states made another collective 
commitment to the improvement of relations with North Korea by participating in the 
adoption of the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula issued after the 
ASEM summit. The last sentence of the declaration reads, 'Leaders also underlined the 
importance of strengthening efforts to improve relations between ASEM, its individual 
partners and the DPRK through dialogue, people-to-people exchanges, economic links, 
as well as through DPRK participating in multilateral dialogue'. 29 The North Korean 
Foreign Ministry welcomed the special declaration in a statement issued on 24 October, 
noting that European countries expressed their support for the implementation of the 
inter-Korean summit declaration in June 2000 (Munwha [lbo, 25 October 2000). 
Since Britain noted on 16 October officially that it was premature to establish 
diplomatic relations with North Korea (Hankyoreh, 21 October 2000), the shift of 
Britain's official positions in three days was closely related to a strong request by 
President Kim, who wanted to make use of the ASEM as a venue to send the signal 
worldwide that engagement is the only option for the resolution of pending security 
issues and integration of North Korea into the international community. Revealing that 
Britain was approached by North Korea in September 2000, British Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook said that his country wished to help inter-Korean rapprochement to gain 
momentum, since President Kim was 'very keen that other countries help to engage 
North Korea by bringing it in from the cold,.3o Former British charge d'affaires in 
Pyongyang, James Hoare (Interview: 2004), noted: 
The ROK government had been pressing European governments for some 
time before the ASEM meeting to improve relations with the DPRK. Unlike 
previous South Korean governments, this time it seemed serious. It is from 
28 Among the leaders of the European countries with which North Korea did not have diplomatic 
relations were Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker. British Prime Minister Tony Blair. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. 
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. 
29 The text for the declaration is available at http://europa.eu.intlcommlexternal relationslaseml 
asem summits/dec! peace.htm (accessed 21 December 2003). 
30 The report. made on 20 October 2000. is available at CNN.com (accessed 15 November 2003). 
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that, I think, that the decision was made by Mr. Blair and Mr. Cook to 
establish diplomatic relations. All the legal requirements had been there for 
years. All that was needed was the political will to go ahead. That is what 
came in September 2000. 
Among the EU members, which had newly set up ties with North Korea, Britain 
established a resident embassy in Pyongyang, while Germany upgraded its existing 
interest section into an embassy, which brought the number of embassies of Western 
countries from one to three. Before that, only Sweden maintained a resident embassy 
there. The normalization talks between North Korea and Germany showed how 
Pyongyang was ready to make unprecedented concessions to set up ties with Berlin. 
North Korea, among other things, agreed on four points: (1): a guarantee on the free 
travel and activities of German diplomats and aid group members; (2) a guarantee on 
aid agencies' access to the monitoring of distribution; (3) a guarantee on the entry of 
German journalists and provision of assistance to their activities; and (4) discussions of 
such issues as human rights, regional security, disarmament, and non-proliferation of 
WMD and missile technology (Chung SJ. 2002). In a press conference following the 
ASEM closing ceremony, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said: 'The EU has no 
common policy towards North Korea. However, the reason why many European states 
expressed their plans to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea simultaneously was 
that we wanted to support the South Korean policy seeking to open North Korea' 
(Hankyoreh, 22 October 2000). 
Unexpectedly, the independent actions by EU members towards North Korea 
caused schism within the IS-nation EU. In particular, Britain and Germany announced 
their decisions to normalize relations with North Korea without properly consulting 
with the then-EU president France and without awaiting a common EU stance on North 
Korea. Spain and Belgium also followed in the footsteps of Britain and Germany in a 
strong wave of rapprochement. Despite President Kim's recommendations and North 
Korea's diplomatic overture, a disgruntled France refused to normalize ties with the 
North by setting preconditions, such as the improvement of North Korea's human rights 
conditions, the removal of WMD and the lifting of restrictions on foreign NGO 
acti vi ti es. 
President Kim's Role in EU's Comprehensive Engagement. Whereas hardliners 
in the US administration and Congress pursued regime change, the EU's basic policy 
towards North Korea stemmed from its observation that the Pyongyang regime enjoys 
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political stability despite its economic and social troubles. The ED's Country Strategy 
Paper 2001-2004, issued in 2000, reads: 'The political situation remains stable, with the 
current regime firmly in place, but, on the economic and social front, North Korea is 
facing major difficulties and now wants to address these in order to improve the living 
conditions of its population'. The ED's observation is basically in line with the position 
of Seoul's policy elites who pursued the Sunshine Policy to help the Pyongyang regime 
to overcome its economic and social problems instead of undermining the foundation of 
the regime. 
Even though the Sunshine Policy could be the prime determinant which opened 
the door for the ED's comprehensive engagement vis-a-vis North Korea, the ED has 
also endeavoured to carve out its profile as an active player in international diplomacy 
in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one of the pillars 
for the formation of the ED after the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 (Drifte 2002).31 
Witnessing the rise of East Asia as an economic powerhouse, the ED wished to 
demonstrate its intention and capability of making positive contributions to peace and 
security in the region as part of its long-term efforts to give a facelift to the image of 
Europe among Asians (Cho and Kim 1998: 55). As the individual interests of the ED 
members converged on the ED's increased role in Asia, its North Korea policy has 
become a test case for the successful implementation of the CFSP (Park C.B. 2002). 
In this emerging international atmosphere favourable to North Korea's 
resocialization, President Kim expedited his efforts to encourage the ED to normalize 
relations with North Korea. On a trip to Sweden in December 2000 to receive the 2000 
Nobel Peace Prize, President Kim held a summit with Swedish Prime Minister Goeran 
Persson and called for European countries' improved relations with North Korea. In 
particular, he supported Persson's tentative idea of visiting North Korea in 2001 for a 
summit with Chairman Kim (Chosun /lbo, 13 December 2000). Persson's trip to North 
Korea carried substantial weight since Sweden was to take over the ED's rotating 
presidency in 2001. In an address at the Swedish parliament, President Kim said: 'I 
hope that Sweden, which will become ED president next year, would take an initiative 
to help North Korea to open up to the international community' (ibid). 
The ED's engagement with North Korea culminated in a high-profile trip to 
Pyongyang by the ED troika, President Persson, External Affairs Commissioner Chris 
Patten and Foreign Policy High Representative Javier Solana, on 2 May 2001, the first 
of its kind in bilateral relations. During his stay in Pyongyang, Persson held a lengthy 
31 The EU's position on its relations with North Korea is well documented on its Internet homepage, 
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/externalrelations/northkorealintro/index.htm (accessed 20 December 2003). 
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summit with Chairman Kim to discuss a wide range of issues. In a highly celebrated 
inter-Korean visit, the EU delegation flew into Seoul and held a meeting with President 
Kim for debriefing. Shortly after the visit, the EU signed diplomatic relations with 
North Korea on 14 May. The EU troika visit yielded significant achievements in many 
respects. First, Chairman Kim promised to keep a moratorium on ballistic missile tests 
in place until 2003 and abide by the AF, which was welcomed immediately by the US 
Department of State. However, the EU delegation exhibited its lack of bargaining 
leverage over the issue of North Korea's exports of ballistic missiles, since Chairman 
Kim reiterated Pyongyang's position that it would continue to export missiles since it is 
a 'form of trade' (Hankook !lbo, 5 May 2001). Chairman Kim, expressing his 
displeasure over the Bush administration's protracted North Korea policy review, 
expressed his strong desire to reopen dialogue with the United States in a peace gesture, 
which prompted Seoul's newspapers to proclaim, 'Now the ball is in the US court' 
(Hankyoreh, 4 May 2001; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 May 2001). 
Second, the EU delegation's trip helped rekindle the process of inter-Korean 
rapprochement, hampered by the inauguration of the Bush administration. Chairman 
Kim, describing President Kim as a 'good friend and leader', made it clear that he 
would make a return visit to Seoul, which is one of the agreements included in the Joint 
Declaration signed by President Kim and Chairman Kim after their summit. 
Nevertheless, Chairman Kim made it clear that his return visit to Seoul would be 
possible only after the United States wrapped up its policy review. 
Third, Chairman Kim agreed to open dialogue with the EU about human rights 
issues, one of the EU's key concerns in the process of normalizing its relations with 
North Korea. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties, North Korea dispatched a 
delegation to Brussels on 13 June to hold a discussion on human rights. 
Since the EU's steps came after the inauguration of President Bush, who shelved 
the previous administration's engagement option in favour of the construction of a 
missile defence system that would protect the United States from attacks by 'rogue' 
states. its diplomatic recognition of North Korea caused potential conflicts of interests 
with the United States. Despite its traditional alliance with the United States, the EU 
decided to 'counter' this new development, initiated by the Bush administration (Drifte 
2002: 166). An EU official was quoted as saying: 'This is the context in which our visit 
is taking place. We wanted to do something to prevent the momentum of the 'Sunshine 
Policy' being lost'. 32 The EU apparently wished to bolster the Sunshine Policy, even 
32 The EU official's remarks were cited on the Asian Human Rights Commission's homepage, 
www.ahrchk.netlnews/mainfile.php/ahrnews 200 105/1 J 391 (accessed 13 December 2003). 
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though the Bush administration abandoned engagement. Swedish Prime Minister 
Persson noted: 'The aim is to express support for the process started by (South Korean 
President) Kim Dae-jung, a process aimed at bringing to an end one of the last conflicts 
with origins in the Second World War' (AFP, 25 March 2001). To minimize frictions 
with the United States and Japan, the EU sent envoys to Washington and Tokyo to offer 
a debriefing on the delegation's trip to Pyongyang. Nevertheless, US newspapers carried 
such headlines as 'EU Seeks to Fill U.S. Role in Koreas: Envoys Will Attempt to Ease 
Missile Risk, Build Reconciliation' (Washington Post, 25 March 2001) and 'Storm 
Clouds over U.S.-Europe Relations' (New York Times, 26 March 2001). 
Meanwhile, North Korea's change in attitude and policies were also an 
important variable for the EU's engagement. The EU took into account five factors as 
criteria for its improvement of ties with North Korea: (1) North Korea's measures for 
inter-Korean reconciliation and dialogue with the countries involved; (2) North Korea's 
commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear and missile issues; (3) North Korea's 
improvement of human rights and observance of relevant UN conventions; (4) North 
Korea's guarantee on civilians' access to external aid and free activities by foreign 
NODs; and (5) North Korea's economic opening and issuance of visas to European 
journalists (Lee J.S. 2002). Since the EU's diplomatic recognition meant it met these 
criteria, North Korea was able to send the message to the United States via the EU that 
'terms similar to those accepted in Europe could also apply to a relationship with the 
United States' (Ahn 2002: 52). 
The Aftermaths of EU's Engagement. The EU, a distant power without serious 
strategic interests or colonial legacies on the Korean Peninsula, satisfied itself by 
playing roles 'complementary' to efforts by major players to terminate North Korea's 
nuclear and missile programmes. Even though it had no notable leverage to persuade 
North Korea to stop its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the EU has not abandoned its 
engagement option towards North Korea even in the face of the North's breach of its 
commitments. After the onset of a controversy over the North's HEU programme, the 
EU, which had been a strong supporter of President Kim's Sunshine Policy, shifted from 
comprehensive engagement to conditional engagement, while waiting to see the nuclear 
programme being addressed by South Korea and the United States in a peaceful manner 
(Asia Times, 10 July 2003). Even though it felt betrayed by the Pyongyang regime, the 
EU was officially committed to its engagement course, hoping diplomacy would prevail 
over bellicose options sought by the Bush administration. 
While the EU fell short of formulating any common policy on the US-led 
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invasion of Iraq despite its ideals for the CFSP, it could produce a rather unifonn voice 
on North Korea-related issues, condemning its propensity for anning itself with nuclear 
weapons but seeking to address the problem through dialogue and economic incentives. 
A nine-member European Union delegation that travelled to North Korea for three days 
from 9 December 2003 deli vered a straightforward message to the Pyongyang 
leadership regarding the linkage between Europe's economic cooperation and North 
Korea's nuclear weapons programme. The head of the delegation, Guido Martini of Italy, 
noted that the EU 'made clear we stand ready to develop relations and to expand 
economic ties, but only after the nuclear issue is settled' (International Herald Tribune, 
12 December 2003). EU Ambassador to Seoul Dorian Prince also emphasized: 'The EU 
has the capability to help a state-run economy adapt to market values, as it has 
experienced the central and eastern European cases', while Guy Ledoux, another EU 
official in Seoul, stressed that the EU is prepared to offer more support to the 
impoverished country, if it scraps its nuclear programmes (Korea Times, 18 December 
2003). Ledoux's comments referred to the typical economic incentives the international 
community could offer in exchange with North Korea's confrontational approaches. 
Another outcome of the visit was Ireland's diplomatic nonnalization with North Korea, 
announced on 20 December 2003. In fact, the announcement was overdue, since the two 
countries seriously considered establishing ties in 2001 in the second wave of 
diplomatic nonnalization. According to a South Korean official, 'I think Ireland decided 
to set up diplomatic ties with North Korea, since it needs to play an increased 
diplomatic role once it takes over the EU presidency next year [2004], (Yonhap News 
Agency, 21 December 2003). 
3.3.3. Findings 
The EU's engagement with North Korea is one of the success stories of the Sunshine 
Policy, since it managed to establish diplomatic ties and their interactions were 
maintained even after the North's brinkmanship with the HEU programme. The close 
link between the Sunshine Policy and the EU's engagement can be shown by the 
following facts. First, the Kim administration used every possible opportunity, including 
the ASEM summit, to urge the EU and its members to improve relations with North 
Korea with the aim of transfonning North Korea into a responsible member of the 
international community. Even though the EU and its member states had independent 
strategies and agendas, such as the improvement of human rights in North Korea, they 
reached the conclusion that accommodating President Kim's request and boosting his 
Sunshine Policy would not only help the two Koreas to solidify a process of 
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rapprochement but also eventually meet the EU's collective interests. In an interview 
with the BBC, President Kim even noted that it is not desirable for the EU to provoke 
the Pyongyang regime by raising human rights issues, while urging it instead to work to 
'liberate North Koreans from the terror of war and famine first, which are genuine 
human rights issues' (Kukmin !lbo, 25 October 2000). Second, the EU's policymakers 
could shed their animosity towards North Korea quickly, unlike those of the United 
States and Japan, which made the EU and its member states more receptive to Seoul's 
request and more far-reaching in their own initiatives toward forging better relations. 
North Korea also harboured less antagonism towards the EU and viewed it as a reliable 
partner for future cooperation (Park H.K. 2001; Chung 2002). While negotiating a 
normalization treaty, the two sides had a lesser number of obstacles resulting from 
historical incidents during the Cold War. In addition, they did not have the intense 
rivalry and the love-hate relationship that could be found between neighbouring 
countries. Third, the EU's key policymakers, as seen in the Country Strategy Paper 
2001-2004, shared the same assessment as South Korean policy elites regarding the 
political stability of the North Korean regime. By launching political dialogue and 
establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea, the EU offered political legitimacy to the 
Kim Jong-il regime and strengthened the political status quo on the Korea Peninsula. 
Fourth, the EU leaders, like Seoul's policy elites, sought to embrace the Pyongyang 
regime by offering economic assistance in order to gradually transform it into a benign 
system respecting human rights and the rule of law instead of pursuing an immediate 
regime change. Since its first humanitarian intervention in 1995 to help alleviate North 
Korea's flood damages, the EU provided a total of 393 million euros in aid to North 
Korea as of November 2002, including food aid (222 million euros), humanitarian 
assistance (52 million euros) and contributions to KEDO (115 million euros).33 In 
March 2002, North Korea sent a team of officials to Europe to learn about the EU's 
economic policy models. 
Since the EU was not the major player on the Korean Peninsula, its engagement 
with North Korea did not bring about profound change in the region's security 
environment. North Korea remained a diplomatically isolated state owing to its 
troublesome relations with the United States and Japan over security issues. Since the 
EU is unlikely to play decisive roles militarily, politically or economically on the 
Korean Peninsula, it is premature to expect the EU to expand its diplomatic presence in 
the short term (Lee J.S. 2002). Nevertheless, the EU could play the role of a stabilizer as 
33 The figures are available at the EU homepage, http://europa.eu.intlcommlexternal_relations/north_ 
korea/intro/ (accessed 7 December 2(03). 
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a rising diplomatic power in the event that the United States attempts to resort to 
coercive means to resolve a crisis on the Korean Peninsula (Park C.B. 2002). 
4. Conclusion 
President Kim's five-year tenure coincided with North Korea's heyday in terms of 
diplomatic achievements, in contrast to the previous five-year period of President Kim 
Young-sam, marked by a nuclear crisis and South Korea's strained relations with the 
United States and Japan stemming from differences in approaches towards North Korea. 
Despite his vision and tenacity on the diplomatic front, President Kim fell short of 
achieving his envisioned goal of North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the 
United States and Japan, thus experiencing setbacks in his Sunshine Policy. The policy's 
relatively modest achievements in North Korea's external relations are, in fact, the 
limitation of identity politics, which is not backed up by material power. Despite his 
strenuous norm entrepreneurship at home and abroad, the Bush administration, armed 
with a different set of norms, pushed ahead with power politics, based on negative 
identification with North Korea. Rozman (2003: 535), comparing Bush's 'axis of evil' 
metaphor to President Reagan's 'evil empire' hyperbole, noted that the two US 
presidents attempted to elevate their policies vis-a-vis enemies to the level of moral 
struggles between good and evil. 
The Sunshine Policy, as an engagement policy, failed to fully demonstrate its 
potentials in forging better relations between the antagonistic states. Fol1owing 
President Kim's tenure, bilateral dialogue for diplomatic normalization gave way to the 
multilateral six-party talks to address the North Korean HEU programme. Depending on 
the progress of this multilateral channel of dialogue, there is a strong possibility that 
bilateral negotiations might restart from where they left off and regain momentum in the 
direction of tearing down the remnants of the Cold War structure in East Asia. 
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